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Abstract
This thesis focused on the role of context in influencing SDM in public R&D 
organisations from the space sector. To address this topic it examined the influences 
of context on the SDM process, implementation and outcomes of two large space 
projects developed by NASA, the USA space agency. By adopting a broad view of 
context and employing a qualitative design within a multi-theoretic perspective, this 
thesis joined a small group of works which approached this topic in a more integrative 
and encompassing way. Findings revealed a more complex strategic decision-making 
reality and role of context than it is usually covered in the majority of studies in the 
field, reaffirming the need for more of this kind of research in the future. Results 
confirm the essential role of decision implementation to the understanding of 
outcomes and show decision specifics as one very significant context variable in 
terms of influencing SDM and outcomes assessment. A general framework of the 
influences of context on SDM in the space sector was developed which more closely 
mirrors the reality of organisational decision-making as experienced by practitioners 
in the field, drawing particular attention to the temporal dimension of SDM and the 
dynamic, enacted nature of context. It also acknowledges the role of managers’ 
cognitions and actions in determining the final impact of “non-decisive” context 
influences on strategic decisions. Overall, findings support the view of SDM as 
context specific and generally “unprogrammemable”. Despite that, this thesis 
maintains that the understanding of the characteristics and dynamics of the context 
within which decisions are embedded and of its influences on strategic decisions can 
help putting expectations in perspective. By doing this, it can also help delimiting the 
realm within which managers can act in attempts to lead SDM processes to the 
desired direction and academics can work to try to advise how.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This Introduction is organized in 4 sections. Section 1.1, Research Question and 
Objectives, presents the central area of interest to this research along with its main 
and specific objectives. In section 1.2: Research Motivation, the personal and 
theoretical motivations behind the development of this research are presented. Next, 
section 1.3: Background Information, explains how this research has evolved from a 
previous research proposal and built on the past methodological experiences of the 
original design. In the sequence, section 1.4 presents the Research Contributions, 
followed by section 1.5, which presents the overall Thesis Structure.
1.1.Research Question and Objectives
1.1.1. Research Question
As the title suggests, the central topic of this research is the role o f context in 
influencing SDM and outcomes. Within this general topic, this thesis aims at 
investigating the role of context in influencing SDM and outcomes in public 
R&D organisations from the space sector, which is reflected in the following 
research question:
> What is the role o f context in influencing SDM processes and outcomes in 
public R&D space organisations?
1.1.2. Research Objectives
In addressing the above question, this research pursues the following main and 
specific objectives.
12
Research Main Objectives
• Develop a contextualized, integrated view of SDM in the space sector which 
more closely mirrors the reality of organisational decision-making as 
experienced by practitioners in the field.
• Establish a macro framework according to which context variables from 
different vertical layers of context influence SDM and decisions outcomes over 
time in public space R&D organisations.
• Reassess conceptual models of SDM and the role of context based on the
analytical findings of this research and propose revised models which can be
tested in future research in the field.
Research Specific Objectives
The main objectives presented above are dealt with through the following specific 
objectives:
• Develop an overview of SDM and of context variables and their influences 
on SDM in the space sector from the macro (business) level.
• Develop an overview of context variables and their influences on SDM from 
the meso (organisational) level.
• Examine the direct and indirect influences of context variables from the 
macro, meso and micro levels of context on the SDM processes, 
implementation and outcomes of two large space projects.
1.2. Research motivation
1.2.1. Experience-based Motivation
The initial motivation for undertaking research in the field of SDM came from my work 
experience as a civil servant in the space sector in Brazil. From the twenty years 
working as an employee to the Brazilian National Institute for Space Research (INPE), 
fifteen were dedicated to the areas of strategic planning and space policy. This
13
experience has put me closely in touch with the intricacy associated with the selection, 
approval and implementation of space projects, vis-à-vis competing areas of interest, 
scarcer public resources, high levels of political influence and environmental 
uncertainty, to name just a few of the concerning issues.
1.2.2. Theoretical Motivation
A review of the literature on SDM revealed an increased role ascribed to context. An 
emphasis on the influence of broad context on SDM and outcomes is apparent, as it will 
become clear in the Literature Review Chapter. It is believed that failure to look at the 
influences of broad context and to simultaneously look at a larger number of variables 
may lie behind the numerous inconsistencies of findings in the SDM literature. This 
recognition has led to an emphasis on more integrative, more inclusive studies, in the 
hope that those may help explain some of the contradictory findings and pave the way 
for the development of a coherent SDM theory. In another stream of the literature, this 
integrative trend has seemingly been accompanied by suggestions that more 
encompassing views on SDM, which would allow for the observation of the co­
existence of different SDM perspectives, are the way forward. The increasing 
importance ascribed to the role of broad context and these integrative and more 
encompassing trends in the literature have provided me with the theoretical motivation 
for this research’s proposal.
1.3. Background Information
This research represents an evolution from a previous, initial proposal which focused on 
understanding strategic decision-making processes in space organisations and on the 
effect of rationality/comprehensiveness of decision processes on SD’s outcomes.
Later on, the research focus shifted from SDM processes to SDM context and new 
research objectives, as well as a new research strategy, were proposed. These changes 
aimed at putting the research more in line with observed trends in the SDM literature, 
reflecting the increasing emphasis ascribed to the role of context in influencing SDM as 
well as a call for more inclusive, integrative studies.
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Before these changes took place, empirical developments of the original research 
became instrumental to the current research’s design and methodology, as explained 
below.
The original research had a design which involved a mixed strategy, including both 
qualitative and quantitative methods, and where both themes and statistical analysis 
would be present. In its early stages, a pilot study was conducted and a decision- 
scenario based questionnaire was designed and envisaged as the main research 
instrument.
The Pilot Study
The conduct of a pilot study in Brazil, along with a first round of interviews with 
selected managers from different space agencies, expanded my understanding of what 
was involved in studying strategic decision-making in the space sector and of what sort 
of problems and constraints I was likely to be faced with in the course of my research. 
The evidence from the pilot study brought light into the issue of the feasibility and 
advisability of exploring certain avenues of the research topic as well as of the 
desirability of some methodological approaches. Even though planned and developed 
within the context of the original research, the pilot study has played an important part 
in contributing to this research’s present format, including the establishment of feasible 
and realistic goals.
The Questionnaire
The questionnaire, along with a hypothetic decision scenario inspired in Fredrickson’s 
work (1984), was developed to be one of the research’s instruments (see Appendix 
A2.1).
After an initial testing with managers from the Brazilian National Institute for Space 
Research, during the Pilot Study, the questionnaire was refined and then taken to a large 
space organisation, NASA. Before it was distributed to some of NASA’s decision­
15
makers, one preparatory conversation with a renowned US space policy expert exposed 
the unsuitability of this kind of approach to attain the objectives of the research. When 
shown the proposed questionnaire, the space policy expert, who is very familiar with 
NASA’s way of “doing business”, made the following comments: “But this is not the 
way we work. We don’t just sit around large tables in pre-arranged meetings and 
decide what we are going to do. This is not the way we do it ”.
This comment drew my attention to the risk of pre-framing SDM in any kind of way 
before actually understanding how things work within the industry and within the 
organisations involved. As I came to understand, the decision scenario and 
questionnaire were far too simplistic research instruments, unable to capture the 
complexities inherent do SDM in space organisations. Their pre-conceived view of 
SDM processes seemed fairly inadequate as a representation of the organisational 
‘reality’, as experienced by space organisations.
As a result of this, a new approach to meet the research objectives had to be devised and 
the research strategy was redesigned. The mixed design was abandoned in favor of a 
qualitative design. The nature of the data required to be collected and the research 
instruments to be employed were subsequently reviewed and changed.
The current research’s design and methodology has built on these lessons learned 
through the empirical work developed for the original research. It should be noted that, 
even though the central focus of the research changed, it stayed closely related to the 
original proposal and it kept the same empirical setting.
As it will be explained in Chapter 3, within the new qualitative research design, a series 
of interviews were made with top decision-makers from different space agencies and 
information on two large space projects was gathered for the development of two case 
studies. Even though data collection was partially constrained due to access restrictions 
and other difficulties, which limited the sources of information that could be used (e.g. 
specific project documentation not available) and the number of interviews that could 
be done, the data collected generated a good, extensive data base on the two case 
studies and a number of relevant and unique interviews.
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1.4. Research Contribution
The distinctive features of this research on which I believe lies its strength are:
• It looked on the effects of broad context on SDM and outcomes and not only 
on effects on SDM processes, as in the majority of studies in the area;
• In addition to decision content, context, process and outcomes, it also took 
into account the implementation of SD’s;
• Its research design, with the choice of qualitative case studies and of an 
“organisational discourse” approach, has allowed for taking in more of the 
overall complexity associated with SDM and the ways according to which 
context variables can influence SDM processes, implementation and 
outcomes. It has allowed for the observation and acknowledgement of 
features from different decision-making models and perspectives and for 
relevant variables to emerge in their natural setting and not through 
theoretical pre-selection. Besides, the number and nature of variables that 
could be examined were not bounded by methodological constraints;
• Its case studies emulated a longitudinal design, allowing for clear observation 
of the direction of the relationships between variables.
Findings have allowed for the development of a general framework of the influences 
of context on SDM processes and outcomes in the space sector which draws attention 
to the temporal dimension of SDM and the dynamism of context and which more 
closely mirrors the reality of organisational decision-making as experienced by 
practitioners in the field.
The general framework served as the basis for the proposition of a revised basic and 
multitheoretical model of SDM which confirms previously identified relationships 
and relevant aspects, as well as add new ones, including decision implementation and 
the acknowledgment of the direct impacts that broad context can have on decision 
implementation and on decision outcomes, in addition to the more commonly 
observed effects on decision processes.
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Finally, it should be noted that this research addresses some of the substantive and 
methodological priorities for SDM research as recently pointed out by Papadakis et 
al (Papadakis et al, 2010). They are: “examine the synergistic effects of context, 
process and content on outcomes” and “put implementation at the centre of SD 
research”, for the substantive ones, and: “longitudinal research” and “consistency 
between unit of analysis and outcomes measures”, for the methodological ones.
1.5. Thesis Structure
This thesis is organized around 8 Chapters. After this Introduction (Chapter 1), 
Chapter 2 presents the Literature Review, covering the main literature on the role of 
context in influencing SDM processes and outcomes, along with some underlying 
issues regarding the broader field of SDM. In Chapter 3, the Research Design and 
Methodology is discussed. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present the three phases of data 
analysis, following a progressively focusing approach, from the macro (“business”) 
level to the micro (decision/project) level. Findings from these three analysis 
chapters are then organized and presented in Chapter 7. In Chapter 4, Analysis o f 
context variables and their influences on SDM from the macro ("business level”), 
the main context variables influencing SDM in space organisations are identified by 
looking at information provided via interviews across space organisations from 
different countries. The influence they are likely to have on SDM processes and 
outcomes are briefly discussed. Next, Chapter 5, Analysis o f the context variables 
and their influences on SDMfrom the meso (organisational) level, has the objective 
of describing and showing how the contextual characteristics of one space 
organisation, in this case NASA, are likely to constrain its SDM, setting the general 
dm context for the two case studies presented in Chapter 6 . In order to reach this 
objective, NASA’s context is characterized according to the context variables 
identified in Chapter 4 and other new context variables unveiled at this level of 
analysis. Subsequently, the way they are likely to influence the organisation’s SDM 
is discussed. The third level of analysis is presented in Chapter 6 , Analysis from the 
micro (decision/project) level: Case Studies. Here, the direct and indirect influences 
of context variables on the SDM process, implementation and outcomes of two large
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space projects are discussed. The two cases are presented in subsections 6.1.: The 
Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS) case and 6.2: The Mars Observer 
(MO) case. Subsequently, Chapter 7 summarizes findings from the previous three 
analytical chapters and presents a final discussion on “t/ze role o f  context in 
influencing SDM in public space R&D organisations”, including a framework of 
context influences on SDM in the sector and two revised conceptual models of 
strategic decision-making. Finally, Chapter 8 presents the Conclusions and 
recommendations and discusses limitations and contributions of the research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Introduction
This Chapter presents a review of part of the broad literature on SDM understood to 
be relevant in connection with the objectives of this thesis. The themes discussed in 
this Chapter aim at providing an understanding of the “status quo” of the literature 
regarding the role of context in influencing SDM processes and outcomes as well as 
presenting the different strategic decision-making perspectives and the underlying 
theoretical issues supporting the view of decisions as elements of organisational 
discourse, which is supported in this thesis.
Section 2.2  of this Chapter discusses a fundamental theoretical reframing of 
perspectives on SDM, involving the rational, action and interpretative perspectives. 
A proposition to reconcile these different SDM perspectives by looking at decisions 
as elements of organisational discourse is discussed. Section 2.3 presents an 
overview of the SDM process literature in four subsections: a brief discussion on 
the nature and importance of strategic decisions made by organisations (2 .3 .1); the 
central themes around which the SDM literature revolves (2.3.2); two general 
conceptual models of SDM process research (2.3.3), and the role of implementation 
in influencing SDM outcomes (2.3.4), an important aspect usually neglected in the 
empirical literature. Section 2.4 presents a review of the relevant works on the role 
of context in SDM. The different ways according to which context is expected to 
influence SDM, conceptualization and operationalization issues, as well as 
limitations of the available literature, are also discussed under this Section. In 
Section 2.5, the Chapter is concluded. In this Section it is noted that the broad 
context for SDM has been ascribed an increasing role in the literature and that there 
seems to be a general convergence for research which is more inclusive, more
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integrative. Additionally, in another stream of the literature, a tendency to favor 
research which will be more “tolerant” of different views and which will break the 
boundaries between different theoretical perspectives is also observed.
2.2. Strategic Decision-Making Perspectives: Theoretical reframing
2.2.1. Central Assumptions of the "Traditional" SDM Perspective
The vast majority of works and models in the literature on decision-making and 
SDM seem to have in common central assumptions regarding the concept and the 
role of decisions in organisations.
As noted by Chia (1994, p.782), “despite substantial transformations in theories of 
decision-making, the issues of choice and the intentionality of action remain central 
assumptions embedded in the intellectual priorities of contemporary decision 
theorists. This assumption of the intentionality of chosen action is substantially 
reinforced by a predisposition towards the use of linear causal thinking in the 
explanatory scheme of things and towards a subtle privileging of the conscious over 
the unconscious in accounting for decisional ‘events’.”
Thus, the central role of purposefulness and reason, intentionality and 
consequentiality, seems to be intrinsically attached to the ‘traditional’ literature on 
decision and strategic decision-making. As other views emerged which question 
these central assumptions, a new, fundamental reframing of perspectives in SDM has 
been made available in the literature. Underlying this reframing are distinct views on 
the concept and role of decisions in organisations. Two similar reframing of SDM 
perspectives proposed in the literature are discussed next.
2.2.2. Rational, Action and Interpretative Perspectives -  First Theoretical 
Reframing
Influenced by the linear, adaptive and interpretive models of strategy (Chaffee, 
1985), three streams or perspectives in the SDM literature were identified by Hendry
(20 0 0): rational, action and interpretative.
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2.2.21. Rational perspective
The rational perspective, as described by Hendry (2000), has a much broader scope 
as compared to previous views of rationality discussed earlier in this document. 
Despite the wide range of theoretical and methodological approaches they 
represent” (p.959), this rational perspective also encompasses much of the literature 
which would be in other contexts categorized as ‘non-rational\ Thus, the 
power/political paradigm, as employed by Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992), or the 
bureaucratic/political model of Allison (1971), are pictured within Hendry’s rational 
view. As argued by the author, the same applies to the works on cognition in SDM 
process research.
Within this view of a rational perspective decisions are seen as ‘realities 
intentional and as preceding organisational actions. The supremacy of thought over 
action is assumed and therefore there is a linear relationship between decisions and 
actions”. Decision-making is seen as isolated, discrete events.
2.2.22. Action perspective
The action perspective, on the other side, is presented as a critique to the rational 
view, where decisions are at the core of organisational studies. As quoted by Hendry 
(2000, p.959), action ‘theorists’, such as Starbuck (1983) and Mintzberg and Waters 
(1990) defend that “organisations should be seen primarily as generators of action, 
and that strategic actions are often created in advance of the decisions by which they 
are justified”. Within this view, as noted by Hendry (2000), the focus is on action or 
‘decisive acts’, not on decisions. Intentionality is not an issue and in fact, decisions 
are seen as “a ‘distraction that gets in the way o f research into strategy” 
(Mintzberg and Waters, 1990, as quoted by Hendry, 2000, p.960).
As implied by Laroche (1995), in the action perspective there is the tendency to treat 
decision-making as a “marginal phenomenon, an artifact built by conventional 
researchers, and/or a rhetoric device serving symbolic functions” (p.67).
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Action theorists observe that there are decisions without actions and actions without 
decisions and believe that by focusing on decision processes we might lose a great 
deal in understanding real organisational processes.
More details on the features associated with the action perspective can be seen in 
Hendry (2000), Laroche (1995) and on the works of authors such as Starbuck (1983, 
1985); Brunsson (1982, 1985), Mintzberg and Waters (1990), Hickson et al (1986) 
who, amongst others, are seen as subscribers to this perspective.
Together, the rational and action perspectives accounts for the vast majority of works 
in the literature on SDM.
2.2.2.3. Interpretative perspective
Finally, the interpretative perspective represents a more fundamental change in the 
way decisions have been seen and treated in organisational studies. For this reason, it 
is discussed in more details below.
As compared to the neo-positivist character of the ‘traditional’ literature on SDM, 
this perspective has its roots on ‘social representation theory’ and ‘social- 
constructionism’. It questions the own conceptualization of decisions and the view of 
decisions as ‘realities’. As pointed out by Miller et al (1996, p.305), “the realism of 
much of the decision-making research has been called into question by those who 
feel that the very concept of decision has outlived its usefulness”. Another issue also 
reviewed by the interpretative perspective is the one regarding the relationship 
between decisions and actions in organisations.
Regarding the concept of decisions, Chia (1994) ‘deconstructs’ it, with emphasis on 
its ontological character, and suggests decisions be seen as an ‘explanatory 
principle . Laroche (1995) refers to decisions as ‘social representations’. Weick 
(1995) calls them ‘acts o f interpretation ’ and Hendry (2000), even though does not 
really present any new conceptualization of decisions, proposes they be looked at as 
‘elements o f  organisational discourse', for analytical expediency.
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Even though there are some important differences between Chia, Laroche and 
Weick’s treatment of the decision concept and of the decision role, these authors are 
all contributors to the ideas of the interpretative perspective of SDM (as described by 
Hendry, 2000) \  Some of their main contributions as well as differences are 
discussed next.
Decisions as “social representations” (Laroche, 1995)
Laroche argues that “decision-making is best understood as a process o f  reality 
creation through organisation member’s representations o f their own role and 
activity” (p.72). He applies the concept of ‘social representations’ to “picture 
decision and decision-making as forms of common sense, socially built and socially 
shared, allowing managers to behave as managers in their professional organisational 
context” (p.63).
The same author draws attention to the fact that decisions exist in the eyes of 
managers and that they see themselves as ‘conscious decision-makers’. He argues 
that, if for nothing else, this alone would be a good reason for us to ascribe more 
importance to the study of decisions and decision-making in organisations. Only, in 
the authors view, they should not be seen as realities but rather as ‘social 
representations’. This sharply contrasts to what happens within the action 
perspective, where decisions are marginalized and treated as irrelevant or a hurdle to 
the study of organisational action.
This view, which is also shared by Chia (1994) and Weick (1995), is shown by 
Hendry (2000) as one of the features of the interpretative perspective. As pointed out 
by Hendry, the importance o f decisions is thereby reasserted, but within a very 
different conceptual and contextual setting.
In the same way, by looking at decisions as representations, the role o f managers as 
decision-makers is somehow rescued in Laroche’s view. As the author suggests,
1 It is important to remark, though, that Laroche (1995) clearly positions himself as a supporter o f the action 
perspective. But one that will be called here a ‘neo’- action perspective and which borrows some o f the views 
introduced by the interpretative perspective. This is discussed further on in this Chapter.
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managers can project their roles via these representations. Even though this is seen as 
an ‘illusion’ by Laroche, he concludes it is a ‘useful’ illusion, as ‘social 
representations’ of decisions can produce effective results. As pointed out by the 
author, they influence organisations members’ ways of understanding and behaving 
in organisations, they influence processes, they facilitate action, and they give 
meaning to what happens in organisations.
hi what seems to be another feature of the interpretative view, as it also is within the 
action perspective, Laroche emphasizes the continuity o f organisational processes. 
As opposed to the traditional perspective, which sees decisions as isolated, discrete 
events, decisions here are seen as ongoing processes, which “organize the flow of 
actions in endless series of cycles” (1995, p.71).
As a result of this view, the same author criticizes the way most of decision-making 
studies are done, i.e. by choosing a decision or choice as a starting point and working 
retrospectively to try to reconstruct the process leading up to that point. He mentions 
that this kind of studies creates “a ‘slice of organisational life’, inside which the 
activities of the identified actors are interpreted in relation to the assumed ‘matter” 
(p.63). An interesting metaphor is used comparing this situation with a photograph 
frame, which “provides a window on a reality that is actually much more 
continuous” (p.63). Additionally, it is recalled by the author that participants engage 
simultaneously in several activities outside the context of the specific decision in 
question.
As mentioned before, within the interpretative perspective decisions are essentially 
seen as interpretations through which reality is socially constructed. However, this 
view has been supported in different ways.
Laroche (1995), for example, defends that “this ‘constructing’ can be retrospective, 
through a process of rationalization.. .prospective, as in a planning process” or “both, 
in the way that decisions serve to establish a link between a past (realized) and a 
future (potential)” (p.70).
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Weick (1995), on the other hand, advocates for retrospective decisiveness, as he sees 
prospective decisiveness as mostly ‘unattainable’. At one side, he has the view that 
“prospective decisiveness gets derailed over and over by unexpected events and 
unanticipated consequences of initial actions” (p. 185). At the other, he defends that 
“retrospective decisiveness erases those false starts and dead ends (p. 185).”
Decisions as “explanatory”principles (Chia, 1994)
Chia (1994) criticizes the linear causal thinking which dominates the traditional view 
of decision-making and which stresses the predominance of thought over action. 
Additionally, he mentions that “decisions seen as ‘concrete events’ suppress the 
primarily dynamic and processual nature of reality” (p.786). He then proposes a 
reconceptualization of decisions as ‘explanatory principles ', more in line with their 
ontological character. In the author’s own words (p.794) “understanding decision­
making as an explanatory principle involves a recognition that it is the product of a 
post-hoc rationalization process in which the cause/effect relationship established 
has been abstracted, reified and chronologically reversed. “Decision-making’ is a 
conceptual invention but one which has been reified and chronologically inverted so 
as to appear as an ‘event’ precedes action.”
He also mentions that it is “possible to conceive of a decision as a fundamental 
ontological act of making an ‘incision’ in the flow of our lived experiences 
punctuating the latter for the purpose of ordering and responding to such experiences. 
Approaching the analysis of decision in this way creates a new dimension for 
understanding decision-making as comprising interlocking chains o f micro-incisional 
acts in the becoming process o f configuring reality ” (p.795).
It is interesting to note here that, as the emphasis is not on reality but on 
constructions of reality through interpretations, there will not be one ultimate ‘truth’, 
but many alternative explanations, not one ‘reality ' but multiple ‘realities '. All that is 
necessary is to find a coherent version or to provide a ‘plausible explanation’. As it 
will be seen next, this is very much in line with Weick’s ideas and his interpretation 
of sense-making, as plausibility is one of the 7 properties of Weick’s version of
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sense-making. Laroche (1995) would also agree with that, as implied in his 
comments that there would not be one, but numerous social representations of 
decisions. Even though within another theoretical framework, these ideas also have 
some association with Pettigrew’s work (1990), who regarded decisions as highly 
contextualized. Essentially, by putting emphasis on the context, it was implied in 
Pettigrew s ideas that decisions take their meaning in relation to the contexts within 
which they are made. Therefore, as contexts vary, different ‘meanings’ or ‘versions 
of reality’ can emerge.
Another interesting aspect to be observed in Chia’s work is that, in contrast with the 
ideas conveyed by Laroche and Weick, his focus on decisions is more on the 
structural, not agency level. He drew on the previous work by Lindblom and its 
‘muddling through” model of decision-making to emphasize the existence of a 
‘collective intelligence’ whereby things happen regardless of individual agents and 
their intentions (p.802).
Despite Chia’s view, it is noted by some authors that the interpretative perspective 
brings back the focus on the ‘agent’ (Magala, 1997; Craig-Lee, 2001), as opposed to 
focus on social structures. As suggested by Magala (1997) and quoted by Craig-Lee
(20 0 1 ), this moves the focus to “understanding the behavior of the individual -  not 
from an external, structural constraint-permission perspective but from the mind-set 
of the agent in relation to aspects of the organisation”.
Sense-making and decisions as “acts o f interpretation ” (Weick, 1995)
In fact, and as mentioned by Craig-Lee (2001), within Weick’s interpretation of 
sense-making, “investigation starts with each individual mind-set, common thoughts 
(ideas, values) are identified, allowing an understanding of the shared meanings, 
which create, sustain, and interpret the ‘structure’ of the organisation”.
With the focus on the individual, Weick (1995) views decisions as acts o f  
interpretation rather than acts o f choice (p. 185). For him, people in organisations 
come across outcomes that must be the result of an earlier choice. He then explains
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that “decision-making consists o f locating, articulating, and ratifying that earlier 
choice, bringing it forward to the present, and claiming it as decision that has just 
been made ” (p. 185).
Instead of decision-making, Weick’s work focus is on sense-making. As noted by 
Craig-Lee (2001), sense-making is not the same as decision-making but a precursor 
to it. It is not interpretation but an interpretive process (Feldman, 1989) or the 
process that culminates in interpretation. In Weick’s words, "... sense-making 
involves the ongoing retrospective development of plausible images that rationalize 
what people are doing” (p.460). And he adds: “When people engage in acts of sense- 
making, it is more precise to think of them as accomplishing reality rather than 
discovering it” (Weick, 2001, p.460). Thus, sense-making is firmly grounded in the 
view of reality as ‘ socially constructed’.
For its general characterization and better understanding of what it is concerned with, 
Weick (1995, 2001) attached seven properties to sense-making which will impact 
people’ s “efforts to size up what they face” (Weick, 2001, p.461). These properties 
are discussed in detail in Weick (1995) and summarized in Weick (2001). They are: 
social context, personal identity, retrospect, salient cues, ongoing projects, 
plausibility and enactment.
These properties will not be discussed here in any detail, but just an initial look at 
them is enough to recognize at least two of the features of the interpretative view of 
decision-making that have been mentioned before: the understanding of ‘experience ’ 
as a continuous flow and not as a collection o f events and the emphasis on coherence 
and plausibility, not on accuracy. The retrospective nature of sense-making has 
already been mentioned before. The ‘personal identity’ property draws attention to 
the bidirectional relationship of influence between peoples’ selves and what sense 
they make of ‘reality’. As put by Weick (1995, p.20): “Depending on who I am, my 
definition of what is ‘out there’ will also change. Whenever I define self, I define ‘it’, 
but to define it I also define self’. The ‘enactment’ property draws attention to the 
fact that through our actions we often produce part of the environment we face 
(p.30).
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Finally, even though sense-making is an individual and unavoidably subjective 
process, Weick emphasizes its social nature, in the sense that “human thinking and 
social functioning ... (are) essential aspects of one another” (Resnick, Levine & 
Teasley, 1991 as quoted by Weick, 1995, p.38). In order to make the connection 
between the individual and social level Weick makes use of concepts such as 
‘intersubjectivity’, ‘shared meanings’, ‘common language’, ‘commonality of 
thought’ and ‘social interactions’. Essentially, as already noted before, this exposes 
the ‘social constructionism’ roots of sense-making, as interpreted by Weick. As 
opposed to the ‘constructionists’ who view “sense-making as subjective and internal 
and not able to be wholly communicated and/or shared by another”, the ‘social 
constructionists’ view sense-making as “a communicable activity that has common 
and shared meaning across individuals” (Craig-Lee, 2001, p.6). One important 
implication of placing sense-making within the ‘social constructionism’s theoretical 
framework is that, by doing so, the “objective measurement of individual perceptions 
can be achieved”, as ‘social constructionists’ “accept that social realities exist and 
can be measured and analyzed” (Craig-Lee, 2001, p.7).
2.2.3. Decision-Making and Action Perspectives-Second Theoretical Reframing
Differently from Hendry, Laroche (1995) refers to only two perspectives on SDM 
research, namely: a decision-making perspective and an action perspective, to which 
he makes very clear he subscribes.
2.2.3.I. Decision-making perspective
In a general way, his decision-making perspective is the same as the rational one 
proposed by Hendry (2000). However, the action perspective, as conveyed by 
Laroche, has features of both the action and the interpretative perspectives, as 
presented by Hendry (2000).
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2.2.3.2. ‘Neo’- Action perspective
As pointed out by Laroche (p.62), contrary to what happens in the decision-making 
perspective which sees decision-making as isolated, discrete events, this ‘emerging’ 
action perspective stresses “the continuity of organisational processes”. “Decision 
and decision-making are either rare, marginal phenomena, or artificial constructs 
producing biased observations” (p.62). As a result of this, Laroche notes, some 
authors suggest we would be better without decision-making.
It is exactly that aspect of the so-called action perspective that Laroche counteracts. 
In his view, decisions and decision-making are realities in the eyes of managers. 
According to him, because “organisation members think and act in terms of decision­
making, a theory of organisational action cannot simply do without a theory of 
decision-making” (p.62).
Laroche then proposes the reinstallation of the relevance of decisions to theories of 
organisational decision-making. Only he does so by looking at decisions not as 
‘realities’ but as ‘social representations’, as already discussed before.
With that in mind, Laroche sees “decision-making as an active component of action”. 
And adds: “decision-making (as ‘social representations’), far from being a mirage in 
manager’s minds, influences the substance of organisational processes”, “facilitates 
action in the messy world of organisations”, and, “from the participant’s perspective, 
help interpret what happened” (p.69, parenthesis added).
According to Laroche, this view of decisions and decision-making establishes some 
kind of link between the decision-making and the action perspectives. As pointed out 
by the author, it can help “the action perspective to reinterpret the realistic decision­
making perspective rather than to oppose decision and action in an artificial and 
unfruitful manner”.
Perhaps what Laroche is arguing for could be read as a ‘neo’ action perspective, one 
which combines features of both the action and the interpretative perspectives, as
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portrayed by Hendry (2000), and also leaves room for embracing the implications of 
managers seeing decisions as realities and themselves as decision-makers.
2.2.4. Reconciliation of different perspectives on SDM
Independently of how the perspectives on SDM have been framed and of the 
differences between them, both authors discussed above show an integrative, 
reconciling intent as to how they should be approached.
In Hendry’s opinion, the problem with the action and interpretative perspectives is 
that they do not allow for the observation of intentional decision-making which, he 
notes, exists in the practitioner’s experience. Like Laroche (1995), he defends the 
“observed reality of intentional decision-making’’ and mentions that “we need a 
conceptualization of decisions and ... of the strategy process that does justice to this 
and is still capable of integrating this with the action and interpretative perspective” 
(p.963).
Thus, Hendry (2000) defends an integration of the three ‘competing’ perspectives, 
but understands that cannot happen within the present conceptual framework adopted 
by each of them.
By drawing on discourse psychology, on Gidden’s (1979) structuration theory and on 
Brunsson’s work (1982, 1985, 1990), his proposed solution to this is a 
conceptualization of decisions as ‘elements o f organisational discourse \  According 
to him (p.964), “decisions are observed, in so far they can be observed at all, not as 
moments of individual or organisational commitment, but as elements of discourse: 
explicitly as statements of record or through reference to such statements (whether 
written or oral), and implicitly through statements of intent or instructions to act”.
He defends that this conceptualization of strategic decisions “provide a common 
foundation for the competing rational, action based and interpretative views of 
SDM” (p.971). This way, he believes, the three otherwise ‘partial’ perspectives can 
coexist.
31
The most significant contribution of this conceptualization of strategic decisions, in 
the author’s view (p.972) “is that it allows us to consider the instrumental and sense- 
making roles of decisions as parallel, interacting features of the strategy process 
rather than as rival interpretations.. It is implied in his paper that the possibility of 
integrating these three different perspectives by looking at the ‘organisational 
discourse’ will better equip us to deal with the complexities surrounding SDM 
research. This view is adopted in this research and is further discussed in Chapter 3: 
Methodology.
2.3. Strategic Decision-Making (SDM) Research -  An overview
2.3.1. Strategic Decisions
Before moving on to a review of some major issues in the literature on strategic 
decision-making, it is opportune to provide a preliminary explanation regarding the 
nature and importance of the strategic decisions made by organisations.
A natural question that follows is: what makes a decision strategic and how one 
distinguishes strategic decisions amongst a whole spectrum of decisions made by 
organisations?
In a simplified approach, typically, strategic decisions have been contrasted with the so- 
called operational decisions made by organisations. Nevertheless, while operational 
decisions are apparently easier to recognize, as having a more routine or day-to-day 
character, the boundaries of the definition for strategic decisions are point of some 
controversy.
Thus, even though there seems to be of general acceptance that strategic decisions are 
"those made at the top about the bigger matters", "this is a relative judgment, relative to 
the organisation in which the decision is being made" (Hickson et al., 1986). In a broad 
sense, as suggested by Hickson et al. (1986), "these strategic decisions are not wholly 
different from all others, moving on a ratified plane unique to themselves, but are
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towards one end of continuum, at the other end of which are the trivial everyday 
questions". The same authors complete: "For them, a strategic decision is one in which 
those who are involved believe will play a bigger rather than a smaller part in shaping 
what happens for a long while afterwards".
On explaining why strategic decisions are likely to shape what happens, Hickson et al. 
(1986) mentioned the fact that they have "some or all of certain features to a greater 
extent than do other decisions". And they proceed by bringing about some important 
characteristics of strategic decisions. "First, it is about something that does not come up 
very often. It is more rare and non-routine than most (Hage, 1980) and therefore 
comparatively novel (Wilson, 1980). There will be few if any direct precedents for it, 
yet it is likely to set precedents for subsequent decisions (Mintzberg et al., 1976). 
Second, it commits substantial resources (Mintzberg et al., 1976). Third, it sets off 
"waves" of lesser decisions (Mintzberg, 1979) and so is comparatively organisation- 
wide in its consequences (Wilson, 1980). In short, it is relatively unusual, substantial, 
and all pervading".
Corroborating the view of these authors, Schwenk (1988), when trying to distinguish 
strategic decisions from other types of decisions, characterized them as: (1) ill- 
structured and non-routine decisions, meaning that these decisions are "somewhat 
unique and cannot be committed to simple decision rules"; (2)"especially important to 
an organisation", such as those involving "large resource commitment and the 
possibility of large gains or losses as a result; and (3)generally very complex decisions 
which, as suggested by Steiner (1979), will call for "a consideration of broad 
environmental trends, competitive dynamics of an industry, company strengths and 
weaknesses in each functional area, and management values".
According to Mazzolini (1981), strategic decisions are defined as "the commitments to 
action and the resource allocations which determine the field of activity of the firm - 
what endeavour it pursues, i.e. what goods or services it produces and what market it 
serves. Strategic decisions also refer to how such endeavours are pursued in terms of the 
way key corporate resources are raised and allocated. For them, too, these decisions are 
unstructured or non-repetitive - as opposed to routine operating decisions (Bower and
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Doz, 1977)". And according to Mintzberg et al. (1976), unstructured refers to "the 
decision processes that have not been encountered in quite the same form and for which 
no predetermined and explicit set of ordered responses exists in the organisation".
Differently from operational decisions, strategic decisions seem to be less amenable to 
precise description and quantitative analyses (Mintzberg et al., 1976). Also, apparently, 
there seems to be general agreement that strategic decisions always involve uncertainty 
and risk, which can vary in degree according to the specific case.
Finally, a discussion on the typical attributes of strategic decisions was provided by 
Johnson and Scholes (1988, p.5-8) that reinforces and summarises the general 
characteristics of these decisions as presented above. Amongst other things, the authors 
characterise strategic decisions as decisions which (1) are concerned with the scope o f  
an organisation’s activities, (2) involve the allocation and reallocation o f major 
resources in an organisation, (3) are likely to affect the long term direction o f an 
organisation, (4) are likely to affect operational decisions (to "set o ff waves o f lesser 
decisions", as mentioned by Mintzberg (1979)), and (5) are complex in nature.
Strategic decision-making (SDM) is the subset of organisational decision-making 
which is concerned with strategic decisions. SDM has been commonly used in the 
literature as a substitute for strategic decision-making process, which represents in 
fact the majority of the literature on SDM. However, SDM, in this thesis, is 
purposely view as more encompassing and referring to all processes, actions and 
events related to the making and implementation of strategic decisions until and 
including delivery of outcomes.
2.3.2. Central Issues
An important subset of the more general literature on organisational decision-making 
and on strategy, the SDM literature, and more specifically, the SDM process 
literature, has produced a major body of work, both theoretical and empirical, 
combining a variety of methodological approaches and theoretical/conceptual 
perspectives.
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Essentially, SDM process research has been centered around two major issues: how 
strategic decisions are made and what is the impact o f SDM processes on outcomes.
2.3.21. How strategic decisions are made
This part of the research is concerned with understanding how strategic decisions are 
made and why they are made in a certain way.
The attempt to understand how strategic decisions are made (decision process) within 
and across organisations and different industries has led to the development and 
proposition of a multitude of decision models. Decision models proposed in the 
literature have been theoretically as well as empirically derived.
A good part of this research is of descriptive nature, more concerned with providing 
insight and understanding of the process rather than with prescriptions or managerial 
relevance.
The attempts to understand why decisions are made in a certain way have led to the 
search for antecedents to strategic decision processes. The objective is to find out 
what the main influences are and how they affect and shape decision processes. As it 
will become clearer further on in this Chapter, this part of the research has been 
increasingly investigated empirically.
For the objectives of this thesis, only part of this segment of the literature will be 
reviewed here: the central issue of rationality in SDM, along with a brief overview 
on some of the theoretical models available in the literature and main paradigms.
2.3.2.I.I. Rationality in Decision-Making
Rationality in decision-making has been treated in the literature in different ways. In the 
most extreme case the term “rationality” alludes to the kind of rationality presumed in 
economic theory. Consistent with this tradition, rationality implies that “events are
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explained as the willed product of the activity of the decision makers maximising some 
utility function. The intellectual aspects of this activity are emphasised, the link of 
means to ends” (March and Olsen, 1976, p.82).
In this tradition, the rational model for decision-making (also sometimes referred to as 
synoptic, comprehensive, analytical or root model or approach) assumes complete 
knowledge and agreement involving objectives, alternatives to choose from, as well as 
consequences that will follow from choosing each of the existing alternatives.
This purely rational model has long been recognised as far too unrealistic as either a 
descriptive or prescriptive model of organisational decision-making. It was replaced by 
the notion of ‘bounded rationality’, which was introduced in organisation theory as 
early as 1945 by Simon (1965), in his first edition of the book “Administrative 
Behaviour”.
Acknowledging the cognitive limitations of human decision-making, the author (Simon, 
1965) mentions that, though human behaviour is intendely rational, it is only limitedly 
so. He then elaborates on a theory of “intended and bounded rationality -  of the 
behaviour of human beings who satisfice because they have not the wits to maximise” 
(Simon, 1965, p. Xxiv of Introduction, first emphasis added).
In line with this view of decision-making are the works of March and Simon (1958) and 
Cyert and March (1963), who became known as the Carnegie group.
Cyert and March (1963) have expressed their concern with the apparent ““substantial 
disparity” between the decision-making processes prescribed by the conventional 
theory of the firm and the way the decisions are actually made within firms”.
Along with Simon (1965), they criticise the two assumptions implicit in the rationality 
of the theory of the firm: the search for maximisation of some utility function and the 
operation with perfect knowledge. Alternatively, they propose the search for 
satisfaction instead of maximisation and the link between the theory of search and the 
theory of decision-making. They explain that the latter is influenced by the previous
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one, which in turn holds that “information is not given to the firm but must be obtained” 
(Cyert and March, 1963, p. 10).
Another criticism made by these authors to the rational model attacks the notion 
implied in this model that goals are clear and unambiguous and fully agreed upon by 
participants. As argued by Cyert and March (1963, p. 117), “most organisations most of 
the time exist and thrive with considerable latent conflict of goals”.
Though recognising the limitations of rationality, the subscribers to the ‘bounded 
rationality’ or ‘satisficing’ approach to organisational decision-making still put strong 
emphasis on the notion of ‘intended rationality’, which focus on the extent to which 
decision processes reflect attempts or intentions to make the best possible decision 
under the circumstances. The term ‘rationality’ still remains one of great significance in 
the literature on decision-making.
hi some cases, it is assumed that in the rational model decisions follow an orderly 
sequence of identifiable phases and actions. This sequence involves: “perception of 
problem or issue; comprehensive search for alternatives to achieve objectives; 
identification of possible alternative courses of action as solutions; evaluation of each 
alternative; judgment on the best solution for securing objectives in most satisfactory 
way; implementation of chosen course of action; monitoring of effects in light of 
achievement of objectives and, if problems occur which reduce effectiveness of chosen 
solution, further search to refine problem definition, choice of solutions, methods of 
implementation and so on” (Dawson, 1992, p.202).
hi other cases, as pointed out by Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992), this orderly sequence 
is not observed. Actually, the different phases and steps can come in any order and can 
repeat. The same authors added: “The result is that steps in a rational strategic decision 
process actually shift, branch, cycle and recycle”. Within this view, they cite the 
examples of the works by Mintzberg et al (1976); Nutt (1984); Hickson et al (1986).
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In a less specific way, authors such as Dean and Sharfinan used the term ‘procedural 
rationality’ to characterise “behaviour that is sensible or logical in pursuing one’s goals” 
(1993, p.588).
2.3.2.I.2. SDM models and paradigms
In this realm of rationality other decision-making models or strategies have been 
proposed which imply different degrees and types of "intended rationality”. Amongst 
them are: disjointed incrementalism or ‘muddling through’, mixed scanning, logical 
incrementalism, political model and garbage can.
These have been seen as either alternatives to the rational model or variations along a 
rationality continuum, at one end of which was the classic notion of rationality and at 
the other the garbage can model.
The political model, for instance, has been usually presented as an alternative to the 
rational model or as an example of a non-rational approach. Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 
(1992), for instance, reviewed the literature on SDM around three ‘dominant’ 
paradigms: rationality and bounded rationality, politics and power, and garbage can. 
Allison (1971), in his study of governmental behaviour regarding the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, made use of three different perspectives to analyse the crisis: the political, 
rational and organisational perspectives.
As mentioned by Schwenk (1988), when referring to Allison’s model of bureaucratic 
politics, within this perspective, "organisational decisions and actions are the result o f  
political processes, bargaining processes, and power games within organisations. 
Organisations are composed o f players in positions who engage in games to enhance 
their own power and prestige ”.
The political model has its roots on the acknowledgement of the existence of conflict 
within organisations. Contrary to the more conventional view of organisations, which 
sustains that members work coherently towards commonly agreed objectives and goals,
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the political perspective sees organisations as “coalitions o f people with conflicting 
interests” (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992, p.23).
The recognition of the existence of conflict within organisations changes the view that 
strategic decision processes can revolve rationally around better means to achieve 
shared organisational objectives and goals. In fact, most practitioners will accept that 
agreement or consensus is rarely obtained either on objectives or on means to achieve 
them.
Another model which has been seen as an alternative to the rational model, and which 
stands right at the other extreme of the rationality continuum, is the garbage can. This 
model was originally conceived by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) through computer 
simulation.
It suggests a chaotic situation where everything, from objectives and participants to 
means of reaching specific outcomes, seems to be uncertain and unclear, therefore 
seemingly unprogrammemable. These chaotic circumstances would be customary in 
“organised anarchies”, defined by the authors as “organisations (or decision situations) 
characterised by problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation” 
(Cohen et al, 1972, p. 1, parenthesis added).
In these organisations (or decision situations), goals are ambiguous or unknown and the 
organisations’ processes are not clearly understood by their members. The organisation 
“discovers preferences through action more than it acts on the basis of preferences” 
(Cohen et al, 1972, p.l). Thus, action is not necessarily preceded by known goals. Also, 
as commented by Miller et al (1996, p. 303), drawing on Weick’s work (1976), “the 
means and ends of decisions become uncoupled” “so that actions do not lead to 
expected outcomes, but are hijacked along the way by other decisions and other 
actions”. In order to survive, then, these organisations have to find alternative decision 
procedures to the ones advocated by the more conventional decision models. The 
“garbage can” model enables organisations to make decisions without having 
consistent, shared goals.
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As commented by Cohen et al (1972, p.2), while conventionally it is usual to expect 
that choice opportunities will lead to the generation of decision alternatives, evaluation 
of their consequences in terms of objectives, and finally to a decision, this is often “a 
poor description of what actually happens”.
In the garbage can model, “a decision is an outcome or interpretation o f several 
relatively independent streams within an organisation” (Cohen et al, 1972, p.3). Four 
of those streams were underscored by the authors, namely: problems, solutions, 
participants, and choice opportunities. According to the model, “an organisation is a 
collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision 
situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might 
be the answer, and decision makers looking for work” (Cohen et al, 1972, p.2).
2.3.2.2. Impact of SDM processes on outcomes
The decision process -  outcomes association has been a central assumption in the 
SDM research, supported by empirical research to date.
This segment of the literature attempts to understand how the characteristics of SDM 
processes influence outcomes, usually expressed in terms of process outcomes, 
decision outcomes and/or organisational performance.
Besides the direct effects that SDM processes are expected to have on outcomes, 
effects contingent upon a number of context specific variables (e.g. external 
environment, organisational characteristics and decision characteristics) have also 
been researched. It is this specific part of the literature which is of interest in this 
Thesis.
To help with the review of this part of the literature and to provide an overall 
understanding of how the SDM literature is organized, with emphasis on the role 
context is expected to play, two general conceptual models from the literature will be 
presented next.
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2.3.3. General Conceptual Models of SDM Research
2.3.3.I. Basic Model
Bell et al (1997) developed a surprisingly concise model of the overall structure of 
the research problem in strategic decision-making. Their model was developed 
around the decision process -  outcomes association.
As they noted, it extends previous work by explicitly representing the context and 
other factors they anticipated would influence the process-outcome association.
The model shows 4 major elements: content, context, process and outcomes. As 
the authors explain, these are expected to relate in a complex manner. The model is 
presented in two versions, which will be reproduced here, given its expediency in 
showing the role context can play in SDM. Even though the model shows the 
complexity of the relationships between these elements, the focus here is on the role 
of context. The 4 main elements of the model are defined as below.
Definition o f  main elements by Bell et al (1997):
Content: It refers to what is being decided, the substance of the choice.
Process: It corresponds to “a set of behaviors associated with a choice opportunity” 
(p. 170).
Context: It includes “the organisational and environmental factors which are not 
subject to influence by the activities of those present at the choice opportunity” 
(Bryson et al, 1990, as quoted by Bell et al, 1997, p. 168). According to the authors, 
context is the “given” in the situation. Actually, other authors, such as Rajagopalan et 
al (1997), would disagree with that and argue that context can also be changed 
through managers’ behaviors and actions. This conceptualization of context, along 
with a broader view which also includes decision specifics and top management team 
(TMT) characteristics, is the one favored in this thesis. This view of context will 
become clearer further along in this Chapter.
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Outcomes: They are represented by “the output or result of the choice or the process 
leading up to the choice” (p. 170). This is another very problematic area in SDM 
which has been defined and approached in different ways.
The variations in the concept and operationalization of context and outcomes will be 
further discussed in Chapter 3.
The first version of Bell et al’s model (p. 172), a simplified one, shows the direct 
relationships between context, content, process and outcomes.
Content
Outcome
Process
Fig. 2.1 Basic Model of SDM 
source: Bell e t al (1997)
As it can be seen in Fig.2.1, in this simplified version, the outcomes are shown to 
suffer multiple influences. Each of the three elements: the content of the decision, the 
decision process and the decision context are shown to influence decision outcomes 
directly. Additionally, the context is also shown to directly influence decision content 
and decision process, which in turn will influence outcomes.
The next model (Bell et al, p. 173) shows that the relationships between content, 
context, process and outcomes are much more complex than seen in the basic model.
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In this expanded version of the basic model, some moderating relationships are 
added.
C o n te n t
C o n te x t O u tc o m e
P ro c e ss
D irec t E ffect 
M o d ellin g  Effect
Fig. 2 .2  C o m p lic a tio n s  o f  t h e  Basic M o d e l o f  SDM 
s o u rc e :  Bell e t  a l (1997)
Regarding the role o f context. Fig. 2.2 suggests that context can affect outcomes 
directly, indirectly through influences on content and/ or process and, additionally, as 
a moderator of the relationship between content and outcome and between process 
and outcome.
The expanded model shows that each of its four elements is interrelated with all the 
others. For this reason, Bell et al (1997) argue that any SDM model should at least 
implicitly consider all of these elements.
2.3.3.2. Multi-Theoretic Model
Another theoretical model which provides an overall picture of the research in SDM 
is the one developed by Rajagopalan et al (1997). They proposed a multi-theoretic 
model of SDM processes which, according to them and based on Whetten (1989), 
“should provide the essential elements of a theory of SDM processes: description and 
explanation” (p.231). Their framework brings together most of the aspects which 
have been covered in the past literature. In fact, it contains essentially the same
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elements as the ones presented by Bell et al (1997), but those are organized in more 
specific categories, along with different dimensions within each category.
Managerial n. 
Cognition:
- Perceived uncertainty 4
- Perceived capability, etc.!
Managerial
Actions:
- Rational actions
- Political actions
Environmental
Factors:
- Uncertainty
- Complexity
- Munificence
Organizational
Factors:
- P a s t performance
- P a s t s trateg ies
- S tructure
- Pow er distribution
Economic Outcomes:
- ROI/ROA
- Growth in sales/profit
- Market share  etc.
Process Outcomes:
- Quality
- T im eliness/Speed
- Relationships etc.
Decision-Specific
Factors:
- Impetus/motive
- Urgency
- Uncertainty
- Complexity__________
SDM Process 
Characteristics:
- Com prehensiveness
- Extent of rationality
- Political activity
- Participation/Involvement etc.
Fig. 2.3 Multi-Theoretical model for Strategic Decision Making Process 
source: Rajagopalan e t al (1997)
As seen in Fig.2.3, the model is organized in terms of antecedents or potential 
influences on SDM processes (environmental, organisational and decision-specific 
factors), SDM process characteristics and outcomes. The outcomes are expressed 
both as process outcomes and economic outcomes.
As we compare the above framework with the one presented by Bell et al (1997), we 
find all the four elements presented by them: context, content, process and outcomes. 
The context here is represented by the environmental factors and organisational
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factors categories; the content by decision-specific factors, the process by process 
characteristics and the outcomes by process outcomes and economic outcomes. The 
subcategories within each of those are also presented in the diagram. They represent 
a selection by the authors of some of the ways according to which these more general 
categories have been approached or measured in the literature.
Additionally, a new interesting aspect of this model, not observed by Bell et al 
(1997), is that the authors show the antecedents (environmental factors, 
organisational factors and decision-specific factors) as affecting the SDM processes 
not only objectively, but also via the filter of managers cognitions (or perceptions) 
and/or reactions to them. Actually, as seen in Fig.2.3, the antecedents will affect and 
be affected by managerial cognitions and actions. This exposes the role of agency in 
giving life to structures and context in organisations and also opens room for 
accommodating the quite substantial literature on cognitive aspects of SDM.
To develop their multi-theoretical model, Rajagopalan et al drew on the linear, 
adaptive and interpretive modes of strategy developed by Chaffee (1985). As 
described by the authors (p.232), in the linear model, “the SDM process is a 
sequential, planned process which unambiguously reflects the demands posed by the 
environmental and organisational contexts of the decision”. In the adaptive model, 
managers feel” their way through the uncertainty and complexity of the internal 
and external environments through trial-and-error decision-making. Managers can 
influence the SDM process through reactive and proactive actions that attempt to re­
shape the context within which decisions are made”. In the interpretive model of 
SDM processes, “managerial cognitions are the critical link between the context and 
managerial actions”. Within the interpretive model, as noted by the authors, 
managers’ actions (and therefore the SDM processes), even when they are exposed to 
similar contextual conditions, will vary depending on their perceptions or 
interpretations of this context.
In another comparison between Bell et al’s model and Rajagopalan’s model, it can be 
said that the former falls within a linear/structural view of SDM, whereas the latter 
offers a multi-theoretic framework where the three different perspectives (linear,
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adaptive and interpretive) can be contemplated. Amongst other things, this impacts 
the way context is understood, as it is discussed below.
The model shows direct and indirect links and influences between its elements, 
including the direction of those influences. Specifically regarding the role o f  context, 
it is shown as influencing SDM processes directly or via the cognitions and actions 
of managers, as mentioned before. Its influence on outcomes, according to this 
framework, is indirect, via the influence on decision processes.
An important aspect to be observed here is that, differently to the way Bell et al 
(1997) and some other authors have looked at context, as the “given” element in 
SDM, Rajagopalan et al show context as influencing as well as being influenced by 
managers and their actions. As mentioned by the authors, “managerial actions can 
help re-shape the organisational context within which decisions are made....” 
(p.235). According to them, for example, managers can influence the context 
(environmental and/or organisational) through political/power-behavioral actions, 
such as bargaining and coalition building, creating internal task forces, replacing key 
personnel etc.
As a whole, Rajagopalan et al’s examination of the SDM literature showed that most 
of the research in the field to that date, in particular the one that focused on the 
outcomes of SDM, had been dominated by a linear/structural view of SDM, offering 
“limited understanding of the role that managers can play in influencing SDM 
processes and their eventual organisational consequences”. They emphasize “the role 
of managerial cognitions and actions in the context-SDM process-outcomes 
relationships by drawing upon the adaptive and interpretive models of DM.”
According to these authors, the contributions of the adaptive and interpretive mode 
remained under explored in empirical research. However, they noted that these three 
modes of decision-making offer theoretical complementarities which can help 
“explain several contradictions and unanswered questions in prior SDM research”. 
Subsequently, they concluded that more research needed to be done within these 
other two perspectives if we were to bridge the gaps in “our understanding of how
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and why SD processes differ from one another and with what organisational 
consequences” (p.245).
2.3.4. Implementation of Strategic Decisions
In general, the two conceptual models reviewed above provide a good summary of 
the aspects and links which have been explored in the SDM process literature. 
However, they did not contemplate the implementation of strategic decisions. In a 
way, this reflects the neglect with which the literature in the field has treated this 
subject.
As acknowledged by many authors (Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984; Nutt, 1993), the 
implementation represents a crucial link between the SDM process and the 
outcomes. It has now been shown that the implementation exerts a major influence 
on outcomes, maybe even stronger than context or other factors (see, for example, 
Sharfinan and Dean, 1997). As such, its role cannot be neglected if one is interested 
in understanding or explaining outcomes.
In acknowledgement of the relevance of implementation in connection with SDM 
outcomes and of the fact that implementation remains an under researched area in 
SDM, this has been recommended as one of the areas worth of more research in the 
future (e.g. Huff and Reger, 1987; Papadakis and Barwise, 1997; Huzschenreuter and 
Kleindienst, 2006; Papadakis et al, 2010). In fact, some authors have already 
invested effort in researching this aspect of SDM (e.g. Miller, 1997; Hickson et al, 
2003; Sharfinan and Dean, 1997; Wilson, D., 2003, Brenes et al, 2008).
In line with this thinking, and additionally to the other four central elements 
identified in the theoretical models previously discussed, namely: content, context, 
process and outcomes, this research will also look at the role of implementation in 
strategic decision-making and decision outcomes. To reflect this proposition the two 
conceptual models discussed above are adapted and presented at the end of this 
Chapter.
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2.4. Context in the SDM literature
2.4.1. Approaches to Context
It is important to note at this point that context has been approached in the literature 
in many different ways, as explained below.
• In terms of what are the elements o f context: In most cases, context is 
regarded as comprising the external environment and the internal 
organisational characteristics. Some authors, though, like Sharfman and Dean 
(1997), have also included the content of decisions and top management team 
(TMT) characteristics as part of the broad context.
• Regarding how the different elements o f context have been characterized or 
operationalized in the literature: The external environment, known as a 
multidimensional variable, has been looked at mainly in terms of its 
uncertainty, complexity and munificence dimensions, as shown in 
Rajagopalan et al’s model. Dynamism, turbulence, instability are other names 
which have been used in association with the uncertainty dimension. 
Velocity, another dimension employed in the literature, has been defined as a 
composition of dynamism and rapid growth (Baum and Wally, 2003). 
Heterogeneity, hostility, resource availability are some other names used for 
the complexity and munificence dimensions mentioned above2. As for the 
organisational environment, some of the characteristics which are believed to 
affect SDM process are TMT characteristics, past performance, past 
strategies, structure and power distribution. Regarding decision content or 
decision-specific factors, as named by Rajagopalan et al (1997), some of the 
characteristics explored in the literature are: impetus/motive, urgency, 
uncertainty and complexity. Regarding TMT characteristics, as employed by 
Sharfman and Dean (1997), for example, some of the constructs are length of 
team tenure, individual tenure in the firm and interpersonal trust. These are 
only some examples of characteristics within each of the four different
2 For an overview o f how environment has been conceptualized in the literature, see Sharfman and Dean (1991).
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elements of decision context employed in the literature. Naturally, they are 
not exhaustive and many others can also be found.
• Regarding the theoretical framework used to approach context: As explained 
before, if one adopts a linear/structural perspective, which is the case with the 
vast majority of research in the field to date, some elements of context (the 
external and internal environments) will be seen as “the given” elements in 
SDM, which cannot be altered by actors of the process. However, if  a 
cognitive/interpretive theoretical framework is used, then context will be seen 
as being passive of change through the cognitions and actions of managers, as 
they interact with the organisational and external environment contexts.
2.4.2. Limitations of the Literature on Context
It should be remarked here that the studies from the SDM literature which have dealt 
with context have usually and mainly looked at just one element of context at a time 
(e.g. environment or organisational factors), or just one or two aspects within each of 
the different context elements (e.g. environmental dynamism or organisational 
structure), or even at just one way according to which context can influence 
outcomes (e.g. direct influences on process or moderator of the process-outcomes 
association). For example, the external environment has been by far the most 
researched contextual element in the SDM literature. And its uncertainty/dynamism 
dimension the most commonly explored. Regarding the organisational factors, 
structure and power distribution have received much more attention than other 
aspects such as past performance and past strategies.
Additionally, available studies have usually been idiosyncratic in the employment of 
terminologies and in the selection, conceptualization and operationalization of 
variables. Different methodological approaches have also contributed to the 
difficulty regarding comparability of results. Finally, and for their most part, studies 
have been developed within the linear/structural perspective of SDM, as already 
pointed out before, leaving out some alternative ways of looking at contexts and 
organisational realities.
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Some of the aspects raised above might explain why not much cumulative 
knowledge on the effects of context on SDM processes and outcomes has been built 
and results are inconclusive. This will become apparent in the review below, as some 
of the contradictory evidence found in the related literature is exposed.
The same problems mentioned above actually apply to the literature on SDM process 
in general. And that is why many authors in the area are now calling for research 
which is more integrative and which will look simultaneously at the influences of 
various factors on SDM processes and outcomes.
2.4.3. Role of Context in influencing Strategic Decision-Making -  Review of 
Relevant Works
The empirical literature on the main themes of interest for this research, along the 
links identified in the conceptual models presented in Fig.2.2 and Fig.2.3, is 
reviewed next.
Based on the two conceptual models of SDM process research shown earlier, context 
can be seen as influencing outcomes in different ways, namely: 1) directly, 2) 
indirectly through influences on decision process, which in turn will influence 
outcomes, or 3) as a moderator/mediator o f the relationship between decision 
process and outcomes. Additionally, and even though not specifically contemplated 
in the models above, another important role for context in relation to outcomes is 4) 
via influences on the way strategic decisions are implemented. This aspect may have 
been partially covered through the research exploring the moderator role of context 
on the process-outcomes relationship. However, this will be looked at in a more 
specific way in this research, at the decision level.
The majority of the literature which looked at context has explored the influences of 
context on decision process (role 2) and the role of context as a moderator of the 
process-outcomes association (role 3). This literature is reviewed below, in 
subsection 2.4.4.
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2.4.3.1. Context as a moderator/mediator of the relationship process-outcome
Within this topic, a large part of the studies looked at the role of external 
environment (different dimensions) as a moderator of the relationship between 
decision processes (usually the comprehensiveness/rationality dimension) and 
organisational performance or decision outcomes.
For an overall view of samples, methods, operationalization of variables used and 
main findings, this literature is organized and presented in Table 2.1 (1A,1B,1C, ID).
Table 2.1(1A.1) -  Strategic Decision Process, Context and Performance: A 
Comparison of Empirical Studies
Miller & Friesen 
(1983)
Fredrickson 
(1984) and 
Fredricks on& 
Mitchell (1984)
Bourgeois &
Eisenhardt
(1988)
Eisenhardt
(1989)
Judge and
Miller
(1991)
Jones,
Jacob,
Spijker
(1992/3)
Sam ple/
Research
Settings
50 Canadian firms 
in 15 industries 
and 36 US firms
109 executives in 
27 firms in an 
unstable industry 
(forest products) 
and 152 executives 
in 38 firms in a 
stable industry 
(paint and 
coatings) -  US
4 firms in the 
microcomputer 
industry in the 
US
8 firms in 
microcomputer 
industry in the 
US
86executive 
s in 32 firms 
including 32 
CEOS (10 
in
biotechnolo 
gy, 10 in 
textiles, and 
12 in
hospitals) — 
US
70 US based
international
firms in
multiple
industries
(e.g.forest
products,
aerospace,
oil and gas
exploration,
drug,medical
and
cosmetic)
Research
M ethod/
Inference
Procedure
Survey/
Deductive
Survey/Deductive Multiple 
embedded case 
studies/ 
Inductive
Multiple 
embedded case 
studies/ 
Inductive
Survey/
Deductive
Survey/
Deductive
Data
Collection
Methods
Questionnaires 
for Canadian 
firms (CEOS 
or general 
managers); expert 
scoring
of case histories 
for the US sample
Single respondent
Questionnaires 
based on a 
decision 
scenario (same 
scenario for all 
firms); structured 
interviews with 
CEOS or VP 
(initial stage)
Multiple
respondents (2-7 
per firm)
Interviews 
(CEO + TMT), 
questionnaires 
and secondary 
sources
Multiple
respondents (5-7 
per firm); one 
decision per firm
Interviews 
(CEO +TMT), 
questionnaires 
and secondary 
sources
Multiple 
respondents 
(5-9 per firm)
Interviews 
and archival 
data
Multiple 
respondents 
(2-3 per 
firm); one 
decision per 
firm
Questionnait 
es (CEOS +  
TMT)
Single
respondent
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Table 2.1(1A.2) -  Strategic Decision Process, Context and Performance: A 
Comparison of Empirical Studies_______________
Miller &
Friesen
(1983)
Fredrickson 
(1984) and 
FredricksonSc 
Mitchell (1984)
Bourgeois
&
Eisenhardt
(1988)
Eisenhardt
(1989)
Judge and
Miller
(1991)
Jones, Jacob,
Spijker
(1992/3)
Data Analysis 
Techniques
Product
moment
correlations
Partial correlations Pattern
analysis,
profile
comparison,
theory
building
from case
studies
Pattern
analysis,
profile
comparison,
theory
building
from case
studies
Regression Partial
correlations
Controls Small and 
diversified 
firms
eliminated 
from the 
sample
Size Industry Industry Size and 
decision 
importance
Size
Unit of 
Analysis
Organisation Organisation Organisation, 
strategic 
decision and 
TMT
Organisation, 
strategic 
decision and 
TMT
Organisation Organisation
Main Context 
Variable
External
environment
External
environment
External
environment
External
environment
External
environment
External
environment
Environmental
Dimension
Dynamism
(uncertainty);
hostility;
heterogeneity
(complexity)
Stability Velocity
(high):
dynamism or 
volatility plus 
discontinuity
Velocity
(high):
dynamism or 
volatility plus 
discontinuity
Velocity
(high,
medium,
low)
Uncertainty 
(complexity 
and dynamism)
Main Process 
Characteristic
Rationality Comprehensiveness Rationality Rationality
..
Rationality Comprehensiv
eness
Table 2.1(1A.3) -  Strategic Decision Process, Context and Performance: A 
Comparison of Empirical Studies
Miller &
Friesen
(1983)
Fredrickson 
(1984) and 
FredricksonSc 
Mitchell(1984)
Bourgeois Sc
Eisenhardt
(1988)
Eisenhardt
(1989)
Judge and 
Miller (1991)
Jones, Jacob,
Spijker
(1992/3)
Operationaliza 
tion of 
Rationality/ 
Comprehensiv 
eness
Analysis:
futurity,
integration,
analysis,
industry
expertise,
multiplexity,
adaptiveness
4 steps:
situation
diagnosis,
alternative
generation,
alternative
evaluation,
decision
integration.
Main measures:
participation,
use o f outside
sources of
information,
use o f analysis
techniques,
number of
alternatives etc
Number of 
alternatives, level 
of analysis, 
existence of 
clear and 
articulated 
institutional 
goals
Number o f
alternatives,
use of
experienced
counselors,
use o f real
time
information,
integration
among
decisions
Number of 
alternatives 
considered
Analytic and 
integrative 
comprehensive 
ness: strategic 
modeling, 
assumptions 
analysis, goal 
clarity & 
awareness. Goal 
comprehensive 
ness, time 
congruity of 
goals, goal 
reinforcement 
systems, 
participatory 
decision-making
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Other
Variables
Innovation of
strategy-
making
process (new
products,
technology,
risk taking
proactiveness,
novelsolution)
-
Political
behavior, power, 
decision speed, 
innovativeness
Decision
speed,
conflict,
power
Decision 
speed, board 
experience
-
Operationaliza 
tion of
Performance/
Effectiveness
Economic 
performance: 
sales growth; 
growth in 
ROE (Return 
on Equities)
Economic 
performance: 
return on assets 
(ROA), sales 
growth
Performance:
market
acceptance;
CEO’s
numerical self- 
report of 
company’s 
“effectiveness”, 
as compared to 
competitors; 
sales and 
profitability
Economic 
performance: 
sales trend 
and return on 
sales
Decision
performance:
perceptual
measures
Economic 
performance: 
return on 
assets; sales 
growth
Strategic
effectiveness:
sales growth,
public image,
competitive
financing,
market
acceptance,
employee
quality,
stockholder
satisfaction,
supplier
reliability,
compliancewith
gov. regulations
Table 2.1(1A.4) -  Strategic Decision Process, Context and Performance: A 
Comparison of Empirical Studies_________________
Miller &
Friesen
(1983)
Fredrickson 
(1984) and 
FredricksonSc 
Mitchell (1984)
Bourgeois Sc
Eisenhardt
(1988)
Eisenhardt
(1989)
Judge and 
Miller (1991)
Jones, Jacob,
Spijker
(1992/3)
Major
Findings
For high
performing
firms,
increases in
environmental
dynamism are
accompanied
by increases in
planning
rationality
Rational 
decision 
processes 
associated with 
superior 
economic 
performance in 
stable
environments 
and inferior 
economic 
performance in 
unstable 
environments
Effective 
strategic 
decisions in 
high velocity 
environments 
are
characterized 
by speed and 
rationality
Effective
strategic
decisions in high 
velocity
environments are 
characterized by 
speed and 
comprehensiven 
ess/rationality
Number of 
alternatives 
simultaneous! 
y considered 
is positively 
associated 
with decision 
speed in all 
environments 
. But decision 
speed leads 
to higher 
performance 
only in high- 
velocity 
environments
Consistently 
positive 
relationships 
between analytic 
and integrative 
comprehensiven 
ess and 
organisational 
effectiveness
Generaliza
bility
Good, since 
sample
includes firms 
in multiple 
industries
Limited, since 
only one 
industry from 
each type of 
environment 
was included
Limited, since 
single 
industry 
sample
Limited, since 
single industry 
sample
Moderate, 
since sample 
contains 
three 
industries 
with varying 
rates o f 
environment 
al change, 
but only one 
industry 
within each 
type and only 
a small 
number of 
firms within 
each industry
Moderate, since 
just one kind of 
environment 
(uncertain) 
which was 
assumed for all 
international 
firms
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Table 2.1(1B.1) -  Strategic Decision Process, Context and Performance: A
Comparison o ■ Empirical Stuc ies (2nd Part)
Click, Miller & 
Huber (1993)
Jones, Jones, Deckro 
(1994)
Powell (1994) Priem,Rasheed & 
Kathulic (1995)
Sample/Research
Settings
Members o f TMT 
of 79 SBUs 
US
27 matrix organisations in 
multiple industries (e.g. 
aerospace, architecture and 
engineering) in unstable 
environments -  US
68 firms in the 
furniture industry and 
45 in the apparel 
industry in die US
101 manufacturing 
firms in multiple 
industries (e.g. 
fiberglass boats, oil 
field equipment, 
frozen vegetables, 
personal computers) 
-U S
Research
M ethod/
Inference
Procedure
Survey/Deductive Survey/Deductive Survey/Deductive Survey/Deductive
Data Collection 
Methods
Questionnaires and 
secondary sources
Questionnaires 
(CEOS/Chairmen -  33%)
Single respondent
Questionnaires
(CEOS)
Questionnaires (key
strategy-making
executives)
1 or 2 respondents 
per firm
Data Analysis 
Techniques
Regression Partial correlations Partial correlations Pearson correlations 
and regression 
analysis
Controls Industry,
munificence
Size Size
Unit of Analysis Organisation Organisation Organisation Organisation
Main Context 
Variable
External
Environment
External environment External environment External
environment
Environmental
Dimension
Turbulence Uncertainty (complexity 
and dynamism)
Stability Dynamism
Main Process 
Characteristic
Comprehensiveness Comprehensiveness Rationality Rationality
Table 2.1(1B.2) -  Strategic Decision Process, Context and Performance: A 
Comparison of Empirical Studies (2nd part)
Click, Miller & 
Huber (1993)
Jones, Jones, 
Deckro (1994)
Powell (1994) Priem,Rasheed & 
Kathulic (1995)
Operationalization of
Rationality/
Comprehensiveness
As in Fredrickson 
(1984)
Comprehensiveness: 
goal clarity & 
awareness, strategic 
modeling, 
assumption 
challenging, time 
congruity o f goals, 
goal reinforcement 
systems
Strategic 
planning, goals, 
scanning, 
analysis
Strategy-making 
rationality: scanning, 
analysis and planning 
processes
Other Variables Firm size and 
generic strategy
Operationalization of 
Performance/Effectiveness
Open systems 
effectiveness, 
profitability
Strategic
effectiveness, sales 
growth, public image, 
competitive 
financing, market 
acceptance, employee 
quality, stockholder 
satisfaction, supplier 
reliability, compliance 
with governmental 
standards and 
regulation
Comparative 
performance: 
profitability 
and sales 
growth
Comparative 
performance: return on 
assets, return on sales, 
sales growth, overall 
performance success
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Major Findings Comprehensiveness 
o f decision-making 
is positively related 
to profitability in 
turbulent 
environments, but 
slightly negatively 
related in low 
turbulence 
environments
Comprehensive 
strategic decision 
processes produce 
better strategic results 
than incremental 
processes
Planning is 
more profitable 
in an unstable 
industry than 
in a stable one
Positive
rationality/performance 
relationship for firms 
facing dynamic 
environments and no 
relationship between 
rationality and 
performance for firms 
facing stable 
environments
Generalizability Good, since sample 
includes firms in 
industries that vary 
greatly in terms o f  
turbulence
Moderate, since just 
one kind of 
environment 
(uncertain), which 
was assumed for all 
matrix organisations
Limited, since 
only one 
industry from 
each type of  
environment 
was included
Good (for
manufacturing firms), 
since sample include 
industries with 
substantial variance in 
environmental 
instability
Table 2.1(1C.1) -  SD process, performance, and the moderating role of context: A  
comparison of empirical studies (3rd Part)________
Dean & Sharfman (1996) Goll and Rasheed (1997) Slevin & Covin (1997)
Sample/Research
Settings
52 decisions in 24 companies 
from 16 manufacturing 
industries (e.g. electronics, 
steel, apparel, footwear, pain 
and coatings) -  US
62 manufacturing firms in 
the US
112 manufacturing firms operating 
in 78 industries in the US 
(73 firms publicly owned)
Research
M ethod/
Inference
Procedure
Survey/Deductive Survey/Deductive Survey/Deductive
Data Collection 
Methods
Interviews with high level 
managers (24% CEOS)
Multiple respondents 
(Average 3.4/2.S people per 
decision in the 2 interview 
rounds)
Questionnaires
Single respondents per firm
Questionnaires
Data Analysis 
Techniques
Multiple regression analysis Moderated regression 
analysis and subgroup 
analysis
Moderated regression analysis
Controls Environmental favorability, 
quality o f implementation
- -
Unit o f Analysis Decision Organisation Organisation
Main Context 
Variables
External environment External environment External environment and 
organisational characteristics 
(structure)
Environmental
Dimension
Stability Dynamism, munificence Hostility
Main Process 
Characteristic
Procedural rationality Rationality Strategy formation pattern: 
emergent or planned
Table 2.1(1C.2) -  SD process, performance, and the moderating role of context: A 
comparison of empirical studies (3rd Part)_______________
Dean & Sharfman 
(1996)
Goll and Rasheed (1997) Slevin & Covin (1997)
Operationalization 
of Rationality
Procedural rationality: 
collection and analysis 
of information, use of 
quantitative analytic 
techniques, nature of 
process
Systematic procedures when 
planning; strategic and long-term 
importance o f participative 
decision-making at management 
levels; the application o f 
operations research techniques;
55
the explanation of proposed 
changes to those involved; 
participative consensus-seeking 
decision-making with feedback; 
open channels for 
communication
Other Variables Political Behavior -
Operationalization 
of Performance/ 
Effectiveness
Decision effectiveness: 
degree of
accomplishment of 
original objectives
Firm performance: return on 
assets and return on sales
Firm performance: sales growth rate
Major Findings Procedural rationality is 
positively related to 
decision effectiveness in 
unstable and stable 
environments
Environmental munificence and 
dynamism do moderate the 
relationship between rationality 
and performance 
Rationality is strongly associated 
with performance in 
environments high in 
munificence and dynamism
Planned strategies are positively 
related to sales growth among firms 
with mechanistic structures and 
operating in hostile environments. 
Emergent strategies are more 
positively associated with sales 
growth among firms with organic 
structures and operating in benign 
environments.
Generalizability Good (for
manufacturing firms), 
since sample includes 
industries with 
substantial variance in 
environmental 
instability
Moderate. Large sample in a 
variety o f industries but limited 
to large manufacturing firms
Good, since sample includes firms 
in a large number of industries
Table 2.1(1D.1) -  SD process, performance, and the moderating role of context: A 
comparison of empirical studies (4th Part) ________
Covin et al (2001) Baum &Wally (2003) Atuahene-Gima & Li (2004)
Sample/Research
Settings
96 manufacturing firms in 68 
industries in the US
318 CEOS from manufacturing 
center in the US, involving all 10 
GICS
373 new technology ventures 
in China
Research
M ethod/
Inference
Procedure
Survey/Deductive Survey/Deductive Survey/Deductive
Data Collection 
Methods
Questionnaires Questionnaires based on 
simulated decision scenarios, 
after a pilot study. Data collected 
in 1997 and then in 2001
Questionnaires
Data Analysis 
Techniques
Moderated regression analysis Structural equation modeling Moderated regression analysis
Controls Firm size and age Size and past firm performance Team size, diversity of  
experience and age; new 
product type; venture size; 
venture ownership; industry 
type
Unit of Analysis Organisation Organisation Decision
Main Context 
Variables
External Environment, 
Organisational characteristics
External Environment, 
Organisational characteristics 
(centralization, formalization)
External Environment
Environmental
Dimension
Technological sophistication Dynamism, munificence Uncertainty: technology 
uncertainty and demand 
uncertainty
Main Process 
Characteristic
Decision style: technocratic 
and intuitive/experience 
based
Decision Speed Comprehensiveness
Operationalization 
of Rationality
As in Fredrickson (1984)
Other Variables - -
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Table 2.1(1D.2) — SD process, perfo 
A comparison of empirical studies
rmance, and the moderating role of context: 
'4th Part)
Covin et al (2001) Baum &Wally (2003) Atuahene-Gima & Li (2004)
Operationalization 
of Performance/ 
Effectiveness
Firm performance: sales 
growth rates and return 
on sales (ROS)
Firm performance: firm growth 
and profitability
New product performance and 
product quality
Major Findings In high-tech 
environments, sales 
growth rates were found 
to be higher when the 
technocracy dimension of 
decision-making style and 
the organicity dimension 
o f organisation structure 
are negatively related. In 
low-tech environments, 
sales growth rates were 
found to be higher when 
these dimensions are 
positively related. 
Different results were 
found when the 
performance measure was 
ROS.
Fast strategic DM predicts 
subsequent firm growth and 
profit and mediates the relation 
o f dynamism, munificence, 
centralization and formalization 
with firm performance.
Other findings: Environmental 
dynamism is an antecedent of 
decision speed and also 
moderates the relation between 
decision speed and firm growth 
but not with profit; 
centralization enhances strategic 
decision speed.
The relationship between SD 
comprehensiveness and new 
product performance was 
negatively moderated by 
technology uncertainty but 
positively moderated by demand 
uncertainty. The effect o f decision 
comprehensiveness on new 
product quality was positively 
moderated by demand uncertainty 
but unaffected by technology 
uncertainty
Generalizability Good, since sample 
includes firms in a large 
number o f industries
Moderate. Sample is quite 
heterogeneous in terms of 
industries, but looked at only 3 
kinds of decisions
Limited as only one kind of 
decision was included
As it can be seen in Table 2.1, the majority of studies in the area so far has adopted a 
quantitative approach (surveys) and chosen the organisation as the unit of analysis. In 
these studies the outcomes were measured in terms of firm’s performance (mostly 
financial/economic measures). In a more contextualized view of SDM, the decision 
level is recommended (Sharfman and Dean, 1997). However, only three studies have 
looked at the decision level and measured outcomes in terms of decision 
effectiveness or decision performance: Eisenhardt (1989), Dean & Sharfman (1996) 
and Atuahene-Gima and Li (1984).
One interesting aspect that should be noted here is that, with just one exception 
(Atuahene-Gima & Li, 2004), all the studies presented in Table 2.1 were developed 
in the US context. This was in fact a common trait throughout the literature on SDM 
up to around a decade ago. As speculated by several authors and with some empirical 
support (e.g. Brouthers et al, 2000; Papadakis et al, 1998), differences in national 
cultures might be relevant. As mentioned by Schwenk, “it may be that many of the 
conclusions about SDM developed in the US context will have to be modified in 
order to be applicable across cultures (Schwenk, 1995, as quoted by Papadakis et al, 
1998, p. 137). As noted by Papadakis et al (2010), this situation has changed
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dramatically over the last years, as an increasing number of SDM studies have now 
included non US data or have been developed in non US settings, covering both 
developed and developing countries. Amongst these studies, it is worth mentioning 
Papadakis (2006), Nutt (2008) and Nooraie (2008), who looked at SDM processes in 
firms operating in Greece, Canada and Malaysia, respectively. As suggested by 
Papadakis et al (2010), even though evidence is not conclusive, there is indication 
that differences in national culture do have a role in SDM.
Table 2.1 also exposes the variety of research designs and methods chosen, 
unavoidably raising the issue of comparability. Thus, different units of analysis, 
choice and conceptualization/operationalization of variables (context, process and 
performance related), variable interactions examined, methods and control variables, 
have made comparisons between findings more difficult, when not impossible, and 
often debatable.
Despite that, some comparisons have and can be attempted. If for nothing else, at 
least they can serve as a provocative element, leading us to speculate about the 
reasons for the inconsistencies found.
Accordingly, as shown in Table 2.1, the evidence from the literature on the role of 
context as a moderator of the relationship between SD processes and outcomes is 
contradictory. One example is offered by comparing the works by Fredrickson 
(1984) and Fredrickson & Mitchell (1984) with the ones by Bourgeois & Eisenhardt
(1988), Eisenhardt (1989). While the former found a negative relationship between 
comprehensiveness of SDM processes and organisational performance in unstable 
environments, the latter found that in high velocity environments there is a positive 
relationship between the rationality/comprehensiveness dimension of SD processes 
and organisational performance. Other works presented in Table 2.1 yielded 
evidence supporting either side or raising other issues.
Even though the specificities of each research would have to be considered before a 
proper comparison could be made, at a first look most of the studies presented in 
Table 2.1 seem to support findings by Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988) and
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Eisenhardt (1989). They are: Miller & Friesen (1983), Jones et al (1992/3), Click et 
al (1993), Powell (1994), Priem et al (1995), Dean & Sharfman (1996), Goll and 
Rasheed (1997) and Slevin & Covin (1997). Another study, by Walters and Bhuian
(2004), also supports this view, finding that environmental dynamism positively 
moderates the relationship between comprehensiveness and performance. Therefore, 
it seems that the prevailing view is that there is a positive association between the 
rationality of decision processes and organisational or decision performance in 
dynamic, uncertain environments.
Dean and Sharfman (1996), who examined the relationship at the decision level, 
found that the level of environmental stability did not affect the positive association 
between rationality of process and decision outcomes.
From the studies showed in Table 2.1 only three looked simultaneously at more than 
one aspect of context. Slevin and Covin (1997) looked at how organisational 
structure and environmental hostility moderated the relationship between the strategy 
formation pattern and firm performance. Covin et al (2001) looked at the impact of 
two aspects of context, namely environmental technological sophistication and 
organisation structure on the relationship between decision-making style 
(technocratic vs. intuitive mode) and performance. Finally, Baum and Wally (2003) 
looked at the munificence and dynamism dimensions of external environment, along 
with the organisation characteristics of centralization and formalization, and their 
relations to decision speed and performance.
Baum and Wally (2003) also raised a new interesting issue when their findings 
suggested that the external environment might not have the same effect on the 
process-outcomes association if different aspects of firm performance (e.g. firm 
growth and profit) are involved. If this result is confirmed, it might help explaining 
some of the contradictions found in the literature, as available studies have 
operationalized performance in a variety of ways.
Additionally, Atuahene-Gima and Li (2004), in their study of new technology 
ventures in China, exposed yet another complication to the establishment of the role 
of external environment as a moderator of the process-outcomes association.
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Working with the uncertainty dimension of the external environment, they drew 
attention to the possibility that different sources of uncertainty (demand uncertainty 
and technology uncertainty) would moderate the process-outcomes association 
differently. Their hypothesis was confirmed by their empirical investigation. As a 
result of their findings, and as noted by the authors themselves, the role played by 
context emerges as an even more complex one than initially thought. These results 
indicate that it may be necessary to open-up our views of the different dimensions of 
external environment to include different sources within each dimension (e.g. 
different sources of complexity or uncertainty) and examine their impacts on the 
process-outcomes association.
2.4.3.1.1. Concluding notes on context as a moderator/mediator of the 
relationship process-outcome
Following the discussions above, it can be summed up that findings from the 
empirical literature on the role of context (external environment) as a moderator of 
the relationship process-outcomes remain controversial and inconclusive. There 
seems to be, however, a predominance of studies suggesting that the association 
between rationality of SD processes and organisation/decision performance is 
positive in dynamic, uncertain environments. However, not much is known regarding 
this association when the environment is less dynamic and uncertain. The same 
applies to the moderator role of other dimensions of the external environment (e.g. 
munificence, complexity).
Interestingly, findings from some studies (e.g. Dean &Sharfman, 1996; Jones et al, 
1992/3; Herek et al, 1987; Janis, 1992) apparently suggest that the rationality- 
performance association may be non-contingent upon variations in the external 
environment.
Additionally, not much research has been done to explore the moderating/mediating 
role, if there is one, of other contextual variables (e.g. organisational and managerial 
characteristics) on the process-outcomes association. Finally, regarding the same 
issue, the available empirical studies have concentrated on the rationality and speed
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dimensions or characteristics of the decision process. Perhaps other process 
characteristics should also be included.
Seemingly, much more research needs to be done before inconsistencies can be 
resolved, cumulative knowledge can be built and a clear theory of the process- 
outcomes association, contingent upon the effect of context, can be developed, given 
that this is the case.
2.4.3.2. Context as antecedent to SDM processes
2.4.3.2.I. Overview
This part of the literature looks at the influences of context on SDM processes or on 
the role played by contextual elements in shaping the SDM processes. If one takes a 
broader view of context, this would include looking at the extent to which variations 
on SDM processes are explained by variations in organisational, environmental, 
decision-specific and managerial factors (Rajagopalan et al, 1997).
As noted by Rajagopalan et al (1997), several authors have referred to the influences 
of aspects of context on SDM processes (e.g. Beach and Mitchell, 1978; Billings, 
Milbum and Schaalman, 1980; Bryson and Bromiley, 1993; Dutton, Fahey and 
Narayanan, 1983; Hitt and Tyler, 1991; Rajagopalan et al, 1993). Other such studies 
include: Papadakis et al (1998), Papadakis and Barwise (2002), Goll and Rasheed
(2005), Papadakis (2006), Elbanna and Child (2007a). Many others have mentioned 
the need for integrative research which explicitly considers the impact of context on 
strategic processes (e.g. Bateman and Zeithaml, 1989; Bryson and Bromiley, 1993; 
Rajagopalan et al, 1993, 1997; Schneider & De Meyer, 1991; Schwenk, 1995).
As shown in the multi-theoretical model of SDM earlier in this Chapter (Fig.2.3), 
context can affect decision processes directly or via the cognitions and actions of 
managers. Most available research in the area concentrates on the direct effects of 
context on processes. With some exceptions (e.g. Schwenk, 1984, 1988), not much 
has been done and can be said of the role of managerial cognitions and actions. In
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other words, not much is known about this indirect role of context in influencing 
SDM processes.
Regarding research on the influences o f  decision specifics on strategic processes, for 
example, and as observed by Papadakis and Barwise (1997, p.276), one important 
aspect to be considered is how the way managers or decision-makers perceive or 
frame the characteristics of the decision to be made (e.g. decision impact, 
complexity, uncertainty) will impact the SD processes. Some of the works in this 
area include Dean and Sharfman (1993), Dutton (1986, 1993), Fredrickson (1985) 
and Haley and Stumph (1989). As empirical research seems to confirm that the 
characteristics of each specific decision will have an important influence on SDM 
processes (Hickson et al, 1985) and as managers cognitions tend to affect their 
labeling of the decision in question, some could argue that this may be an important 
area for managers to act upon in order to try and help leading decision processes in 
the direction they want. Accordingly, Papadakis and Barwise (1997), in their very 
prescriptive line of reasoning, have mentioned: “filtering information and 
manipulating the way the decision is characterized may enable management to 
subsequently control the characteristics of the processes followed” (p.277).
Rajagopalan et al (1997) noticed that research in this area has been very idiosyncratic 
in the choice and conceptualization of decision-specific characteristics (e.g. decision 
urgency, riskiness, magnitude of impact, complexity, politicality, uncertainty and 
familiarity). As a result, comparison between studies has been rendered difficult. 
Additionally, and following an increasing understanding that decision processes are 
shaped by the result of a combination of a multitude of contextual forces acting 
simultaneously, the same authors remarked that the majority of studies on the 
influences of decision-specifics on decision processes (e.g. Stein, 1981; Astley et al, 
1992; Pinfield, 1986; Schilit, 1987; Cray et al, 1991; Papadakis and Lioukas, 1996) 
has not controlled for organisational and environmental aspects. Finally, Papadakis et 
al (1998) observed that most of the studies have looked at the impact of one decision 
characteristic on one dimension of the decision process.
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Regarding the external environment, most of the empirical literature supports a 
strong role for this contextual variable in influencing SDM (e.g. Rajagopalan et al, 
1993, Schwenk, 1988, Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Jemison, 1981, Dess and Beard, 
1984). However, there is some evidence to the contrary. Papadakis et al (1998), for 
example, in their integrative study developed in the context of Greek firms, found 
that the external environment characteristics were not as important as other context 
variables in relation to SD processes. Details on these findings are discussed below, 
along with other integrative studies.
The majority of research which dealt with external environment, though, has 
explored its moderator/mediator effect on the process-outcomes relationship. This 
literature has already been reviewed earlier in this Chapter.
Regarding the characteristics o f  the TMT, as pointed out by Papadakis and Barwise
(1997) and Papadakis et al (1998), while the literature on their influence on different 
organisational dimensions and on organisational performance is quite substantial, 
little has been published regarding their impact on SDM processes. Even though 
there is evidence to the importance of TMT characteristics (such as age, tenure, 
educational and functional backgrounds), specific results are mixed and seem unclear 
(Papadakis et al, 1998). A later study developed by the same authors (Papadakis et al, 
2002) tried to bring light to this matter. Through the investigation of 70 SDs in Greek 
firms, the study confirmed that the characteristics of both CEO and TMT (even more 
strongly) influenced strategic decisions. However, it was found that the broader 
context of SDs is more influential than either the CEO or the TMT. Amongst the 
TMT characteristics examined, “aggressiveness”, defined as commitment to beating 
the competition, attitude to innovation and willingness to take risks, stood out as 
more significant. Finally, it was also found that TMT characteristics affect different 
dimensions of SDM process. Another interesting study is the one by Miller et al
(1998), exploring the influences of executive cognitive diversity on decision 
comprehensiveness and extensiveness of strategic planning. Contrary to common 
sense, they found that more executive diversity is negatively related to both. They 
also imply that there might be an indirect impact on performance. Other recent
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findings on this subject are discussed in the review of integrative studies further 
down.
On the influences of organisational characteristics on SDM processes, Rajagopalan 
et al (1997) draw attention to the fact that structure has been the most widely 
researched organisational aspect, including centralization, autonomy and power 
distributions. They noted that other themes, such as organisational past performance, 
strategy and TMT characteristics (here interpreted as an organisational 
characteristic), have been under-researched.
The same authors observed that the literature on the effects of centralization has 
produced contradictory results. While Eisenhardt (1989 and Bourgeois and 
Eisenhardt (1988) have found that power centralization was associated with less 
rationality and poorer performance, Miller (1987) and Miller et al (1988) found 
opposite evidence. On the role of strategy, the works of Segev (1987), Floyd and 
Wooldridge (1992) and Yasai-Ardekani and Haug (1997) seem to confirm it has an 
impact on SD processes.
An interesting work, by Ashmos et al (1998), examined how participation in SDM 
(one characteristic of decision process) is affected by predisposition (rule orientation 
and past financial performance, two organisational characteristics) and 
interpretations of the strategic issues. Following earlier comments in this section, this 
study brings a contribution to fill in the existing gap in the literature on the effect of 
organisational past performance and of managerial perceptions of strategic issues on 
SDM processes.
As the emphasis in the literature increases in terms of looking at influences of broad 
context on SDM processes in an integrative way (i.e. simultaneous effects and 
interactions of context variables) the next section will focus on reviewing recent 
studies which attempted to follow this approach. This review will add to the 
comments above on the influence of each element of broad context on SDM 
processes.
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2.4.3.2.2. Attempts to use an integrative model
As mentioned before, the inconsistencies and contradictory evidence found in the 
literature on SDM, including the role of context, might have derived, at least in part, 
from model under-specification (Rajagopalan et al, 1997; Sharfman and Dean, 1997). 
This view, amongst other factors, has led to a call for research which is more 
integrative, which will look simultaneously at how several variables and several 
characteristics or attributes of each of them, involving content, context and process, 
will interact and combine together to produce outcomes. This demand for more 
integrative studies comes accompanied by a broader view of context and its role in 
shaping strategic decision processes and subsequently in influencing outcomes.
In compliance with the above concerns and views, some studies have more recently 
tried to take this approach to study SDM and to look at the effect of context on SDM 
processes. Due to their relevance in providing a more holistic view of the complex 
links between context, SDM processes and outcomes, in close association with the 
underlying concerns of this thesis, they receive special attention in this review and 
are discussed below.
Five studies have been identified as attempts to use an integrative model to look at 
strategic decision-making. They are: “The effects o f context on strategic decision­
making processes and outcomes”, by Sharfman and Dean (1997); “Strategic 
decision-making processes: the role o f  management and context”, by Papadakis et al
(1998); “Influences on strategic decision-making in the Dutch financial services 
industry”, by Brouthers and Brouthers (2000), and “Strategic decision speed and 
firm performance ”, by Baum and Wally (2003).
A basic comparison between these 5 studies which attempted to work with 
contextual models of SDM, is presented in Table 2.2. The Table illustrates the choice 
of context, process and outcomes variables, along with their specific characteristics, 
as selected by the authors.
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Like with other studies reviewed in this Chapter, a simple comparison of the 5 
studies in Table 2.2 exposes the several differences regarding the choice and 
characterization/operationalization of main variables. These differences also extend 
to methodological approaches, cultural settings and even the focus of research. These 
remarks also generalize to other works on the influences of context on SDM 
processes.
As a consequence, and as it happened with the previous topic on the role of context 
in moderating the process-outcome relationship, this part of the literature has also 
produced results which are not always comparable.
Table 2.2 - A comparison of integrative studies on the effects of context on 
SDM processes: The characterization of context and process_________
Sharfman 
and Dean  
(1997)
Papadakis et al (1998) Brouthers and 
Brouthers 
(2000)
Baum  
& Wally 
(2003)
Elbanna and
Child
(2007b)
SAMPLE A N D
RESEARCH
SETTINGS
60 decisions 
within 25 
companies 
across 16 
industries — 
US
70 SD in 38 manufacturing 
firms in Greece
9 banks and 33 
insurance 
companies in 
the
Netherlands
318 CEOS 
from
manufacturing 
center in the 
US, involving 
all 10 GICS
1st stage: 117 
SD on 117 
Egyptian 
companies
2nd stage: 169
CEOS and
senior
managers
from private
Egyptian
manufacturing
companies
across 9
industries
BROAD CONTEXT
D ecision content/ 
decision specific 
characteristics
Importance to 
the firm, 
contention 
and
uncertainty
Magnitude of impact, 
threat/crisis, frequency, type of 
SD (perceived and objective 
measures)
- -
Decision 
importance, 
uncertainty 
and decision 
motive
TMT characteristics Length of 
team tenure, 
individual 
tenure in the 
firm and 
interpersonal 
trust.
CEO characteristics: risk 
propensity, education, need for 
achievement;
TMT characteristics: level of 
education, aggressive 
philosophy
Age,
educational
level,
functional
work
experience, 
executive level 
and risk 
propensity
- -
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External environment Complexity, 
instability and 
competitive 
threat
Heterogeneity, dynamism, 
hostility
Turbulence: 
speed, 
complexity, 
novelty, and 
predictability 
of changes
Dynamism,
munificence
Uncertainty,
hostility
Internal
environment/
Organisational
characteristics
Size, power 
concentration, 
degree of  
external 
control, and 
level o f slack 
resources
Internal systems (e.g. planning 
formality), company 
performance, size, corporate 
control (i.e. ownership)
Entrepreneurial
style:
willingness to 
take business 
risks, to be 
proactive when 
competing with 
other firms and 
to innovate 
Firm structure: 
centralization 
o f DM, 
adherence to 
formal rules 
and
procedures, 
control o f 
information 
flows,
reporting and
workflow
relationships
Centralization,
formalization
Performance, 
company size
PROCESS
CHARACTERISTICS
Procedural 
Rationality, 
political 
behavior and 
flexibility
Comprehensiveness/rationality, 
financial reporting, rule 
formalization, hierarchical 
decentralization, lateral 
communication, politicization, 
problem-solving dissension
Strategic 
aggressiveness: 
entrepreneurial, 
administrative 
and technical
Decision
speed
Rationality, 
intuition and 
political 
behavior
U N IT  OF ANALYSIS Decision Organisation Organisation Organisation Decision
OUTCOMES
MEASURES
Decision
effectiveness
N o attempt to link with 
outcomes
N o attempt to 
link with 
outcomes
Firm
performance: 
firm growth 
and
profitability
Decision
effectiveness
N otes Focus on the 
effect of 
broad context 
on SD 
processes
Focus on the effect o f broad 
context on SD processes
Focus on the 
effect of 
context on 
strategic 
aggressiveness
Focus on the 
effect o f SD 
speed on firm 
performance, 
with special 
attention on 
how context 
relates to SD 
speed.
Focus on the 
impact o f  
SDM process 
dimensions 
on SD 
effectiveness 
and on the 
moderating 
role o f broad 
context 
variables
From the five studies, the most relevant empirical work in connection with the 
objectives of this thesis is the one by Sharfman and Dean (1997), on “The effects o f  
context on strategic decision-making processes and outcomes To my knowledge, 
this is the only integrative study which has simultaneously looked at effects of broad
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context (including external and internal environment, decision content and TMT 
characteristics) and at decision outcomes.
In their study, the authors present an interesting diagram with a useful visualization 
of their multiple contexts model of strategic decision-making processes and 
effectiveness, showing the 4 elements of context and the 3 dimensions of process 
employed in their study and their association with decision effectiveness. This 
diagram is reproduced below in Fig. 2.4.
CONTEXT PRO C ESS OUTCOME
Flexible
Methods
Procedural
Rationality
Decision
Effectiveness
Political
Behaviour
Implementation
Quality
Decision
Making
Team
Decision
Content
Organizational
C haracteristics
B usiness
Environment
Fig. 2.4 A Multiple Contexts M odel o f Strategic Decision Process and Effectiveness 
source: Sharfman and Dean (1997)
It is interesting to note that the authors take the view that managers have a role in 
influencing decision processes and this way, have included decision-making team 
characteristics as one aspect of context in their model (Dean and Sharfman, 1996). In 
their study, the authors examined the effects of procedural rationality and political 
behavior on SDM effectiveness.
Interestingly, they controlled for environmental favorability and quality of 
implementation, two aspects thought to be influential on outcomes. They defined 
environmental favorability as “the extent to which environmental conditions 
subsequent to the decision favor the choice that was made” (p. 187). The quality of
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decision implementation was defined as “the competence with which the steps are 
taken to execute the choice” (p. 187).
Amongst the findings, this study confirmed that decision processes matter and do 
influence outcomes or effectiveness (as also found in Dean and Sharfman, 1996) and 
showed that context drives process. Environmental favorability and quality of 
implementation were also shown to be positively related to SD effectiveness. The 
findings regarding the influence of context on SDM processes confirm the 
assumption that SD processes are shaped by a multitude of contextual factors.
In addition to the important roles of context in shaping decision processes and of 
process in influencing outcomes shown in this study, the crucial role of 
implementation in influencing outcomes also became apparent in the results. As 
pointed out by the authors, the study’s objective data showed that environmental 
favorability and implementation responded for most of the variance. Interestingly, 
their subjective data, based on manager’s perceptions, confirmed that implementation 
was seen as the most important influence on the outcomes of strategic choices but 
only just (p. 197).
2.4.3.2.3. Concluding notes on context as antecedent to SDM processes
The integrative approach to the study of SDM and, in particular, of the influence of 
context on SDM processes, is relatively new. Earlier studies have usually focused on 
one element of context and one characteristic or dimension within this element. 
There are few exceptions when more than one element of context, or more than one 
feature within a selected context element, were examined simultaneously. Some 
examples include: Jones et al (1994); Goll and Rasheed (1997); Slevin and Covin 
(1997); Miller & Friesen (1983); Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988), and Eisenhardt
(1989). However, it is only in the last few years that this approach has received 
increased attention and gained a more definite shape. It seems to be the way forward 
to explore effects of context. But so far, it is still too incipient, both in number of 
studies and in comparability of results, to produce significant advances in our
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knowledge of how context shapes SDM processes and, indirectly, influence 
outcomes.
In a more general way, it can be said that the studies exploring the impact of context 
on SDM processes have produced contradictory results and did not yield much 
cumulative knowledge so far. This is a repetition of what happened in the other area 
exploring the moderating effect of context on the process-outcomes relationship.
Finally, it should be noted that, despite their limitations, the more recent studies in 
the field not only tend to bring in the new integrative approach to SDM, but also 
draw attention to the need for new methods to study this complex organisational 
process. They also represent one step further in understanding how context-specific 
strategic decision-making is.
2.5. Concluding comments and research objectives
As the theoretical and empirical literature on strategic decision-making evolved, it 
unveiled more and more of the great complexity involved in this central 
organisational process. If it did not provide the amount of cumulative knowledge we 
could have expected, considering the myriad of works in the field, nor the so wanted 
reliable prescriptive recommendations, it did indeed reveal and acknowledge many 
of its weaknesses and strengths and brought more awareness of what the 
requirements are for advancing knowledge in the field. Essentially, as advised by 
some of the SDM literature reviewers (Schwenk, 1995; Rajagopalan et al, 1993; 
Eisenhardt, and Zbaracki, 1992, Rajagopalan et al, 1997; Papadakis et al, 1997), we 
need to be prepared for some significant content and methodological changes in the 
research designs in the field. In fact, some of these changes are already reflected in 
several of more recent works in the area.
In general, there seems to be a tendency for emphasizing more integrative research 
which, given the appropriate choice of method, should be able to take in more 
elements of the complexity surrounding SDM processes, produce more 
comparability of findings and hopefully fill in the gaps and resolve the contradictions
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found in the literature. Within this tendency, it is also observed an emphasis on 
contextual influences on SDM processes and outcomes.
Some studies have tried to explore this more integrative perspective and the 
influence of broad context on SDM (e.g. Sharfman and Dean, 1997; Papadakis et al, 
1998; Brouthers et al, 2000; Baum and Wally, 2003). However, they all seem to fall 
within the so-called “traditional” perspective of SDM.
As explained earlier in this document, contrary to what happened in the rational and 
action perspectives, where the ontological status of the conceptualization of decision 
was never really questioned (Chia, 1994), in the interpretative perspective decisions 
cease to be seen as ‘real’ in the sense we have known in the traditional perspective to 
become a ‘social construct’. They become ‘acts of interpretation’ instead of ‘acts of 
choice’ (Weick, 1995). The supremacy of thought, intention, over action is 
questioned, decision processes are seen as ongoing, not as isolated events, context 
variables such as external environment and organisational structure are ‘enacted’, not 
given, and processes are described in a way which allow for many “truths” or 
plausible explanations, which will emerge via interpretations in context, and not just 
one accurate reading.
It is possible that the interpretative view of SDM can complement the traditional 
view and help with the overall problematic involved with the study and 
understanding of organisational and strategic decision-making processes.
Interestingly, and apparently following some sort of parallel with the tendency 
observed within the traditional perspective to become more encompassing or 
integrative, a reconciliation of SDM perspectives has been proposed by authors such 
as Laroche (1994) and Hendry (2000). Hendry (2000) goes even beyond and 
proposes a vehicle (decisions as elements of organisational discourse) through which 
a conciliation of these streams of thought might take effect.
A broader, all-encompassing view of decisions and SDM may open up new 
possibilities for us to capture the complexities of SDM. They may just as well expose
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the ‘uniqueness’ or context-specific nature of SD processes and, subsequently, their 
‘unprogrammemability’.
This research intends to explore these issues. Following the observation by 
Papadakis and Barwise (1997, p.293) that there is “a scarcity of research focusing on 
outcomes and contexts” and a “paucity of integrative research more generally”, this 
research focuses on the influence of broader context on SDM processes and 
outcomes. The view that further research is needed on the influence of broader 
context on SDM is shared by other authors, such as Wally and Baum (1994), 
Rajagopalan et al (1993) and Bryson and Bromiley (1993).
In line with other remarks by Papadakis and Barwise (1997), who drew attention to 
the need to do “research that more accurately reflects the SD process in its context” 
and to the fact that large sample research on SDs has failed to address this gap, this 
research emulates a longitudinal design to create a rich picture of two strategic 
decisions developed in the context of the space sector.
It attempts to extend the view on the complex links between context, decision 
content, process and outcomes by also looking at the role of implementation (an 
under explored theme in the SDM literature). Additionally, it tries to go beyond the 
confines of the traditional view of SDM by employing a methodological approach 
which allows for the observation of features from the action and interpretative 
perspectives on SDM (as categorized by Hendry, 2000).
The result, it is expected, should be a more ‘realistic’ view of the complexities 
associated with SDM as decisions evolve over time and of how the forces of context 
act to influence strategic decisions and their outcomes, all the way through decision 
formulation, implementation and observation of outcomes. As the current state of the 
literature on SDM seems to indicate that the time is not ready for broad 
generalizations, maybe it is time instead to go one step back and take a close-up view 
of strategic decision processes as they unfold over time. This could assist in the 
establishment of the relevance and relative weight of multiple variables and variable 
interactions in influencing outcomes, as well as of the directions of causality between
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them. More importantly, this can contribute to the understanding of how context- 
specific strategic decisions really are. This way, the feasibility and worth of making 
generalizations in this field can be reassessed and, if it is the case, more appropriate 
models of SDM can be proposed.
hi view of what has been presented in this Literature Review Chapter and 
considering what has just been discussed in the previous paragraphs, this research 
intends to offer a new inductive empirical study of the role of context in influencing 
SDM and outcomes with the following main and specific objectives:
Research Main Objectives
• Develop a contextualized, integrated view of SDM in the space sector which 
more closely mirrors the reality of organisational decision-making as 
experienced by practitioners in the field.
• Establish a macro framework according to which context variables from
different vertical layers of context influence SDM and decisions outcomes over 
time in public space R&D organisations.
« Reassess conceptual models of SDM and the role of context based on the
analytical findings of this research and propose revised models which can be
tested in future research in the field.
Research Specific Objectives
• Develop an overview of SDM and of context variables and their influences 
on SDM in the space sector from the macro (business) level.
• Develop an overview of context variables and their influences on SDM from 
the meso (organisational) level.
• Examine the direct and indirect influences of context variables from the 
macro, meso and micro levels of context on the SDM processes, 
implementation and outcomes of two large space projects.
The next Chapter, Research Design and Methodology, explains how these objectives 
are going to be achieved.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
3.1. Introduction
As explained in the Literature Review Chapter, the influences of context on SDM 
processes and outcomes, with few exceptions, have been explored largely through 
cross-sectional surveys & quantitative deductive research designs. The evidence 
produced remains contradictory and only lately more inclusive, integrative research 
designs seem to be able to absorb a bit more of the overall complexity associated with 
SDM processes in general and the different ways according to which SD processes and 
outcomes are influenced by contextual variables.
The choice of this research’s design, including its inductive qualitative approach, is an 
attempt to counteract some of the limitations of the more common cross-sectional, 
static, quantitative studies in the field and offer another view of the effects of context on 
SDM processes and outcomes. It should be noted, for example, that amongst the survey 
studies, even the ones which adopted a longitudinal design, as opposed to the more 
common cross-sectional design, haven’t been able to observe the unfolding of events 
over time.
As this research intended to look at how context influences SDM processes and 
outcomes over time, all along the formulation and development of space projects 
through to delivery and observation of outcomes, the choice of a different research 
design became necessary.
The aspect mentioned above, alongside the frustrated attempt to apply a questionnaire 
in a large space organisation in the early stages of this research, as explained before, 
have helped defining this research’s strategy. Its main characteristics are explained 
below.
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3.2. Main features of research design
3.2.1. Initial Considerations
As stated by Yin (1994, p. 18), "a research design is the logic that links the data to be 
collected (and the conclusions to be drawn) to the initial questions o f study" (Yin, 1994,
p. 18).
Quite often, the nature of the research question directly determines which research 
strategy should be adopted. This intimate association between the research questions 
and the choice of the research strategy is pointed out, for example, by Field and Morse 
(1991), and emphasised by Dreher (1994, p.293): "the single most important element in 
constructing a research design is the consistency o f the method with the research 
questions being asked".
The choice of a research design requires careful consideration of the particularities of 
each research setting and objectives and a weighed examination of how different 
methodological alternatives can contribute to produce the desired outcomes.
Rajagopalan et al (1997, p.232) pointed out the need for a match between the chosen 
method and the chosen research topic and, in debates about method, for examining “the 
way different methods open up and constrain opportunities fo r  certain kinds o f 
theoretical, empirical and practical developments ”.
The strong link between the particularities of each research setting and the choice of 
research methods is also well illustrated in the comment below:
"The most relevant o f the presuppositions that determine one's research perspective is 
that methodological issues must always be answered within the context o f a particular 
research setting. That is to say: methodologies are neither appropriate nor 
inappropriate until they are applied to a specific research problem" (Downey & 
Ireland, 1983, p. 179).
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Most often, the cautious consideration of methodological alternatives in face of the 
many particularities that each research setting is likely to present ultimately result in 
"self-styled” research designs. In the particular case of qualitative designs, for example, 
this point had already been remarked by Wolcott (1994, p.390), when he wrote: "each 
of us doing qualitative/descriptive research is indeed self-styled".
Likewise, after careful examination and some testing of methodological alternatives for 
this research, a "self-styled" design was produced that seemed to best accommodate the 
needs and constraints involved in its development and which was expected to yield the 
desirable outcomes. This design is explained in the pages ahead.
3.2.2. Inductive Approach
This thesis takes an inductive approach to address its research question and 
objectives on the role of context in influencing SDM and outcomes in space R&D 
organisations.
As it will become clearer further along in this Chapter, this research attempts to 
counteract some of the limitations of the more common cross-sectional, static, 
deductive survey studies which comprise the majority of available studies in this 
field. As discussed in the Literature Review Chapter, these studies led to numerous 
inconsistencies of findings which they seem to have been unable to resolve. As a result 
of this recognition, there has been an increasing demand for more integrative, more 
inclusive studies, capable of absorbing more of the complexity surrounding the field, in 
the hope that those may help explain some of the contradictory findings and pave the 
way for the development of a coherent SDM theory. Naturally, this kind of studies 
requires a departure from the research methods which have been predominantly 
employed so far.
With this theoretical motivation in mind, this research set out to explore and “discover” 
rather than confirming or testing. Central to inductive methodologies, the 
“discovery” mode (Morse, 2002, p. 196) presupposes no theoretical pre-framing. 
While deductive methods start from a theory or hypothesis to be tested moving down
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to the necessary data to verify or confirm this theory/hypothesis, the inductive 
approach follows the opposite path, going from the specific to the more general, from 
observations to conclusions, from data to theory.
Accordingly, no context variables and/or dimensions, relationships or theoretical 
models were pre-selected as of interest to this research. As it will be explained in 
more details further on in this Chapter, data collection and data analysis were 
conducted with views to gain insight on the research topic gradually, though a 
progressive focusing approach, and to allow for a broad view of context and its 
influence on SDM to emerge from its natural setting, without pre-theoretical framing.
As explained by Steenhuis and Bruijn (2006), the use of multiple sources of evidence 
and of different analysis techniques are common characteristics of grounded 
inductive approach and can be used to the advantage of the researcher who can 
combine them in a variety of ways to gain more insight on the observed 
phenomenon. As it will become clearer further on in this Chapter, the different 
phases of data collection (pilot study, first and second round interviews, and the case 
studies) and the three analysis phases (from the macro, meso and micro level) 
employed in this research all combined to generate increasing insight on the research 
topic.
Differently from deductive methods, the main goal of choosing an inductive 
approach is not to validate theory but to generate knowledge and new insight, 
grounded in empirical data and which can be tested in future research.
The inductive approach adopted in this thesis is also in line with the grounded theory 
approach proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and confirmed in Glaser (1978, 
p.44): “there is no initial preconceived framework of concepts and hypotheses”.
Nevertheless, differently to what usually happens in grounded theory approach, 
where “a substantive literature study is discouraged because of its inability to 
generate insight” (Steenhuis and Bruijn, 2006, p.7), this thesis did review the 
literature before going into the field. However, the knowledge of the literature was
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not used to generate a theoretical framework to guide subsequent research or to pre­
frame research in any way, as in deductive studies, but rather to “create awareness of 
what is known” and to get some guidance as to what are the promising areas 
(Steenhuis and Bruijn, 2006, p.7). In this thesis, this “awareness” of what is known 
(and what is not known) was instrumental in the choice of the research’s design and 
methods, as indicated in the paragraphs above.
In summary, in the belief that it may still be premature to test hypothesis or theories 
on SDM and that more insight needs to be gained in the field before more refined 
theories on SDM area ready to be tested, the inductive approach was the preferred 
choice for this research’s design.
This is not to say, that, as it commonly happens in most inductive research, there has 
not been instances where some deductive reasoning was also employed, such as 
when, for example, the revised conceptual models which are presented in Fig.7.3 and 
Fig-7.4 were developed. As it will be seen in Chapter 7, findings from this research 
helped confirming relationships between content, context, process and outcomes 
which had been previously established in models from the literature (Fig.2.1 and 
Fig.2.3). Thus, the revised models which were presented in Fig.7.3 and Fig. 7.4 have 
components which were confirmatory of previous theory (typical of deductive 
reasoning) as well as new inclusions which were grounded on the research’s 
observations and findings (typical of inductive reasoning).
However, this does not change the main inference orientation of the research. As 
explained by Morse (2002), even if minor parts of the research are confirmatory or 
deductive, this does not change the overall inductive drive, as the “major direction of 
thinking” remains inductive.
3.2.3. Qualitative approach
Even though the topic of this thesis is amenable to be explored through the use of 
quantitative methods, as it has indeed been the case with several studies from the related
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literature (e.g. Sharfinan and Dean, 1997; Papadakis et al, 1998), this research 
approaches it via a qualitative design.
As seen in Chapter 1, this research’s objectives clearly cover contextual analysis. 
Additionally, they expose a processual emphasis, as it is interested in the unfolding of 
events over time (influences of context on sdm processes, implementation and 
outcomes). Finally, it calls for a more exploratory and descriptive kind of research 
where new factors and variables are allowed to emerge and contextual associations 
between them can be visualised.
In combination, these characteristics strongly argue for a qualitative strategy, as several 
passages of the literature on research methods seem to suggest.
Thus, for instance, Bryman (1989, p. 140) comments: "quantitative research tends to 
deal less well with the processual aspects of organisational reality. It often entails fairly 
static analyses in which relationships among variables are explored”. The same author 
(p. 137) presents a "number of distinguishing features of much qualitative research", 
amongst which are the emphasis on process ("the unfolding of events in time") and the 
delineation of context. Another author, Creswell (1994, p.9), presents exploratory 
research, variables unknown and the importance of the context as characteristics of the 
qualitative paradigm.
Additional aspects commonly associated with the qualitative paradigm also seemed to 
be much in line with the objectives and interests of this research. For example, Denzin 
and Lincoln (1994), as quoted in Creswell (1998, p. 14), draw attention to the fact that 
qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter. 
Creswell (1998) emphasizes the “complex, holistic picture” that takes the reader into 
the multiple dimensions of a problem or issue and displays it in all of its complexity.
Finally, amongst the reasons pointed out by Creswell (1998) for selecting a qualitative 
design, one was particularly appealing to this research: the need to present a detailed 
view of the topic, which occur, according to the author, “when the wide-angle lens or
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the distant panoramic shot will not suffice to present answers to the problem, or the 
close-up view does not exist” (Creswell, 1998, p. 17).
As a result of the above considerations, the choice of a qualitative approach seemed 
natural. First, it stood out as the most appropriate to meet the objectives and interests of 
the proposed research. Second, and as a direct result of the first, it seemed to offer the 
best prospects for obtaining the expected outcomes.
3.2.4. Case studies strategy
3.2.4.I. The choice of case studies strategy
From the start, the intention to take a close-up view and offer a detailed account of how 
context comes to interfere with the development of SD processes and their outcomes 
over time made it clear that the size of the sample in this research would have to be 
sacrificed. Additionally, the search for a research strategy that would allow for the 
relevant variables and interactions between them to emerge from their natural setting, 
with a clear view of the direction of the relationships, made the choice of a case study 
strategy an appealing one.
Indeed, the case study strategy seems to deal well with all the aspects raised above. 
Case studies prioritize detail over quantity and allow for the observation of multiple 
variables in context and the relationships between them. Besides, they can provide a 
much more “realistic” and complete picture of organisational life as compared to cross- 
sectional or even longitudinal surveys. These and other features of case studies, which 
show their appropriateness for approaching this research’s topic, are confirmed in some 
of the definitions and views provided by several writers on research methods. Some of 
those views are presented below.
The definition of case studies as a research strategy, as employed by Yin (1994, p. 13), 
for example, exposes great affinity with the nature of the research proposed in this 
thesis. He defines case study as "an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between
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phenomenon and context are not clearly evident". The same author also adds: "you 
would use the case study method because you deliberately wanted to cover contextual 
conditions - believing that they might be highly pertinent to your phenomenon of 
study".
Creswell (1998, p. 61) defines a case study as “an exploration of a ‘bounded system’ or 
a case (or multiple cases) over time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving 
multiple sources of information rich in context”. They added that this bounded system 
is bounded by time and place.
Lincoln and Cuba (1985, p.360) draw attention to the fact that case studies provide a 
grounded assessment of context. They state that a case study “represents an unparalleled 
means for communicating contextual information that is grounded in the particular 
setting that was studied”.
The same authors also mention that case studies present “a holistic and lifelike 
description that is like those that the readers normally encounter in their experience of 
the world” (p.359).
The ability of case studies to deal with a variety of evidence, as stressed by Yin (1994, 
p.8), was also an appealing factor in choosing the case study strategy for this research.
One of the claimed limitations of case studies is that they are not so suitable for 
generalizations in the statistical sense of the word (Yin, 1994; Stake, 1994; Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985).
As this research is not concerned with this kind of generalization, this limitation is 
not an issue. In fact, generalizations may not even be desirable or possible on SDM 
studies in general, as it has already been raised in the literature. For example, Bell et 
al (1997, p. 175), when raising some critical issues for SDM researchers, suggested 
that results are unlikely to be broadly generalizable, but rather be contexts or content 
specific.
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3.2.4.2. Instrumental case studies
As seen by Stake (1994) and adopted by authors such as Denzin & Lincoln (1994) and 
Creswell (1998), case studies can be instrumental or intrinsic. In an intrinsic case study, 
the focus is on the case itself, which is chosen because of its uniqueness or particularity. 
In an instrumental case study, as defined by Stake, "a particular case is examined to 
provide insight into an issue or refinement of theory. The case is of secondary interest; 
it plays a supportive role, facilitating our understanding of something else” (Stake, 
1994, p. 237). This research makes use of instrumental case studies.
3.2.5. General analytical strategy: a progressively focusing approach
In order to address its objectives this research employs a progressively focusing 
analytical strategy.
hi the first stage of this strategy, information obtained from different space 
organisations are analysed and the main contextual factors with potential to influence 
strategic decision-making across space organisations are identified (analysis from the 
macro (“business”) level). The ways according to which these context variables are 
perceived to influence SDM are discussed.
hi the second stage, following the progressively focusing approach, the analysis focuses 
on the meso (organisational) level and looks at the context specifics of one space 
organisation (NASA) and at how they are likely to influence SDM across all the 
different areas of space projects developed by the organisation. In the process of 
examining context at NASA’s level, the characteristics of the context variables pre­
identified at the macro level are described within NASA’s environment and any other 
new context variable or contextual peculiarities specific to NASA’s organisation that 
may have emerged from the analysis are discussed.
Finally, in the third stage of the analysis, following the ‘traditional’ view of SDM (see 
the Literature Review Chapter), the analysis goes down to the micro (project) level. In 
the most substantial empirical part of this research, two case studies were chosen and
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carried out, involving a detailed account of the development of two large space sciences 
projects by NASA. The case studies add to the previous analysis of context in stages 1 
and 2 a close-in view of SDM in one large space organisation and a basis from where 
the actual influences of context could be observed. In fact, the case studies investigated 
in detail how contextual variables actually interfered with the SDM processes, 
implementation and outcomes of the two space projects mentioned above.
Based on Pettigrew’s view of contextualism (Pettigrew, 1990), the influence of multiple 
vertical layers of context, inside and outside the organisation, over the horizontal 
dimensions of process (including formulation, implementation and delivery of 
outcomes) is examined. By also looking at the links between content, context, process 
and outcomes, the direct and indirect effects of context on outcomes are observed.
Based on the overall results of the analysis process, a framework according to which the 
context variables at all levels influence SDM and outcomes of space projects is 
developed. The role of context in influencing SDM and outcomes in space R&D 
organisations is then discussed.
3.3. Data collection strategy and methods
This thesis adopted a three-phased data collection strategy and multiple data collection 
methods, as it will be shown below.
Emphasis was put on keeping methods "flexible and opportunistic" (Eisenhardt, 1989, 
p.533) throughout the research process. This way, methods could benefit from an 
ongoing analysis of the new evidence being collected and be refined accordingly. Also, 
flexibility of the methods allowed for responsiveness to possible opportunities 
materialised during the course of the research.
3.3.1. Phases of data collection
As mentioned earlier, the data collection was done in three phases, which are explained 
below.
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3.3.11. Phase 1: Pilot Study and first round of interviews
The first phase involved the pilot study developed in Brazil and a first round o f 
interviews with a few selected managers and employees from different space 
organisations. It provided information at a general level covering contextual factors and 
other major concerns and issues on SDM in space organisations across several 
countries.
3 3.1.2. Phase 2: Second round of "stimulated" interviews
hi the second phase, a second round o f interviews was carried out, involving the space 
organisations of the US (NASA), Europe (ESA) and France (CNES), which were 
selected for study in more details. Some documentary and archival evidence was also 
examined to complement information from the interviews, whenever necessary. These 
interviews were “stimulated” interviews, as explained further down, in the “Data 
Collection Methods” section. This time more specific and detailed information on 
contexts for SDM and on SDM procedures in these three space organisations was 
obtained.
NASA is the largest space organisation in the world. If we leave aside the former 
URSS space programme (access to information on its strategic decision-making 
proved very difficult), ESA comes second as the largest space budget in the world, 
followed by France, through CNES. It was assumed that, being the largest space 
organisations in the world, and additionally being ESA a particularly complex and 
peculiar organisation as a European consortium for space projects, a look at their 
strategic decision-making and contextual variables should expose most of the 
complexity which is expected to involve the area. Hence, along with the first round 
interviews, it was expected that extra interviews concentrating on these three 
agencies should provide enough information to develop an overview of strategic 
decision-making in the space sector as a whole and to unveil the relevant context 
variables. So, the majority of and best elaborated (used a model as stimulus) 
interviews were concentrated in these three space agencies, from the first and second 
group of countries, according to annual budgets (see classification Table in Section
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4.1.3). It should also be added that, as Brazil, which belongs to the third group of 
countries in terms of space expenditures, had already been covered in details during the 
Pilot study, at least one of each of the three groups of countries in terms of space 
budgets had their SDM contexts studied in more details.
3.31.3. Phase 3: Two case studies
The undertaking of two case studies was the activity of the third and main phase o f data 
collection and o f the research in general Two polar cases, in relation to their final 
outcomes, were chosen. Regarding contextual conditions, though, the two cases were 
very similar, as they were purposely chosen to allow for some comparability. Both 
projects were of the same nature (scientific), developed within the same area of 
NASA, the Office of Space Science and Applications - OSSA, at about the same 
period in time. Both projects were large and complex and had similar costs, of 
around US 500 million dollars. However, one of them was a success, which was the 
case of the Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS), and the other one was a 
failure, the case of Mars Observer (MO).
The case studies data base consists essentially of documentary and archival evidence. 
However, interviews with two decision makers involved in each of the cases were 
also conducted and incorporated in the data base. In general terms, information on 
the case studies was collected covering the antecedents leading up to the proposal of 
the two projects, the decision-making or formulation phase and the implementation 
phase through to project delivery and observation of first outcomes.
Specific information on the data collection methods employed in each of the three 
phases listed above is provided next.
3.3.2. Data collection methods
During the pilot study phase, which was developed within the context of the original 
research proposal, different methods were used in a trial manner, as in preparation for 
subsequent phases of the research. A decision-scenario based questionnaire was
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included and later on dropped, for reasons already explained earlier on in the 
Introduction Chapter (Section 1.3). Following the pilot study, methods were essentially 
complementary.
3.3.21. Interviews 
3.3.2.1.1. General information
Medium-duration interviews of between 2 and 3 hours were used during the pilot study 
in Brazil and the first round of interviews with managers and employees from different 
space organisations. In the other two phases of the research, interviews covered a 
shorter period of time, between 1 and 1:30 hours. All the interviews were audio-taped 
for a more accurate rendition of the data and information provided by the respondents.
3.3.2.1.2. Semi-structured interviews (Pilot study phase)
Semi-structured interviews were used in the pilot study to try out specific questions and 
to make sure that all the relevant topics would be covered. A general guide for the 
interviews with the relevant questions and additional prompts was employed. 
Nevertheless, answers were not framed into any pre-conceived set of alternatives. 
Instead, they were purposely left open-ended, in accordance with the exploratory nature 
of this phase (see Appendix A2.2).
Interviewees were at the same time respondents and key informants in that they were 
asked to suggest sources of further evidence as well as to indicate names for future 
contact or interviews. In most cases, they also provided shortcuts forthe access to 
relevant information and relevant people.
This phase provided a basic understanding of the nature of strategic decisions made by 
the space sector, what was involved in making and implementing them and what were 
the major factors and stakeholders generally influencing strategic decision-making in 
the area. For this reason, as explained before, the results from the pilot study remained
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relevant, even after the research objectives were reviewed and a new research proposal 
was developed.
3.3.2.L3. ‘Stimulated’ Interviews (Second phase of data collection)
‘Stimulated’ interviews were employed in the second phase of data collection. Like in 
the previous phase, interviews remained of an open-ended nature. This time, though, the 
interviewees were presented with a ‘working’ decision-making model at the start of the 
interviews (see Appendix A2.3.a and A2.3.b). The model, which had been developed 
during the pilot study, was then used as a basis to stimulate comments by the 
interviewees. After an introductory presentation of the model, its objectives and 
components, the interviewees were then asked to comment on whether and to what 
extent they thought the model was adequate for describing major issues related to 
strategic decision-making in their organisations. The contextual influences on SDM 
processes and outcomes were explored around the working-model.
Here again, interviewees worked as informants and facilitators, playing a decisive role 
in providing names, relevant materials and indicating new sources of evidence for the 
last phase of the research.
3.3.2.I.4. Focused Interviews (Third phase of data collection: case studies)
Focused interviews were employed in the third phase of data collection, relating to the 
conduct of case studies of two strategic decisions made by NASA. Partially open-ended 
and partially close-ended, these interviews, contrary to the other two kinds described 
above, followed a much more specific set of questions. These questions related to each 
of the projects being covered and the involvement of the interviewees with them (see 
Appendix A2.5). '
3.3.2.2. Documentary Evidence & Archival Data
Many different kinds of documents, along with some archival data, were used in all the 
three phases of the research. In some instances, they were used to complement
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information provided through interviews and in others as the main source of evidence. 
It should be observed that, in both cases, they contributed to eliminate the recollection 
problem, so common with interviews.
Amongst the documents are: formal studies or evaluations, programmes proposals and 
progress reports, letters, memoranda, newspapers clippings, press releases, company 
newsletters and other internal documents and reports. In a different category of 
documentary evidence, books and journal articles were also functional in many 
instances in providing information about specific space organisations and their space 
programmes.
As to archival data, I made use of organisational charts and other records, like budgets 
and plans, lists of names (e.g. list of project managers) and some survey data.
Documents and archival data represented an important source of evidence during the 
whole course of this research but played an essential role in the third phase, for the 
development of the two case studies.
The retrieval of documents represented a substantial part of the data collection and it 
took place all along the development of this research. In particular, a concentration of 
efforts occurred during the third phase of data collection, in preparation for the case 
studies. Finding out and being granted access to the relevant documentation on the two 
space projects from NASA was an important issue. For that, the 3 months spent in 
Washington DC, at the Space Policy Institute and NASA, were crucial. NASA’s 
History Office provided most of the documentary evidence for the two case studies.
The complete list of documents and archival data used in this research are presented in 
Appendix 1.
3.4. Data Analysis
The analysis procedures, along with more specific information on data base and other 
related methodological issues, are explained and provided below as per stage of the
analysis process, namely: 1) Analysis from the macro (“business”) level; 2) Analysis 
from the meso (organisational) level, and 3) Analysis from the micro (project) level: 
the case studies.
3.4.1. Analysis from the macro (“business”) level
3.4.1.1. Content
As explained before in this Chapter, this part of the analysis involves understanding 
and outlining of the general context variables to which SDM in space organisations is 
subjected. The main contextual variables with potential to influence strategic decision­
making in these organisations in general are identified. The ways according to which 
these context variables are perceived to influence SDM are discussed.
3.4.1.2. Approach to context
As explained in the Literature Review Chapter, context has usually been regarded in 
the literature as comprising the external environment and the internal organisational 
environment (even though the majority of studies in the field have focused on the 
influence of different aspects of the external environment on SDM). Some authors, 
though, have taken a broader view of context, which also included the content of 
decisions and top management team (TMT) characteristics (see Sharfinan and Dean, 
1997).
In this thesis, no context variables and/or dimensions were pre-chosen or pre­
selected as relevant for this research and the analysis was conducted with views to 
allow for any relevant context variables to emerge from their natural settings in the 
hope that this would lead to a grounded broad view of context.
3.4.1.3. Sources of evidence
All the information for the development of this part of the research came essentially 
from interviews. However, whenever thought necessary and opportune documentary
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sources, such as internal documents and reports, were employed to complement or to 
detail aspects mentioned during the interviews.
Thus, for the study of contextual influences on SDM from this macro or “business” 
level, I have relied essentially on a series of interviews with top decision-makers from 
different space organisations. The interviews employed here came from both the first 
and second stages of data collection, as described earlier on in this Chapter. In total, 31 
interviews were conducted involving decision-makers from the space organisations of 
Europe, USA, Brazil, France, Canada, Russia, Holland and the UK.
The initial round of interviews started during the pilot study in Brazil and involved 4 
managers of the Brazilian National Space Research Institute (INPE). A former 
director, the current director, the head of the Engineering Department and the head of 
New Programmes were interviewed at the time. In sequence, another 7 interviews 
were conducted with top managers of the space organisations of the USA, France, 
Canada, Russia, The Netherlands and the UK. It also included one interview with a 
top manager of one French aerospace industry. As explained before in this Chapter, 
these were all semi-structured interviews, with open-ended questions and topics to be 
discussed by interviewees.
The second round of interviews included “stimulated” interviews with top managers 
from NASA (USA), ESA (Europe) and CNES (France). In total, 9 interviews were
conducted at NASA, 6 at ESA and 5 at CNES.
In the first round interviews decision-makers were asked to talk about their
organisation's major concerns and constraints regarding the choice of new space 
projects or missions and about how these strategic decisions had been and were likely to 
be made and implemented in their organisations. In the second round interviews 
decision-makers were presented with a “working” model, developed from the 
information obtained from the pilot study and first interviews, and were asked to 
discuss how and whether they thought the model was appropriate for their
organisations’ (or areas) SDM and how they would position themselves within the
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model. This allowed for the identification of important contextual differences between 
space agencies.
Thus, the discussion revolved around the same general topics as the first round 
interviews but this time interviewees were presented with a diagram where major issues 
and aspects were displayed in an organized way and which included some specific 
aspects pre-identified in the first round of interviews as relevant in the making and 
implementation of strategic decisions in space.
All the interviews were tape-recorded as explained before. The information thus 
gathered was analysed and the outcomes are presented further down.
3.4.1.4. Method of Analysis
As the number of interviews was relatively small, it was possible to conduct a very 
detailed qualitative analysis of all the information provided by the interviewees.
Initially, recorded tapes were separated by space organisation and were transcribed. 
Comments made by the interviewees were then grouped in separate categories, very 
much in line with the aspects identified in the “working model”, such as initial stimulus, 
DM process, implementation, sources of uncertainty and complexity, politics. 
Additionally, other relevant comments were placed in a “general comments” category 
(see example of this part of the analysis in Appendix A2.4).
For the first round interviews, all the information provided was taken into account. As 
mentioned before, this was initially used to develop the “working” model, in 
preparation for the second round interviews. Regarding the latter, a comparison was 
made through interviews within the same organisation and, unless there was 
contradictory information (in which case, the opinion of the majority would be taken 
into account), all the comments provided by the informants were again considered. As 
the major objective here was to develop an overall understanding of SDM in the space 
sector and to unveil context variables with potential to influence it, it was thought that 
no information should be neglected at this stage of the analysis.
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At the next stage, the comments in all the different categories were reviewed but this 
time in a comparative manner. All comments in each category were looked at both 
within and across agencies (e.g. checking all comments on decision process within the 
same organisations and across them). In the process of doing this, similarities and 
differences in SDM across agencies emerged. In the same way, some patterns also 
emerged (e.g. scientific projects tend to be less political than projects in other areas of 
space, larger projects are more scrutinized than smaller projects, indicating a clear 
association between the nature of projects, or content of decision, and decision process).
Those aspects were noted and, as the central focus here was to unveil context variables 
with a role in influencing SDM, a final review of the data focused on searching for all 
important sources of influence on SDM. These sources of influence would have been 
either directly raised by the interviewees or implicitly revealed in their comments about 
how their organisations went about making and implementing SDs (e.g. the use of 
decisional boards, scientific councils etc). It should be noted that, when searching for 
these sources of influence, the horizontal dimensions of SDM were considered, from 
the initial stimulus to develop a new project to project delivery, including its 
implementation phase.
All these sources of influence were then grouped into the main context variables which 
are presented in Chapter 4. These context variables represent an important way 
according to which space agencies can differ from each other and display distinct SDM 
characteristics.
3.4.2. Analysis from the meso (organisational) level
3.4.2.I. Content
After identifying the main context variables affecting SDM across space 
organisations in the first stage of the analysis process, and following the 
progressively focusing approach adopted in this research, this part of the analysis 
left the “business” level to focus down on the organisational level and explore the
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contextual specificities of one particular space organisation and its implications for 
SDM.
3.4.2.2. Sources of Evidence
As mentioned before in this Chapter, a total of 9 interviews were made at NASA. 
They involved some of the organisation’s top decision-makers. Four of the 
interviewees were heads of programme areas within NASA (from a total of 7) and 
had the very high level of associate administrators (AA). The areas involved were: 
Space Access and Technology; Mission to Planet Earth; Space Flight and Space 
Science. Another associate administrator for Policy and Plans was also interviewed. 
The other interviews involved a deputy AA for Space Sciences and Applications, 
NASA’s European representative and two Division Directors.
Even though small in number, these interviews have a very high level content due to 
the high hierarchical position occupied by the interviewees within the organisation 
and the relevance of their positions to SDM matters. These interviews represent the 
primary sources of evidence employed in this part of the research. Veiy importantly, 
though, and as required by the characteristics of this phase of the analysis, a great 
number of secondary sources was also employed and make up for a substantial part 
of the evidence employed here. They include documentary and archival sources, such 
as internal documents, reports and organisational charts, which were used to 
complement or to detail aspects raised during the interviews (e.g. information on the 
decision-making boards, councils, budgetary processes etc). In many instances, the 
documentary sources which were employed here were provided by the interviewees 
themselves or indicated by them. A full list of what these documents are is enclosed in 
Appendix I.
3.4.2.3. Method of Analysis
The information obtained through the interviews with top decision-makers from 
NASA had already been previously analyzed in the first stage of the analysis process, 
along with the interviews with decision-makers from other space organisations. This
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time, though, the information provided by NASA’s interviewees was revisited and 
looked at into detail, but with a focus on extracting as much information as possible 
on the specificities of NASA’s context for decision-making. As mentioned above, the 
evidence from the interviews was ratified and complemented by documentary 
information to help depict the characteristics of NASA’s context and understand how 
they may influence and constrain SDM within the organisation. Thus, the 
information provided through the interviews was reorganized around the pre­
identified context variables and complemented with documentary sources to provide 
a general picture of how the characteristics of NASA’s internal and external context 
are likely to affect its SDM.
The information gathered together in this phase was also carefully examined and 
cross-checked with views to detect any new relevant context characteristics and 
variables for dm which could not be identified at the “business” level.
3.4.3. Analysis from the micro (project) level
3.4.3.I. Content
As mentioned before in this Chapter, this part of the research involves the conduct of 
two polar case studies, in relation to outcomes, involving two large space sciences 
projects developed by NASA (see Section 3.3.1 - Phases of data collection). The 
projects are Mars Observer (MO), a failure case, and the Upper Atmosphere Research 
Satellite (UARS), a success case.
Via a longitudinal account of events, the case studies take a close look at how two 
particular strategic decisions on large space projects were made and carried out by 
NASA. Then, the effects of context all along the horizontal phases of project 
development, from the formulation through to the implementation phases, delivery and 
observation of outcomes, are discussed.
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3.4.3.2. The sources of evidence
3.4 3.2.1. Initial notes
As mentioned before in this Chapter, the case studies data base consists essentially of 
documentary and archival evidence. However, interviews with two decision-makers 
involved in each of the cases were also conducted and incorporated into the data 
base. In general terms, information on the case studies was collected covering the 
antecedents leading up to the proposal of the two projects, the decision-making or 
formulation phase, the implementation phase, project delivery and observation of 
first outcomes.
3.4.3.2.2. Focused Semi-structured Interviews
As also explained before in this Chapter (see Section 3.3.2.1.4), two interviews were 
held per case with decision makers who were directly involved in the formulation 
and/or development activities of the two projects in question. They were tape 
recorded and lasted between 60 to 90 minutes each. The interviews were focused and 
partially open-ended, partially close-ended. They followed a specific set of questions 
related to the two cases being studied and covered the antecedents to and the 
decision-making processes, implementation and outcomes of the two projects (see 
extract of interview in Appendix A2.5).
3.4.3.2.3. Documentary/ Archival data
It is important to mention that access to the certain specific project documents (e.g. 
meetings minutes, technical reports and notes) was generally not possible. As a 
result, this research relied on other sources of documentary evidence, such as internal 
documents from NASA and JPL -  Jet Propulsion Laboratory, responsible for 
implementing the two projects - contracted studies, news clips, amongst others, as 
well as on the interviews previously mentioned, to try to understand and reconstruct 
the projects history. Despite these limitations, data collection on the two cases was 
extensive and all the effort was made to be as inclusive as possible.
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During several visits to NASA’s History Center, in Washington DC, all available 
documents and news clips regarding the two projects were photocopied. Other 
relevant documents were provided or recommended by the interviewees and obtained 
afterwards.
In the particular case of Mars Observer, there was a report contracted by NASA 
(Polk, 1990), which described the mission history up to 1988 (four years before 
launch) and which was based on project’s specific documents. The report is divided 
in two parts. The first part describes mission facts and history whereas the second 
presents an analysis of the facts, as viewed by the author. As the document was 
reviewed and agreed upon by MO’s managers at JPL and NASA Headquarters, it 
was considered a reliable source of material with which to study the MO’s case. 
Thus, even though direct access to specific project documents was not granted for 
this research, the first part of Polk’s report, which was prepared based on these 
documents, served as an acceptable replacement in the MO’s case.
Even though Polk’s report was the main source of information for describing the 
MO’s project history up to 1988, the facts were also checked out against news 
published by NASA Headquarters, JPL, specialized periodicals like Defense Daily, 
Aviation Week & Space Technology, Space News, as well as daily newspapers, such 
as The Washington Post, The Washington Times, amongst others. Naturally, these 
sources have different weights in terms of reliability and this was also taken into 
account, in both cases. Priority was given to information, whenever available, 
coming from the most reliable sources.
Another important remark that should be made regards the amount and the level of 
detail of the information available for each case studied. As the Mars Observer 
project was a failure, it attracted a lot of interest. This, along with the need for 
investigating the causes of the failure, led to the development of a series of studies 
which reviewed mission history and analyzed it thoroughly. For this reason, I could 
count on a much more complete and detailed data base for Mars Observer than for 
the UARS case.
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However, as the main purpose of carrying out the two case studies was to gather 
evidence on and examine the actual effect of context on the SD processes, 
implementation and outcomes of the two projects in question, this aspect did not 
pose a problem. The evidence collected from both case studies was used in 
complementary and sometimes confirmatory ways to help developing a framework 
according to which the context variables influence SDM and outcomes of space 
projects. Thus, either as complementary or confirmatory, the information obtained 
through the analysis of each case added to the overall picture of how context comes to 
interfere with and influence SDM in space organisations.
3.4.3.S. Method of Analysis
3.4.3 3.1. General outline of case studies analysis strategy
Initially, all the data and information obtained on the case studies was organized in 
chronological order. Then, a methodical process of reading through the data base and 
cross-checking information across different sources was carried out, looking for 
confirmation and/or filling in gaps of information regarding the history of the 
development of the projects. The final outcomes of the two projects are also 
identified and assessed, according to criteria which are presented further down. As a 
result, a chronological reconstruction of the main events and occurrences involved in 
the development of the two projects and their SDM, all the way up to delivery and 
observation of outcomes, was made (see Appendix A2.6).
Next, with the help of some project milestones, the horizontal phases of project 
development are identified and compared with the SDM phases, including the initial 
stimulus and formulation phase leading up to the decision approval and followed by 
implementation, delivery and observation of outcomes. Project events are then 
distinguished from context events.
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Then, as envisaged in the research’s analytical strategy, the context events are 
categorized and organized in vertical layers, namely: external, at the international, 
national or organisational level, and internal, at the project level.
Subsequently, respecting the chronological order of events, the links between events 
taking place along vertical layers of context and events taking place along the 
horizontal phases of project or decision development are established and analyzed. 
The overall influence of context on the two projects’ SDM processes, 
implementation and outcomes is then discussed. Fig.6.1 and Fig.6.2 in Chapter 6 
represent the main outcomes of this analysis.
3.4.3.3.2. “Longitudinal” design
Even though it was not real-time, an attempt was made here to emulate a longitudinal 
design. It was expected that this would contribute to fill in a gap in the literature, 
which has been mostly cross-sectional, as mentioned earlier on in this Chapter and as 
also discussed in the Literature Review Chapter. As suggested and recommended by 
several authors (Rajagopalan et al, 1997; Papadakis and Barwise, 1997; Pettigrew, 
1990), longitudinal studies seem to better meet the demands of doing integrative, 
more holistic research, which seems the way forward in SDM research right now. 
Some of the advantages of this approach are well summarized by Papadakis and 
Barwise (1997, p.296) in the passage below:
“Longitudinal designs allow researchers to examine the multiple and 
intertwined links between context, process, and outcomes, as well as to 
achieve a better understanding of the degree and direction of causality. In 
addition, they can offer researchers a much better understanding of how the 
SD evolves over time and the factors influencing the process o f making the 
decisions as well as its implementation. ”
Thus, after the chronological account of events involved in the development of the two 
space projects was accomplished, the two case studies became a very good basis from 
which to examine the influences of context along project formulation and 
implementation through to project delivery & initial observation of outcomes.
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As already suggested by the comments and quotations above, several were the 
advantages of simulating a longitudinal design to the case studies, such as:
• It allowed for the observation of associations between different variables which 
clearly showed the direction of the relationships, offering an interesting 
advantage as compared to cross-sectional surveys;
• It eliminated a common problem in research in the field, the effect of 
hindsight, which is known to alter perception. In the analysis of the case 
studies, the data collected essentially reflected views and described events 
when they were actually happening at specific points in time during the 
formulation and development of the two projects in question;
• It allowed for the inclusion of the implementation phase in the analysis process 
and for the observation of its role in influencing the final outcomes of projects 
as well as of the influences of context during this period until project delivery 
and observation of outcomes. As shown before in the Literature Review 
Chapter, implementation of SDs is an under researched area and one of the 
areas recommended for further research.
3.4.3.3.3. Operationalization of outcomes
In order to understand and develop the final analysis of how context variables 
influenced the SDM process, implementation and outcomes of the two projects in 
question, it was essential to assess how each of the projects had worked out. Based 
on knowledge acquired during the first phases of this research, the assessment of 
projects outcomes was made as follows.
The outcomes of the two space projects chosen as case studies were evaluated in 
terms of managerial success, technical success, science success and policy success. 
Regarding the managerial success, two major aspects of project management, costs 
and schedule, were examined. The delivery of a project within estimated costs and on 
schedule is a common indicator of how well a project has performed. Regarding 
schedule, one aspect of particular interest to this research was the extent to which it
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interfered with the timeliness of the project and, subsequently, with its ultimate 
overall success. Timeliness is not necessarily a success factor for all projects. It 
might well happen, for instance, that the project has a very long “immunity” to 
external environment changes, meaning that even if it is delivered much later than 
expected, its “value” will still be mostly unaffected. For most cases, though, and that 
includes UARS, timeliness is a factor. For the majority of projects, delays in delivery 
undermine at least some aspects of their overall success. Finally, it should be said 
that these two aspects, costs and schedule, were evaluated at the time of project 
delivery.
The other aspect of success which was examined regards the technical success. 
Without a technical success, of course, there is no science or policy success. Initially, 
once delivered, a satellite has then to be launched and successfully deployed (in its 
planned orbit) if the other objectives of the mission are to be achieved. Therefore, 
launch and deployment of both the satellite as well as its instruments, were the first 
aspects of technical success examined. The launch in itself introduces an exogenous 
variable, which is the performance of the launcher alone. The launch success is a 
variable which is not under the control of the project’s decision makers and 
implementers. Once launched and deployed, a project enters its operations phase. 
The technical success of the projects in this phase was then examined in terms of: 
spacecraft performance, flight operations (regarding the decisions and actions taken 
by ground controllers to keep the satellite performing as expected), instruments 
performance and data availability. Finally, the two projects were assessed in terms of 
their science and policy success, which ultimately are the most relevant aspects of 
mission success, given that it is a scientific mission.
3.4.4. Comments on Validity and Reliability
Validity
Due to the essential exploratory nature of this research, the internal validity, which is 
generally concerned with the quality of making causal inferences, is not going to be 
discussed here.
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The external validity of a research refers to the extent to which results are 
transferable or generalizable to other contexts or settings (Yin, 1994). As observed 
by the same author, the external validity of case studies has been object to much 
criticism, as they are usually regarded as offering a poor base for generalizations.
Yin, in his book on Case Studies Research and Methods (1994, p. 36) draws attention 
to the incorrect analogy to samples and universes, features of deductive, survey 
studies, for aspects regarding transferability and generalizations of case studies 
findings. As observed by Yin, this comparison is incorrect as survey research relies 
on statistical generalizations whereas case studies research relies on analytical 
generalizations. He added: “in analytical generalizations, the investigator is striving 
to generalize a particular set of results to some broader theory” (Yin, 1994, p.36). 
According to Yin, instead of trying to generalize to other case studies, “an analyst 
should try to generalize findings to theory, analogous in the way a scientist 
generalizes from experimental results to theory”. And he recommends that the 
resulting theory should be tested through replication of the findings via repetition of 
the same research procedures in different cases..
hi an analogy to Yin’s observations regarding case studies research, this research too 
is not amenable to statistical generalizations. However, as noted by Steenhuis and 
Bruijn (2006), Yin’s replication logic seems to carry a positivist orientation, usually 
associated with deductive or test oriented logic (p.4).
Following its inductive orientation, the issue of generalizations in this research may 
be better understood within the framework of grounded theory. As mentioned in 
Section 3.2.2. of this Chapter, differently from deductive methods, the main goal of 
choosing an inductive approach is not to validate theory which can generally apply to 
others contexts or settings but to generate knowledge and new insight, grounded in 
empirical data, which can be tested in future research.
Glaser and Strauss (1967, p.6), as quoted by Steenhuis and Bruijn (2006, p.5) pointed 
out that in grounded, inductive research, theory is generated from data and the result
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is an “ever developing, unproven theory that can be formulated as a set of 
propositions or hypotheses where the importance of the theory is to generated 
insights through new concepts”. The same authors added that the grounded method 
“:is concerned with generating and plausibly suggesting (but not provisionally 
testing) many categories, properties, and hypotheses about general problems. Some 
of these properties may involve conditions, consequences, dimensions, types, 
processes etc...” ... with no attempt “to ascertain either the universality or the proof 
of suggested causes or other properties.” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, as quoted by 
Steenhuis and Bruijn (2006, p.6)).
Even though, as a result of its inductive, grounded nature, case studies mehodology, 
generalization of findings neither comes as an output of nor was pursued in this 
research, findings did help understanding the other contexts to which they may be 
transferable. This should be the case, for example, of other similar decisions in the 
same area of NASA. Fig. 7.1 in Chapter 7 provides an indication of what
characteristics should generally apply to SDM on the same levels of context
(respectively the space “business”, NASA’s organisation and science projects from 
the Office of Space Sciences of NASA). Given the contextual similarities,
transferability should be higher for decisions under the same context group and
decrease as we move further away from the specific context within which the case 
studies were developed.
Generally, findings from this research, such as the new features and relationships 
proposed in the revised conceptual models presented in Fig. 7.3. and 7.4, as well as 
in the macro framework of context influences presented in Fig. 7.2, can be put to test 
in future research.
Reliability
Reliability has to do with repeatability, with leaving records of the steps followed 
throughout a research development so as to ensure that anyone willing to do so could 
repeat the same research again and arrive at the same results. As mentioned by Yin 
(1994, p.36) “the goal of reliability is to minimize errors and biases in a study” .
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A necessary condition to ensure reliability is to document the procedures adopted 
and steps taken to develop a research. Earlier in this Chapter, the data collection 
phases and methods were described as well as the data analysis steps. To support 
these accounts and increase reliability, Appendix 1, 2 and 3 present the Case Studies 
Data Base, one of the recommended tactics to increase reliability suggested by Yin 
(1994, p.37), copies of research instruments, interviews guides and decision-making 
model used in this research, extracts of interviews, parts of the content analysis of 
interviews and case studies reports, along with a specific analytical causal network 
developed to explain Mars Observer’s failure.
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS OF CONTEXT VARIABLES AND THEIR 
INFLUENCES ON SDM FROM THE MACRO ("BUSINESS")
LEVEL
As explained in Chapter 3, the data analysis was organized following a progressively 
focusing approach. Thus, the role of context in influencing SDM in the space sector 
is first approached from the macro (“business) level , then it is further delimited as 
approached from the meso (organisational) level and, finally, it gets down to the 
micro (project & decision) level, with the analysis of data from two case 
studies. These three steps of the analysis are presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
Findings are then summarized in Chapter 7, which presents the overall view of the 
role of context in influencing SDM in the space sector, with a general framework of 
context influences over time and two revised conceptual models of SDM.
4This first part of the analysis involves understanding and outlining the general 
context variables to which SDM in the space sector is subject. The main contextual 
variables with potential to influence strategic decision-making in the space sector in 
general are identified and categorized. The ways according to which these context 
variables are perceived to influence SDM are discussed.
4.1. Space Activities -  An Overview
Before presenting the analysis results, this subsection provides an overview of space 
activities or space “business” and identifies the segment of the space sector chosen to be 
the focus of this research, represented by the public R&D space organisations.
4.1.1 "Spacefaring" nations
Towards the end of the 50’s the USA and the former URSS became the first 
"spacefaring" nations, i.e. nations which developed indigenous space competence, at the
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systems level, including design and development, in one or more of the space 
technology subfields. Over the years, we have watched the gradual entrance of new 
countries in the group.
On September 1962, Canada became the third spacefaring nation, with the launching of 
its first satellite, the Alouette. France, Japan and China followed. In 1975, a European 
consortium of 11 countries (currently 19) was formed and the European Space Agency 
(ESA) was created. ESA placed Europe as another spacefaring power. In 1980, India 
launched its first satellite. Brazil joined the select group of spacefaring nations with the 
launching of its first satellite in 1993. This group keep expanding at an increasing rate, 
with new additions from all continents.
Unlikely the two pioneer countries, though, the motivation for involvement in space of 
the other countries did not always follow the same rationale. The strategic nature of 
space activities, with potential implications of national security, their public appeal and 
repercussion to national image, as well as their capacity to bring about international 
prestige and power, makes it presumable that there will always be political motivations 
behind any space programme of magnitude.
Reflecting the strategic character of space activities, it was not uncommon that civil 
space programmes were bom to military or defence-related initiatives, to be dissociated 
later on. In some cases, though, space programmes had a civil nature from the start. 
This is, for example, the case of Japan.
When comparing the US and the Japanese space programmes. Wells and Hastings 
(1991) commented that, as opposed to the American programme, the initial objectives 
for the Japanese programme "did not include the utilisation of space technologies in 
defence-related activities". In fact, the initial space activities in Japan were oriented to 
the university by nature (Wells and Hasting, 1991).
Other rather than just political-strategic considerations have also driven other nations to 
develop space activities.
105
Even though India also has strong political motivations driving its space policy, as 
indicated in Welck (1987), the underlying rationale of its space programme since its 
beginning has been socio-economic (Welck, 1987).
Ultimately, the major motivations for the conduction of space activities of the different 
nations have direct implications on the priority assigned to their space programmes and, 
subsequently, on the associated level of federal investment (size of the programme). 
Also, they determine the national priorities in space and shape the space programme.
4.1.2. Public civilian space R&D organisations
hi most countries the space sector has a military and a civil segment controlled by the 
Government. As it would be expected, each of them has a different rationale driving 
their operations, with different motivations and objectives.
However, space activities are not an exclusive affair of the Government. Public 
investments on space have allowed for the emergence and consolidation of a private 
space sector (a space industry and a services sector), which has been increasingly 
consolidated, with the commercialisation of some segments of space activities such as 
telecommunications and several remote sensing services.
Nevertheless, space still remains strongly funded by public money in most countries. 
Major decisions regarding large-scale R&D space projects remains largely in the hands 
of governmental authorities, who tend to dictate the dynamics of the entire space 
programme. Commonly, the non-governmental segment of the space sector revolves 
around and has its own survival dependent on the governmental space programmes. As 
of 2010, Government space programmes accounted for approximately a third of the 
total global space “business” (The Space Report, 2011).
Given their weight and significance for the space “business” and also as a result of my 
experience as a practitioner in the field, the focus of this research is on government 
sponsored space activities. From those, access problems commonly associated with
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military programmes led me to concentrate on the civilian segment of governmental 
space activities.
In most countries, the conduction of government sponsored space activities is 
concentrated around one or two major "locus of competence" on space matters. These 
are public space R&D organisations, sometimes known as space agencies, and they are 
the object o f study in this research.
4.1.3. Classification of space organisations according to size
The level of governmental space spending in the different countries shows big gaps 
between them. These gaps account for significant differences in size of the public space 
organisations or agencies responsible for implementing the national space programmes 
in these countries, which is a factor known to affect decision-making. For that reason, 
some of the most important spacefaring nations, along with the European Space Agency 
(ESA), are grouped below in three categories, according to their annual budgets (the 
annual budgets have been used as indicators of size of national space programmes and, 
indirectly, of their space organisations). These groups are shown in Table 4.1 below.
Table 4.1 Group of Countries by Space Expenditure1
Group Annual Budget (US$) Space Faring Nations
1 > 60 billions USA
2 1 - 5  billions ESA2, Japan, Russia, China, France3, 
European Union, Germany3, India, Italy3
3 0.1-0.5 Billion UK3, Spain3, Canada, South Korea, Brazil
Source: The Space Report (2011)
'Military and civilian space activities
2 ESA or European Space Agency is an intergovernmental organisation currently with 19 member states: France, 
Germany, Italy, UK, Spain, Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Austria, Ireland, 
Finland, Greece, Portugal, Romania, Czech Republic and Luxembourg, totaling 19 countries, as of January 2012. 
Poland should become the 20th member of ESA by March 2012.
3 Emboldened countries are also members of ESA. Classification in group 2 includes ESA’s spending. Italy space 
spending is approaching US$1 billion, so it was placed in group 2 instead o f 3.
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In the course of this research, data (mainly through interviews) were obtained from 
space organisations from all the three groups.
4.1.4. M ajor areas of space activities
Even though they can be regrouped in different ways, the major areas of space activities 
can be represented by:
a) Space Sciences
b) Space Applications: telecommunications, earth observation, meteorology, geodesy 
and navigation systems
c) Space Transportation Systems
d) Manned Space Flights
e) Interplanetary& Deep Space Missions
f) Space Station & Platforms
g) Microgravity
Space sciences are the most traditional area of space activities. The scientific 
community was the first civil beneficiary of the last advancements in rocketry 
technology, which had served military purposes during the World War II.
Many countries started their space programmes by developing research in areas like 
astronomy, solar and space physics, solar system characteristics, to name some of the 
disciplines of the space sciences.
Normally less costly than other areas of space activities, and also of general interest, as 
far as scientific knowledge is concerned, all the spacefaring nations, to a larger or lesser 
extent, have some degree of activity in this field.
Also, the nature of the knowledge generated by space sciences research makes it all 
very suitable for co-operation. Since its early days, this has been an area of extensive 
international co-operation.
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Space applications, like telecommunications, earth observation and meteorology, have 
been of increasing interest to all countries. For many, some or all of these applications 
are major priorities for investments in space. This is due to their more immediate and 
practical outcomes, including commercial ones.
Telecommunications by satellites, for example, turned into a very lucrative area, which 
is now basically self-sufficient and increasingly independent from governmental 
investments.
Space transportation was always a controversial area, due to its latent military 
applications and to its strategic character in that it is essential for the place into orbit of 
satellites and space experiments.
Today, space transportation services are provided by different countries on commercial 
basis (e.g. USA, France, Japan). Thus, for some countries, this is a non-priority area. 
Whenever necessary, they prefer to contract launching services abroad for their 
satellites.
For other countries, though, autonomy in the area and independence from the leading 
space powers for launching their satellites became a strategic issue. Indigenous capacity 
in the area was then acquired and national space transportation systems were developed 
(e.g. France).
The other mentioned areas of space activities, namely, manned space flights, 
interplanetary missions and space station & platforms, are essentially developed to 
serve the purposes of the other areas of space sciences and applications. 
Notwithstanding this, they are placed as separate categories here to indicate that they 
are in great deal more expensive and more sophisticated areas of space research and 
technology. For that reason, only the major space powers can afford or are willing to 
undertake them.
Finally, microgravity is a more recent and somewhat controversial area, in relation to 
the commercial potential of its applications.
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As referred earlier in this Chapter, national priorities along with the level of investment 
on space activities of a certain country will determine the major characteristics of their 
space programmes. It will define which of the previously mentioned areas of activities 
will be undertaken and which priority will be assigned to them.
4.2. Overview of SDM in space organisations — A macro and integrated view
After analysing the interviews from the first and second phases of this research (see 
Research Design & Methodology Chapter), three diagrams were designed which 
provide a simplified macro view of SDM in the space sector. They are presented 
below.
Fig.4.1 focuses on the horizontal aspects of the SD processes, unfolded over time, 
and along which contextual influences on SDM will take place.
Hence, three major phases of the development of large space projects can be 
observed. They are: 1) the pre-approval phase, representing all the process leading 
up to the identification of a new mission (project) opportunity plus the formulation 
and authorization process which ensues. This phase culminates when a new project 
proposal is granted formal approval and the "go ahead" by Governmental authorities. 
Usually, this is accompanied by the commitment and allocation (partial or total) of 
resources to the project; 2) the implementation phase or project work, when the 
design and actual project development take place, and 3) the observation of 
outcomes, following project delivery and initial tests, and corresponding to the 
operations phase.
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According to the scheme shown in Fig.4.1, two milestones in the overall process can 
be identified, namely: 1) the formal project approval and 2) the project delivery.
Fig.4.1 also draws attention to the internal and external contexts of the formulation 
and authorization process, with its interactions, as the whole process, in particular the 
authorization process, will involve participants from both environments. It should be 
noted that this is an aspect which is intrinsic to public organisations in general.
In summary, Fig.4.1 represents a simplified model, which tries to illustrate a macro 
and integrated view of strategic decision-making in space organisations. It takes into
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account both the internal and external contexts for decision-making and all the three 
major phases of the process, from initial conception to final delivery and operations.
hi addition to the elements represented in Fig.4.1, the major phases of project 
planning, as employed by NASA, are contrasted with the major phases of strategic 
decision-making in Fig.4.2.
A final comment that should be made about Fig.4.1, which also applies to Fig.4.3, 
regards the use of the expression “formulation and authorization (F&A) process”, 
instead of “decision-making” process. First, it is understood here that the actual 
“decision-making” process starts earlier than what is now being called F&A process. 
In fact, it should start with and involve the initial stimulus and the process leading up 
to the identification of a new mission opportunity. Additionally, it could also extend 
beyond the F&A phase, as it will become clearer later on in this thesis. For this 
reason, the term F&A seemed to better describe what actually happens after a new 
mission opportunity is identified and before it enters its implementation phase.
An extended version of the model described in Fig.4.1 and Fig.4.2 is presented in 
Fig.4.3 below. It attempts to show the horizontal phases of strategic decision-making 
on space projects and their interactions with the vertical layers of context. The model 
also shows examples of major stakeholders and gives an indication of the 
significance of the role they could play in a hypothetical decision case.
The model shows a high level of interaction with all the different levels of contexts 
and indicates that a good part of SDM on space projects can take place outside the 
organisation’s boundaries. As mentioned before, this is a direct result of the fact that 
the space organisations being studied here are all public organisations. Additionally, 
the model also suggests that SDM on space projects is subjected to great external 
interference, which should further affect the ability of the space organisation to hold 
control over processes.
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In the attempt to increase control, thus, it seems important that space organisations 
have a good understanding of their decisional environment and of the constraints 
imposed by external decision-makers and other stakeholders’ participation on SDM 
processes.
The core of the model shows what is being called the internal environment (or 
context), referring to a space organisation's headquarters and research and 
operational centres. The organisation is part of and interacts with the so-called 
external environment, which is split in the model into two distinct environments: the
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national external environment (or context) and the international external environment 
(or context).
Some projects might be developed entirely at the national level, under the scope of 
one government/one agency, without involvement of the international environment. 
If it is a cooperative endeavour, though, between two or more partners, the 
international environment is involved. As it could be expected, this brings more 
stakeholders and additional elements of interference upon the decision-making 
process, making control over process and outcomes even more complex.
The left side of Fig.4.3 shows that initial stimulus can come from all the three 
environments, internal, external or international, or from a combination of those. 
Thus, new ideas and new proposals leading up to new decision-making processes can 
emerge in many different ways and can alone provide some initial information on 
how the decision-making processes are likely to unfold after that. For example, if the 
initial stimulus for the development of a new project comes in the form of a 
governmental demand aiming at satisfying a political or economic interest, it is much 
more likely that the approval for the project, as well as the necessary commitment of 
resources, will be obtained with less struggle than in cases where the initial stimulus 
comes, for instance, from a proposal made by the internal or even external scientific 
community.
The formulation and authorization processes following up the initial stimulus and 
identification of a mission opportunity are due to occur partly inside the space 
organisation and partly outside. In a "typical" situation, an initial internal formulation 
and authorization process will lead to a decision by the agency to submit a project for 
approval by governmental authorities (external environment).
The formal approval thus obtained normally implies initial or total commitment of 
resources, and it is followed by the implementation phase. Here again, both the 
internal and external environment are likely to be involved. Most often, decisions 
made by the space organisations and approved by governmental authorities are 
implemented totally or partially outside the internal environment, by national or even
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international organisations and private companies. Once completed, the operations 
phase might again be carried out in the internal or external environment or an 
intersection of those.
In relation to the participation of stakeholders, their role can vary in importance 
along the phases of the F&A process. These possible variations in importance or 
level of influence of stakeholders over the horizontal phases of process are illustrated 
in the model, with capital letters standing for higher degrees of influence, and lower 
case for lesser degrees of influence.
The illustrations in the model show the example of one hypothetical situation, 
amongst many other possible combinations, where the government (at the executive 
level) would play a major role before the formal approval of a project and would 
have its role reduced in the implementation and operation phases. In an opposite 
way, the model shows an industry playing a small role in the pre-approval phase, but 
a significant role in the implementation and operations phases. The hypothetical 
participation of other stakeholders is also illustrated in the model.
hi general, though, from the observation of some real cases, it seems that the 
participation of stakeholders and their level of influence over decision-making 
processes can vary significantly from decision to decision, even within the same 
space agency and for the same nature of projects (applications, scientific, infra­
structure).
As it may seem, there is no specific way according to which space projects emerge or 
are carried out. Usually, different new stimulus will lead up to different major 
decisions on new projects, which will be followed by a series of associated decisions, 
like whether the project should be developed at the national level or in partnership, 
what should be done in-house and what should be done outside the agency, and who 
should be the potential partners and contractors.
A confluence of these initial stimulus and major and associated decisions on new 
projects will determine a specific "path" followed by each project in terms of events
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taking place at the internal or external environment or context, at the national or 
international level.
Most naturally, as it could be expected, the introduction of the international 
environment in the decision process will add to the already complex interplay of 
internal and external contexts of decision-making processes and is likely to increase 
the difficulty of control over process and outcomes by the space organisations. At the 
national environment, the major stakeholders or agents of the process are better 
known of the space organisations, while at the international level, either in cases of 
bilateral or, even more justifiably, in cases of multilateral cooperation, some 
probably unfamiliar agents and aspects will have to be considered as part of the 
decisional environment.
Regardless of the lack of a general rule capable of explaining how strategic decision 
processes in different space organisations (or even within the same organisation) are 
carried out, a closer observation at the way space organisations make and implement 
their strategic decisions seems to indicate that specific characteristics of the 
decisional context encountered in different space agencies and countries can provide 
some indication on how the decision processes are likely to develop. Amongst other 
things, they can, for instance, favour a more or less active influence of different 
stakeholders along the major decision phases. Additionally to the influence exerted 
by more general context variables, it is also understood that the characteristics of 
each specific decision being made (space project), like size and nature, will also 
influence the decision process.
Some practical examples of characteristics of the decisional context which are likely 
to differentiate space agencies and affect their SDM behaviour are discussed below.
4.3. Common context variables influencing SDM across space organisations
4.3.1 Common context variables
Before presenting the specific context variables unveiled through this first part of the 
analysis, according to which space organisations/agencies and their SDM may differ,
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it is important to draw attention to two important contextual characteristics which are 
common to all space organisations which are focus of this research:
1) They are in the same "business", space technology, and therefore share technology 
and market-related problems and concerns, and
2) they are all state-owned and, thus, public funded organisations.
The two contextual aspects raised above and which are common to all organisations 
focus of this research actually correspond to two general context variables known to 
influence SDM in any organisation: 1) the industry or business within which the 
organisation making the SD is embedded, and 2) the ownership of the organisation.
4.3.2. Implications for SDM
4.3.2.I. Space Sector and Space Technology
The decisions under study in this thesis involve large R&D space projects, which are 
ultimately the most important SDs made by space organisations. Great complexity and 
the long-term required for their development are characteristics commonly associated 
with space projects and space technology in general. As it happens with other R&D 
projects, these characteristics contribute to generate a high degree of uncertainty 
involving decisions in the area. This is an important characteristic of decision-making 
in the space sector, with clear implications for the formulation, implementation and, 
even more obviously, outcomes of space projects.
Some of the ways according to which these high degrees of uncertainty associated with 
space projects may affect their SDM and outcomes are raised in the comments below 
regarding long-term R&D programmes in general.
On his paper on "Quantitative methods in research and development decision-making", 
Goodman (1982, p. 112) refers to long-range research and development as 
"exceptionally uncertain". And he adds: "Uncertainties around both demand and supply 
for a product can change drastically, as can early estimates of performance and project
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costs. As an R&D programme proceeds, original designs and plans invariably change; 
unforeseen technical difficulties forestall the meeting of performance requirements". 
The same author still mentions that "risk acceptability levels and perceptions of benefit 
may also fluctuate with time" (Goodman, 1982, p. 120).
When commenting on the characteristics of NASA's procurement Holman (1974, p.67) 
also alludes to the uncertainty associated with R&D projects, as the following comment 
shows: "NASA's requirements encompass all the risks and uncertainties associated with 
the acquisition of sophisticated R&D systems".
4.3.2.2. State-owned, public funded space organisations
As public organisations, much of the actual decision-making takes place outside the 
organisations’ boundaries and has an essentially political nature, escaping the full 
control of organisational decision-makers. The ultimate decision-makers are politicians, 
usually from both the executive and legislative branches of a Government, who control 
matters of budget and set policy for the space activities in a country.
Decisions on space projects are, subsequently, a result of an interplay between public 
policy-making and organisational decision-making. The dual character of decision­
making in space organisations implies that decisions cannot be made on purely 
scientific/technological basis. There will always be a strong political component to it, 
which can are hereby illustrated by the two comments below regarding NASA’s dm.
“Although it still has a highly scientific orientation, the goals and policies of the 
agency have been dictated by political considerations” (Teaching Material for MBA, 
NASA -  The Case Study, 1992).
“NASA could not be a good decision-maker because “government policy is based on 
partisan and interest group politics instead of on business or technological grounds”” 
(Teaching Material for MBA, NASA -  The Case Study, 1992, partly referring to a 
comment by Goldman, 1985).
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It should be noted that the fact that all organisations which are focus of this research 
are public organisations and belong to the space sector will have a restrictive impact 
on any findings coming out of this research.
4.4. Contextual variables with a role in explaining distinct SDM characteristics 
across space organisations
The following context variables were found to distinguish space organisations and 
influence their SDM. The presentation of the variables is followed by brief 
considerations on how they are likely to influence SDM in space organisations.
National Space Policy
One of the most obvious elements found to distinguish space agencies and influence 
their decisional behaviour is the national space policy. In several passages during the 
interviews, elements of a national space policy came about to justify actions and 
directions taken by the space organisations represented by the interviewees. Examples 
of these passages are: (1) regarding the French space organisation, ONES: “France is 
not interested in the space station programme, as this is not a national priority; (2) 
regarding one of the member countries of the European Space Agency -  ESA, and 
while referring to presidential guidance for space: “commercialization in remote 
sensing is not an objective”.
National space policy is perceived in this research as a "collective understanding", at 
both national and organisational levels, of what are the national priorities and general 
guidelines for the conduct of space activities in a certain country. Space policy can be 
explicit or implicit. In either case, though, a true understanding of the major motivations 
and general priorities for space of a certain nation or agency may require attentive 
observation of past and present strategic decisions made by them as well as of the 
declarations and public attitudes of their top decision makers.
Naturally, the national space policy transcends the organisational boundaries and scope 
of influence of space agencies. It emerges as a confluence of political objectives and
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motivations of national governments for undertaking space activities and the aspirations 
of their space agencies. Unsurprisingly, national space policies have a strong cultural 
component.
Practical examples of contents of national space policies can be found, for instance, in 
Delpech et alii (1993), where the authors make reference to "an explicit national policy 
goal of leadership in space" in the USA and to the establishment of "autonomy" as a 
policy objective adopted by both Europe and Japan.
Terms like "leadership", "autonomy", "competitiveness", "industrial capacitation", 
"social or economical returns", amongst others, may be common drivers of decisional 
behaviour, derived from national space policies and applying to overall space projects 
or particular areas of space activities of spacefaring nations.
Besides the major drivers, other components of a national space policy may provide 
information on the general inclinations and preferences of space agencies and 
correspondent countries in relation to their involvement in space activities. In all cases, 
these components are likely to reflect elements of both national and corporate culture.
Hence, while some countries might put strong emphasis on fundamental research, for 
instance, others might prioritize applications, some might go for more large-scale and 
innovative undertakings, while others would have a more conservative and incremental 
approach to new projects.
Organisational Culture
hi addition to elements of a national space policy, which tend to reflect some cultural 
bias, the organisational culture also came out as one influential aspect on SDM. During 
the interviews, some of the cultural biases associated with the space agencies hereby 
studied became apparent (e.g. a bias towards larger and more ambitious projects for 
NASA, a common bias towards projects which will fit in their conception of “useful 
space” for CNES etc).
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Pfeffer (1981) defined organisation's culture in terms of "shared meanings and beliefs". 
For Pettigrew (1979), the term "culture" refers to an "amalgam of beliefs, ideology, 
language, ritual and myth". Finally, "the term corporate culture is often used to describe 
the values and beliefs which characterise a particular organisation" (Dawson, 1992).
The discussions about the influence of corporate culture over organisations’ processes 
and outcomes/performance are all over the literature on organisational behaviour.
According to Schwenk (1988), for example, "the relevance of culture to strategic 
decision-making is clear. Culture serves to specify what is and is not acceptable in an 
organisation. Therefore, culture will affect the types of strategic alternatives that are 
seriously considered for dealing with a particular strategic problem and which criteria 
will be used in evaluating these alternatives". And he concludes by saying that "culture 
will also affect the patterns of political manoeuvring that may occur in organisations".
hi terms of learning more about the "way of doing business" of different space agencies, 
the contribution that the understanding of organisational culture has to offer seems 
apparent. As mentioned by McCurdy in his article on NASA's organisational culture 
(Levine, 1992), "within organisations, cultures are often expressed as assumptions - 
beliefs that define "the way we do things in here."
hi the same article McCurdy (Levine, 1992) outlines aspects of NASA’s organisational 
culture: "NASA has a bias towards "big science". NASA has also a characteristic bias 
towards new projects rather than old endeavours".
Even though the organisational culture, as compared to the national culture, is likely to 
have a more direct effect on SDM of space agencies, elements from both national and 
corporate culture were found to have an influence on SDM in space agencies. Because 
of the public nature of space agencies, as previously mentioned, considerable part of the 
strategic decision processes take place outside the organisation, in the public arena, and 
suffer influences that transcend organisational boundaries. Subsequently, the influence 
of culture is considered here in a broader context, both at the corporate and national 
levels.
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General national economical and political situation
The state of the economy, as well as the relative political stability found in different 
spacefaring nations, was associated with the strength of the political commitment to an 
approved project and the stability of allocation of resources to it.
Visibility of the agency in the national budget
This is related to the size of space agencies and to how much of the national budget is 
being spent on space activities. It became apparent from the interviews that the more 
"visible" a space agency is, the more likely it is to suffer external influences from 
different stakeholders.
Nature of national political processes and relative power distribution between 
legislative and executive branches of the government
Political processes will be more or less open, more or less centralized, more or less 
participative across nations. The distribution of power between the legislative and 
executive will also vary. These aspects were seen as determining the major political 
agents influencing SDM in the space sector.
The two last items above are likely to influence the level of external political 
interference versus relative autonomy of the space agencies over strategic decisions 
made. Naturally, the level of political interference will also vary from project to project, 
in accordance with their own visibility, in terms of overall costs and strategic relevance, 
to national governments.
Budgetary processes
The process of budget formulation and approval is bounded by specific regulations and 
routines in each country and involves different participants. As it became very clear 
during the interviews, these characteristics of budgetary processes provide indication on
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the level of difficulty faced by space agencies on their struggle to get projects approved. 
They can also determine how the commitment of resources to space project is made. It 
may be total or partial, on an annual or multi-annual basis. Finally, they influence the 
degree of stability in resources allocation during the implementation phase of space 
projects.
The set of decision-making boards and advisory committees with specific role in SDM 
processes
It came out from the interviews that there are important differences between space 
agencies in terms of the existence and the use they make of decision-making boards and 
advisory committees in strategic decision processes. This aspect illustrates in part the 
complexity of the decision-making framework of a certain space agency and can have 
implications, for instance, on the time spent and the degree of difficulty in reaching 
agreement on objectives and means when a decision is to be made.
Contracting policy
The contracting policy of different countries was another factor that came out from the 
interviews as a relevant one in connection with the implementation of strategic 
decisions. Legislation regulating industrial contracting by the public sector can differ 
substantially from country to country and can be more or less restrictive. This may 
impose constraints upon and limit the ability of space agencies of fast contracting and 
of making the best choice amongst qualified contractors. This can influence 
implementation of space projects and give room for the occurrence of common 
problems during this phase, such as project delays, cost increases and technical 
mismanagements.
Existence of significant expertise in space matters outside the space agency
This was found to be influenced by the size and maturity of space activities within a 
country. Thus, for the more experienced countries and for the ones who spend more in 
space activities, it is more likely that considerable expertise in space outside their space
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agencies can be found. This can affect the level and the type of external influence over 
strategic decision processes that agencies can expect to receive. When this expertise 
becomes an active part of decision processes (like through the creation of expert 
committees inside the government), space organisations which are very often regarded 
as the only centre of excellence on space matters will have their relative independence 
over the contents of new proposals reduced or threatened. In these cases, proposals 
forwarded by space agencies for approval by external authorities will also be submitted 
to technical scrutiny and merit judgment outside the agency, in addition to the usual 
political and budgetary considerations. Amongst other things, this will add to the level 
of difficulty in reaching agreement over decisions.
Size and qualification of space industry
This will also vary from country to country and will affect the level of external 
influence (e.g. industrial lobbying) over decisions made in the area, as well as the 
implementation phase of strategic decision processes.
Significance and influence of other stakeholders (e.g. scientific community, users 
community, value-added companies!
This also has implications on the expected degree and type of external influence over 
decisions made by space agencies.
The existence of a formal strategy for the whole organisation or for particular areas of 
space activities and the actual incorporation of this strategy into the main stream of the 
SDM process
Another context variable found to influence SDM across space agencies regarded the 
existence and use of a formal strategy.
At the national level space policy can provide guidance for the involvement of a 
country in space. At the organisational level, though, space agencies may opt for
124
developing a formal strategy, establishing priorities and guidelines for their activities in 
the long-term, as a mechanism for facilitating and guiding strategic decision-making.
However, even when existent, formal strategies are not necessarily followed. In some 
cases, this may have to do with the way the strategy was elaborated. Thus, for instance, 
strategies created through a bottom-up approach and which promote decision-making 
on an incremental basis, are expected to be more easily implemented than top-down or 
revolutionary strategies.
The existence of an explicit, formal strategy, agreed upon and generally accepted by 
members of the organisation may facilitate decision-making and shorten the duration of 
the decision process by making it easier to reach agreement on which projects should be 
proposed in first place. Besides, it may facilitate implementation, as those responsible 
for it at the project level will be in agreement that the decision is an appropriate one 
and, subsequently, will commit themselves to its successful implementation.
Strategy formulation can also be used as a mechanism to match decisions made by 
space organisations with national priorities. Subsequently, decisions made in 
accordance with it will be more likely to have their approval facilitated and to secure 
stronger political commitment during their implementation.
In summary, the adoption of a formal strategy by space agencies, in consonance with 
national priorities, and its effective incorporation into their SDM processes, is likely to 
have several implications. It may reduce the time spent and the degree of difficulty in 
reaching a decision; it may increase the degree of political commitment to the decision, 
once approved, and it may facilitate the implementation phase.
Decision-making styles
Certain differences in SDM observed between space agencies seemed to be the result of 
differences in decision-making styles, such as consensus building, more or less 
participative etc. Most often, this variable incorporates a strong cultural component.
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One good general example of this comes from Japan. It is widely known that the nature 
of the Japanese political process relies on consensus and political precedent for 
decision- making. Subsequently, reaching a decision in Japan may involve long periods 
of time and extensive negotiations. On the other hand, once agreement has been reached 
and approval secured, political commitment to the decision is supposed to be very 
strong and implementation is likely to be very stable.
As a whole, differences in decision-making styles are likely to influence the time taken 
and the difficulty in reaching agreement over decisions to be made. They could also 
have implications on the implementation of decisions.
The use of contingency plans
The information obtained through the interviews showed different approaches adopted 
by space organisations regarding contingency planning. Differences in contingency 
allowances will affect the flexibility and difficulty involved in overcoming cost 
overruns during the implementation phase of the projects. Larger contingency 
allowances for projects might, for instance, prevent project managers from the necessity 
to go through another request for approval process when costs exceed pre-fixed sums.
Attitudes towards cost-estimates of space projects
An interplay between space organisations and industries' perceptions of the best ways to 
secure their interests may sometimes favour practices of over or under estimating 
projects costs. As a result of these practices, in the case of under-estimates, for instance, 
projects can face cost overruns during the implementation phase which were not 
accounted for and which might not be easily sorted out. In some cases, this can even be 
the cause of significant project delays. On the other hand, in the cases of over-estimates, 
projects can face more difficulties in getting formal approval.
In summary, over or under estimating practices regarding costs of projects can have an 
influence over the difficulty in getting formal approval, the chances of occurrence of
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implementation problems (e.g. cost overruns and project delays) and the degree of 
difficulty involved in overcoming them.
Reporting and controlling systems
Space organisations can be more or less formal, more or less detailed in relation to 
reporting systems and project documentation.
Regarding project control or monitoring, different systems adopted by space 
organisations may imply in some cases closer and constant supervision during the 
phases of project planning and development. In those cases, project managers may have 
to report and resubmit for new approval any significant proposals for modifications on 
the project in question. Or, on the other extreme, project managers may have large 
autonomy to cope with and to go ahead with substantial changes that may have to be 
made on the project. This can affect the time taken and the degree of difficulty for 
sorting out problems during the implementation phase.
Ultimately, differences in managerial practices such as the ones mentioned above can 
influence the chances of occurrences of problems and difficulties before and during the 
implementation of projects and the flexibility and agility of the organisation in 
overcoming them.
Nature of strategic decisions
This variable was also found to affect SDM across and within space organisations. 
However, differently from the other variables presented above, this one actually 
emerged from the analysis as a pattern across space organisations. Thus, for example, 
decision processes involving scientific projects in all the organisations researched here 
were found to be less political and usually more formal and structured than projects in 
other areas of space applications (e.g. remote sensing, meteorology, communications).
Finally, after looking at all the context variables presented above, it becomes clear that a 
confluence of characteristics associated with each one of them will confer a particular
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"wholeness" to each space organisation and to each strategic decision to be made which 
is likely to influence the decisional behaviour of any particular space organisation and 
the characteristics of any given strategic decision process.
4.5. Reorganisation and categorization of the context variables identified with 
the analysis from the “business” level
4.5.1. Reorganisation of variables according to context levels
As it is the objective of this research to look at different layers of context (verticality) 
and their influence over the horizontal aspects of process, the above variables were 
initially reorganized in three different context levels, as shown below.
National/International Context:
• National economic & political situations
• National space policies
• Nature of national political processes and relative power distribution 
between legislative and executive branches of the Government
• National public budgetary processes
• National public contracting policies
• Existence of significant expertise in space matters outside the space agency
• Size and qualification of space industry
• Significance and influence of other stakeholders
• The set of decision-making boards and advisory committees with a specific 
role in SDM processes
Organisational Context.
• Organisation culture
• Visibility of the agency in the national budget
• The set of decision-making boards and advisory committees with a specific
role in SDM processes
• The existence of a formal strategy for the whole organisation or for
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particular areas of space activities and the actual incorporation of this 
strategy into the SDM processes
• Decision-making styles
• The use of contingency plans
• Attitudes towards cost-estimates of space projects
• Reporting and controlling systems
Decision Context (Space Project Level):
• Nature of strategic decisions
4.5.2. Meta-variables and sub-variables
A more careful look at the variables allowed for a rearrangement in terms of meta­
variables and sub-variables. Whenever applicable, and to avoid as much as possible 
terminology problems, the variables were associated with familiar variables from the 
SDM literature (e.g. structure, size, culture). The rearranged variables are as follows:
National/International Context:
• National economic & political situations
• National public policies:
S  National space policies 
v' Budgetary processes 
'S Contracting policies
• Nature of national political processes and relative power distribution between 
legislative and executive branches of the Government
• Significance and influence of stakeholders:
S  Size and qualification of space industry
S  Other stakeholders (e.g. scientific community, users communities)
• Formal DM authorization and advisory structure
• Set of decision-making boards and advisory committees with a specific 
role in SDM processes
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• Existence of significant expertise in space matters outside the space 
organisation.
Organisation Context
• Organisational culture
• Organisation size
• Organisational DM authorization and advisory structure
• The existence and use of formal general or dedicated strategies
• Managerial & project management practices:
S  Decision-making styles 
S  The use of contingency plans 
S  Attitudes towards cost-estimates of space projects 
S  Reporting and controlling systems
Decision Context (Space Project Level)
• Nature of strategic decisions
4.6. Implications for SDM
As a whole, contextual differences between space organisations like the ones pointed 
out above are likely to influence SDM all along its horizontal dimensions (initial 
stimulus and formulation, implementation, delivery and operations), at national or 
international levels, in the following ways:
4.6.1. General implications
In the pre-approval or formulation & authorization phase:
1. the time spent in reaching a decision
2. the degree of political influence on strategic decision processes versus 
relative autonomy of the space agencies over the decisions to be made 
(1 and 2 affecting length and politics of the process)
3. the degree and the type of external influence on strategic decision processes 
versus relative autonomy of the agencies over the decisions made. It can
130
make process more or less adversarial.
In the implementation phase:
1. the degree of political commitment to the decision, once approved
2. the degree of stability in resources allocation to the project 
(1 and 2 associated with stability of implementation)
3. the chances of occurrence of other implementation problems (e.g. cost 
overruns, technical difficulties, project delays), and
4. the difficulty and flexibility in overcoming these problems.
In the operations phase:
1. the degree of commitment to the operations phase.
Finally, the nature of space projects (e.g. scientific missions, technology missions, 
space applications missions) is likely to strongly influence the process (e.g. more or 
less political, more or less formal and structured etc).
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CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS OF CONTEXT VARIABLES AND THEIR 
INFLUENCES ON SDM FROM THE MESO 
(ORGANISATIONAL) LEVEL
5.1. Preliminary considerations and the selection of NASA’s organisation
After looking for relevant context variables affecting SDM across space 
organisations (the macro or “business” level), and following the progressively 
focusing approach previously explained in Chapter 3, this part of the analysis will 
leave the “business” level to focus down on the organisational level and explore the 
contextual specificities of one particular space organisation and its implications for 
SDM.
Thus, as indicated before, in this part of the analysis the specificities of NASA’s 
organisational context are discussed by using the previously identified context 
variables at the “business” level as a guide to select the relevant aspects for 
discussion. The depiction of NASA’s contextual characteristics this way aims at 
generating a general picture of how the organisational context is likely to constrain 
and influence SDM across space projects throughout the organisation.
Additionally, the analysis process at this level was also aimed at detecting and 
discussing any new contextual variables which might be relevant in connection with 
SDM in NASA and in other space organisations.
Finally, and very importantly, this part of the analysis sets the general dm context for 
the two case studies that will follow, as it shows how the characteristics of the 
organisational context in which they are embedded are likely to constrain and 
partially pre-shape their SDM.
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Rationale fo r selecting NASA
As already mentioned, the space organisation chosen for this part of the analysis is 
NASA, the American civilian space agency. Several are the reasons for that. First, 
NASA represents, on the civilian side, the largest, oldest (along with the former 
Soviet Union) and most complex space programme in the world. It encompasses all 
the different areas of space projects, from space applications and transportation 
systems to interplanetary and manned space missions. Also very importantly, and 
contrary to what happens with the Russian space organisation, NASA has a very 
open policy towards releasing of information and data on its projects and other 
activities to the general, scientific and academic public.
Together, the maturity and scale of the American civilian space programme, allied 
with the accessibility to necessary data and information, made NASA a very 
attractive choice for that part of the research. It was thought that the USA context 
and NASA, as a very large and complex organisation itself, could provide a rich 
picture of the complexity associated with SDM on large space projects and of the 
role of context in influencing it, offering, therefore, a very good basis from which to 
investigate these issues.
As a natural consequence of NASA being chosen for the analysis at the 
organisational level, and for the same reasons described above, the two case studies 
that will follow in the last step of this thesis’ progressively focusing analysis also 
involve two projects developed within this organisation.
5.2. NASA’s organisational context -  General Outline
NASA (National Administration Space Agency) is a large federal agency which 
directs the US civilian activities in space. It was created in 1958 to lead “the 
expansion of human knowledge of phenomena in the atmosphere and space” 
(Welcome to NASA, 1995). It is an agency of the executive branch of the 
Government, under the control of the US President, who directs space policy and 
appoints NASA’s head administrator. As a federal agency, NASA’s money comes
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from the federal budget. Congress sets spending limits and can specify projects to be 
undertaken.
NASA comprises the Headquarters in Washington, D.C. and nine centers throughout 
the country, along with a number of additional installations that support specific 
centers. NASA also owns the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, which is operated for 
NASA by the California Institute of Technology.
Communications (O)
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Aerospace Safety 
Advisory Panel
NASA Advisory 
 Council
Inspector
General(W)
Goddard Space 
Flight Center
Mission to 
Planet Earth (Y)
SpaceFlight (M)
L- B. Johnson 
Space Center
Space Science (S)
Program Offices
Space Access & 
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Ames Research 
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LangleyResearch
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Lewis Research
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Fig.5.1. National charts for headquarters offices, 1995.
S ource : T h e  N A S A  M issio n  S ta te m e n t a n d  O rg a n iz a tio n
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At the time of the interviews, NASA employed 22,000 civil servants and had an 
approximate annual budget of around $15 billion.
Fig.5.1. above shows NASA’s organisational chart as it stood back in 1995. The staff 
offices were purposely omitted from the chart, as they are not relevant for this 
research’s objectives.
5.3. NASA’s context and influences on the organisation’s SDM
It is important to mention at this point that NASA is a very large and complex 
organisation and so are its SDM processes. Describing the organisation’s context and 
understanding its SDM is not a simple task. As explained before, in this Chapter the 
focus will be on describing and discussing those aspects of NASA’s context which 
seem most influential to the organisation’s SDM. For that purpose, the general 
context variables identified from the “business” level will be used as a guide around 
which the discussion of NASA’s context and its influence on SDM will be 
organized. Thus, the information provided below is not meant as a foil 
characterization of each of NASA’s context variables. Rather, it aims at providing 
enough information to allow for the understanding of how each of these variables can 
play a role in influencing NASA’s SDM. Additionally, and as intended, the 
information provided here supplies the contextual background within which the two 
case studies presented in Chapter 6 develop.
5.3.1. Common context variables: NASA’s business and NASA’s ownership
The first context variables with a clear influence on NASA’s SDM are the two 
common context variables identified during the analysis from the “business” level, 
namely: the industry or business NASA is in and its ownership.
In the first case, the “industry” or “business” is space or space technology. In the 
second, NASA, along with all the other space organisations which are the focus of 
this research, is a public organisation or, more specifically, a federal government 
organisation.
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As mentioned in Chapter 4, these two variables will influence strategic decision­
making throughout the space sector. In fact, they act as two “permanent” context 
variables which will impact strategic decisions within and across governmental space 
organisations throughout the world.
Thus, some characteristics of SDM in NASA, as well as in other space organisations, 
can be directly ascribed to these two context variables and will be consistent for all 
strategic decisions within and across these organisations and the different areas of 
space activities developed by them.
As seen before, in general terms these two context variables introduce technological 
complexity and both political and technological uncertainty to SDM processes in 
governmental space organisations, including NASA. These, in turn, make decision 
processes characteristically long and political and outcomes difficult to predict. Even 
though the space business and the public nature are common context features to all 
organisations which are object of attention in this research, it is important to note 
some distinctions related to them. Thus, if in general the characteristics of the space 
business and space technology remain the same across countries and across space 
organisations, the characteristics of national public systems and subsequently the 
way they can impact SDM in space organisations can vary substantially from one 
country to another. For this reason, even though no detailed discussion of the 
organisation and rules of the US public system will be provided here, a brief 
discussion about NASA’s insertion in the US Federal Bureaucracy is presented 
below.
- NASA in the US Federal Bureaucracy
Figure 5.2 below illustrates how NASA is affected by being a federal agency and 
who are the main external agents who have formal jurisdiction over the 
organisation’s activities and to whom it has to answer. In other words, it shows the 
main external decision-makers, from both the executive and legislative branches of 
the Government, who are involved in setting policy for the conduction of the
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organisation s activities, approving its decisions and providing the necessary 
resources for their implementation.
Executive
M oney Policy
Congress
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Fig. 5.2 NASA in the US Federal Bureaucracy
At one side it shows the President, the Office of Science & Technology Policy and 
the Congress involved in setting policy which will provide guidance to NASA’s 
activities. On the other, it shows the President, the Office of Management and 
Budget and the Congress, through the Senate and House of Representatives, involved 
in the budgetary process which will decide the amount of money which will be given 
to NASA. Together, as the ultimate decision-makers for NASA, they all play a 
decisive role in the organisation’s SDM.
Differently from the two variables presented above, the characteristics of the next 
context variables will vary from country to country, from space organisation to space 
organisation and, in some cases, even from decision to decision, thus distinguishing 
SDM across different space organisations and specific strategic decisions. As they 
also tend to be more dynamic, they can change over time and therefore may affect 
decisions in different ways at different points in time.
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Their characteristics and influences on NASA’s SDM are presented below within the 
three different levels of context and following the same categorization of variables 
presented in Chapter 4.
5.3.2. Context Variables at the National/International Level
5 3.2.1. National system of government, its general organisation and relative 
distribution of power between the different branches of government
The US is a federal democracy, more specifically, a constitutional federal republic. 
The federal government is made up of three branches: the executive, the legislative 
and the judiciary. The US system of Government was designed to be open to a wide 
variety of opinions and interests. As a result, political processes are very open and 
highly participative. The legislative branch of the Government consists of a very 
powerful Congress, composed of two chambers: the US Senate House and the US 
House of Representatives. Contrary to what happens in some other countries, where 
the legislative branch of the Government will not discuss the contents and details of 
the space programme, the US Congress has the necessary expertise in space 
technology and space sciences to scrutinize NASA’s proposals in a very high level of 
detail. In the US, therefore, both the legislative and executive branches of the 
Government play a major role in NASA’s SDM.
The representational nature of the American democracy will also have a direct 
influence on NASA’s SDM, bringing up the politics of interests, as members of 
Congress will be looking out for the interests of their constituents when considering 
funding for the agency’s proposals.
Finally, as a republic, the ultimate power within the American system rests with the 
people. The people are also the ultimate beneficiaries as well as the ultimate resource 
providers for NASA’s activities. Therefore, the agency needs to be attuned to the 
public opinion as well, as this, directly or indirectly, may affect the organisation’s 
activities.
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In summary, the US system of Government and its general characteristics and 
organisation have a direct impact on NASA’s SDM processes, in particular during 
the formulation phase. As a result of its characteristics, NASA’s SDM processes, at 
least in their external part, will be very open, participative, complex and subject to a 
myriad of external influences, which include lobbysts and groups of interests of all 
sorts, constituents and others. These groups put forth their views and defend their 
interests as they are allowed to take part in the policy-making process involving the 
approval of NASA’s programmes.
S.3.2.2. National political agenda & National economic situation
As explained above, politics plays an integral part in NASA’s SDM, with the 
ultimate decision-makers being the US Administration and Congress. As NASA 
relies on them for general guidance, approval of its strategic decisions and financial 
support, it becomes automatically influenced by the political interests and priorities 
of the country’s governors and congressmen. Therefore, NASA’s SDM is directly 
influenced by the political agenda and national priorities of the US Government at 
any given time.
Through different wording, this influence was clearly recognized by former NASA 
Administrator James Beggs, who said that the support for the space programme is a 
matter of “the mood of the country and a question of priorities” (Sky and Telescope, 
1982, p.333).
In the same way, as NASA’s resources are discussed within the national budgetary 
process and as fluctuations in the general state of the economy will affect national 
budgets, so NASA’s activities and SDM will be affected by the state of the national 
economy.
One of the most obvious examples of the national political agenda influencing the 
space programme lies on the creation of the agency itself, back in 1958, which, as 
mentioned before, was pretty much a response to the launch by the soviets of the first 
artificial satellite, the Sputnik. Technological supremacy and leadership in space
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became major political priorities of the American Government and a space race with 
the Soviets was initiated then. As a result of that, the Apollo programme was created 
and all of NASA’s efforts throughout the 60’s were directed towards putting 
Americans on the Moon before the Soviets. NASA’s direction was very clear then 
and political support as well as financial resources to the implementation of its 
activities was not an issue.
Another example that can be offered here relates to the origins of one of the case 
studies which will be presented in Chapter 6. As concerns about the destruction of 
the atmosphere’s ozone layers by man-made pollutants became a major 
environmental issue in the 70’s, the US Government issued a mandate in 1976 for 
NASA to develop a research programme to investigate this problem. Amongst other 
initiatives, this mandate resulted in the proposition and development by NASA of the 
Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS), which is going to be further 
discussed in the next Chapter.
The two context variables just described can affect SDM throughout its horizontal 
phases, as they can lead to changes in the political and financial support given to a 
project throughout its formulation and implementation phases. However, probably 
their most significant impact will be on decisions content, as they will influence what 
gets and does not get approved in the first place, under which conditions (e.g. 
reduced budgets usually lead to re-planning and force changes in the content of 
projects in order to accommodate the imposed budgetary limitations).
S.3.2.3. National public policies
• National space policy
Introductory remarks
In the previous Chapter it was discussed what was understood by national space 
policy, both implicit and explicit. Even though they both reveal priorities for the 
space activities in a country, an implicit space policy can only surface through the
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observation of a series of past strategic decisions made over a period of time whereas 
an explicit, formal space policy will show current objectives and priorities which 
should serve as a guide for future decisions on space activities in a country.
Contrary to what happens with an implicit space policy, in an explicit space policy 
objectives and priorities for space are spelled out and made official in a document 
which can then be used as a reference and guide by those involved. Thus, for 
instance, in the particular case of NASA, it can be instrumental in the advocacy of its 
projects before the Administration and Congress in the pre-approval phase of 
projects.
It is interesting to note, though, that in both cases one can find that a National Space 
Policy is likely to reflect elements of national culture such as, for example, national 
pride, a taste for more remarkable, ambitious undertakings or a preference for more 
“down to Earth” endeavours with tangible returns and so on.
The US National Space Policy
At the time of the interviews and in the years around the development of the two 
projects studied in the next phase of the analysis, the US did have a National Space 
Policy. A formal, explicit, documented national space policy. This policy specified 
what the national objectives and goals for the space programme were and provided 
guidelines and implementing actions regarding the conduct of the national space 
programme and related activities.
Usually, the National Space Policy document is issued by the Executive branch of 
the Government (the Administration in the US case) and sets the general tone for 
space activities in a country. In the US, the National Space Council, which is under 
the Executive branch3, was directed to coordinate the process for developing a 
National Space Policy and strategy and for monitoring its implementation. The US 
Vice-president was the Chairman of the Council, and served as the President’s
3 Later on, in 1993, the National Space Council was absorbed by the NSTC -  National Science and Technology 
Council.
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principal advisor on national space policy and strategy. Along with many other 
authorities from the executive branch of the Government (in related areas such as 
national security, defence, commerce, transportation, science & technology and 
central intelligence), the Administrator of NASA was also a member of the Council. 
Therefore, as it would be expected, NASA did have a say in the elaboration of the 
National Space Policy and its own aspirations should also be at least partially 
reflected in the final document.
With the purpose of showing the sort of general and specific guidelines that can be 
found in a National Space Policy, selected examples extracted from the 1989 US 
National Space Policy document are provided and discussed below. They provide an 
idea of how and at which level the contents of a National Space Policy are likely to 
affect decisions in the area.
Before doing so, however, it is important to note that the space activities in the US 
are conducted by three separate sectors: two strongly interacting governmental 
sectors (civil and national security) and a separate, non-governmental commercial 
sector. The National Space Policy provides guidelines to all the three segments of 
space activities in the country. However, this research is focusing only on the civilian 
segment of the space activities. Thus, apart from the general objectives and goals, 
which apply to the whole of the US space programme, the illustrations provided 
below represent policy directives for the civilian space activities in the country.
Illustrations o f  contents o f  the US National Space Policy (based on year 1989)
Initially, as made clear in the above mentioned document, world prestige and 
leadership had been the main motors of space activities in the US. In its opening 
page it reads: “A fundamental objective guiding United States space activities has 
been and continues to be space leadership
Amongst the overall goals of the US Space Policy in that same year, it was possible 
to identify, for example, an emphasis on the development and use o f  space 
technology for the benefit o f the general population, on encouraging American
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private sector investment on space, on promoting international cooperation and on 
expanding human presence and activity beyond Earth orbit into the solar system, 
showing strong support for manned space missions in the years ahead.
Regarding the specific objectives for the civil space programme, they showed strong 
consistency with the overall goals, such as the ones pointed out above. Examples of 
these objectives are: “To preserve the US pre-eminence in critical aspects o f space 
science, applications, technology and manned space fligh t”; “to establish a 
permanently manned presence in space “to engage in international cooperative 
efforts that further US overall space goals” (National Space Policy, 1989).
Still within the civil space sector, illustrations of more specific guidelines provided in 
the same document are:
On Human Exploration : “NASA will continue the systematic development of 
technologies necessary to enable and support a range of future manned missions. 
This technology programme (Pathfinder) will be oriented toward a Presidential 
decision on a focused programme of manned exploration of the solar system.”
On Space Applications: “Agencies will seek to promote private sector development 
and implementation of applications”.
On Permanent Manned Presence: “NASA will develop the Space Station to achieve 
permanently manned operational capability by the mid 1990s”.
On International Cooperation: “The United States will foster increased international 
cooperation in civil space activities by seeking mutually beneficial international 
participation in civil space and space-related programmes”.
In other parts of the document, inter-sector policies and inter-sector guidelines are 
also set out, which are meant to cover aspects of the programme which 
simultaneously affect more than one of the three segments of the American space 
programme. One example of an inter-sector policy found in the same document is the
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one which establishes “assured access to space” as a “key element of national space 
policy”. Amongst the inter-sector guidelines are the ones involving policy guidelines 
on the use of the STS (Space Transportation System), which serves both the civilian 
and the national security segments of the space activities4, represented by NASA and 
the Department of Defence (DOD) respectively. The specific guideline in this case 
covered launch priority and read: “Launch priority will be provided for national 
security missions as implemented by NASA-DOD agreements.”
A quick look through the examples presented above shows that sometimes goals and 
guidelines are left purposely vague or open indicating a more general area of interest 
under which there is freedom of choice. Other times, they can be more specific, 
clearly indicating the points where action is required or expected.
Also, it is important to draw attention to the dynamic character of a National Space 
Policy. It should be noted that, even though some objectives and guidelines will 
prevail over a long period of time, in most cases, as the situation evolves and 
changes, they will be adjusted or replaced by new ones, more in line with current 
national priorities and Government vision for the space programme. For example, 
leadership has been a major motor of the American space programme for a long time 
whereas emphasis in areas such as commercialization of space activities and 
increasing involvement of private sector came along at a later stage.
On the impact o f the National Space Policy on NASA’s SDM
The National Space Policy seems to play an influential role in NASA’s SDM. In fact, 
it is formally expected that the agencies responsible for carrying out the American 
space programme comply with what is set out in the National Space Policy and be, 
therefore, directly influenced by it. A clear indication of how this is expected to 
happen is found in the following extract of the US National Space Policy document 
from 1989: “Agencies will use these sections as guidance on priorities, including
4 The DOD and NASA cooperate in the development and use o f military and civil Space Transportation Systems 
-STS
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preparation, review and execution o f budgets for space activities, within the overall 
resource and policy guidance provided by the President. Affected Government 
Agencies shall ensure that their current policies are consistent with this directive 
and, where necessary, shall establish policies to implement these practices
By setting the general orientation for the space programme and for NASA’s activities 
and by indicating the priorities, the National Space Policy (NSP) can affect, to start 
with, the nature and the characteristics of projects which are proposed and 
subsequently approved. In other words, it can affect the content of decisions. In 
effect, projects can be created specifically to meet an established goal or priority or 
just be adjusted so as to comply with general guidelines from the NSP. Moreover, 
regardless of whether or not any proposed project attempts to do so, its chances of 
approval can be directly affected by the NSP. Accordingly, the more obvious the 
conformity of a project with the NSP goals and guidelines, the more appealing and 
saleable the project will appear to decision-makers and the higher the chances of it 
being approved, both internally by NASA and externally by the Government. In fact, 
these projects will have priority over others where the conformity with the NSP is 
not so clear or does not exist. Thus, compliance with the NSP can facilitate decision­
making, first to NASA’s administrator, who has to decide between many competing 
projects which ones to forward to the Administration and Congress for approval, and 
then to the Government itself, the same one who set out the NSP.
In summary, the contents of the National Space Policy can influence what projects 
are proposed in the first place, the likelihood of them being internally approved by 
NASA’s decision-makers and of being externally approved and continually 
supported throughout their implementation by the ultimate decision-makers: the US 
Administration and the US Congress. Thus, the NSP can influence the content of 
strategic decisions and decisions’ formulation and implementation phases, as 
compliance or no-compliance with the priorities set out in the NSP can affect the 
level of support for the projects throughout the approval processes and 
implementation phases. In the particular case of the implementation phase, 
compliance with the NSP can ensure higher political and budgetary commitment to
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projects, making this phase more stable. Regarding the formulation phase, this can be 
facilitated or even shortened as a result of compliance with the NSP.
Finally, as a practical example of the influence of the US National Space Policy on 
NASA’s decisions, it could be said that the pioneer space projects developed by the 
Americans over the last decades, which include many missions to explore other 
planets, a series of ambitious manned missions, the development of a reusable space 
transportation vehicle (the Space Shuttle) and of a permanent facility in space (the 
Space Station), the latter as part of a huge international cooperation effort, are a 
reflex of the US’s pursuit of pre-eminence in space and also of some other elements 
of the NSP, such as the emphasis on international cooperation. The goal of leadership 
in space may also well be behind a culture of mega, highly innovative and extremely 
complex projects which came to be part of NASA’s organisational culture, as it will 
be discussed further down in this Chapter.
• Budgetary process 
Introductory Remarks
As mentioned before, as a federal agency, NASA gets its financial resources from the 
federal Government. Therefore, it will be in the realm of the extremely complex US 
budgetary process that the resources for NASA and its projects will be approved. As 
a result, the US budgetary process becomes a major player in NASA’s SDM.
The general organisation and the particular characteristics of the US budgetary 
process will determine how NASA’s SDM will be affected by it. Thus, a look at the 
way the process is organized will reveal who the main agents are, what steps need to 
be followed, what is the distribution of responsibilities and decisional power amongst 
the main agents and the nature and number of interactions between the main agents 
and other participants of the process. The way NASA is inserted into the general 
organisation of the process is a particular relevant aspect, as it will determine who 
has direct jurisdiction over the organisation and its projects and with whom NASA 
will have to immediately compete for resources. Finally, other specific attributes of
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the budgetary process usually related to how it is conducted may also be identified as 
playing an important role in influencing SDM.
Without any intention to fully describe the characteristics of the US budgetary 
process, as this is not the purpose here, some of its features found to be relevant in 
connection with influencing NASA’s SDM are presented and discussed below.
General Organisation and NASA’s insertion into the US budgetary process.
As suggested above, it would be beyond the scope of this research to provide a 
detailed account of how the budgetary process is organized and conducted in the 
US5. However, some basic elements of it are pinpointed and presented below.
The main agents of the process were already shown in Fig. 5.2 and involve the US 
President, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the US Congress. At 
the start of the process the OMB issues a budget call to NASA with general 
guidelines. After going through its own internal budget formulation process, NASA 
submits its budget proposal to the OMB. Following a series of steps and back and 
forth interactions involving the main agents above, the process will end with the 
President signing the appropriate bill.
Both houses of the Congress (Senate and House of Representatives) are involved in 
the budgetary process and play a major role in reviewing and approving NASA’s 
budget. They exercise their roles through three kinds of committees: the Budget 
Committee, the Authorizing Committee and the Appropriations Committee. These, 
in turn, are organized in several subcommittees. In a very simplified way, the Budget 
Committee ensures that “the aggregate spending of the Congress does not exceed 
prior guidelines that have been established” (Dawson, 1992, p.405). The Authorizing 
Committees establish the purpose and guidelines for the NASA programme and set 
overall spending limits, or ceilings, for specific programmes, whereas the 
Appropriations committees will recommend the actual budget figures for the full
5 For a good simplified description o f the sequential steps followed in the US budgetary process see Office o f  
Space Science (1994, p.2-6.7, p.2-6.9).
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Congress to allocate to the Government agencies, including NASA. As pointed out 
by Dawson (1992, p.408), these committees detain most of the “power of purse”.
As an interactive process, during the development of the budgetary process, several 
hearings are held where NASA has the opportunity to advocate for its projects or 
programmes. This is usually done by NASA’s Administrator and relevant Associate 
Administrators responsible for specific projects being proposed. In some particular 
instances, though, they can be assisted by other programme managers. Thus, NASA 
testifies before the OMB and later on before the Congress committees and 
subcommittees. This shows that, even though NASA is significantly affected by the 
federal budgetary process, it also has the opportunity to influence it during the 
congressional hearings and the ones before the OMB, by defending its interests and 
trying to counteract any unfavourable decisions to the agency that may be made 
during the process.
As mentioned before, the way NASA is inserted into the organisation of the federal 
budgetary process will determine who has direct jurisdiction over its budget and with 
whom it will directly compete for funds. This can be a very important source of 
influence on NASA’s budget and therefore on its SDM.
Fig.5.3 below shows which are the congressional committees and subcommittees 
with direct jurisdiction over NASA’s budget.
AUTHORIZATION
HOUSE SENATE
Com m ittee on Science, Space 
and Technology
Com m ittee on Science, 
Space and Transportation
Sub com m ittee on Space Sub com m ittee on Science, 
Technology and Space
APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE SENATE
Committee on Appropriations Com m ittee on
Sub com m ittee on Veteran affairs 
Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) and Independent Agencies
Sub com m ittee on V eteran 
affairs, (HUD) and 
Independent Agencies
Fig. 5.3 Policy Formulation and Approval Process 
Source: Office of Space Science, 1994
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As pointed out by Dawson (1992, p.411), “it turns out that in almost every step of the 
budget process NASA is competing for funds with a somewhat different cast of 
characters. Within the Administration, NASA essentially has to compete with all 
other federal departments and agencies. In the review of the Budget committee, 
NASA competes within Function 250 with other domestic science initiatives while at 
the same time competing for funds with other budget functions (such as education, 
energy, natural resources and the environment, etc). Within the authorization bill, 
NASA does not really have any competition as such; the entire bill deals only with 
NASA programmes. And finally, within the appropriations process, NASA 
programmes find themselves in direct competition for funding with housing and 
veterans programmes.”6
Being such a politically sensitive area, it is easy to see, for example, how 
unfavourable it is for NASA to have to compete for funds with veterans health care 
and housing for the poor and the homeless. In one example of how this can affect 
NASA’s SDM, Dawson (1992, p. 411) refers to one particular occasion when, during 
the debate of the Appropriations Bill of 1991, a member of Congress, from the 
House of Representatives, voted for killing the space station programme by arguing 
that it was more important to build houses for the poor than for the astronauts.
As shown above, at almost every step of the process NASA’s proposals will be 
weighed against projects from different areas, rather than space or even R&D or 
sciences sometimes. That takes away the focus from the space programme to include 
considerations and priorities of very different nature. Depending on the specific 
combination of projects and of priorities at any given time, this may favour or run 
against NASA.
6 Comments apply to the way the budgetary process was organized back in 1992.
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Relevant features o f the US budgetary process
-Politics of interests: district concerns by members
In addition to weighing the merits and values of competing projects from several 
areas at different stages of the process, other exclusively political interests will also 
play a role along the budgetary decision-making process. Amongst them is the 
Congress members concern with satisfying the interests of their constituents. As 
explained by Dawson (1992, p.411), the representational nature of the American 
Democracy will imply that Congress members “are very attuned to the extent to 
which a particular piece of legislation will provide funding or jobs to the constituents 
in their district or state”. Therefore, they will tend to be more supportive of projects 
which will generate more jobs or funding for their constituents.
-Open and participative
The open and very participative nature of the US budgetary process adds to its 
complexity, as it allows a myriad of external influences to play a role in the process. 
Numerous interest groups (e.g. national associations representing industry, 
commerce and labour) will have a say in support or against different projects through 
their lobbying activities during the congressional hearings held out throughout the 
process. Additionally, constituents can also take part through e-mails and letters to 
their members in Congress7. All these influences are factored in during the budgetary 
decision-making process.
Due to the innumerable sources of influences acting on the budgetary process (e.g. 
political interests, lobbyists, constituents, the competition between the merits and 
priorities for projects of different areas, personal preferences of key decision-makers 
etc), its final outcomes will be very difficult to predict, as they will be the resultant of 
many forces acting simultaneously and pulling at different directions.
7 For a good discussion on the different types o f  interest groups and lobbyists and on the participation  
o f  these groups and o f  constituents in the budgetary process see R ip ley  (1983, Chapter 8).
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-Annual Basis
An influential feature of the US budgetary process is that funding for projects is 
provided on an annual basis. Thus, even though funds for a multiyear project may be 
approved, they will be reviewed annually. This means projects will have to go 
through the budgetary process and compete for the necessary funding year after year, 
all along their implementation phase. This practice has become a great source of 
instability during the implementation of space projects, as they will get exposed 
throughout this phase, and not only up until project approval, to all sorts of external 
environmental changes which may affect the level of commitment and/or the level of 
resources given to a project (e.g. fluctuations in the political "mood" of the country 
and in the state of the national economy, changes in the composition of Congress 
committees and subcommittees, amongst many others).
As a result of this characteristic of the budgetary process, quite too often, for reasons 
which cannot be controlled by project managers or even NASA, projects will have 
their budgets reduced and will have to be restructured and/or stretched out, usually at 
a high cost. In some instances, projects may even be cancelled.
The negative impact that this has on the development and outcomes of projects is 
apparent. As mentioned by Dawson (1992, p.414), stretching out the schedules of 
projects will cause “huge overruns in almost everything , making the cost efficiency 
of the dollars that are spent lower still, and causing even greater problems in the 
“out-years””. Regarding the cancellations, sometimes they happen when projects are 
well advanced into their R&D cycle, again showing poor management of resources 
and causing frustration amongst the scientific and technological community who are 
the direct beneficiaries of the project.
The annual basis feature of the US budgetary process and the impact it has on the 
implementation and outcomes of space projects were discussed by Wells and 
Hastings (1991, p. 241). They wrote: “...the US government reviews its budget 
annually, but without systemic guarantees or commitments to items in budgetary 
areas considered to be discretionary (such as the space programme) rather than
151
essential”. As a result, they noted, “...the level of governmental funding and 
commitment to specific projects is often highly variable”. Finally, they concluded: 
“Since the activities of the space programme frequently involve multiyear research 
and development schedules and long production lead times, these budgetary 
fluctuations and uncertainties generally have a deleterious effect on the efficiency of 
the programme”.
-High level of scrutiny to projects
In the US federal budget system resources are granted to NASA on a project by 
project basis, not institutionally. Project proposals are treated individually and are 
examined at a very high level of detail. This makes it more difficult for individual 
projects to obtain approval and makes the overall approval process more complex, as 
there will be a lot more interference with the specifics of each project proposal. 
Often, changes which will affect the content of what is being proposed will have to 
be made to meet demands imposed by decision-makers involved in the budgetary 
process.
The comments below, made by two of the interviewees, but also corroborated by 
practically all of the other NASA’s interviewees, well illustrate this feature of the US 
budgetary process:
"We are almost naked before Congress. Every little detail o f the programme is subject 
to scrutiny by a Congress that changes its composition and attitude every single year. 
Certainly every second year but in my case I  think it's been from one year to the next”.
... and they don't look at NASA's budget as a whole and argue about its balance as a 
whole. Different committees o f Congress look directly at the individual programmes, at 
the details, and they approve them separately, and so the NASA budget is not, even 
though NASA puts it together, it is not an integral budget for the Agency. The separate 
items are separately approved by Congress and then ended up, and then handed to 
NASA and said: that is your budget. And so, the degree o f  power that they have is very 
high”.
“ The Congress has always managed the NASA budget at a very detailed level”.
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Influences on NASA ’S SDM
Overall, the most striking features of the US budgetary process were its complexity 
and the high uncertainty levels it involves. Its complexity derives from many factors, 
including the large number of participants, the number of steps and back and forth 
interactions between the main agents, and the myriad of different interests which are 
represented and manifest themselves throughout the process. The high uncertainty 
levels arise from a combination of characteristics of the process, including its own 
complexity and multiple sources of influence and the way money is allocated to 
approved projects or initiatives.
As the budgetary process is an intrinsic part of NASA’s SDM, its complexity and 
uncertainty levels are automatically reflected in it and can be observed all along the 
horizontal phases of the process. Thus, for instance, greatly due to the complexity 
observed in the budgetary process itself, the formulation phase of NASA’s projects 
will also be very complex. Regarding the uncertainty brought about by the budgetary 
process, it can be felt all along the formulation and the implementation phases of 
projects. During the formulation phase, process outcomes become highly uncertain 
and very difficult to predict due to the countless sources of influences playing a role 
in the process. Those include political and partisan interests, the role of lobbyists and 
constituents, and the competition for funds with a large and very different variety of 
players, which will appeal differently to the main agents or decision-makers in the 
process. Once projects get approved and resources are initially allocated to them, the 
uncertainty levels will remain high throughout their implementation. This will be 
mainly due to the funding instability that usually arises as a result of resources being 
granted on an annual basis and not for the totality of the development period. This 
way, in order to try to ensure the necessary resources for their development, projects 
will have to go through the budgetary process again every year and subject 
themselves to the same numerous sources of influences and to any changes affecting 
the level of political commitment to the projects and the level of resources which are 
made available to them.
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In summary, some of the general characteristics of NASA’s SDM derive, at least 
partially, from the characteristics of the US budgetary process. As indicated above, 
the budgetary process usually affects the content of the decisions being made, the 
complexity and difficulty levels in reaching a decision, the length of decision 
processes (formulation and implementation phases) and the stability levels during the 
implementation phase. Thus, greatly due to the budgetary process characteristics, 
NASA’s SDM processes are generally complex, very political, with variable duration 
depending on level of political priority, and with very uncertain outcomes. The 
implementation, on its side, will be characteristically very unstable, as funding levels 
and political commitment to projects can vary significantly along the projects’ 
development phase. This high level of funding instability often lead to rescheduling 
and re-planning of projects, or even cancellation in some cases, with obvious 
damaging consequences to their final outcomes. These characteristics of NASA’s 
SDM will apply to SDs made across NASA’s organisation.
• Contracting policy
A major part of NASA’s SDM, mainly affecting the implementation of projects, has 
to do with the relationship with industry, which includes the selection of the 
contractors and subcontractors which will be involved in the development of its 
projects and the relationship the agency will maintain with them throughout the 
development phase up to project delivery.
The involvement of the industry in NASA’s projects has always been very high. The 
contractors provide NASA with systems, subsystems, components, parts, materials, 
as well as support services.
Since its creation, in 1958, NASA was granted broad authority and flexibility in 
procurement actions. Usually, after establishing internally a set of weighted criteria 
according to which any proposals from the industry will be evaluated, a formal Request 
for Proposals (RFP) is released by NASA to industry. Any proposals subsequently 
received will be evaluated and ranked in accordance with the previously established 
selection criteria. The final decision, though, in the hands of NASA’s high officials or
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other top decision-makers, may or not follow the criteria and the recommendations 
made by the evaluators. The decision-makers will have the information available to 
help them with the decision but retain the freedom to follow them or not.
Despite NASA’s great autonomy to select and negotiate with its contractors and 
subcontractors, as a Governmental agency, its freedom to do so can be constrained 
by legislation regulating industrial contracting by the public sector. Thus, for instance, 
as mentioned in Holman (1974), social and economic objectives incorporated in 
some national laws can impose restrictions on NASA’s freedom to contract with 
industry, such as minimum wages, maximum hours, non-discrimination in 
employment, excess profits, use of small businesses, use of firms in labour surplus 
areas etc. Additionally, as recalled in the same document, “there are strong political 
pressures for states to have a “just” share of procurement contracts” (p.77).
Given the high interests at stake, politics also has become an inherent part of the 
procurement process. As quoted in Holman (1974, p.66), the comments made by a 
management consultant company, which investigated and prepared a report on NASA’s 
contracting policy in its early years, well illustrate its political side: ‘Wo aspect o f  
NASA's job is more politically sensitive than its contracting process. In substantial 
part, this political sensitivity arises out o f the large volume o f contracts being let and 
their significance to individual contractors and to the community in which their 
plants are located. ”
As one would expect, any kind of constraints imposed on NASA’s procurement process 
can be detrimental to the development of its projects. The need to satisfy constraints 
such as the ones mentioned above and any others, such as the requirement to keep costs 
down, for instance, is likely to deviate the final decision on the selection of contractors 
away from the one which would best serve the interests of the project to be developed. 
Thus, for instance, during the contractors’ selection process, criteria such as greatest 
technical competence, clearly one that should be determinant as far as the interests of 
the projects are concerned, may well be outweighed by the need to keep costs down or 
to satisfy political pressures. This way, even though this may not necessarily be always 
the case, the resulting decision and final choice of contractors may put projects at
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increased risk of facing problems during their implementation, with subsequent 
implications for their outcomes.
hi summary, NASA has great autonomy and flexibility regarding the contractors’ 
selection process. However, as a Governmental agency, NASA is subject to any laws 
and regulations which apply to industrial contracting by the public sector. These may 
limit the agency’s freedom to select winners and award contracts. Besides, the agency’s 
decisions on contractors can also be affected by strong political pressures and industrial 
lobbying, as discussed below. These constraints have the potential to affect the 
implementation and, therefore, the outcomes of NASA’s projects.
Finally, it is important to mention here that the selection of contractors represent a very 
important aspect of NASA’s overall SDM process, as the contractors share with NASA 
the responsibility for implementing the projects and, thus, can greatly affect their “fate”.
5.3.2.4. Significance and influence of stakeholders
Size and qualification o f space industry
Differently from the situation in some other countries with newer and smaller space 
programmes, the scale and the maturity the space programme in the US has reached 
has allowed for the emergence and consolidation of a very strong and diverse space 
industry. The US space industry remains the strongest in the world and bears great 
responsibility for the successes as well as for the failures of the US civil space 
programme, as NASA relies heavily on them for help with developing its projects.
The US space industry is well organized (e.g. active trade associations) and 
represents a strong source of influence on NASA’s SDM. Its influence can be felt in 
different ways and at different stages of the SDM process. In the pre-approval or 
formulation phase, industry can exert its influence on NASA’s SDM through 
lobbying activities in the Congress to promote their interests. Industry is also 
represented at some of the committees and subcommittees of NASA’s internal 
advisory structure, which exists to provide advice to NASA throughout the life cycle
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of projects and which is discussed further down in this Chapter. During the 
implementation phase, though, industry will play its most crucial role, as it will take 
up or share with NASA the responsibility for developing the projects. Actually, the 
industry’s involvement with specific projects can start very early, still during the 
project formulation, in preparation for the implementation phase. The industry’s 
performance during the implementation phase can be decisive to the success of space 
projects.
Scientific Community
The scientific community in the US is also broad, strong and very well organized. It 
has a very important role in influencing NASA’s SDM, which is exercised in several 
different ways. In one of them, the scientific community actually becomes part of the 
SDM process, when it responds to the Announcement of Opportunities (AO) 
released by NASA during the formulation phase of projects, where the agency 
formally invites the scientific community to present proposals of scientific 
experiments to fly aboard a new scientific satellite or in another space mission. By 
presenting and getting their proposals approved, the scientific community become 
then involved with the development of the payload for NASA’s scientific missions 
and, consequently, also become co-responsible for the implementation and final 
outcomes of these missions.
As direct beneficiaries of many of the space projects developed by NASA, the 
scientific community also plays a vital role as users of the data generated by the 
agency’s scientific missions. After being analysed, the data generate scientific 
knowledge which in turn leads to new scientific questions that become the basis for 
the development of new missions by NASA. It is a cyclical process, with NASA’s 
projects generating data for the scientific community which, in turn, after analysing 
them, will generate knowledge and ideas for NASA’s new space projects. In this 
role, the scientific community will affect the content of decisions as well as their 
outcomes, as for the scientific space missions one measure of success can be the 
extent to which the data that was expected to be generated by a particular project was 
in fact generated and successfully reached the scientific community.
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In yet another way of influencing NASA’s SDM, the scientific community take up 
the role of advisors to NASA. They exercise this role through representation in 
NASA’s internal and external advisory structure. Externally, the National Academy 
of Sciences and the National Research Council, with its specific boards dealing 
directly with space activities, will indicate what the main scientific questions are that 
need to be addressed by the agency and will provide general guidance and advice to 
NASA’s decision-makers. Internally, the scientific community is well represented in 
the many committees and subcommittees of the NASA Advisory Council and 
provide optional8 and independent advice to NASA’s decision-makers. The influence 
of the scientific community in the role of advisors to NASA can be observed all 
along the horizontal phases of projects, but is most important in the formulation or 
pre-approval phase.
Finally, the scientific community may also influence NASA’s SDM via the policy­
making process, by expressing their views and defending their interests in the 
Congressional hearings, for example, during the pre-approval phase of NASA’s 
projects.
hi summary, the scientific community in the US is very strong, highly organized and 
plays a very influential role in NASA’s SDM. This influence is exercised through 
different roles, the most important of which being: as beneficiaries and users of data 
from space projects, as co-developers of the projects and as advisors to NASA’s 
decision-makers.
Other stakeholders
Due to the open and participative nature of the US policy-making process, other 
beneficiaries of the space technology, such as the users of data from remote sensing 
satellites, for example, or any other stakeholders, can also defend their interests 
during the policy-making processes dealing with NASA’s programmes.
8 The internal advisory structure is created and funded by NASA.
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5.3.2.S. External formal authorization and advisory structure
Amongst the external sources of influence on NASA’s SDM are the advisory boards 
and their committees. They help with the space policy formulation and project’s 
reviewing process. Even though the organisation of specific boards and committees 
will change over time, they have always represented an important source of influence 
on NASA’s SDM and on the space sector in general. At the time of the interviews, 
the external advisory structure with direct influence on NASA’s activities was 
formed by the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) and the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS)/ National Research Council (NRC).
The National Science and Technology Council (NTSC)
As mentioned in OSS (1994, p.2-10.4), the NTSC is a cabinet level council created 
in 1993 by President Clinton to coordinate science, space and technology policies 
throughout the federal government. It replaced several other interagency councils, 
like the Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering, and Technology 
(FCCSET), the National Space Council and the National Critical Materials Council. 
An important objective of the NSTC, as presented in NSTC (1994, p.l), is “to 
establish clear national goals for federal science and technology investments and to 
ensure that science, space, and technology policies and programmes are developed 
and implemented to effectively contribute to those national goals”
The NSTC is chaired by the President and includes several members from the US 
Government, such as the secretaries of Energy, Defense, Interior, Commerce, State, 
Agriculture, amongst others. The vice-president, some assistants to the President and 
directors of several federal agencies are also members of the council. Amongst those 
is the Administrator of NASA.
The NTSC is composed of nine R&D coordinating committees, which will 
coordinate research and development strategies and prepare budget recommendations 
for achieving national goals. For specific information on the committees and their 
responsibilities see NTSC, 1994.
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National Academy of Sciences (NAS)/National Research Council (NRC)
The National Academy of Sciences defines what are the major issues in space 
sciences and indicates what sort of scientific questions NASA’s programmes should 
be addressing. As it is supposed to provide independent and unbiased advice to 
NASA, it is essentially composed by scientists from academia and industry, even 
though some members may happen to be from the Agency itself.
The National Research Council, as mentioned in OSS (1994, p.2-10.5), “was 
organized by NAS in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and 
technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the 
federal Government. The NRC has become the principal operating portion of the 
Academy providing services to the Government, the public and the scientific and 
engineering communities”. The two boards of the NRC which will oversee the 
achievement of the nation’s civilian space programme objectives are the Space 
Studies Board (SSB) and the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB). 
Each of these boards has their own committees and subcommittees, covering specific 
disciplines. These committees meet on regular intervals and have both an advisory 
and reviewing role.
Influence on NASA’s SDM
The active role played by NASA’s external advisory structure in the agency’s SDM 
became very clear in several passages of the interviews, as all interviewees agreed 
that they did take into account the views and recommendations of the main 
committees and boards involved with NASA’s activities. As confirmed by the 
interviewees, they used the views from the advisory committees as a guide for their 
SDM and kept in close contact with them, continuing to take their advice even after 
projects have been approved.
The following extracts from the interviews illustrates this assertion:
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When referring to the outside advisory committees, one of the interviewees 
mentioned: “We pay a lot o f attention to their recommendations. When they make 
recommendations we assess each one o f them and respond to them”.
Another interviewee spoke about the role played by the National Academy of 
Sciences in providing the main scientific questions which NASA will try to answer 
by developing new scientific missions. Amongst his comments were:
“Their job (the NAS) is not to define missions or projects, their job is to define for  
this country what the major issues are in space sciences, what are the major issues 
and questions we ought to be addressing in the next decade. ”
“I  will work with them (the internal advisory committees) to learn how we can 
implement a programme that will answer these questions that the Academy poses, to 
address the issues that the Academy poses ”.
Another interviewee, talking about the relationship between the internal and external 
advisory structures, said there was a complex interchange between scientists and 
technologists on both sides and added: “They talk back and forth, but ultimately the 
Space Sciences Board and the NASA advisory committees have to agree that this is a 
good mission to do. ”
Finally, regarding specifically the Space Studies Board (SSB) and its committees, the 
following comments from the OSS document (1994, p.2-10.5) are indicative of their 
influential role in NASA’s SDM: “programme managers must be aware that the 
support of their associated SSB scientific discipline committee and of the SSB itself 
is an important step in gaining New Start Approval within the Agency”. After New 
Start Approval, it was explained, “programme managers should continue to keep the 
appropriate committees of the SSB informed on the status of the programme and 
should bring to their attention any major changes in scientific capabilities or 
objectives”. In some particular cases, as described in the same document, changes 
even have to be discussed with the SSB and appropriate committees before action is 
taken.
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S.3.2.6. Existence of significant expertise in space matters outside the space 
agency
As commented in Chapter 4, if  there is no significant expertise in space matters 
outside the space organisations, their level of autonomy over the contents of the 
decisions made will be higher, as there will be no room for much scrutiny on the 
content of decisions outside the organisation. In the case of NASA, though, there is 
considerable expertise in space technology and space sciences outside the agency, 
including the National Academy of Sciences, advisory committees, space boards and 
also both the Administration and Congress. This expertise confers ability to the 
Government to analyse NASA’s proposals not only on political/budgetary grounds 
but also on merit grounds. It allows the examination in details of the contents of 
proposed projects, thus interfering with how much control the agency will have over 
the contents of the decisions made. This interference can generally make the 
approval process more complicated.
A few comments made by one of the interviewees, and which have already been 
cited before, illustrates very well how high is the level of scrutiny on NASA’s project 
proposals within the Congress, for example:
“We are almost naked before the Congress. Every little detail o f the programme is 
subject to scrutiny by a Congress ... different committees o f Congress look directly at 
the individual programmes, at the details, and they approve them separately ...The 
Congress has always managed the NASA budget at a very detailed level. ”
5.3.3. Context Variables at the Organisational Level
5.3.3.I. Organisational culture
As discussed in Chapter4, the organisational culture can be seen as an additional 
element of context driving and explaining decisional behaviour in organisations. 
Understood as shared meanings, beliefs and values that characterise an organisation, 
the organisational culture can affect organisations’ processes and performance and be
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particularly relevant in terms of influencing their SDM. Amongst other things, the 
organisational culture can affect the kind of strategic choices considered or made by 
organisations and, as a result, the characteristics of the strategic processes that will 
follow after that.
In 1990, the Augustine Committee, an advisory committee that discussed the future 
of the US space programme, studied and described NASA’s organisational culture. 
Amongst the aspects mentioned by the Committee which had a clear impact on the 
kind of strategic choices made by NASA was a general orientation towards mega- 
projects and a preference for new, innovative projects.
In his article on NASA’s organisational culture, McCurdy (1992, p. 190) refers to 
these two characteristics of NASA’s culture in the following passage: “NASA has a 
bias toward “big science””. NASA also has a characteristic bias toward new 
programmes rather than old endeavours”.
In another document, also reflecting these traits of NASA’s organisational culture, 
the authors mentioned that the US space programme had a “fundamental orientation 
towards revolutionaiy or technologically unique projects” (Wells and Hastings, 1991, 
p. 243). Further on in the same document, the authors talked about the propensity of 
the US space programme for creating “megaprojects” or projects large in scope (p. 
244). Even though there may have been other motivations behind this tendency, such 
as the belief that this could increase projects’ chances of obtaining political support, 
the authors believed that this characteristic was at least partially due to NASA’s 
institutional preference for such projects.
These features of NASA’s organisational culture seem in fact to be very much 
aligned with some of the deep-rooted values of the American national culture, such 
as national pride and the country’s image as a technology innovator and technology 
leader.
The orientation towards very large and innovative projects has several implications 
fo r  NASA’s SDM. Besides the obvious impact on the kind of projects that prevail in
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the agency’s SDM, it influences aspects of both the formulation and implementation 
phases of projects. By increasing the overall complexity and uncertainty levels 
associated with the projects to be developed, it extends the length of time necessary 
to design and to implement them, as well as the risk of design and management 
complications and of cost overruns. Overall, these characteristics also affect the 
projects’ chances of success and, along with the high development costs involved, 
the impact that an eventual failure can have.
Even though cultural changes tend to occur very slowly and are very difficult to be 
imposed, it is interesting to mention that around the time of the interviews, NASA 
was undergoing a series of organisational changes, including an attempt of a cultural 
shift. Amongst other things, NASA’s then administrator, Mr. Daniel Goldin, was 
trying to implement his new policy of “smaller, faster, cheaper” missions, in sharp 
contrast with the way the organisation had been working so far.
5.3.3.2. Organisation size
As mentioned before, NASA is a very large organisation, responsible for the civil 
segment of the US space programme, which is the largest in the world. The scale of 
the American space programme and of NASA’s activities, more specifically, does 
have an important impact and raise a lot of interest in different segments of the 
American society, such as academia, industry, users’ communities, the very 
American Government etc. Overall, the large size of NASA and of the US space 
programme tends to raise the levels of conflict and politics in the agency’s SDM 
processes, as different stakeholders try to defend their interests, as well as their 
overall complexity levels during the formulation and implementation phases of 
projects.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, though, the specific effects of size will be felt on a 
project by project basis, depending on the particular characteristics of each project. 
These are discussed further down in this Chapter.
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S.3.3.3. Organisational authorization & advisory structure
In addition to the external advisory structure, which was previously discussed in this 
Chapter, NASA has a formal internal advisory structure which provides advice and 
counsel on major programmes and policy issues to the agency’s main decision­
makers, from the highest hierarchical level of NASA Administrator all the way down 
to the Division level. Below this level, non-official working groups and scientific 
steering groups can also provide informal advice to NASA’s discipline chiefs.
Contrary to the external advisory structure, this is an optional structure, which is 
created by NASA and whose members are chosen by NASA. However, in order to 
ensure impartiality, members of the internal advisory structure are, with very few 
exceptions, from outside of NASA. It should be noted that, even though the 
particular organisation of this advisory structure may have changed over the years, 
the search for independent judgment and guidance has remained a strong tradition in 
NASA.
At the time of the interviews NASA’s internal advisory structure was headed by the 
NASA Advisory Council (NAC), which provided advice directly to NASA’s 
administrator. As explained in NASA (Introduction to the NAC, 1994), “the council 
reviews the agency’s policies, programmes and strategies and considers the degree to 
which they achieve their objectives. It serves as an additional source of reflection and 
consultation for the NASA administration on broad-reaching issues.”
The NAC has eight standing advisory committees, which will provide advice at the 
next hierarchical level, the level of Associate Administrators. The committees report 
formally to the Council and to their respective programme heads. Thus, as organized 
at the time of the interviews, the committees and the respective NASA’s offices they 
provided advice to were:
1. NAC Advisory Committee on the International Space Station - NASA Office 
of Space Flight
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2. NAC Aeronautics Advisory Committee -  NASA Office o f Aeronautics
3. NAC Earth System Science and Applications Advisory Committee -  NASA 
Office of Mission to Planet Earth
4. NAC Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications Advisory Committee 
- NASA Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications
5. NAC Minority Business Resource Advisory Committee -  NASA Office of 
Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization
6. NAC NASA-NIH Advisory Committee on Biomedical and Behavioural 
Research - NASA Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications
7. NAC Space Science Advisory Committee -  NASA Office of Space Sciences
8. NAC Technology and Commercialization Advisory Committee -  NASA 
Office of Advanced Concepts and Technology
Under the scope of these committees there is a series of subcommittees which 
provide advice to directors and their staff at the Division’s level. For example, under 
the Space Sciences Advisory Committee there were three subcommittees: 
Astrophysics, Solar System Exploration and Space Physics. Additionally, special 
study groups or task forces may also be organized from time to time to examine 
particular issues.
Usually the NAC, its committees and subcommittees hold regular meetings which, 
with few exceptions, are open to the public. Members include experts from 
universities, research organisations, industry etc. The NASA Deputy Administrator is 
the principal point of contact with the NAC and serves as NASA’s member. The 
National Research Council’s Space Studies Board and its Aeronautics Space 
Engineering Board serve as ex-officio members. This shows a point of intersection
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between the internal and external advisory structures which both provide advice to 
NASA, but from different perspectives.
Influences on N ASA9s SDM
Like with the external advisory structure, it became clear during the interviews that 
the internal advisory groups were also a very important source of consultation for 
NASA’s decision-makers and an integral part of the organisation’s SDM processes.
Actually, the comments made by one of the interviewees indicated that the search for 
independent advice to help with the agency’s decision-making was in fact a customary 
practice, which extended much beyond the official advisory structure. While talking 
about the advisory committees, the interviewee explained that in some cases there were 
also special teams set up with outside experts to provide advice and recommendations. 
And he added: “Sometimes we will actually bring people into NASA to work with us on 
addressing this particular type o f programme and to help us developing the 
programme. So, we can be rather flexible, it depends on the specific mission, but we try 
very hard to seek outside advice when possible
The next interview passages shown below have already been presented before in the 
“External Authorization and Advisory Structure” subsection. However, they are 
repeated here, as they indicate not only the active role of the advisory structure but 
also how both the external and internal advisory structures play a part in helping 
decision-making in NASA.
hi one of the passages, the interviewee, when talking about the relationship between the 
internal and external advisory structures, said there was a complex interchange between 
scientists and technologists on both sides and added: “They talk back and forth, but 
ultimately the Space Sciences Board and the NASA advisory committees have to agree 
that this is a good mission to do. ”
Another interviewee, NASA’s associate administrator for space sciences, explained 
that these advisory groups (referring to the NAC subcommittees involved with his
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area) would help them find ways of tackling the scientific questions raised by the 
National Academy of Sciences. In his words: “I will work with them (advisory 
committees) to learn how we can implement a programme that will answer these 
questions that the Academy poses, to address the issues that the Academy poses”.
The influence of both the external and internal advisory structures will be felt all 
along the decision process, but will have a bigger impact on the content of the 
decisions being made (such as NASA’s attempts to define missions that will answer 
scientific questions posed by the National Academy of Sciences) and will be more 
noticeable during the decision formulation process, in the pre-approval phase.
S.3.3.4. The existence and use of formal general or dedicated strategies for SDM
A formal strategy is an internally developed input to guide SDM in the organisation or 
in the area to which it applies and can work internally in a similar way as the national 
space policy works externally to the space organisations. As mentioned in Chapter 4, 
the existence of an explicit, formal strategy, agreed upon and generally accepted by 
members of the organisation can work as a mechanism for facilitating and guiding 
strategic decision-making.
At the time of the interviews NASA had only recently developed the first strategic 
plan for the whole organisation. As explained by one of the interviewees, in the 60’s 
a strategic plan was not necessary because it was clear what their direction was: “go 
to the Moon and get people back to Earth”. After that objective was accomplished, 
the agency spent many years “without having such a clear cut direction from the 
Administration”.
A couple of years before the interviews were conducted, a strategy for the whole 
organisation was finally developed and reviewed one year later. However, as it was 
so recent, it was still early to say that this would have a significant impact on the 
organisation’s SDM. On the other hand, the area of space sciences, for example, to 
which belong the two projects studied in this dissertation’s case studies, had had their 
own strategic plan for many years. In the process of developing that plan, which was
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renewed and updated every three years, an assessment of the external environment 
was made, specially the budget scenario, and the major scientific questions posed by 
the National Academy of Sciences were taken into consideration. The strategic plan 
became an effective instrument to guide strategic decision-making in the area. This 
was clearly indicated by one of the interviewees, whom when asked if their strategic 
plan really played a role in guiding their SDM, replied: “Yes, it is absolutely crucial, 
absolutely critical”.
By defining the priorities for the area and even listing which missions’ proposals 
should be developed first, the main influence of this strategy was on the content of 
decisions. As the strategy was developed with the participation and concurrence of 
the scientists, it also had a facilitating role for the area’s internal decision-making, 
making agreement on which missions should be proposed easier and faster.
53.3.5. Managerial & project management practices
Decision-making styles
As it became apparent during the interviews and analysis of data, NASA had an 
extremely open and participative decision-making style, even though part of it was 
compulsory, therefore not a choice to NASA. Decision-making was also very formal, 
well documented and, despite emphasizing consultation with the relevant 
professionals and experts, was not based on consensus but on lines of authority, 
which followed a hierarchy of power.
As a result of its very open and participative style NASA’s strategic decisions were 
exposed to a wide number of influences, some of it imposed on the agency and some 
others of voluntary nature like, for example, the agency’s long tradition of seeking 
independent advice through an internal advisory structure and numerous project 
reviews which, in both cases, involved professionals and experts from outside the 
project and the agency.
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These characteristics of NASA’s SDM will be present throughout the life cycle of a 
project, from its formulation to its implementation and delivery, basically every time 
a project related decision has to be made. However, they will be most noticeable 
during the formulation phase.
Even though it is difficult to pinpoint a priori what specific effects these 
characteristics of NASA’s SDM will have on the decisions being made, they 
generally aim at improving the quality of dm and therefore the outcomes of projects. 
This is particularly true for the tradition of broad consultation and the attempts to 
take in many different views from relevant professionals and experts.
The making of contingency plans
Due to the budgetary instability and constraints generally observed during the 
implementation of space projects in the US, it turns out that the making of 
contingency plans is not a particularly relevant variable for NASA’s SDM. 
Therefore, it will not be further discussed here. Besides, the inclusion or not of 
contingency funds in project plans can vary from project to project and may well be 
associated with the practice of overestimating or underestimating project costs, 
which is discussed below.
Attitudes towards cost-estimates of space projects
Comments made by some of the interviewees, along with the analysis of 
documentary evidence, indicated that the practice of underestimating costs, much 
more than the other way round, had been quite common in NASA along the years. 
Wells and Hastings (1991, p.240), for example, when referring to NASA and to the 
US space programme, talked explicitly about " ... a tendency within the programme 
to underestimate costs for potential projects”.
However, after confirming the practice and saying that this was seen as "the best way 
of selling something”, one of the interviewees mentioned that in the agency’s 
environment of that time this practice was becoming increasingly difficult to happen.
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He explained: “people cannot get away with things like that anymore”, and added: 
“maybe in the past but not in today’s environment”. He mentioned that they had a 
senior management group and a programme management council (both of them 
relatively recent) that checked over major projects every year. And he explained that 
if a project started overrunning (like above 15% of estimated costs) project managers 
would need to justify why they didn’t cancel it.
As mentioned in Chapter4, the practice of underestimating project costs can 
influence both the formulation and the implementation phases of projects and have a 
decisive impact on final outcomes. Initially, it can facilitate project’s approval and 
even shorten the formulation phase, as projects will look more appealing to decision­
makers when offering greater capability at cheaper costs. Later on, however, it will 
have a detrimental effect on the implementation phase, as it is likely to lead to cost 
overruns that can only be overcome by either stretching out projects, at high costs, or 
by canceling them, both with obvious negative consequences in terms of final 
outcomes.
However, as just explained, the situation had changed and the practice of 
underestimating projects was becoming less of a problem for NASA’s SDM.
Reporting and controlling systems
As mentioned before, NASA had a very formal and well documented decision­
making process. One of the interviewees explained that they had formal reviews with 
boards and committees that reviewed projects and made recommendations as they 
moved along their development phases.
Another interviewee talked about some of the many reviews that take place during 
the life cycle of a project, such as non-advocate reviews, critical design reviews, 
independent readiness reviews and several other independent reviews. The 
independent reviews, as the name suggests, were made by independent teams. People 
from outside the project and in some cases from outside the agency were brought in 
to review the projects and provide impartial recommendations. A general description
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of the overall review and reporting process for NASA’s scientific projects is 
provided in OSS (1994, p.2-7.1 to 2-7.20). In this document the main documentation, 
formal procedures and reviews are described as per phase of project’s development.
During the interviews, the dynamic aspect of this variable became salient, with some 
recent changes in the review and reporting process pointing at higher level of control 
over major projects and major changes made to projects (such as the ones which 
implied a significant increase in costs). One example of this, as offered by one of the 
interviewees, was the recent creation of two independent boards, a senior 
management group and a programme management council, to review major projects 
on an annual basis and check aspects such as costs, schedule and technical issues.
It also became clear that size was a factor in influencing the review and reporting
process, the larger projects being subject to extra reviews and overall higher level of 
control.
Overall, the independent reviews and reporting process provide an indication of the 
level of external (outside the scope of the project) control and supervision versus the 
relative autonomy of decision-makers at the project level. Generally, more reviews 
and the need to report any significant changes made to projects, for example, are 
likely to have a positive impact on projects outcomes, as they can help to early 
identify and correct potential problems and to ensure the project is on the right track. 
On the other hand, though, higher control can also sometimes mean more time and 
less flexibility of project managers to overcome identified problems.
As discussed above, NASA’s projects go through many reviews along their life 
cycle, with the larger projects being monitored more closely and undergoing further 
reviews and higher level of control. Independent reviews take place along the 
project s development phases to ensure unbiased views and recommendations. 
Overall, it looks as if  NASA’s projects benefit from the agency’s formal and 
extensive review and reporting system. However, the actual impact on projects can 
only be felt on a project by project basis, depending, amongst other things, on the
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project size and on the specific needs and troubles that may emerge and have to be 
tackled during the projects’ life cycle.
5.3.4. Context Variables at the Decision Level (Space Project Level)
Nature of strategic decisions
As mentioned in Chapter4, it became evident through the interviews that the nature 
of the strategic decisions being made, or the kind of space projects being developed, 
would influence the SDM processes that would follow. NASA develops space 
projects in all different areas of space activities, such as space sciences, space 
applications (e.g. remote sensing, meteorology); interplanetary missions, space 
transportation, manned missions etc. Each of these areas will bring about a different 
set of requirements and specificities which tend to affect the characteristics of the 
SDM processes and the assessment of outcomes of the respective projects. Thus, for 
example, whereas in a scientific mission the focal point and the main basis upon 
which success is measured relates to the data generated from the payload that is 
carried by a spacecraft, the spacecraft itself being of secondary importance, in a 
space transportation mission, the focus is on the performance of the space vehicle 
itself.
As also mentioned before, another important aspect that emerged from the interviews 
in general, and which was confirmed in NASA, referred to the fact that decision 
processes in the space sciences area tended to be less political and generally better 
structured and organized than processes in other areas of space activities. In part, this 
could be explained by the fact that space sciences are one of the oldest and less 
controversial area of space activities.
5.4. New context variables and relevant aspects for SDM
A closer and more specific look at the characteristics of NASA’s context drew 
attention to some additional aspects of context which will have implications for 
space organisations’ SDM.
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5.4.1. The temporal dimension of the context variables
The analysis at the organisational level drew attention to the dynamic aspect of the 
context variables. Data from the interviews showed that changes had occurred in 
several of the variables in the recent past or were about to take place in the near 
future. Even though some variables seemed to be quite stable and may be more 
difficult to change, they all displayed, to a bigger or lesser extent, some susceptibility 
for change over time, as the country and the organisation evolved, people in charge 
changed and overall circumstances modified. As the characteristics of the context 
variables change over time, so will their influence over the organisation’s SDM 
processes. Thus, it became clear that, in order to understand the influence of context 
on any particular strategic decision, it is important to consider the time when the 
decision took place, as this will determine the specific characteristics of the context 
variables at the time and, consequently, how they are likely to influence the 
respective SDM process and outcomes.
The specific point or period in time when a decision takes place can be regarded as 
one more context variable, which will vary from decision to decision or project to 
project, or just as one dimension of the context variables, the temporal dimension. 
Either way, it will be decisive to understand the role played by the context in 
influencing SDM processes and outcomes.
5.4.2. Decision specifics
At the decision or project level, it had been already identified that the nature of 
decisions would influence SDM processes. Besides that, during the analysis at the 
organisational level, at least two other characteristics of strategic decisions, or of 
space projects, came out as relevant in terms of influencing SDM processes. They are 
presented below.
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Size
As it could be observed during the analysis process, larger and more expensive 
projects tend to attract more interest and, consequently, increase the overall level of 
external influence and politics associated with the respective SDM processes. They 
are also usually associated with higher complexity in the formulation and 
implementation phases of the processes.
hi several passages from the interviews with NASA’s associate administrators, the 
influence of size on the organisation’s SDM became evident. Some examples are 
presented below.
One of the interviewees explained that whereas for smaller projects there may be less 
visibility to the agency as to what is being done (suggesting more autonomy at the 
project level), “for the big projects there is always a lot of discussion of what is going 
on all along” (suggesting higher level of external influence on the project).
Another interviewee, when explaining how they used to try to be more open to the 
science community and always leave room for them to come up with their own ideas 
and propose their own missions to NASA (“...instead of us telling them what to 
do...”), made a distinction between their attitudes towards smaller and larger 
missions. He said: “ ...but these are the small missions. For the larger missions ... 
more costly, they need a better, different kind of pedigree”.
In another passage, the interviewee explained that, even though there was no formal 
step to involve the public in their SDM processes, this would happen to some degree 
depending on the visibility o f what they were going to do. The same interviewee also 
indicated that the number of reviews a project goes through along its life cycle varies 
according to size.
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International dimension
It also came out from the analysis at this stage that when a project has international 
dimensions or it is under an international cooperation agreement it is more protected 
against the political and funding instability usually associated with the development 
of space projects. The presence of an international agreement is likely to reduce 
instability both before and after project approval, throughout the formulation and 
implementation phases of projects.
As one of the interviewees put it, when a project is under an intergovernmental 
treaty, signed and approved by Congress, such as it was the case with the Space 
Station, “the ability of Congress to modify that is constrained to some extent by this 
high level political commitments, whereas with a programme that doesn't have an 
intergovernmental treaty, Congress has more flexibility in changing things, in fact it has 
cancelled whole programmes...”
Final comments
Thus, size and presence of an international agreement, along with the nature of 
strategic decisions, as previously discussed, can all be placed under one same 
category of context variable called here as “decision specifics”.
It should be noted that, contrary to the other context variables discussed before in this 
Chapter, the “decision specifics” variable is directly associated with the projects 
themselves and thus will vary from project to project, according to their specific 
characteristics. Therefore, they are not an organisational source of influence on 
NASA’s SDM which will equally apply to all strategic decisions made by the 
organisation.
5.5. Concluding Notes
As initially mentioned, this Chapter aimed at further exploring the influence of 
context on SDM processes and outcomes in space organisations. At this particular
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stage of the research, the objective was to show how an organisation’s context is 
likely to pre-frame SDM in this same organisation by providing several of its 
characteristics, which may then generally apply to strategic decisions across the 
organisation.
Thus, after the analysis of the specifics of NASA’s organisational context at the 
different levels, some general characteristics of the agency’s SDM processes, which 
should then prevail across decisions within the organisation, became apparent. The 
main ones are summarized below.
To start with, due to the kind of business NASA is in and to its public nature, SDM 
in NASA, as well as in other space organisations, is inherently complex, political 
and long, with outcomes characteristically uncertain. As explained before in this 
Chapter, the “business” of space technology introduces technological complexity 
and technological uncertainty to SDM in space organisations, which are inherent to 
sophisticated R&D projects in general. Additionally, the technological complexity of 
the decisions made makes SDM processes (formulation and implementation) usually 
long, increasing the overall level of uncertainty even further. Finally, NASA’s public 
nature automatically transfers ultimate decision-power to the political arena, making 
SDM in the organisation essentially political.
Regarding the distinctive characteristics of NASA’s context and subsequently of 
NASA’s SDM, the analysis of the data revealed an extremely open and participative 
SDM process, which subjected NASA’s strategic decisions to a myriad of external 
sources of influences, some of which very powerful. Those include the influence of 
lobbysts and different interest groups plus the influence of strong stakeholders such 
as the space industry and the scientific community. It was also found out that SDM 
processes within NASA tended to be very formal, well documented and generally 
well organized, following clear sequential steps, even though with variations across 
the different areas of space activities (e.g. the area of space sciences seemed overall 
better organized than other areas of space activities). Despite emphasizing 
consultation with the relevant professionals and experts, NASA’s SDM was not 
based on consensus but on lines o f authority, which followed a hierarchy of power.
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Decision-making structure, both internal and external, was very complex, with an 
authorization and an advisory structure involving many participants at several 
decisional levels, adding to the overall level of complexity observed particularly 
during the formulation phase of NASA’s SDM.
The characteristics of the US budgetary process also significantly added to the 
complexity levels of NASA’s SDM and generated high levels o f  uncertainty, both 
political and financial, affecting particularly the implementation phase of strategic 
decisions.
Some aspects of NASA’s context were understood as having an impact on the 
content of strategic decisions or the kind of choices made by the organisation. They 
are summarized below:
• A long-standing national goal of technological supremacy and leadership in 
space, allied with an organisational culture which favoured highly innovative, 
cutting-edge mega-projects, has influenced the content of the strategic 
decisions made or the kind of space projects developed by NASA over the 
years.
• The US has a formal National Space Policy which provides general and 
specific guidance to the space activities in the country and with which NASA 
is expected to comply, therefore being directly influenced by it.
• At the time of the interviews, NASA had only recently developed its first 
strategic plan for the whole organisation. Therefore, up until then this had not 
been an influential factor to NASA’s SDM in general. However, it had been 
an important source of influence on SDM in the space sciences area, which 
routinely developed and employed strategic plans to guide their SDM.
• Differently from what happens in some other space-faring nations, the 
existence of space expertise outside the space agency, in the external
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authorization and advisory structure, resulted in NASA having the contents of 
its strategic decisions highly scrutinized and, subsequently, a reduced control 
over their final content.
Even though their specific influences on NASA’s SDM will be felt more on a project 
by project basis, the following aspects of NASA’s context were observed during the 
analysis of the data and are also worth mentioning:
• The US has well organized and strong space industry and scientific 
community, which play different and veiy influential roles in NASA’s SDM, 
as co-developers, advisors and stakeholders.
• As NASA relies a lot on the space industry for developing its projects, the 
relationship with the industry stood out as an extremely important and 
influential aspect of the agency’s SDM. Thus, the SDM process leading up to 
the selection of contractors and the relationship with the industry throughout 
the development of the projects is an integral and crucial part of the agency’s 
SDM and extremely consequential to the success of its strategic decisions or 
space projects.
In summary, NASA’s SDM processes are highly complex, managerially and 
technologically, very political and usually long, with duration varying depending on 
level of political priority and technological complexity. As a result, outcomes are 
very uncertain. The implementation phase is characteristically very unstable, as 
funding levels and political commitment to projects can vary significantly during 
projects’ development.
If one looks specifically at the complexity and uncertainty dimensions of context, the 
most striking or distinctive aspects of NASA’s SDM, as compared to other space 
organisations, is the very high level o f complexity before projects’ approval, in the 
formulation phase, and a very high level o f  uncertainty after the approval, during 
the implementation phase o f projects.
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Finally, in its final part, this Chapter presented new variables or new aspects of 
context revealed during the analysis process as being relevant to SDM processes in 
NASA and in space organisations in general. The first aspect referred to the temporal 
dimension attached to each context variable, drawing attention to their dynamic 
nature and to the implications this would have for SDM processes. Accordingly, as 
context variables change over time and take on new characteristics they will affect 
SDM differently at different points in time. The second aspect referred to the role 
played by the specific characteristics of each strategic decision in influencing SDM 
processes. In fact, the nature of the strategic decision being made or the kind of space 
project being developed had already been identified during the analysis from the 
“business” level as influential to SDM processes (e.g. space sciences projects tended 
to be generally better organized and less political). Additionally, in this Chapter, two 
other characteristics of strategic decisions came up as relevant to SDM: decision or 
project size and existence of an international treaty shielding the project. Thus, for 
example, larger projects tended to be more scrutinized than smaller ones and to 
increase the level of politics, complexity and uncertainty of their SDM processes. 
Projects under an international treaty, on the other hand, generally become less 
amenable to the budgetary instability usually associated with the implementation of 
strategic decisions in NASA. These characteristics of strategic decisions were 
grouped in this Chapter under the name of “decision specifics ” and labelled as a new 
context variable.
The next Chapter presents the analysis results of the two case studies carried out in 
this research.
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CHAPTER 6
ANALYSIS FROM THE MICRO (DECISION/PROJECT) LEVEL:
CASE STUDIES
This Chapter involves the analysis of two cases regarding large scientific projects (or 
missions) developed by NASA. The two cases were chosen in a way so as to allow 
for some comparability in terms of the context in which they were embedded. Both 
projects were of the same nature (scientific), developed within the same area of 
NASA, the Office of Space Science and Applications - OSSA, at about the same 
time. Both projects were large and complex and had similar costs, of around US 500 
million dollars. However, one of them was a success, which was the case of the 
Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS), and the other one was a failure, the 
case of Mars Observer (MO).
As the third and last part of the progressively focusing analytical approach employed 
in this research, the objective of the case studies analysis was at first to provide a 
contextualized, longitudinal picture of what happens at the decision/project level, by 
taking a close look at how two particular decisions on space projects were made and 
carried out by NASA. Second, by choosing projects embedded in similar contexts 
and by following how decision events unfolded over time, it was expected that a 
clearer picture of the role played by context in terms of affecting decision-making 
process, implementation and outcomes of space projects would emerge.
Additionally, assuming that the variables previously identified in the first two parts 
of the analysis and their characteristics should set the stage for decision-making 
processes on space projects within NASA, it was expected that the case studies 
analysis would allow for the observation of some of these variables in action as well 
as for the emergence of new relevant context variables and critical factors to 
decision-making and outcomes which are only visible at the project level.
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6.1. CASE STUDY I: U A R S
6.1.1 Project Development Facts
6.1.1.1. Description of the Mission
UARS was a scientific programme proposed within the NASA’s Office of Space 
Science and Applications (OSSA), as part of the Environmental Observations 
Programme. Its main objectives were to study the processes that control upper 
atmospheric structure and variability, the response of the upper atmosphere to natural 
and human-induced changes, and the role of the upper atmosphere in climate and 
climate variability. NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Centre (GSFC) was responsible for 
the management of the development of the observatory and its related ground system, 
mission operations and data analysis phase of the programme.
The next subsections present a brief description of the most important facts and events 
during UARS mission development, from conception to delivery of first data. Some of 
the most important mission events are plotted in chronological order in Fig.6.1 in 
subsection 6.1.2.1 below.
61.1.2. UARS Development - From conception to preliminary project definition 
(1971-1978)
The long-standing interest in atmospheric changes and the factors influencing climate 
and weather were intensified notoriously since 1971. By this time, as mentioned in the 
JPL Report (NASA/JPL, 1978, p.2), "the idea that man-made pollutants can adversely 
affect the upper atmosphere came to public attention". It was suggested then that 
"exhaust emissions from high-altitude, supersonic aircraft could alter the concentration 
of stratospheric ozone" (NASA/JPL, 1978, p.2).
In response to this concern, several initiatives were taken by the Federal Government 
and the scientific community (see Programmematic Background in 
NASA/JPL, 1978,p.2) which aimed at trying to better understand and assess the
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potential damage to the atmosphere that by-products of various human activities could 
cause.
Amongst these initiatives were: the Climatic Impact Assessment Programme (CLAP), 
the Climatic Impact Committee (CIC), and a Federal Task Force on the Inadvertent 
Modification of the Stratosphere. By 1975, as a result of these and other similar efforts, 
there was a general consensus, as it seems, that "concerns about inadvertent ozone 
reduction were well founded, and that research efforts in this area should be 
accelerated" (NASA/JPL, 1978, p.2).
As a result of these growing concerns, in 1976 the American Congress issued a mandate 
(1976 NASA Authorisation Act - Public Law 94-39) for NASA "to develop and 
implement a comprehensive programme of research, technology and monitoring of the 
phenomena of the upper atmosphere, aimed at improving basic scientific understanding 
of the upper atmosphere and the methods needed to maintain its chemical and physical 
integrity" (NASA/JPL, 1978, p.2).
This mandate was reiterated in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 (Public Law 95- 
95), where NASA was directed to "continue programmes in research, technology, and 
monitoring of the stratosphere for the purpose o f understanding the physics and 
chemistry o f these regions andfor the early detection ofpotentially harmful changes o f 
ozone".
It was left for NASA "to arrange for participation by the scientific and engineering 
community in planning and carrying out appropriate research, in developing necessary 
technology, and in making necessary observations and measurements" (NASA/JPL, 
1978, p.2). Also, to seek international collaboration.
In order to accomplish this objective, "a vigorous research initiative was established, 
involving sounding rockets, aircraft and balloons, together with laboratory and 
theoretical studies" (UARS Pre-Launch Mission Operations Report, 1991).
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NASA established the Upper Atmospheric Research Programme in the Office of Space 
Science with cooperation of the Office of Space and Terrestrial Applications. "Within 
this programme, a Programme Plan and a Measurement Strategy have been developed 
with the active participation o f the NASA Stratospheric Research Advisory Committee 
(SRAC), a committee composed of experts from universities and other institutions who 
have demonstrated competence in various areas of atmospheric science".
The conclusions of this Committee highlighted "the need for a continuing series of 
upper atmosphere research satellites ... to make dedicated long-term global 
measurements of the stratosphere, mesosphere, and lower thermosphere over extended 
time periods" (JPL Report, 1978, p.3). Also, it added that the other contributions made 
by the Space Shuttle AMPS programmeras well as ground-based, balloon-borne, and 
rocket-borne measurements should be complementary to a long-term satellite 
observational programme.
The National Academy of Sciences Panel on Atmospheric Chemistry (1976, 1977), the 
Committee on Stratospheric Change (1976), and Geophysics Research board (1977) 
have also "emphasized the importance of long-term, coordinated global atmospheric 
measurements toward improvement of scientific knowledge about upper atmospheric 
behaviour" (NASA/JPL, 1978, p.3).
It was within this context that the Solar-Terrestrial Office of the Office of Space 
Sciences, NASA Headquarters, established in October 1977 a Science Working Group - 
SWG (also referred to as Science Definition Group), in charge of developing "a 
satellite programme proposal to conduct research on the chemistry, energetics, 
and dynamics of the upper atmosphere”.
The group consisted of 14 scientists, 7 of which from 3 NASA Centres (Jet Propusion 
Laboratory - JPL, Goddard Space Flight Centre - GSFC, and Langley Research Centre - 
LRC), 2 from the National Centre for Atmospheric Research, and 5 from 3 American 
universities.
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In 1978, around 7 months later, the Science Working Group delivered a Final Report, 
which can be regarded as a preliminary definition of the UARS mission. As it reads in 
the Abstract (NASA/JPL, 1978), the report "outlines the scientific goals of the Upper 
Atmospheric Research Programme, the Programme requirements, and the approach 
toward meeting these requirements".
The report proposed an initial series of two overlapping spacecraft missions, to be 
launched and recovered by STS, one in the winter of 1983 and the other a year later, in 
1984. Each of the two proposed satellites should have a nominal life of 18 months.
It was also said that the programme became a natural evolution from the then present 
planned series of atmosphere research satellites, and included "supportive observations 
from other platform such as rockets, balloons, and the Spaeelab" (NASA/JPL, 1978, 
Abstract).
The primary objective of the programme was stated then as being 11 the study o f the 
physical processes acting within and upon the stratosphere, mesosphere, and the lower 
thermosphere" (NASA/JPL, 1978, p.7).
The long-term goals identified then for the UARS Programme were:
"(1) To understand the mechanisms that control upper atmosphere structure and 
variability.
(2) To understand the response of the upper atmosphere to natural and anthropogenic 
perturbations.
(3) To define the role of the upper atmosphere in climate and climate variability."
Even though changing policy was not one of the stated objectives of UARS either in the 
Working Science Group Report (NASA/JPL, 1978) or in the Pre-Launch Report 
(NASAa, 1991), this objective was indirectly implied when the American Congress 
issued a mandate directing NASA to conduct research in the upper atmosphere. 
Additionally, the expectation that UARS should play a role in changing policy can be 
confirmed in the following pieces of evidence:
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In the Washington Post (September, 1991), presumably on the same week of UARS 
launch, it was mentioned that one of the UARS aims was "to provide data to help 
policymakers throughout the world decide how best to limit damage that is being 
inflicted on the atmosphere".
Around the same time, in the edition of September 9, 1991 of Aviation Week & Space 
Technology, it was mentioned that UARS would help guide environmental policy 
decisions. In the same newspaper, Mr. Carl Reber, UARS project scientist, said that 
data from UARS "should provide the ammunition people will need to make more 
informed environmental policy decisions
Finally, in NASA News, on May 28, 1991, there was mention of the role of UARS in 
terms of helping informed policy decisions to address the human role in relation to 
atmospheric changes.
6.1.13. From Initial Project Definition to Formal Approval/New Start (1978- 
1984)
Two months after the conclusion of the Working Science Group report, in Sept/1978, a 
first Announcement of Opportunities (AO) was released, formally inviting the 
scientific community to come up with proposals for instruments to be flown aboard 
UARS, as well as with proposals for theoretical investigations.
hi April, 1980 (one year and seven months later), NASA announced the selection of 26 
scientific investigations, out of 75 proposals, to be studied for possible inclusion aboard 
UARS satellites. They were 23 from the USA, 2 from the UK and 1 from France, 16 
experimental and 10 theoretical. In the US they were from universities, government 
laboratories and private organisations.
By this time (1980), responsibility for the project management had already been 
assigned to NASA's Goddard Space Flight Centre, in Greenbelt, Md.
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At the end of 1980, Martin Marietta (an aerospace company) emerged as a candidate for 
prime contractor for the UARS programme. It seemed then that there was an 
expectation for a new start (formal approval by the US Congress for initialisation of a 
new programme) in FY 1983. Launches were expected to take place in 1986 and 1987.
In May 1981, a decision to reduce the budget for the space applications area by US$ 
110 million was announced by the Congress. Amongst its implications was a delay in 
the development of UARS instruments.
hi November 1981 there was a new instruments selection release (final selection of 
instruments, following a two-phase process). It was announced that NASA had selected 
9 experimental and 10 theoretical teams for participation in the UARS programme.
In 1981, the UARS experiments budget was increased by NASA by US$ 1 million to 
US$ 6 million.
As it seems, a cost review of the programme was initialised in June 1982, in search for 
cost-saving alternatives for UARS. The final selection was said to have taken place in 
October 1982.
In August 1982, it was mentioned that UARS was looking for a new start in FY 1984. 
At this time NASA was performing an in-house definition study of the UARS 
programme, which should be concluded in 1983. Launch was then expected to take 
place in 1988. The acquisition plans for UARS were also announced at this time.
By this time, reference was made to the reduction of the scope of the mission, down 
from two, as initially proposed, to one satellite. Additionally, it was mentioned that the 
number of instruments to fly in UARS had also been reduced "due to both the 
complexity of the project and budgetary limitations" (Aerospace Daily, August 26, 
1982, p.314). It was said that the instruments were entering Phase C/D development, as 
funding for them had started in FY 1982 budget.
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Still around the same time, it was announced that Bendix (another aerospace company) 
was in bid to replace Martin Marietta as a prime contractor for the UARS.
hi February 1983, the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
announced the deletion of a new start for UARS in FY 1984 (which would start from 
October/1983). However, the development of the instruments should proceed as 
planned. The rationale for this deletion was that the OMB wanted the agency to 
reinvestigate the possibility of coming up with a lower cost design. It was added: " ... 
funding for UARS instruments was approved, so eventual project approval is not in 
question" (Defense Daily, February 10,1983, p.218).
At the same time, a contract was awarded to Fairchild Space & Electronics Co. for 
conducting a study to identify modifications to the Communications & Data Handling 
module of the Multimission Modular Spacecraft (MMS) to make it compatible with the 
planned UARS.
hi August 1983, it was confirmed that the launch date for UARS had been delayed by a 
year to the fall of 1989, as it did not win approval in the FY 1984. It was also mentioned 
that run-out costs were expected to increase as a result of such delay.
By this time, NASA had concluded its cost-cutting analysis of alternatives for the 
UARS mission. Amongst the conclusions were:
(1) One large satellite would be cheaper than a series of smaller satellites launched 
separately or several small satellites launched together;
(2) UARS would be built on a ground spare Multimission Modular Spacecraft (MMS) 
bus procured for the Landsat programme;
(3) UARS plan should now include the flight of a refurbished attitude control 
subsystem that would be recovered from another satellite already in space.
As a result of the decision to use a spare MMS, changes occurred in the contracting 
plans. However, it was mentioned then that NASA still planned to award a contract on a 
competitive basis for the overall flight segment system design. It was also stated that if
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the mission was given a go-ahead in FY 1985, a Request for Proposals (RFP) should be 
issued to industry in March 1984 and a contract should be awarded at about June 1985.
hi December 1983, as mentioned in the Space World Staff Report (Space World, 1983), 
UARS Project Manager from Goddard Space Centre said that the decision to reduce the 
scope of the mission to one satellite was "a science trade-off, decided by the UARS 
scientists". And he added: "... there was some (science) loss, but it is hard to quantify".
The expected cost of UARS was then mentioned as being $570 to $670 million dollars. 
It was also mentioned then that there was no prime contractor and that NASA-Goddard 
was doing all of the design and definition work with General Electric Space Division as 
a support contractor. Additionally, reference was made on the inclusion of two extra 
experiments to UARS, totalizing 11.
hi January 1984, it was announced by NASA’s administrator that UARS was one of the 
initiatives contemplated for FY 1985 budget, along with the Space Station Programme 
and a Mars Geoscience/Climatology Orbiter (MGCO). It was mentioned that this 
budget would enable them to begin to develop the satellite. In February 1984 UARS 
was formally granted a new start for FY 1985.
6.1.1.4. From New Start Approval to Launch Slip (1984 -1986)
hi March 1984, the final RFP was released. In November 1984, 9 months after New 
Start Approval, it was announced that NASA was preparing to award a sole contract to 
Fairchild Space Co. to fabricate subsystems, integrate and test a Multimission Modular 
Spacecraft for UARS. It was also mentioned the legal need for soliciting other sources 
and that NASA was doing so at the time.
In March 1985, NASA awarded UARS contract to General Electric. That was one year 
after the New Start approval and marked the beginning of mission development. The 
US$ 145.8 million contract was mainly for the development of the UARS's observatory. 
At this time mention is made to 10, as opposed to 11 instruments to be flown by UARS. 
Launch was set for October 1989, by the Space Shuttle.
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In April 1985 UARS costs were referred to as being between US$ 630 and US$ 700 
million.
In August 1985, it was announced that NASA-Goddard had awarded a US$16.3 million 
contract to Fairchild to provide a Multimission Modular Spacecraft for the UARS.
In 1986 there was the Challenger accident. As a result of this accident, UARS launch 
had to be postponed for two years. The programme needed to be replanned and some 
engineering changes had to be made. The scientific objectives were maintained. The 
costs of the programme were expected to increase as a result of this delay. The main 
change was the substitution of solid neon for solid hydrogen as coolant for CLAES, one 
of UARS instruments.
hi October 1986, reference was already made to UARS launch as being planned to the 
4th quarter of 1991 and not anymore October 1989.
6.1.1.5. From Launch Slip to Project Delivery and Launch (1986-1991)
hi March 1991 the launch date was announced as expected for October 1991 and not 
September/1991. This was due to adjustments/repairs in the Shuttle Discovery and had 
nothing to do with the UARS programme development itself.
hi August 1991, a statement made by Dr. Robert J. McNeal (UARS Programme 
Scientist) referred to the fact that Governments around the world had already limited 
CFG (chlorofluorocarbons) emissions as mandated by the Montreal Protocol. Dr. 
McNeal also mentioned the importance of timely data analysis and theoretical studies 
and recalled that the theoretical investigators had been chosen at the same time as the 
nine experiments. He mentioned then the plans for rapid access to analysed data from 
UARS by the scientific community and the public, as he commented on the 
extraordinary public interest in stratospheric ozone depletion.
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At this time, the 10 theoretical investigations and the 10 instruments of the UARS 
mission showed differences in relation to the previous account of December, 1984. Two 
previously mentioned experiments, the SBUV from Goddard Space Flight Center and 
the Winters from CNES had disappeared, whereas another one, the Wind II from 
Canada had been introduced. In relation to the 10 experiments, only nine were 
considered part of UARS primary mission.
On September 12, UARS was successfully launched from the Kennedy Space Centre.
It carried the following 10 instruments on board: Wind Imaging Interferometer 
(WTNDII), Microwave Limb Sounder (MLS), Particle Environment Monitor (PEM), 
Solar Ultraviolet Spectral Irradiance Monitor (SUSM), Active Cavity Radiometer 
Irradiance Monitor (ACRIM II), High Resolution Doppler Imager (HRDI), Cryogenic 
Limb Array Etalon Spectrometer (CLAES), Improved Stratospheric and Mesospheric 
Sounder (ISAMS), Halogen Occultation Experiment (HALOE) and Solar Stellar 
Irradiance Comparison Experiment (SOLSTICE).
6.1.1.6. From Launch to Solar Array Failure - Delivery of First Data
After a short delay due to problems with the antenna, UARS was deployed by the 
Shuttle on September 15,1991. After going through a one-month pre-operational phase, 
UARS instruments were all operating successfully. In June 1992 a failure in the solar 
array of UARS occurred and some of the instruments were switched off to save energy. 
That resulted on loss and discontinuation of data flow. A month after that, the problem 
was solved and operations returned to normal.
6.1.1.7. Afterwards - Further Data
No more technical problems were detected and data flow proceeded normally, as 
expected, till 1995, when data collection was finalised.
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6.I.I.8. Mission Assessment
Official Assessment of UARS Success (as in Post-Launch Report. 1994)
UARS has met its scientific requirements and can be considered a success both 
technically and scientifically.
Illustrative Facts and Comments Related to UARS Outcomes Assessment at the time of 
Project Delivery
The comments below present some examples of how the outcomes and significance of 
UARS were perceived from different standpoints, namely: managerial, scientific, 
engineering/industrial, and political. They draw attention to the different aspects of 
success and different ways of looking at it. Amongst these aspects, for instance, is the 
role that one particular project can have to the development of future ones. Mr. 
Buckley, a GE Executive, in one of the comments below, recognizes this potential role 
of space projects when he mentioned that UARS was a precursor to the large Earth 
Observing System platforms planned by NASA at the time.
Comments on UARS outcomes/significance:
hi an interview by Mr. Michael Luther (UARS programme manager) in August, 1991, 
it was mentioned that with launch in September 1991, UARS would have been 
delivered on schedule and some $30 million under budget.
As mentioned by Mr. Joseph Waters, principal investigator for the MLS instrument 
(one of the UARS instruments), also in August 1991, UARS would provide "the most 
comprehensive set o f stratospheric measurements ever taken". And he added the MLS 
would provide the first global measurements o f chlorine monoxide in the upper 
atmosphere. In addition, two instruments would measure winds in the stratosphere for  
the first time ever directly from space. It was also mentioned by Mr. Carl Reber, UARS 
project scientist, from Goddard Space Flight Centre, that UARS would provide unique.
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three-dimensional maps o f the phenomena o f ozone depletion over Antarctica. Finally, 
it was said that UARS was timed to cover at least two cycles of the ozone hole.
hi September, 1991, Mr. Buckley (GE Astro - Space Executive) said that "the platform 
was produced on budget and schedule because NASA held the design of the 
instruments and other components firm once it was set". He added: "...history showed 
the need to pick a design and stick to it regardless o f subsequent technological 
advances".
hi relation to the instruments, Mr. Buckley said that the Goddard team was responsible 
for the contracts. He added that "they heldfirm to requirements that were set out early 
to size, weight, power allocations and didn't let the mission grow".
He also said: "We came up with a good understanding of the requirements we had to 
meet and we focused early as a system engineering team to understand the real 
requirements". And he concluded: "That's the major lesson we've learned, to work early 
on the engineering with the science team and then don't let the objectives grow, don't let 
people add more capability and more capability. There's always a temptation".
Mr. Buckley also commented that UARS platform could be regarded as a precursor to 
the large multi-sensor platforms of the 90's and he mentioned in particular that UARS 
foreshadowed EOS-A (Earth Observation System). In his words: "... lessons learned on 
NASA's UARS are being applied to development of the first Earth Observation System 
platform (EOS-A) ..." He regarded UARS as a model technically and politically to 
Mission to Planet Earth.
In September 11, 1991, the Wall Street Journal published an interesting comment by 
space analyst John Pike, which reads: "... many projects look like they have a blank 
check at the beginning and never scale back as the check gets smaller and smaller with 
each successive review". In relation to the lesson of success learned with UARS, it is 
mentioned in the paper: "... its managers combined political savoir with technological 
conservatism to shield the project from controversy and keep it from moving ahead year 
after year".
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6.1.2 Project-Specific Context Influences on UARS
In the previous steps of the analysis, presented in Chapters 4 and 5, several context 
variables were found which are likely to affect SDM on space projects in general and 
on NASA s projects in particular, both from the internal and external environments. 
Additionally to those, however, other context influences on space projects can take 
place which will be circumstantial to the specifics of a particular project/decision, i.e. 
which will be project-specific. Those will include the specific characteristics and 
circumstances surrounding the development of each project/decision, as well as 
events/occurrences taking place at both the external and internal environments during 
the time of a project’s development. Some of these project-specific circumstances and 
events that might have played a role in UARS decision-making process and outcomes 
are presented and discussed below.
UARS development and outcomes most likely suffered a variety of contextual 
influences of this kind. Identifying all of them and the extent to which they affected the 
project might prove an arduous task, if not impossible. However, as the major 
motivation leading up to UARS conception and development was related to the concern 
with atmospheric ozone depletion, the analysis of the influence of project-specific 
context factors presented here was particularly focused on ozone related major events 
which took place before and during the UARS decision-making process, 
implementation and operations phase.
6.12.1. UARS Mission Chronology -  Macroview of Context and Process
To assist with the analysis of context influences on UARS, a chronology of UARS 
major mission events, along with relevant environmental occurrences from the project’s 
internal and external context, is presented in Fig.6.1 below. In this chronology, events 
from different vertical layers of context (project, organisational, governmental, 
national/international) are shown in relation to the horizontal phases of project 
development, from formulation all the way through to project delivery and operations.
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Fig.6.1 UARS Mission Chronology - Macroview of Context and P rocess
Dates
1570's
1976/77
1977
1978(July)
1978(Sept) 
Early 80 s
1980(April) 
1981 (May)
1981
1981(Dec)
1982(Jan)
1982(Jun/Aug)
1982(Oct)
1983(Feb)
1983(Aug)
1983(Sep)
1984(Feb)
1984(Mar)
Pre-Approval Phase (Duration:6Years 4Months)
S cien tific  C om m unity G overn m en t N ASA  NASA
Industry (Executive Branch, Internal to Project External to  Project
G eneral E nvironm ent Legislative Branch) (JPUSWG)
Growing concerns over:
O zone depletion & \
AtmosphericChanges \
Reaction:  ► Creation of
CongressM andate Committee SWG
UNEP create coordinating 
committee on ozone layer
W SG Report 
(UARS proposal 
by scientists)
I
AO
USACanada&Scandinavia 
take initiatives to control 
production of CFO's
UNEP develop global 
convention to tackle 
ozone depletion
Asks NASA for 
reviewing project 
costs
First selection 
of instruments
$110m budget cut in 
the sp ace  applications area. 
Funds for instruments 
developments approved. 
(FY 1982) x
Final selection of 
\  instruments.
^  (Instruments development 
to be delayed)
(Increase on UARS 
experiments budget 
by $1m.)
Initiates 1st co st review
Concludes 1st cost review: 
number of instruments and 
the scope of mission a re 
reduced
NASA w as 
performing an 
an in-house 
definition 
study of UARS
OMB denies New 
Start for UARS in FY84&^*- 
asks NASA for a  lower 
cost design
Run out costs expected to 
increase as  result of delay 
in approval.
Initiation of 2nd cost review
I
Concludes 2nd cost review. 
(Adjustments of number 
of instruments and more 
cost saving m easures
[Preliminary RFP]
UARS is granted a  ► Beginning of development
New Start for FY1985
RFP released
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Dates
1984(Feb)
1984(March)
1984 (Oct) 
1985(March)
1985(Aug)
1985
1986/1987
1987
1990
1991(March)
1991 (Aug) 
1991(Sept)
Fig.6.1 UARS Mission Chronology - Macroview of Context and Process
Implementation Phase (Duration 7years 7months)
Scientific Community 
Industry
General Environment
Government 
(Executive Branch, 
Legislative Branch)
NASA
Internal to Project 
(JPL)
NASA
External to Project
UARS granted formal 
approval for FY1985 ~
Preparations for the 
development phase
Published paper on 
the discovery of the 
seasonal ozone hole 
over Antarctica
NASA issues final RFP
UARS contract aw arded 
to GE. Beginning of 
m ission development.
SAGE II ozone 
related experiment w as 
launched
Contract aw arded to 
Fairchild to provide 
a  MMS for UARS
Vienna convention 
of the protection of 
the ozone layer
Re-formulation
UARS expected launch 
date  in 1989 had to be 
postponed for two years. 
Program replanned, new * 
budget,som e engineering 
changes made,scientific 
objectives maintained
x  Challenger accident
Signature of the Montreal 
Protocol, controlling the 
production and u se  
of CFCs
London 1st Amendment to 
the Montreal Protocol
Annual
Budget
Reviews
O ne month delay < - 
in UARS
UARS w as launched • 
a s  expected
O ne month delay 
of Shuttle m ission 
announced a s  likely
O zone related TO M S's 
instrum ent flew for the 
2nd time
■ O ther possible delays 
of 2  w eeks announced. 
Shuttle m ission w as 
maintained for Sept1991
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Fig.6.1 UARS Mission Chronology-Macroview of Context and Process
Operations Phase (1) (Expected duration 3 years)
Dates
1991(SepL13)
1991(SepL15)
1991(Sept.15/16)
1991(Sept.18)
1991(SepL26)
1991(mid Oct) 
1991 (Dec.) 
1992(Feb.)
Scientific Community 
Industry
General Environment
Governm ent 
(Executive Branch, 
Legislative Branch)
NASA
Internal to Project 
(JPL)
UARS launch
UARS deployed 
successfully and 
with energy savings 
that meant extended life 
of about 8 months
I
Communication problems 
sorted out by using 
a backup transponder
I
Initializing tests and 
check-out of UARS 
instruments
I
Orbit adjustments & 
Instruments activation
First release of 
preliminary data
[UARS expected to be 
fully operational]
Confirmation that UARS 
was fully operational
Introduction of new 
legislation to speed 
the phase-out of 
ozone depleting 
chemicals
Scientific community starts 
analysing UARS data and 
producing evidence confirming 
ozone depletion levels and
its relation to man-made *------
pollutants
NASA
External to Project
Shuttle Discovery mission 
Minor technical 
problems in deploying 
UARS sorted out; successful 
manoeuvre with the Shuttle 
placed it into a higher orbit
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Fig.6.1 UARS Mission Chronology - Macroview of Context and Process
Operations Phase (2) (From failure onwards)
Dates
1992(June 1) 
1992
1992(June 10) 
1992(June 14) 
1992(July 8)
1992
1992(July 20)
1994(Dec.)
From 1994/1995 
1995
Scientific Community Government NASA NASA
Industry (Executive Branch, Internal to Project External to Project
General Environment Legislative Branch) (JPL)
Failure of the 
Solar array  of 
UARS due to a  
m echanical failure 
(8.5 m onths after launch)
ATLAS flew for th e  first 
tim e to  m ake ozone 
m easu rem en ts
UARS w as pow ered-dow n 
(all instrum ents)& 
D ecision on sc ie n ce  
m ission priorities
1
O ne instrum ent (CLAES) 
reactivated
Another instrum ent (MLS) 
reactivated
1
Solar array  responded  a s  
expected  and NASA began 
turning on m ore instrum ents
2nd am endm ent to the 
Montreal Protocol, 
accelerating the phasing out 
of C F C s  production and 
consum ption
More findings on ozoneA. - - '  
depletion and others, 
not only b ased  on '   ^
UARS data
D ata reaching the 
scientific com m unity 
in a  m ore w idespread 
w ay
3rd am endm ent to  the 
Montreal Protocol
UARS resu m e s  full operations 
(All instrum ents expected  to  be 
operating normally)
(O bs. 8  instrum ents w ere  off for 
abou t 1 month 18 days)
A sse ssm e n t of O utcom es: 
A nnouncem ent tha t UARS did 
provide conclusive evidence 
tha t hum an-m ade chlorine in 
the s tra to sphere  w as  the 
c a u se  of the Antarctic 
ozone hole
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6.I.2.2. Context influences before UARS conception
As mentioned earlier, before UARS conception, growing concerns amongst the 
scientific community and the public in general over ozone depletion being caused by 
man-made pollutants led the American Congress to mandate NASA to carry out studies 
to investigate the problem thoroughly.
hi response to such a mandate, NASA created an Upper Atmosphere Research 
Programme from which the UARS project was later derived, being one amongst a 
series of other initiatives to investigate atmospheric issues.
During this period, a series of events that took place in the external environment and 
some scientific findings that became available, such as studies conducted by the World 
Meteorological Organisation (WMO), may have been ultimately responsible for the 
decision to develop UARS.
6.I.2.3. Context influences during UARS formulation phase
UARS formulation phase took place between October 1977 and February 1984, when it 
was formally granted a new start by the American Congress. The whole process totalled 
6 years and 4 months.
During this period when UARS was being formulated to tackle the ozone depletion and 
other atmospheric issues, some important events were taking place in the environment, 
basically revolving around two main aspects. One o f them regards the launching o f  
other satellites carrying instruments designed to provide ozone measurements. The two 
major instruments of this kind, launched in different satellites, were: TOMS (Total 
Ozone Mapping Spectrometer) and SAGE (Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment). 
Data from TOMS, for example, underpinned several international agreements to phase­
out the use o f CFCs and other ozone depleting chemicals.
The other aspect regards the observation that initial moves towards changing 
environmental policy regarding the production and use o f CFCs and other ozone
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depleting substances were already being made at that time. Most likely, the new data 
from the two satellite instruments mentioned above, along with other non space-based 
measurements, were behind these initiatives, to the extent that they were able to provide 
increasing evidence that there was a cause for concern in relation to the production of 
CFOs.
If we look at the chronological account of ozone related events we see that, as early as 
1977, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) created a co-ordinating 
committee on the ozone layer. Later, in 1981, UNEP decided to develop a global 
convention to tackle the problem of ozone depletion. Also, in the late 70's / early 80's, 
some national Governments (e.g. USA, Canada and the Scandinavian countries) took 
some specific initiatives to control the production and use of CFC's 
(Chlorofluorcarbons).
As previously mentioned (see subsection 6.1.1.2), one of UARS expected outcomes 
was to change policy with regards to ozone depletion. UARS was supposed to provide 
the scientific evidence to confirm that ozone layer was being depleted by man-made 
chemicals and, this way, lead politicians and environmental authorities to change policy 
in order to tackle the problem.
However, as it seems, during UARS formulation process, the policy changes that it was 
meant to influence started taking place.
-UARS being granted a New Start: Feb/1984
UARS was granted a new start by Congress on February 1984, after more than 6 years 
since the beginning of the project formulation phase.
One of the most important events favouring the development of the UARS project took 
place at around this time and regarded the discovery and public announcement of the 
existence of an ozone hole over Antarctica.
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This discovery, though it did not interfere with the formulation process and formal 
approval of UARS, helped confirming that the development of UARS was a good and 
worthwhile decision. As a result of this announcement, the Project could expect to get 
continuous support (at least in the beginning) from the Government for its 
implementation. It is worth recalling here that, though a New Start implies a formal 
commitment by the Government to provide the necessary resources to implement a 
programme, the federal budget is discussed on an annual basis. As such, every year, 
even the approved programmes go through a new scrutiny process before being granted 
the required resources.
Another important event that happened by the time UARS was being granted a New 
Start regarded the launch of SAGE II in 1984. Data from this experiment contributed 
significantly to studies of the Antarctic ozone hole as well as of the decline of ozone 
over mid-latitudes.
After the announcement of the ozone hole over Antarctica, analysis of satellite data 
from NASA’s TOMS instrument confirmed it and indicated it had existed since at least 
1979.
6.I.2.4. Context influences during UARS implementation (1984 - 1991)
Though it could be said that the need for developing a satellite like UARS to address 
ozone and other atmospheric issues was reinforced by the announcement and posterior 
confirmation of the existence of an ozone hole, at the same time these announcements, 
being the proof of severe ozone depletion, made the need for definite measures to tackle 
the problem only more urgent and might have accelerated some policy changes.
As soon as UARS went into its development (implementation) phase, some events took 
place in the environment which were ultimately bound to undermine its policy 
outcomes.
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As early as 1985, for example, at the initial steps of UARS development, the Vienna 
Convention for the protection of ozone layer called for voluntary measures to reduce 
emission of ozone-depleting substances (ODS).
During the period between 1985 and 1991, the WMO issued 3 new ozone assessments, 
with new scientific findings regarding ozone depletion, some of which very alarming, 
hi 1986, an international study of high latitude ozone depletion began which used a 
wide variety of measurement techniques. In 1987 and 1989 new findings based on 
TOMS data confirmed the decline in ozone density over the South Pole. The WMO 
ozone assessments, as well as the announcement of other related scientific findings, 
further raised public awareness and concern over ozone depletion. These new alarming 
research findings were vital to the decisions leading up to the Montreal Protocol.
The Montreal Protocol, an international agreement controlling the production and use of 
ozone damaging chemicals, was signed by 24 nations in 1987. It was stipulated then 
that further decisions on ozone-depleting substances on an international basis would be 
made every 4 years, based on scientific assessments.
The signature of the Montreal Protocol was the most significant event in terms of 
changing policy to tackle the ozone depletion issue and the one which most contributed 
to undermine UARS policy success. It is also interesting to remark that the Montreal 
Protocol happened four years before UARS was even launched. Even if we take into 
account that, had it not been for the Challenger accident, UARS would have been 
launched two years earlier, in 1989, this would still have been 2 years after the signature 
of the Protocol.
In 1988, another important occurrence might have contributed to partly undermine 
UARS success. According to the report of the World Meteorological Organisation 
(1992), entitled "WMO and the ozone issue", in 1988 the NASA Antarctic Campaign 
helped proving that the active chlorine and bromine as by-products of human activities 
were the cause of the Antarctic-spring ozone hole. As mentioned earlier in this Chapter, 
UARS was supposed to provide the scientific evidence to confirm that, which in turn 
should support policy changes to address the issue of ozone depletion. However, there
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is contradictory evidence on this respect, which needs further verification. The two 
interviewees for the UARS case mentioned that UARS had provided the final proof that 
man-made pollutants and not other natural causes were actually responsible for 
destroying the ozone layer.
Though this aspect may be disputable, the policy changes brought up with the signature 
of the Montreal Protocol before UARS could even be launched, are not.
Still during the implementation phase of UARS, further developments of the Montreal 
Protocol took place. In 1990, the London Amendment to the Protocol strengthened it by 
committing to phasing out all CFC production and consumption by 2000.
- The Challenger accident: UARS replanned and launch postponed fo r 2 years, from  
1989 to 1991
Another unexpected, not accounted for event, which happened during the 
implementation of the UARS project, was the Challenger accident in 1986. The 
accident resulted in the need for replanning UARS and in a delay of the launching date 
by two years.
- UARS being launched: 1991
By the time UARS was being launched, a series of new studies on ozone depletion 
confirmed the thinning of the ozone layer and revealed even more alarming news on the 
scale and extension of the problem. Even though this new scientific evidence can be 
thought of as having partially answered some of the questions UARS was meant to 
address, they also contributed to make UARS data look more relevant. This is so as 
UARS project was also designed to provide better overall understanding of the 
mechanisms leading to ozone depletion, and subsequently, to contribute to find possible 
ways of tackling the problem.
Another event which took place that year was another launch of the TOMS instrument, 
this time aboard a Soviet Union satellite, the Meteor-3.
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6.1.2.5. Relevant context occurrences during UARS operational period 
(1992 to 1995)
In 1992, when UARS was at the beginning of its operational life, the Atmospheric 
Laboratory for Applications and Science (ATLAS), an international effort involving 
scientists from the US and Europe, which consisted of a series of Space-Shuttle- 
Spacelab missions, flew for the first time. ATLAS carried instruments to measure ozone 
and other chemicals in the upper atmosphere and to measure solar energy received by 
the Earth system.
During the planned operational period of UARS the Montreal Protocol received two 
other amendments, in 1992 and 1995, which accelerated the phasing-out of CFCs 
production and consumption, including other ozone-depleting substances to the 
previous list. Though it seems unlikely that UARS data would have come up in time to 
influence the 1992 amendment of the Protocol, it seems very plausible to think that 
UARS data might have contributed for the decisions involved in the second 
amendment.
6.1.2.6. Relevant context occurrences during UARS extended life-time (1996 - )
In 1996, when UARS had accomplished its programmed mission and was beginning its 
extended life-time, TOMS instrument flew again aboard the Japanese Advanced Earth 
Observations Satellite (ADEOS). One year later, in 1997, ADEOS ran into technical 
problems and was declared unrecoverable by the Japanese Space Agency NASDA.
hi 1997, the Montreal Protocol completed 10 years and the number of signatories had 
grown to 163 countries. The first four years of the Protocol went by without the 
presence of UARS data. During the following years, though, UARS data were available 
and may have played a role in influencing or at least corroborating some of the 
decisions made by politicians and national Governments throughout the world 
regarding the control of ozone depletion.
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6.1.2.7. - Concluding comments
During the period while UARS project was being formulated and implemented, the 
launching of other experiments/instruments for ozone related studies, as well as data 
from other sources (e.g. ground-based experiments) seem to have provided at least part 
of the information UARS was meant to provide. As a result, they also contributed to 
accelerate some policy changes that UARS was meant to induce. Looking at it this way, 
it can be said that they undermined UARS policy success (see subsection 6.1.3.2.4).
On the other hand, though, by providing the evidence that the ozone depletion problem 
really existed and that it was even more serious than initially foreseen, they also helped 
promoting UARS. The reason for that was the fact that UARS had been designed to 
provide better and more complete understanding of the phenomena of ozone depletion 
on a global scale for the first time ever. This understanding, on its turn, should help with 
finding best ways of tackling the problem.
Finally, it is important to draw attention to the fact that both TOMS and SAGE 
experiments, which provided the most relevant information leading up to the policy 
changes mentioned before, were NASA's experiments. Therefore, it cannot be said that 
these were surprise elements which came to interfere with UARS final success 
appraisal. On the other hand, other events, such as the discovery of the ozone hole over 
Antarctica through British ground-based observations, or the signature of the Montreal 
Protocol, were not under NASA's control and were not in a foreseeable scenario at the 
time UARS was formulated. Nonetheless, these and other similar not accounted for 
events came, as it seems, either to reinforce the need for a project like UARS or to 
undermine its policy success.
6.1.3. UARS Outcomes/Success Assessment
6.I.3.I. Initial Considerations
If one looks at the objectives of the UARS mission, as stated both in the Working 
Science Group Report (NASA/JPL,1978) as well as in the Pre-Launch Report
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(NASAa,1991), it is clear that they were all of scientific nature (see subsection 6.1.1.2). 
No technological or even policy objectives were specified in either of the two reports.
Therefore, if we opt for a more standard evaluation of success by using the "goal 
attainment" approach, it would be enough to look at the scientific outcomes of the 
UARS mission to provide an assessment of its overall success.
However, a more inclusive view of mission success should also take into account the 
fact that the science that UARS was designed to provide was expected to influence 
some policy regarding the reduction of ozone depletion by man-made pollutants (see 
subsection 6.1.1.2 for comments and supporting evidence of this objective of UARS). 
Therefore, UARS success in terms of its policy outcomes will also be discussed here.
Finally, in order to be able to deliver the science it is supposed to deliver, a project has 
to be properly planned and designed, approved, implemented and delivered, launched 
successfully, operate properly and get its data distributed and analysed by scientists. 
These aspects of UARS outcomes will be discussed in association with its performance 
success. Due to their relevance in connection with overall project's success, the aspects 
of schedule and costs will also be looked at.
Thus, for analysis purposes, UARS overall success will be assessed by examining four 
aspects of project outcomes: managerial success, technical success, science success and 
policy success. Considering their degree of interdependence (policy success depends on 
science success which in turn depends on technical success), they will be looked at in 
the same order as presented above.
6.I.3.2. UARS Success Assessment
6.I.3.2.I. Managerial Success (At Project Delivery)
Costs
As already mentioned before, the Challenger accident, in 1986, caused a delay of 2 
years on UARS launch, as well as an increase in project’s costs. Thus, if the plans
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before the accident are taken into account, UARS did not meet its proposed budget. 
However, if we remove this external factor (outside the control of UARS decision­
makers and implemented from the analysis, then UARS offers a very good example of 
success with respect to meeting its proposed costs.
As confirmed by one of the interviewees and also by documentary evidence, if one 
looks at the performance of UARS project after it was replanned, following the 
Challenger accident, it was completed right on schedule and some 35 million dollars 
under budget (see, for instance, Aviation Week & Space Technology, Sept.9, 1991; 
Daily News in brief, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 10, 1991).
The total project costs, as presented in the Pre-Launch Report (NASAa,1991, p.53), 
were of US$740 million, of which US$ 633 million had been spent for the observatory 
and instrument development, and another US$107 million were estimated for mission 
operations and data analysis during the operational life-time of the project. These cost 
numbers were also widespread in the newspapers (e.g. The Washington Post: Science - 
Atmospheric Studies, Sept. [12], 1991; The Washington Post, Sept. 13, 1991, p. A3). In 
some publications, though, there was mention of a total project cost of US$750 million, 
including 18 months of mission operations costs and a year of data analysis (see 
Aviation Week & Space Technology, Sept. 9,1991).
Another aspect to consider in relation to UARS costs involves the first two frustrated 
attempts to get it approved, first for FY1983 and then for FY1984 (details and evidence 
are discussed in the next subsection: “Schedule”). According to the evidence (see “Brief 
Review of UARS Performance in Relation to Schedule” further down), the first attempt 
failed and the UARS proponents had to go back and work out a cheaper proposal. Thus, 
costs had to be reduced for the first time. Again, in the second attempt, they were turned 
down and had to work out a yet cheaper proposal, with costs being further reduced. At 
this point of the project (before formal approval), as it seems, the costs reduction was 
not a good sign but rather it represented a failure of the proponents to satisfy the 
demands and constraints imposed by the Government (OMB).
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Thus, if we look back at the history of the project, the estimated costs for UARS were 
first reduced twice before formal approval and then increased due to the Challenger 
accident, after formal approval, during the implementation period. In the end, though, if 
the Challenger accident is not taken into account, the project was delivered with 
significant savings as compared to the planned costs back in 1986. This means that the 
project performance regarding costs was extremely successful and set a good, though 
uncommon (see discussion further below), example for other NASA's projects.
Schedule
As mentioned by one of the interviewees and confirmed by several documents 
analysed, UARS was a unique capability and also an extremely expensive initiative. 
Together, these two characteristics suggested UARS was facing no threat, at least not in 
the short or mid-run, of being duplicated. This gave the project a protection against 
delays in delivery. However, had the project taken even longer than it did to be 
launched (in case there had been yet further delays), it could have happened that other 
systems would be made available by other space agencies which could undermine the 
scientific impact of UARS and put in question its significance and worth. One good 
example of such a threat was the ENVISAT, which was developed later on by the 
Europeans and had some of the same measurements.
Though in the case of UARS the project delays did not undermine its scientific value, 
they did in fact undermine, at least partially, its policy value, as it will be discussed 
further down. This indicates that timeliness was a success factor for UARS and 
therefore whatever caused UARS to be delayed may have played a role in its final 
outcomes.
Due to its relevance in connection with project's final outcomes we tracked down how 
the UARS project performed in terms of its planned and executed schedule, as well as 
the causes and implications of the delays to which the project was subject. This review 
is provided below.
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-Brief Review o f UARS Performance in Relation to Schedule.
The facts: When initially planned by the Science Working Group (1978), the first of the 
two planned satellites for UARS mission was expected to fly in 1983. The other one 
should be launched in 1984.
Considerations: Thinking with hindsight in terms of UARS final outcomes, if this plan 
had worked out UARS would have been delivered in time to influence the decisions 
which led to the Montreal Protocol. It could have even led to a Protocol of the kind 
earlier.
The facts: Two years later, though, in November 18th, 1980, in accordance with some 
overheads presented by R.W. Vanderkoppel, from Martin Marietta (UARS Data Base 
in Appendix 1), it was mentioned that the launch of the two satellites was expected for 
1986 and 1987 and that they would be looking for a New Start in FY 1983 in order to 
implement these planned launch dates.
Considerations: Again here, had this plan worked out, UARS would still have had time 
to play a part in the Protocol.
It is not clear why, between the plan back in 1978 and the above news in 1980, there 
was a slip of 3 years in the expected launch date. For analytical purposes, it will be 
assumed that the first proposed launch data, of 1983, was too unrealistic due to the fact 
that the proposal made at the time had concentrated mainly on the scientific aspects of 
the mission and less on the engineering feasibility and other practical aspects of it (e.g. 
financial). An analysis of the proposal from the engineering side (Martin Marietta was 
one of the potential contractors for UARS) might have led them to come up with more 
realistic expected launch dates: 1986 for the first launch and 1987 for the second. Thus, 
these dates will be used as reference to discuss fixture delays on the launch of UARS.
The facts: In August 4, 1982, in Defense Daily (p. 180), it was said that they (NASA) 
were looking for initiation of UARS in FY 1984 and that launch was expected for the
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fall of 1988 (2 years later than predicted before). At that time the project was already in 
Phase B (definition).
By then, as the evidence seems to suggest, the first attempt to get a New Start for FY 
1983 had been turned down (they should have known that by Jan/Feb 1982). They were 
then, presumably, asked by OMB (Office of Management and Budget) to carry out a 
cost review, which started in June and got concluded in October 1982. This cost review 
resulted in significant changes on UARS proposal (from two to one satellite, from about 
20 to 10 instruments) and on a slip on the expected launch date of two years, from 
1986 (for the first launch) to 1988 (see Space World - Staff Report, Dec. 1983, 
quotations by Project Manager from Goddard, Mr. Pete Burr).
Considerations'. If one analyses the situation at this point, if UARS was to be delivered 
in time for influencing the Montreal Protocol, it would have needed to be granted a 
New Start in its first attempt, for FY 1983.
The facts: In February 1983, the OMB denied a New Start for UARS for FY 1984 (see 
February 3, 1983, Defense Daily, p. 190). As discussed before, that was NASA’s second 
frustrated attempt. NASA was then asked to carry out another cost review, which took 
place from February to August 1983 (6 months). That review resulted in further cost 
saving measures and more adjustments on the number of instruments. It also implied 
further delay of expected launch date of one year, from 1988 to 1989.
Considerations: If we go back to the reference point, in 1980, when launch was planned 
for 1986 (first satellite), in total the UARS expected launch date was delayed for 3 years 
(from 1986 to 1989). These 3 years delay was caused by the failure of UARS 
proponents to obtain authorisation for a New Start from the Government. Essentially, as 
the evidence indicates, the reason for this failure was the high cost of the proposed 
mission. There is no indication that there was any other relevant issue, scientific or 
technical, behind UARS New Start denial in the first two attempts. Interesting to note 
here that even though UARS was created following a Governmental mandate this did 
not prevent it from having to go through two cost revisions before being approved.
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The 3 years delay could have made a difference in terms of the policy success of the 
programme. Had it been not for these delays, UARS could have had a bigger impact on 
the policy moves which led to the Protocol and its first amendment in 1990.
The facts: Finally, the last two years slip in the expected launch date of UARS (from 
1989 to 1991) were due to an exogenous factor, which was the Challenger accident in 
1986, as already discussed before.
Considerations: This further delay in the UARS project delivery, alone or in 
combination with the other 3 years described before, contributed to preventing UARS 
from having a bigger policy impact, through the Montreal Protocol and its amendments.
The facts: In total UARS launch was slipped by 5 years, or 8, if we take into account 
the plans back in 1978. From the 5 years, the 2 years delay caused by the Challenger 
accident was outside the control of UARS decision-makers and implementers. It was an 
exogenous factor which, in relation to the project development, can be ascribed to 
chance. The other 3 years delay, though, seems to be at least partially a result of the 
actions of decision-makers and participants involved in the project formulation, who 
failed to satisfy the demands and constraints of the OMB in two consecutive occasions. 
Had they acted differently, it is possible that this 3 years delay could have been 
prevented or reduced and the chances of UARS having a bigger policy impact 
increased. But, it is also possible that UARS proponents thought they were doing their 
best at the time, with the information available at the time. There is actually no way of 
finding out if, had they presented a different, cheaper proposal than the original one, 
UARS would have been granted a New Start earlier.
Considerations: As timeliness was a success factor for UARS, the 5 years delay in 
project delivery, as compared to original plans, reduced the chances of UARS having a 
bigger policy impact. This was so as the policy that UARS was supposed to influence 
started changing with the help of other sources of data. Therefore, the delays partially 
affected UARS policy success.
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Potential Explanations for UARS Managerial Success up to Project Delivery
As to the causes of UARS managerial success, Mr. Michael Luther (Programme 
Manager at NASA Headquarters) attributed the savings (US$ 35 million under budget) 
to Goddard’s selection of an experienced management team that was able to accurately 
define solid engineering specifications early in the programme. He added that "the team 
also developed good clean interfaces between the nine instruments and the satellite bus" 
(see Aviation Week & Space Technology, Sept. 9, 1991).
A General Electric Astro-Space executive, Mr. Buckley, also commented on the 
reasons behind UARS project success on the edition of September 6, 1991 of 
Aerospace Daily. One of the comments he made was that "history showed the need to 
pick a design and stick to it regardless o f subsequent technological advances". He 
referred to UARS as "... a model technically and a model politically..."
He continued to say that, apart from the changes made due to the Challenger accident, 
UARS platform "... was produced on budget and schedule because NASA held the 
design o f the instruments and other components firm once it was set".
hi relation to the development of the instruments, Mr. Buckley mentioned that the 
Goddard team was responsible for the contracts. Again, he said that "they held firm to 
requirements that were set out early to size, weight, power allocations and didn't let the 
mission grow". He proceeded by saying: "We came up with a good understanding of the 
requirements we had to meet and we focused early as a system engineering team to 
understand the real requirements".
Mr. Buckley concluded his comments by stating: "That's the major lesson we've 
learned, to work early on the engineering with the science team and then don't let the 
objectives grow, don't let people add more capability and more capability. There's 
always a temptation".
A third opinion on UARS project success was provided by John Pike, a space analyst 
from the Federation of American Scientists (Daily News in Brief - Wall Street Journal,
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Sept. 10, 1991). In relation to the lesson of success learned with UARS, the paper says: 
... its managers combined political savoir with technological conservatism to shield the 
project from controversy and keep it from moving ahead year after year".
The same analyst also commented on the fact that UARS was an uncommon case of 
success with respect to meeting its planned budget and deadlines. A comparison was 
made between UARS and another big NASA project, the Earth Observing System 
(EOS). At one side there was UARS, with costs around US$ 630 million, and which 
was delivered on time and under budget. At the other side there was EOS, budgeted at 
the time at US$ 13 billion, and originally proposed as only $ 1 billion. It was 
commented that EOS was more like the norm and that UARS was very unusual.
John Pike added to this observation the following comments:
"...many projects look like they have a blank check at the beginning and never scale 
back as the check gets smaller and smaller with each successive review".
"... if a space project isn't fouled up, it got lucky".
Final Comments on UARS Managerial Success up to Project Delivery
By the time of project delivery, in 1991, UARS implementation was an example of 
success. If the chance factor represented by the Challenger accident is not taken into 
account, the project planning (as approved in 1986, after the accident) can be regarded 
as very and unusually successful. UARS was delivered on schedule and under budget.
The comments and pieces of evidence presented above seem to point to the relevance of 
at least three factors in connection with project outcomes up to delivery.
The first of them regards the importance of good project planning and project 
management. Since successful project delivery is the first essential step towards 
overall project success, project planning and project management are also bound to be 
relevant for project's overall success.
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The second factor regards the ability of the organisation, NASA in this case, to get 
the programme externally approved, once an internal decision has been made to 
submit it to the OMB and Congress for a New Start. It should be noted that this factor 
belongs to a phase of the project before it has been actually put in place. It was shown 
above that failure in getting formal approval for UARS in the first two attempts led to 
changes in project budget and content and to delays in project launch (in total 3 years). 
As with the first factor, by affecting project's success up to delivery, this aspect is also 
likely to affect final project's success. In fact, as also discussed before, the delays in 
launching UARS might have affected its ability to influence some policy changes and 
subsequently its policy success.
Finally, the third factor that seems to have directly affected the fate of the project up to 
delivery was the Challenger accident, which will be ascribed here to "chance".
6.I.3.2.2. Technical Success
Launch and Deployment
Shortly before the expected launch date for UARS, on Sept. 12, 1991, the possibility of 
a two weeks launch delay due to a leak in the Shuttle was announced (see Washington 
Post, Sept.8, 1991, p.A18; New York Times, Sept.8, 1991, p.20; The Washington 
Times, Sept.9, 1991, p.A2). It is interesting to note that this delay, due to an exogenous 
factor, could in fact have affected some of UARS scientific outcomes. A clear 
indication of such a possibility was the comment made by Mr. Michael Luther, UARS 
Programme Manager, on the week of launch, on the expedience of launching UARS in 
mid-September, so that it could watch ozone-depletion over the South Polar Region 
(Washington Post: Science -Atmospheric Studies, Sept. 1991).
Seemingly, though, any existing technical problems were resolved in time for launch as 
planned and UARS was successfully launched on September 12, 1991 by the Space 
Shuttle Discovery. Its deployment took place 3 days later, on September 15.
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An unexpected occurrence which actually benefited UARS regards a successful 
manoeuvre with the Shuttle which placed it into a higher orbit (307 nautical miles - one 
of the highest so far). Thanks to this manoeuvre, UARS could be deployed in a way that 
would require less energy for it to reach its final altitude of 372 miles. The savings in 
energy, as appraised by NASA, could extend the life o f the satellite for an extra 8 
months, in addition to the expected 18 to 20 months (see comments on The New York 
Times, Sept. 15,1991, p.A4).
Even though these were not significant events for the fate of UARS, the comments 
above draw attention again to the role that "chance” may have in influencing the 
success of projects.
Operations
Once delivered and launched, the project enters its operational phase. Then, a pre­
requisite for success is that the spacecraft and its instruments operate well and that data 
can be transmitted, decoded and accessed by the scientific community with success.
® Spacecraft Performance
As stated in the Post-Launch Report (p.5), in 1994, "... there were several component 
problems that have been resolved by redundancy or careful management by the 
operations team". This draws attention, for instance, to an important aspect of project 
planning and definition, which is the design of redundant systems.
hi general, though, as mentioned in the same report, performance had been nominal and 
the spacecraft "continued to successfully provide the support functions for the UARS 
Observatory..."
A description of the components which failed and of how they overcame the problems 
is presented in the same report. In summary, as mentioned on page 3 of that report, 
"unplanned disruptions to science data gathering have resulted from two On Board 
Computer (OBC) "safe-hold" modes (recovery was immediate), two Solar Array Drive
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anomaly occurrences, a Narrowband Tape Recorder anomaly and several instrument 
power-downs due to power balance problems".
The most serious of the failures seems to have been the Solar Array Drive, which led to 
instrument reduction operation for a month, between June and July 1992. After the 
array was successfully switched to the redundant drive in October 1993, array operation 
continued without incident (see UARS Post-Launch Report - NASA, 1994, p.3-4).
As of September 1994, the following passage of the Post-Launch Report (p.4) describes 
the then current overall state of UARS mission: "UARS continue to perform nominally 
with all instruments on in normal scheduled operation, except for the ISAMS and the 
CLAES. The ISAMS' chopper motor failed in July of 1992 and the CLAES Neon 
cryogen was depleted as expected in May of 1993. The MLS 183 GHz channel has not 
been available for operations since April of 1993, although the remaining channels 
continue to function normally".
• Flight operations9
hi summary, as mentioned in the Post-Launch Report (NASA, 1994, p.3), "UARS 
Flight Operations have been very successful in achieving mission objectives - both in 
day-to-day mission operations, special operations, and in response to anomalous 
observatory and ground system situations".
It was also mentioned in this part of the Report that the UARS ground system had 
provided excellent support in both the Observatory operations and data processing 
areas.
• Instruments Performance
UARS observatory carried 10 instruments. The technical performance of each of them 
is summarised below.
As explained in the UARS Post Launch Report (NASA, 1994, p.3), "UARS Flight Operations is a coordinated 
effort among Instrument Operations personnel, Goddard Space Flight Centre Institutional Support Elements, Mission 
Planning, and a Flight Operations Team which serves as the focal point responsible for operating the Observatory".
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(1) Wind Imaging Interferometer (WBNDII)
As stated in the Post-Launch Report (NASA, 1994, p.8), in 1994, WENDII was 
functionally the same instrument as it was before launch. There had been no component 
failures. Expectations were then that the instrument could operate for several more 
years. There was some loss of small amounts of data, but that appears not to reflect a 
more fundamental problem.
(2) Microwave Limb Sounder (MLS)
In summary, as stated in the Post-Launch Report (NASA, 1994, p.9), MLS had had no 
significant non-planned events during the mission to that date. Minor problems with 
new scan programmes had caused the loss of short periods of data on only four days. 
There had been MLS or UARS operational errors on twelve other occasions but none of 
these threatened safety or performance. Continuous operation had been interrupted by 
Observatory problems.
(3) Particle Environment Monitor (PEM)
As stated in the Post-Launch Report (NASA, 1994, p .ll), "two unplanned spacecraft 
events have interrupted or influenced all of PEM data. PEM data was lost during the 
failure of the Solar Array Drive and during an attitude safe hold. There is also a 
spacecraft charge which has been greater than specified. This spacecraft charge has 
caused MEPS data to be significantly contaminated and made it impossible to perform 
low energy measurements when the spacecraft is in sun light".
(4) Solar Ultraviolet Spectral Irradiance Monitor (SUSIM)
As it can be deduced from the comments made in the Post-Launch Report (NASA, 
1994, p. 12), SUSIM performed as expected, "except when idled by spacecraft 
anomalies". At the time the report was made, the status of the instrument was excellent, 
as stated in the same document. Minor technical problems seem to have been overcome 
without further repercussion on the achievement of the scientific goals.
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(5) Active Cavity Radiometer Irradiance Monitor (ACRIM IT)
As stated in the Post-Launch Report (NASA, 1994, p. 13), "the ACRIM II instrument 
has functioned flawlessly since activation in October 1991".
(6) High Resolution Doppler Imager (HRDI)
As stated in the Report (NASA, 1994, p. 13), "the instrument has operated at least as 
well as expected, with excellent stability and no significant degradation". And they 
added: "There have been two failures in the instrument electronics that occurred in 
March 1992 and February 1993. In both cases the design of the instrument and the 
operational versatility provided by the on-board computer allowed a complete recovery 
ofperformance
(7) Cryogenic Limb Array Etalon Spectrometer (CLAES)
The instrument performed as planned and there was not even the need for redundant- 
system activation. As also mentioned in the Post-Launch Report (NASA, 1994, p. 14), 
the solid neon cryogen (providing detector cooling) was depleted around 20 months 
after launch as predicted. There is reference to two technical problems which were both 
soon eliminated. One of them resulted in loss of about three days of science data.
(8) Improved Stratospheric and Mesospheric Sounder (ISAMS)
As stated in the Post-Launch Report (NASA, 1994, p. 15) "ISAMS failed to achieve its 
operation lifetime goal because of a malfunction in the mechanical chopper system, 
initially from January 18 until March 27, 1992, and again from July 29, 1992 to the 
present" (September/1994). The problem, as indicated in the Report, was ascribed to a 
probable mechanical failure in the chopper motor bearings. Though all the other 
systems performed well, they proceeded, "the inactive chopper results in a loss of 
science data" (p. 15).
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The failure of the chopper system was then an unpredictable technical event with a 
negative impact on project’s outcomes. In the same way, another technical event with 
negative impact on outcomes was "an effect, due to sun glint at certain beta-angles, on 
the scan mirror control" (p. 15), which resulted in the partial loss of data from October 
15-28,1991.
(9) Halogen Occultation Experiment (HALOE)
As stated in the Post-Launch Report (NASA, 1994, p. 16), the HALOE instrument "has 
operated essentially without flaw since launch". There was mention of a minor thermal 
problem which resulted in the loss of approximately 5% of the science data. They also 
mentioned at the time that there was indication that HALOE would continue to provide 
excellent science measurements well into the future.
(10) Solar Stellar Irradiance Comparison Experiment (SOLSTICE)
As mentioned in the Post-Launch Report (NASA, 1994, p. 17), "during the UARS 
mission there have been two minor component failures with the SOLSTICE 
instrument". However, as also mentioned in the Report, "neither of these failures have 
produced any degradation of the science data or any reduction in scope for the 
SOLSTICE instrument" (p. 17).
hi general, as stated in the same Report (p. 17), SOLSTICE was performing "extremely 
well" and was exceeding the mission objective for the instrument. No further technical 
problems of any kind were reported.
• UARS Data Availability
As of 1994, as stated in the Post-Launch Report (NASA, 1994, p.3), data collection had 
been excellent. As indicated in the same Report (p.3, p. 19), the data capture to that date 
for the UARS Observatory mission was better than 99,97% of the spacecraft generated 
telemetry (through 28 March, 1994). The calculations then showed a total of data loss
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of approximately 5 hours, 05 minutes, which represented 0,0194% of total data 
telemetry.
Final Comments on UARS Technical Performance after Launch
As to the technical performance of UARS, the evidence presented above shows that 
both spacecraft and instruments had several technical problems. However, most of them 
were minor or could be corrected soon enough in time to prevent any serious data loss. 
One major problem with the spacecraft, though, the failure of the Solar Array Drive, 
resulted on instruments being temporarily switched off and on subsequent data loss. 
Regarding the instruments, the exception was ISAMS, which had a mechanical failure 
that resulted in significant loss of science data.
Overall, UARS is seen as a technically successful mission, as the following comments 
by the two interviewees for UARS indicate:
Interviewee 1:
"... clearly from the engineering standpoint, I think it’s been a technical success. Not 
perhaps as much as some other programmes we had ... but this was also a more 
complex one. ... it had an operational goal of one year and a half and a design life of 
three years and it succeeded in both o f those".
"... it has had some technical problems, but none which have significantly limited the 
scientific value of the data, until very recently, which was past the mission's success 
goals. So, it's met the success goals that it was set up to meet".
Interviewee 2:
He mentioned that UARS had already surpassed its expected lifetime and that it was 
doing better than the engineers had thought it would.
220
6.I.3.2.3. Science Success
As a scientific mission, UARS success could only be achieved if it delivered the science 
it was set out to deliver. As it can be implied from the discussion above, one of the 
factors which directly affect the science success of a project such as UARS is the 
technical performance of both spacecraft and instruments. Significant technical failures 
in either of them can result in data loss, which will subsequently affect science 
outcomes. In general terms, though, as explained above, UARS is regarded as a 
technical/engineering success. The next step towards project’s ultimate success then 
depends on the extent to which the project achieved its scientific objectives.
As with the previous outcomes analysis, the analysis of UARS scientific outcomes drew 
from both interviews and documentary evidence and was mainly based on the extent to 
which UARS met its stated objectives (goal-attainment approach).
Regarding the documentary evidence, three are the main documents which provided the 
basis for the analysis of UARS outcomes vis a vis stated objectives: the Final Report of 
the Science Working Group (NASA/JPL,1978), the Pre-Launch Mission Operations 
Report (NASA, 1991a) and the Post-Launch Missions Operations Report (NASA, 
1994).
hi the Final Report of the Science Working Group, concluded as early as 1978 (13 years 
before UARS launch), the quantities to be measured by UARS, accompanied by the 
correspondent measurement requirements, were specified and maintained as part of the 
objectives of the mission all along the way. They are summarised in Table A-l of that 
Report (NASA/JPL, 1978, Appendix, p.50).
The Pre-Launch Report was signed up in August 1991 (one month before UARS 
launch) by UARS Programme Scientist, Robert McNeal; UARS Programme Manager, 
Michael Luther (also one of the interviewees); the Director for the Earth Science and 
Applications Division, Shelby Tilford, and the Associate Administrator for Space 
Science and Applications, Lennard Fisk.
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In the Pre-Launch Report (NASA, 1991a) a general success criterion for evaluation of 
UARS outcomes was presented as follows:
"The ultimate success of UARS mission will be judged on the basis of the improvement 
on scientific understanding of: the processes that control upper atmospheric structure 
and variability, the response of the upper atmosphere in climate and climate variability" 
(p.7).
In the sequence, some more specific success criteria were presented, as the following 
section taken from the same Report (NASA, 1991a, p.7) shows:
"The UARS mission will be successful if: (1) upper atmospheric dynamics; energy 
inputs; temperature; pressure; and key source, reservoir, and radical species 
concentrations are measured on a global scale with accuracy close to or better than 
those defined as adequate in the UARS Science Working Group Final Report (specified 
in Table A-l of that Report); (2) these measurements are made during significant 
portions of two Northern Hemisphere winter seasons; (3) these measurements are made 
during significant portions of the time period in which the Antarctic ozone hole is 
formed; and (4) the UARS data are processed to level 3 and made available to the 
general community on the schedule defined by the UARS Policy for Data Use and 
Sharing".
The Post-Launch Mission Operations Report was prepared by NASA and provided a 
mission assessment for UARS at the completion of its programmed lifetime, by October 
1994. The project or mission assessment was signed up by Dr. Charles Kennel, then 
Associate Administrator for Mission to Planet Earth, on October 11,1994.
hi general terms, UARS was regarded as a successful mission. In a summarised 
conclusion of the mission assessment in the same Report (p.2) it was stated: ’’The 
UARS mission objectives for science have been met”. It was also added then: ’This 
successful mission continues to provide critical scientific information influencing 
national and international policy decisions”.
2 2 2
In the same part of the Report (NASA, 1994, p.2), a more extended summary of the 
overall mission assessment compares UARS outcomes at this stage with the previously 
stated objectives, checking them against the success criteria stated in the Pre-Launch 
Report. These also include the measurement requirements established in 1978 by the 
Science Working Group. It reads:
(1) "The planned upper atmosphere dynamics; energy inputs; temperature; pressure; 
and key source, reservoir, and radical species concentrations have been measured on a 
global scale with accuracy close to or better than those defined as adequate in the 
UARS Science Working Group Report".
(2) "The planned measurements were made during significant portions of two Northern 
Hemisphere winter seasons". An unexpected positive outcome is also mentioned at this 
stage: "In addition, there have now been measurements during three Northern 
Hemisphere winter seasons" (as opposed to the originally planned two winter seasons): 
"1991/1992 (all instruments operational although ISAMS only operated during part of 
the winter"; "1992/1993 (all instruments except ISAMS operational); and 1993/1994 
(all instruments except ISAMS and CLAES operational)."
(3) "These measurements were made during significant portions of the time period in 
which the Antarctic ozone hole is formed."
(4) "Most of the UARS data was processed to level 3 and made available to the general 
scientific community by the end of May, 1994." Here again, an unpredicted negative 
outcome was identified. As it reads in the Post-Launch Report (p.2): "This availability 
(UARS data) was up to 8 months behind the schedule defined by the UARS Policy for 
Data Use and Sharing, depending on the instrument." However, by September 15, 1994, 
it seems that this problem was already being overcome, as the following comments 
seem to confirm: "However, as of September 15, 1994, UARS data sets are flowing 
smoothly to the Data Active Archive Centre (DAAC), and are available to the general 
scientific community. The current release rate is on schedule with the UARS Policy for 
Data Use and Sharing plan which states that there are no exclusive UARS Science 
Team data rights after month 36 of flight operations".
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Regarding the science results of UARS instruments, in summary, all of UARS 
instruments lost some data and, consequently, some science, during the six week period 
they were off due to the technical problem with the Solar Array Drive. Another 
significant data and science loss resulted from the failure of one of the components of 
ISAMS. PEM data were also said to have been significantly contaminated due to a 
spacecraft charge that was greater than specified. In general terms, though, as 
mentioned before, UARS is regarded as a successful mission from the scientific 
standpoint.
Regarding the evidence from interviews, when asked about the science success of 
UARS, one of the interviewees (actually a scientist in a related area himself) mentioned 
that, for him, UARS had been an enormous success. And he justified: "... it has 
permitted us to understand the true extent, globally, of how ozone is changing in a way 
that we could have never done with any other tools, because it would just be too 
expensive to fly airplanes enough and they don't have the capability to look high 
enough, to actually go into the high enough elevation from the atmosphere to make the 
sort of global measurements that the satellite does. So, it has given us the full 
understanding o f the spatial extent o f global ozone change".
And he added: "It has also allowed us to do the so-called mass balance, which is an 
accounting process, where we know approximately how much of the CFCs and other 
related ozone depleting chemicals have been released by industry ... With the satellites 
we can now measure those globally and look at the amounts that are in the stratosphere 
and see if there is a balance. If it does then it gives a lot of science credibility, because it 
is like a bank account. We now can keep track of all the chemicals, how much has been 
released, how much is actually in the stratosphere. It is just in the last years, so doing 
that accounting it has shown that the amount of chlorine in the stratosphere was 
increasing and it was approximately the same amount that has been released from the 
ground, so that the balance was appropriate. Therefore, the scientists have documented 
that the increasing amount of chlorine in the stratosphere could only come from these 
industrial chemicals. If volcanos or other natural sources were so important to the 
stratosphere then we would have not been able to get that balance. It was then the fina l
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most conclusive evidence that allows fo r  a, what most scientists believe, as the 
undisputed prove that ozone chemistry has been influenced by these chemicals as 
opposed to natural sources
As it was also noted by the previous interviewee, the second interviewee mentioned the 
fact that it was only in the 1994-1995 time period that UARS data and correspondent 
scientific results were being widely distributed. Thus, he said, "its impact has only been 
appreciated".
Still on the scientific outcomes of UARS, he mentioned: ”98% of the scientific 
community would agree that the results are undisputable, ... remarkable for 
science".
6.I.3.2.4. Policy Success
As previously mentioned (see subsection 6.1.1.2), one of the expected outcomes of 
UARS was that its data would help guide policy decisions regarding the issue of ozone 
depletion caused by man-made chemicals.
As shown in Fig. 6.1, UARS data came late for what can be regarded as the most 
significant policy move involving the ozone depletion issue: the signature of the 
Montreal Protocol in 1987 (see also subsection 6.1.4). The main reason for UARS 
being late for the Protocol, as it can be seen now with hindsight, are NASA's two 
consecutive failures in getting the project formally approved by the Government. This 
resulted in a slip of expected launch data of 3 years.
If the Challenger accident had not taken place, these 3 years could have made a big 
difference in terms of the policy success of the UARS project. They could have given 
UARS a chance of having a significant impact on the policy moves which led to the 
Protocol and its first amendment in 1990.
Naturally, missing out such an important event like the Montreal Protocol has 
undermined the policy success of UARS. The Protocol was amended for the first time
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in 1990 and UARS data were not available at that time either. Later, UARS Protocol 
was amended again, in 1992 and 1995. As the evidence seems to indicate (see below), 
UARS did have a role in the amendment that took place in 1992 and, though I did not 
collect direct evidence of this, it seems likely that UARS data also had some influence 
on the amendment of 1995.
The assessment of UARS policy success by one of the interviewees (manager & 
engineer) is provided below, through the following passages:
"... my sense to date is that UARS has confirmed a lot, but I don't think, it is not clear 
tha t... the data were required to change policy. There were other events that sort of 
drove it, but the data helped to confirm the policy changes".
"The one event that did happen was that in about a year after launch ... there was a 
series of political activities that took place and the data from the UARS actually 
accelerated the policy and the position that US took in amending the Montreal Protocol 
to accelerate the guidelines for restricting CFCs".
"UARS's data made a very strong player in accelerating that timetable. And so, from a 
policy standpoint, I think it's been, I would classify this as marginally successful. It has 
... influenced some policy, it hasn't driven policy ... but as a collective of data it has 
assisted to drive policy and make changes".
"...the policy that UARS may be able to influence maybe hasn't happened yet".
The interviewee also mentioned that it had been three years and a half of data taking at 
the time and that the data continued to be scientifically refereed and put out to the 
public. Thus, he suggested, more findings were still likely to come.
As it can be deduced from the comments made above, the assessment of the policy 
success of UARS is not as clear-cut as the assessment of its performance and science 
success. First, influencing policy was not a stated objective for UARS and, as such, 
there is no objective way of assessing the extent to which UARS met its policy
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objectives and goals. Second, "influencing policy" is a broad objective and the ability of 
UARS to succeed in this aspect had an ongoing character. However, if we look at the 
policy success of UARS after completion of its three years of designed operational life, 
the programme can be regarded, as mentioned by one of the interviewees, as only 
"marginally successful".
Additional Comments Provided by the Interviewees on UARS Outcomes:
When asked about whether or not UARS had come too late, one of the interviewees 
mentioned that it had, in the sense that it would have been nicer to have it before. And 
he mentioned: "It would have made the policy process less adversarial. Even today, 
there are sceptics, but they are few in number".
He explained that before UARS sceptics and major stakeholders from industry would 
claim that there could be natural sources causing ozone depletion as well and there was 
not so far conclusive prove to refute them. He added that only with UARS they got the 
conclusive prove.
He continued: "In the Congress there will no longer be a debate on whether there is a 
problem or not. If  we could have reached that point earlier that would have been 
good but we had the delays ... "
In other part of the interview he drew attention to the unique capability of UARS, which 
was not only able of doing ozone measurements but also various chemicals that are 
involved in the process of depleting ozone.
He made reference then to other sensors to fly aboard a European (Envisat) and a 
Japanese satellite (EOS) which would continue to do some of the same measurements.
The possibility that someone else would come up with the same sort of measurements 
that UARS was designed to provide before it could be delivered (due to the delays the 
project was subject to, for example) was discarded by him. He justified it by saying that
227
UARS "was such a large and expensive programme that nobody else was actually in a 
position to fund anything that large at the time".
6.1.4 Final Analysis on the Role of Context in Influencing UARS DM and 
Outcomes
The role of major project-specific context influences in shaping UARS development 
and influencing its outcomes are summarized below, organized in terms of external and 
internal factors.
External (to NASA! events
From all the ozone related environmental occurrences throughout the formulation, 
implementation and operations phase of the UARS programme, two can be selected 
that seem to have had a more significant role in affecting its outcomes. Other events are 
directly or indirectly associated with these two major events which are discussed below.
1st Major Context Influence: A Positive Factor
The first major ozone related occurrence influencing UARS was the discovery of the 
ozone hole back in 1984, at approximately the same time UARS was getting formal 
authorisation to proceed by the OMB (New Start). Seemingly, this event was not 
necessary to secure UARS approval. However, it reinforced the need for a programme 
of that kind and it may have strengthened the political support for it, at least in the first 
years of project implementation.
As mentioned before, considering the fact that being granted a New Start by Congress 
is not guarantee of adequate project funding throughout its implementation10, an 
increase in political support for a project is likely to facilitate implementation over the 
years, in terms of securing the necessary budgetaiy resources for its development.
10 The American budgetary process takes place on an annual basis and approved projects continue to be scrutinized 
every year and can be subject to funding cuts or even cancellation all along their implementation phase.
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2nd Major Context Influence: A Negative Factor
The second major ozone related occurrence influencing UARS and its outcomes was 
the signature of the Montreal Protocol in 1987,3 years into the implementation phase 
and 4 years before UARS launch.
As explained by one of the interviewees, the Montreal Protocol "is a global protocol 
that calls for different nations to restrict the development of CFCs (chlorofluorcarbons), 
which is a very expensive process that costs a lot of money to implement and you don't 
want to make a decision unless you have to".
The signature of the Montreal Protocol represented a change of policy before UARS 
was even launched and it showed that UARS was not necessary to change policy. This 
aspect, as already mentioned before, was emphasised by one of the interviewees, in his 
assessment of UARS outcomes:
"... I  don't think, it is not clear that... the data were required to change policy. There 
were other events that sort o f drove it, but the data helped to confirm the policy 
changes".
Thus, as previously discussed in subsection 6.1.3.2.4, this event (the Montreal Protocol) 
seems to have at least partially undermined the success of UARS (the policy 
success). However, as the piece of evidence above also seems to indicate, UARS data 
helped confirming that the decisions made through the Montreal Protocol were in the 
right direction. Later on, as already mentioned, UARS data did have a chance to 
influence some aspects of policy (at least two of the Montreal Protocol amendments, in 
1992 and in 1995). They may have influenced policy later on too, as it had been 
suggested then by the interviewees.
The signature of the Montreal Protocol probably did not come as a big surprise to 
UARS decision makers and implementers. At least it was not supposed to be so, as 
there were clear indications, even before UARS project formulation got started, that 
some initiatives were taking place which might result in policy changes, regardless of
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UARS data. As it can be noted in the UARS Mission Chronology (see Fig.6.1), in the 
late 70's / early 80's, when UARS formulation phase was at the beginning, some 
national Governments were already taking some actions to control the production and 
use of CFCs. They included USA, Canada and the Scandinavian countries. In 1981, at 
a time when UARS was first being proposed for a New Start in FY 1983 (which was 
denied afterwards), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) decided to 
develop a global convention to tackle the problem of ozone depletion. Finally, in 1985 
(after UARS New Start approval and at the beginning of its implementation phase), the 
Vienna Convention for the protection of the ozone layer took place. It called for 
voluntary measures to reduce emission of ozone-depleting substances (ODS). That was 
the preparatory stage for the Montreal Protocol, which happened 2 years later, still 
during UARS implementation.
All these policy moves were based on data and scientific evidence from other sources 
rather than UARS. As mentioned earlier (see subsection 6.1.2.3), several instruments 
and experiments flew before UARS which contributed to the understanding of ozone 
depletion. Most of these instruments and experiments belonged to NASA (e.g. TOMS, 
SAGE, SSBUV). Besides, there were other non-space based sources, like balloons, 
aircraft or even ground measurements which also contributed to scientific findings 
related to ozone.
Thus, looking retrospectively, even before UARS got approved there were signs of 
some moves towards future policy changes. Shortly after its approval, this became even 
clearer with the Vienna Convention. At that point, in 1985, the expected launch date for 
UARS was 1989, 4 years ahead. Even though the relevance of the UARS programme 
could have been reassessed then in face of these events, it was probably difficult to 
know at the time whether or not something like the Montreal Protocol would happen 
before the expected launch date of UARS. Besides, for the scientists involved, the 
relevance of UARS was not based on its ability to contribute for environmental policy 
changes, but rather on the unique science it would provide. In 1986, though, the 
Challenger accident happened and the UARS launch had to be postponed for further 
two years, from 1989 to 1991. This happened just one year before the Montreal 
Protocol got signed, in 1987. It seems reasonable to assume that, by then (1986), UARS
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decision-makers and implementers should have a good idea that UARS would be late 
for something such as the Montreal Protocol.
Finally, when the Protocol did happen, UARS was already almost halfway through its 
implementation. At that point, to those stakeholders who believed the great value of 
UARS was based on its policy outcomes, considerations of whether or not to stop the 
project could have come about. However, this would also imply in wasting a lot of 
money and effort, let alone other more general implications (e.g. frustration amongst the 
scientific community). Additionally, as UARS was a very complex mission and unique 
in its scientific ambitions, its value to the scientific community was likely to remain 
strong, regardless of its expected impact on environmental policy. The following 
comments by one of the interviewees show the kind of considerations that the advent of 
the Montreal Protocol brought about:
"... so, that was a stimulus (the Montreal Protocol) that would lead one to ask: well, if 
we reached agreement on this, why do we need this big and expensive satellite..."
"The letter of the Montreal Protocol happened so late that we had spent all the money 
and we were going to fly it anyway. And, we really wanted a monitoring programme, 
we wanted to answer the monitoring questions ..."
Internal (to NASA) events
The one event that was external to UARS project but internal to NASA which 
significantly affected the fate of the project was the Challenger accident in 1986.
As mentioned previously, due to this event, UARS had to be redesigned, the costs had 
to be re-evaluated, with a resulting budget increase. The scientific objectives, though, 
were maintained. The following comments by one of the interviewees address the 
impact of the Challenger accident on UARS:
"... the programme effectively had to be totally replanned at that point because our 
launch day slipped two years because of the Shuttle ...”
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"We had to put together a brand new budget, and replan the programme for the 
contractor all the way [through] the systems. So, we made major engineering changes 
on the payload and slipped the programme two years. "
The same interviewee also made comments on the new negotiations for proceeding 
with UARS which became necessary as a result of the Challenger accident:
"... we didn't have to go back to Congress for a New Start, for authority to proceed, 
what we had to do was replan the programme, which increased the budget. And both 
within Agency and on the Hill we had to advocate and secure that budget and that 
replan process".
About the implications on the objectives of UARS, he said:
"The objectives of the mission were not changed at all. We maintained the science 
objectives, we maintained all the level one requirements, which are the top level 
scientific and engineering requirements for the programme". Having said that, he added 
that there had been one minor change in one of the instruments only.
Finally, he mentioned: "we lessened the engineering requirements, but maintained the 
scientific requirements, looking at the whole system..."
As it can be seen from the evidence provided above, the Challenger accident had a 
serious impact on UARS project, half way into its implementation. It did not affect the 
original formulation phase of the project. However, it did create the need for carrying 
out a project redefinition in order to adjust it to the new circumstances and constraints 
imposed by the changes in the launcher. In a way, it was like going back through some 
steps of the formulation phase.
This event was unusual, unexpected and unpredictable. Its negative impact on UARS 
can be ascribed to "chance". Contrary to what happened regarding the signature of the 
Montreal Protocol, there were no beforehand indications of that sort of accident
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happening until it did happen. As one of the interviewees said: "...zY was something the 
programme had no control at the time".
The most obvious impact of the Challenger accident on UARS outcomes was the 
launch slip of two years. This delay on the project affected, of course, at least one 
aspect of its managerial success, regarding schedule. It also had the potential to affect 
UARS policy success, as it left the mission with yet smaller chances of coming in time 
to influence the sigmficant policy changes that seemed imminent after the adventure of 
the Vienna Convention in 1985. In fact, as mentioned before, had it not been for the 
accident, UARS could have had an influence on the first amendment of the Montreal 
Protocol which took place in 1990, for example.
On the other hand, we have to consider that UARS was delivered on time and under 
costs, after the replanning in 1986. This suggests that had it not been for the Challenger 
accident most likely it would have been delivered as originally planned.
6.2. CASE STUDY II: MARS OBSERVER (MO)
6.2.1 Project Development Facts
6.2.1.1. Description of the Mission
Mars Observer (MO), originally named Mars Geoscience Climatology Orbiter 
(MGCO) programme, was a NASA’s planetary exploration mission designed to 
explore the geology, topography and climatology of Mars, during one Martian year 
(687 days on Earth).
It was recommended and developed by the Solar System Exploration Committee of the 
NASA Advisory Council during the period 1981-1983. MO was to be the first of a 
new series of moderate costs planetary observers, which would try to employ existing 
technology for both spacecraft and instruments reconfigured for planetary missions. 
MO got formal approval from Congress for a New Start in fiscal year 1985 and it was 
managed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). MO was launched in September
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1992 and was expected to go into Mars orbit in August 1993, when communications 
with the spacecraft ceased after an attempt to pressurise the spacecraft’s fuel tanks. 
After several attempts to re-establish contact with the spacecraft the mission was 
finally considered over and the spacecraft lost. Altogether, the mission cost around $1 
billion dollars.
The next subsections present a brief description of the most important facts and events 
during MO mission development, from conception to delivery. Some of the most 
important mission events are plotted in chronological order in Fig.6.2 in subsection 
6.2.2.1 below.
6.2.I.2. Mars Observer Development - From conception to formal project 
initiation (1980-84)
hi response to a stringent fiscal environment in the late 70s, NASA formed the Solar 
System Exploration Committee (SSEC) in 1980 to study and recommend alternatives 
for the future of the space sciences programme. The aim was to make the programme 
more realistic and more in line with the growing budgetary constraints. The committee 
was formed from among the nation's top planetary scientists, including participants of 
all past US planetary missions (Polk, 1990, p.6). The result was a proposed core 
programme of planetary exploration through the year 2000, which involved a 
significant change in relation to the previous approach to these programmes. Instead of 
large and very expensive projects, with big intervals between launches, the SSEC 
recommended smaller and more frequent missions, at moderate costs. As observed by 
Polk (1990, p.6), "affordability would be obtained through series planning; the sharing 
of engineering and production resources and facilities; and flexible missions designs, 
with launches scheduled around three-year centres to provide efficient sequencing of 
mission-operation resources". Within this new strategy, the SSEC proposed in 1982 
two core space exploration programmes: one for the inner planets and one for the outer 
planets. Regarding the inner planets (Mercury, Venus, Earth and Mars), in 1983 SSEC 
specifically recommended a series of low-cost, modestly scaled missions, called the 
Planetary Observer series. The Mars Geoscience Climatology Orbiter, later renamed
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Mars Geoscience Climatology Observer, and even later renamed Mars Observer, was 
to be the first of this series.
Thus, the Mars Observer mission was proposed in an environment of very restricted 
funding conditions. As such, it was conceived as part of a new strategy to be adopted 
by NASA, created to enable the agency to ensure the survival of its planetary 
exploration programme until sufficient funds were available again to allow for any 
reviews of this strategy.
The new strategy proposed for the planetary exploration programme embodied a series 
of important recommendations. They aimed at achieving the lower cost goal for 
missions in general (involving the spacecraft itself, the instruments and mission 
operations and launches). These recommendations represented a substantial departure 
from the way planetary missions were conceived and developed before and were to be 
experimented for the first time with the Mars Observer mission. As presented by Polk 
(1990, p.xi), some of these recommendations included: (1) The spacecraft was to be 
procured commercially through fixed-price contracts from Earth orbital derivatives; (2) 
To avoid cost-growth risk and system interaction difficulties, instruments should be of 
mature design when selected for a mission; (3) Mission operation should take on a 
multi-mission approach; (4) Shuttle use would reduce launch costs relative to 
expendables. The implementation of these recommendations would require 
investment in new capabilities, such as: (1) The development of a JPL supplied 
instrument module to fix the spacecraft resource envelope, so as to minimise spacecraft 
changes due to instrument changes and thus increase the chance of gains from the 
spacecraft procurement approach; (2) A separately funded design effort was intended 
to provide mature, low-growth-risk instrument concepts prior to Observer’s instrument 
selection; (3) A multi-mission operations centre was to be constructed at JPL. 
Additionally, Polk (1990, p.xii) also pointed out some programmematic 
recommendations, involving: (1) The Observers should avoid the turbulence of New 
Start and FY (Fiscal Year) funding by receiving fixed line-item authority; (2) High 
resource margins should be maintained to avoid cost-escalation, even if this 
necessitated the deletion of science capabilities.
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It should also be noted here that within this new approach, which was to be tested by 
Mars Observer, contrary to what happened in previous scientific missions, the 
spacecraft was to be selected first, from amongst standard assembly-line spacecraft 
designed for Earth-orbit missions, for later adaptation to planetary journeys. Then, the 
instruments would be selected to fit into it. Before, the instruments were chosen first 
and a specific spacecraft, thus unique to each mission, was designed and developed to 
accommodate these instruments.
Even though the SSEC report was issued in mid-1983, its contents had been widely 
known and planning at NASA for the Planetary Observers had been under way for 
some time (Polk, 1990, p. 11). As noted by Polk (1990, p. 11), JPL’s MO task- 
breakdown structures were being defined at least since May, 1983, two Price Board 
Reviews were held on July, 1983 and MO was presented to the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) on September, 1983.
On January 1984, Mars Observer won formal approval for a New Start in Fiscal 
Year 1985. Mars Observer was initially assigned $16 million, which should permit the 
initiation of the design and development of the orbiter and its instruments. By that time, 
the run-out cost expected for Mars Observer was around 300 to 375 million dollars. 
This was regarded as a moderate cost for a planetary mission, if compared with the cost 
of other similar missions, such as the Viking programme, which was around 1 billion 
dollars. Even though it was announced during the Press Budget Conference on January 
31, 1984 that it was NASA’s intent to make it a continuing programme, making a new 
start every few years, this continuation was not secured yet and should be negotiated on 
an annual basis. Similarly, though it was the SSEC recommendation that the Observers 
should avoid the “turbulence of New Start and Fiscal Year funding”, the remaining of 
the funding for the development of Mars Observer was to be negotiated annually, like 
most of NASA’s scientific missions.
At this point, the mission was scheduled to be launched in August 1990, to arrive into 
Mars orbit 11 months later and to complete its mission two years after that, in 1993.
In November 1983, NASA had already formed a science-working group to establish
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instrument requirements for the mission. The announcement of opportunity (AO) for 
instrument proposals, however, would come much later and would be based on the 
selected spacecraft’s capability.
6 2.1.3. From Formal Project Initiation to Launch Slip (1984 -1987)
As mentioned earlier, Mars Observer was to be the first planetary mission to follow a 
different procurement approach in which a fixed-price spacecraft was selected first and 
instruments were chosen to fit bus capability. Earlier planetary programmes had 
instruments selection first, followed by a customised and often costly spacecraft design. 
Despite that approach, NASA was making some provision for the scientific 
instruments, considering the requirements that the payload might impose on the 
spacecraft, as mentioned by Mr. William Purdy, project manager for MO, in an 
interview for Spaceflight (1984). By that time, they expected the actual payload to be 
finalised around October 1985 and that it would weigh around 100kg. Altogether, the 
satellite should weigh 550kg in Mars Orbit By April 1984 (Spaceflight), the cost of 
MO was expected to be around $250 million, including experiments, the craft, and the 
creation of an operation system. A further $40 million would go on two and a half years 
of operation, and another $90 million was needed for the Shuttle launch and upper 
stage. It was mentioned then that this cost was about $50 million cheaper than a 
purposely built spacecraft.
In 1985 (Washington Roundup, n/d), just one year after New Start, the first signs of the 
funding problems which would be observed all along Mars Observer’s project 
implementation started showing. It was mentioned then that NASA was likely to suffer 
cuts in its budget for 1986 and that Mars Observer, along with the space telescope, were 
initial targets for that.
A Request for Proposals (RFP) for Mars Observer’s flight system was issued in 1985, 
after several delays. By April 1984 (Spaceflight, 1984), NASA and JPL were planning 
to request bids for MGCO in early July and would be expecting bids to be submitted by 
the end of August. NASA should name the winning contractor in December, 1984. The 
main problems that the manufacturers were likely to face in converting existing designs
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for communications satellites to the scientific role were discussed by Mr. William 
Purdy (Spaceflight, 1984). Mr. Purdy said the primary difficulty was the data system, 
non-existent in communications satellite. Other changes included more autonomy, 
larger solar array, greater propulsion capability, and the ability to cope with a different 
range of temperatures. On September 1984, as mentioned in Defense Daily (Sept. 25,
1984, p. 113), the release of MO’s RFP had been slated for late October, 1984. As 
mentioned then, the delay was due to a number of reviews of the programme, including 
some suggested changes. It was said then that the contract award should be in March
1985, depending on the number of proposals received. In October 31, 1984, the 
Defense Daily (p.315) announced even further delay for Mars Observer RFP. NASA 
was then expecting to issue RFPs for MO around the beginning of January, 1985, with 
selection of a contractor anticipated for the following fall. As mentioned then, that was 
mainly tied to resolving the question of how to write the RFP to not preclude the variety 
of potential upper stages that could be used to boost MO on its planetary mission. Due 
to this delay they would have to re-evaluate when to issue the Announcement of 
Opportunity, which was planned for July. On April 8, 1985 (Defense Daily, p. 212), it 
was mentioned that JPL was preparing to issue RFP's for Mars Observer in May or June 
of that year. Finally, the Request for Proposal was issued in June, 1985, with 
approximately one-year delay over the original plan. Nine months later, by March 1986, 
JPL had selected RCA Corp. and Orbital Sciences Corp. for negotiations leading to the 
award of contracts to build a spacecraft and an upper stage booster, respectively, for 
MO mission (NASA News, 1986, Rel.:86-34).
Shortly afterwards, the Hughes Aircraft Company filed a bid protest with the General 
Accounting Office (GAO), complaining over the procurement procedures and asking 
for a review and eventual cancellation of the selection process. Due to the bid protest, 
contracts could not be awarded until the protest was resolved. In the meantime, 
however, in order to prevent further delays in project development, NASA and JPL 
proceeded with negotiations with the selected contractors. Later on this same year, 
GAO rejected Hughes bid protest and NASA and JPL went ahead with contracting the 
two selected companies.
238
Meanwhile, the Challenger accident happened. Even though the Shuttle programme 
was put on a hold for undetermined time for investigations leading to the causes of the 
accident, the original schedule for MO’s launch was still maintained at that time 
(around April 1986).
An Announcement of Opportunity for the selection of the instruments was released in 
July 1985 and NASA decided to develop two instruments for the mission: the Gamma 
Ray Spectrometer and the Visual and Infrared Mapping Spectrometer. More than 90 
experiments, instruments, and investigators proposals were received in August 1985 in 
response to the AO. At that time, the proposals underwent technical, cost and peer 
reviews that categorised the instruments. A JPL team, independent of the MO project, 
performed the technical feasibility and cost reviews. A NASA-formed peer group 
evaluated the scientific aspects of the proposals (Polk, 1990, p.23). The selection of 
Mars Observer experiments and investigations was completed in April 1986 (two 
weeks after spacecraft selection). By this time, NASA introduced some new changes, 
when it decided to test Ka-band communications and planned to acquire photographs 
for public distribution.
It is important to note that the selected payload in April 1986 was oversubscribed 
relative to the spacecraft RFP requirements (of June 1985). The SSEC suggestion to 
maintain high margins was not followed. The scope of MO was ambitious and 
developmental, a status achieved via payload resource oversubscription, thus deviating 
from the moderate science goal initially pursued (Polk, 1990, p.xiv). As observed by 
Polk (1990, p.xiv), the risk of resource growth was substantial. Also, with the possible 
exception of a magnetometer, none of the instruments selected could be referred to as 
off-the-shelf, as initially proposed.
Although the late issuance of the spacecraft’s Request for Proposals and the long 
selection process for the spacecraft’s instruments created tight project deadlines, NASA 
and JPL believed that the original launch date, August 1990, could have been 
maintained. And it was, until April 1987, when NASA decided to postpone the launch 
for two years, to September 1992. The explanation given for the launch slip was that 
too many planetary launches were scheduled in the first two years of the Shuttle’s
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return after the Challenger accident. Fiscal Year 1987 funding constraints were also 
mentioned as a contributing factor in the decision (GAO, 1988, Appendix I, p. 13).
6.2.I.4. From Launch Slip to Project Delivery and Launch (1987 - 1992)
After the decision on the launch slip, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory issued a partial 
stop work order and initiated mission re-planning for the new launch date. In the 
meantime, JPL continued to develop key instruments, while all other efforts, including 
spacecraft development, were reduced to support levels. Around this time, NASA 
decided to expand the mission to include France’s Electron Reflectometer.
A combination of programmematic and technical considerations would serve as drivers 
for the redefinition. Amongst the programmematic considerations were the increased 
national interest in Mars exploration and the desire to obtain sufficient science return 
on the investment in the mission, given the additional two-year wait before realising 
any return. The technical considerations centred on a policy of reducing the risk of 
system failures through system upgrades and stronger requirements for system 
integration and testing.
As mentioned in Polk (1990, p.57), the MO Project Review Board “expressed the 
opinion that the level of risk associated with instrument performance may have been 
appropriate when Mars Observer was the first in a series of frequent low-cost missions, 
but was no longer appropriate for a mission running seven years from initial funding 
through launch, especially given the impact of failure, and the increased U.S. and 
international attention being accorded Mars”.
Thus, with the project’s review, it was decided that the capabilities and reliability of 
Mars Observer should be upgraded. There were proposals for many instrument 
changes, along with their spacecraft system ramifications. The launch slip was used to 
upgrade the mission, but also to bring the estimates more in line with the project’s 
likely cost (Polk, 1990, p.xvii). The cost estimates for a 1992 launch far exceeded all 
estimates for the 1990 launch. The greatest single increase came from the estimated
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instruments costs. All the instruments costs increased, with the total estimated payload 
cost increasing more than 100 per cent.
Investigators were encouraged to redesign their instruments away from single-point 
failures and toward redundancy. Full instrument sparing was approved on the basis of 
increasing reliability and reducing schedule risk. Most of these changes had system 
effects and actually they accounted for many of the changes made on the spacecraft. In 
most cases, they were made for instrument accommodation. Instruments to be added to 
the spacecraft were the Ka-band beacon and the electron reflectometer. Other sources 
of changes to the spacecraft contract were the expanded spares policy and alterations 
required to accommodate a Mars Rover Sample Return (MRSR) precursor tasks. 
Furthermore, spacecraft redefinition dealt with increased reliability, which primarily 
entailed increased testing at the subassembly and assembly levels. Regarding the 
mission changes, the main change resulting from the launch slip was a greater on- 
station mass capability using the same launch vehicle and upper stage. That was due to 
more favourable conditions for insertion of the MO spacecraft into Mars Orbit, as a 
result of the specific characteristics of the launch window of 1992.
hi December 1987, when the Experiments Implementation Plans and spacecraft 
contract response for the 1992 launch were received by the Project, it was apparent that 
the mission, as configured, would extend well beyond the run-out cost for which the 
Office of Management and Budget and Congress had expressed support. A consensus 
emerged among NASA, JPL and the Project Science Group that real alterations in 
project development would be necessary to reduce the run-out cost. During the next 
six-months, information was requested by NASA on the benefits and costs of 
eliminating and/or downgrading various project components (instruments, spares, 
reserves, and reliability requirements).
The outcome of the descoping process was to be an acceptable redefinition of Mars 
Observer. The Handshake Agreement on July 19, 1988, represented MO Project’s 
acceptance of the NASA-ordered descope. Details of the mission descope can be found 
in Polk (1990, p.80). Amongst other changes, it included the provision of a $45million
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run-out contingency, and the Mars Balloon Relay, with funding from outside the MO 
project.
After all the changes made, Mars Observer’s final payload consisted of seven 
instruments and a Mars Balloon Relay radio system. They were: (1) Gamma Ray 
Spectrometer, built by Martin Marietta Astronautics Group; (2) Magnetometer and 
Electron Reflectometer, built by Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), University of 
California, Berkley and Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES); (3) Mars 
Observer Camera, built by the California Institute of Technology; (4) Mars Observer 
Laser Altimeter, built by GFSC; (5) Pressure Modulator Infrared Radiometer, built by 
JPL; (6) Radio Science, built by the Applied Physics Laboratory; (7) Thermal 
Emission Spectrometer, built by Santa Barbara Research Centre, and (8) Mars Balloon 
Relay, built by CNES.
From this point, July 1988, onwards, the project was in its final version and 
implementation proceeded as expected, without any significant problems. However, 
there was a key management decision, taken 7 months before launch, which should be 
mentioned here. In February 1992, NASA decided to postpone pressurising Mars 
Observer’s fuel tanks until the spacecraft had completed its 11 month cruise to Mars, 
instead of doing it five days after launch, as planned when the craft was designed and 
built (The Washington Post, January 11, 1984). Programme managers at JPL said they 
made the change because someone belatedly remembered that early pressurisation had 
caused leakage problems in the Viking craft in the late 1970s. Dr. Timothy Coffey, 
Director of Research at the Naval Research Laboratory, Washington DC, and head of 
the Review Board created to investigate the loss of communication with MO, said that a 
possible reason JPL managers did not make the change earlier and dealt with it more 
thoroughly was that the programme's rigid fixed-price contract kept JPL managers at 
"arm's length" from the contractor. Investigators found that this had led to inadequate 
understanding of the spacecraft by JPL managers.
On September 25, 1992, Mars Observer was successfully launched from Cape 
Canaveral Air Force Station, onboard a Titan Ill/Transfer Orbit Stage (TOS), starting 
its 11-month journey to Mars. The final cost of Mars Observer was $511 million and
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the total cost of the mission was around $1 billion, including launch and operation 
costs.
6.2.1.5 From Launch up to Loss of Communications with the Spacecraft (1992- 
93)
Shortly after launch, the spacecraft presented some minor problems. One of them 
related to the high gain antenna, which did not latch at first. Another was related to a 
sun sensor, which was not functioning. All of them, though, were fixed shortly 
afterwards. A complete initial instrument checkout had been achieved on October 10, 
1992 and everything was working as expected.
Along the way, Mars Observer had other technical problems. However, all of them 
were sorted out without jeopardising the success or the capability of the spacecraft to 
achieve its scientific objectives.
On August 21, 1993, just three days before Mars Observer would enter into Mars orbit, 
communications with the spacecraft were lost during an activity in which the tanks in 
the propulsion system were being pressurised, with the objective of slowing down the 
spacecraft's speed, allowing it to be captured into Mars orbit.
Attempts to re-establish contact with the spacecraft went on for about a month after 
loss of communications, but the spacecraft never sent any signal back to Earth. The 
attempts finally stopped around September 1993 and Mars Observer was declared lost. 
Naturally, the mission could not achieve any of its scientific objectives.
6.2.2 Project-Specific Context Influences on MO
As with the UARS case (see subsection 6.1.2), some project-specific context 
circumstances and events that might have played a role in MO’s decision-making 
process and outcomes are presented and discussed below.
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6 2.2.1. MO Mission Chronology -  Macroview of Context and Process
As done in the UARS case, a longitudinal account of MO’s major mission events, 
alongside several environmental occurrences from the project’s internal and external 
context, is presented in Fig.6.2 below for the purpose of assisting with the analysis of 
context influences over MO.
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Fig.6.2
Dates
Before 1980
1980
1980-1983
1983(summer)
1983(July)
1983(Sep)
1983(Oct)
1984(Jan)
▼
1984(Apr)
MARS Observer (MO) Mission Chronology - Macroview of Context and Process
Pre-approval phase (Duration: le s s  than a year)
Scientific Community 
Industry
General Environment
Government 
(Executive & 
Legislative 
Branches)
NASA
Internal to Project 
(JPUSWG)
NASA
External to Proiect
Low support for
planetary exploration __
-*■ Formed the SSEC 
to develop a cost 
effective strategy for 
planetary exploration
SSEC developed a 
strategy from which MO 
concept was derived
NASA formed a Scientific 
• Working Group(SWG) to study 
instrument requirements 
for the mission
New Start 
presentation to the 
Associate Administrator 
of OSSA
Approval by OSSA
Project definition activities
Presentation 
to the OMB
Approval by OMB 
Fixed-line item for 
Observers denied
Increasing public 
support for planetary 
missions .
MO won New Start \  
approval for FY1985 \
After Approval \
Inclusion of a camera 
in MO payload/ 
Payload module 
abandoned
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Fig.6.2
Dates
1984(Apr)
1984(June)
1985(Apr)
1985(June)
1986(Jan)
1986(M ar)
1986(Apr)
MARS Observer (MO) Mission Chronology - Macroview of Context and Process
Project Implementation (Total duration: 8 years 7 months)
First phase - From New Start to Launch Slip (Durations years 2 months)
Scientific Community Government NASA NASA
Industry (Executive & Internal to Project External to Project
General Environment Legislative (JPL/SWG)
Branches)
First formal 
review board 
meeting
Initial plans for 
RFP release
Hughes Co files 
bid protest
AO release to 
scientific community 
(initial plans Julyl 985)
RPF release to 
industry (1 year la ter)''
Selection of spacecraft 
and upper stage 
contractors, but 
delay in contract 
signature due to 
bid protest
Selection of 
instruments
Challenger
accident
| A Selection of instruments process
B [ : Selection of contractors process
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Fig.6.2 MARS O b se rv e r  (MO) M ission C hronology - M acroview  of C on tex t an d  P ro c e ss
Project Implementation (Total duration: 8 years 7 months)
S e c o n d  P h a s e -  From L aunch  Slip  to  Project D elivery a n d  L aunch  (Duration: 5  y ea r s  5 m on th s)
D a tes
1987(Ju ly)
1987(A ug)
1987(N ov-D ec)
1988(Jan )
1988(F eb)
1988(Apr)
1988(Ju ly)
1988(A ug)
1989(Ju ly)
1992(F eb)
1992 (25S ep )
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Industry
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(E xecutive & 
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Internal to  P roject 
(JPU SW G )
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RCA w as purchased 
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Soviets requested 
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New cost estim ates 
returned by instruments 
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Mark up of new 
spacecraft contract 
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Inclusion of MBR 
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for FY1988 directed mission descope
NASA to launch X  
MO on an ELV X
Decision to launch 
MO on an  ELV
Inclusion of MBR
President Bush calls 
for a  manned mission 
to Mars
President Bush announces 
a  long range commitment 
to sp ace  exploration, 
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mission to Mars
Decision to postpone 
pressurization of MO's 
fuel tanks for 11 months 
after launch
MO's launch
[ 1 'f : Strong support of Reagan's administration for the sp ace  program, including sp ace  sciences
NASA
External to  Project
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mission descope
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from MO's funding to the 
S pace Shuttle and S pace 
Station program s
247
Fig.6.2 MARS O b se rv e r (MO) M ission C hronology - M acroview of C on tex t an d  P ro c e s s
Project Implementation (Total duration: 8 years 7 months)
First phase - From New Start to Launch Slip - co n t (Duration:3 years 2 months)
D a te s
1 986(A pr)
1 9 8 6 (J u n e )
1 9 8 6 (A u g )
1 9 8 6 (S e p t)
1 9 8 6 (N o v )
1 9 8 6 (D e c )
1987(M ar)
1987(A pr)
S c ie n t if ic  C o m m u n ity  
Ind u stry
G en era l E n v iro n m en t
G o v e rn m en t  
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N A S A
Internal to  P ro ject  
(JPL/SW G )
/  Beginning of Confirmation/ \
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launch slip
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resolved by 
GAO(denied)-v
0 0
0
.^A nticipated 
contract 
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(fixed-price)
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S p a c e  craft Preliminary 
D esign Review (by RCA)
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N A S A
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(adding to  project 
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C h an g es  in funding 
policies from other 
m issions (e.g. 
CRAF, Galileo), 
affecting MO's 
funding
Confirmation letters 
signed  to 
investigators
Inclusion of a  French 
reflectom eter in MO 
payload
2 y ea rs  launch 
slip m a d e  official
[ C Scientific Com m unity influencing decisions on launch slip 
[ D Confirmation/Accommodation p ro cess
[ E 'f- Funding problems (budgetary cu ts , c o s t growth and extra dem and  on Project's re so u rces) 
[ F Decision p ro cess  on Launch Slip
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-► : m utual influence
-► : unilateral influence
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Fig.6.2 MARS Observer (MO) Mission Chronology - Macroview of Context and Process
Project Implementation (Total duration: 8 years 7 months)
Second Phase- From Launch up to Spacecraft Loss (Duration: 11 months)
Dates Scientific Community 
Industry
General Environment
Government 
(Executive & 
Legislative 
Branches)
NASA
Internal to Project 
(JPL/SWG)
NASA
External to Project
1992(25Sep) MO's launch
1992(Sep)
1992(1 OOct)
1993(21Aug)
1993(Sep)
Com plete initial 
instrum ents checkout, 
no problem s detected
Loss of com munication 
with spacecraft, 3 days 
before reaching MARS J 
orbit.
End of attem pts to 
re-establish contact: 
MO declared officially 
lost
[ J Minor sp acec raft technical problem s detected  and sorted  out
6.2.2.2 Context influences during the formulation and implementation phases 
up to launch slip (1983-1987)
The first important role played by the context in terms of influencing MO project 
involved its own conception. As discussed before in this Chapter, the stringent 
funding conditions and the low support for planetary exploration in the 70’s led to 
the elaboration of a new strategy for this area by NASA, from which the MO project 
was derived. Thus, this strategy was designed as a reaction to an unfavourable 
external environment and represented an attempt to adjust the planetary exploration 
programme to the new restrictions imposed by this environment, with the objective 
of ensuring its continuity and survival. Within this strategy, MO was initially
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conceived as the first of a then planned series of smaller and low cost planetary 
missions.
Comment: Characteristics of the national context in the US in the 70’s forced NASA 
to review its strategy regarding the planetary exploration programme, which led to a 
mission proposal with very different characteristics from the usual planetary 
missions the agency used to develop. The main changes affected the characteristics 
or contents of the mission. In particular, it affected the size and cost of the mission, 
both smaller than usual.
The next important contextual influence on MO project was the denial of the fixed- 
line item by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Along with it, the 
PIDDP (a fund for the development of off-the-shelf instruments for the Planetary 
missions) sub.-line item was also denied (see Polk, 1990, p.90). MO was presented 
as a new start to the OMB in September 1983 and was approved shortly after that. 
However, OMB approved MO as a single mission and not as part of a series of 
Observers, as expected. This can be seen as the first serious blow to the SSEC 
strategy, as the fixed-line item was a critical element for its success.
Later on, another relevant external influence over MO project came from the national 
context. This aspect was brought up by one of the interviewees, who mentioned that 
around the first semester of 1984, they had been observing a change in public support 
for planetary missions. According to him, that change motivated the members of the 
MO Science Working Group to augment the scientific payload of the mission by 
including a camera as part of its payload. In order to do that, however, they needed to 
find a way of accommodating the extra mass of the camera. The way they found to 
obtain this extra mass was by removing another very relevant aspect of the original 
MO project, which was the payload module. This module, as mentioned previously, 
was supposed to insulate the spacecraft from its payload and prevent cost-growth due 
to mission expansion as well as technical interface problems between spacecraft and 
payload. However, even though the link between the change in public support for 
planetary missions and the camera inclusion in MO payload was explicitly indicated 
by the interviewee, it is not clear or confirmed that this was the only cause of the
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decision which was made by the Science Working Group nor that they would not 
have made this decision had the environment been different. It seems reasonable, 
though, in face of the evidence mentioned above, to maintain that the change in the 
public support for the planetary missions was a factor in the decision to increase the 
mission payload and subsequently to remove the payload module. From the analysis 
of the available evidence, this decision was made sometime between September 1983 
and March 1984.
Comment: It should be noted that even though there might have been external factors 
influencing it, the decision to increase the mission payload and to delete the payload 
module was internal to the Project, in fact internal to the Science Working Group. 
Therefore, this particular deviation from the original strategy may have been 
influenced by the external context but was not determined by it.
Another external influence on the project occurred around March 1986, when the 
contractors for the mission spacecraft and upper stage were selected. One of the 
bidders contested the bidding process and prevented NASA from signing the 
contracts with the selected companies until protest was resolved. However, the 
Agency managed to start negotiations with the selected companies while waiting for 
the decision on the protest by the General Accounting Office. The decision was made 
only four months later, in June 1986, favoring NASA. This way, even though a bid 
protest can be seen as a potentially significant external interference on the course of 
a project's development, it does not seem to have seriously affected MO’s 
implementation. Probably it only contributed for a small delay regarding contract 
awards.
In Januaiy 1986, an event happened at the organisational context which directly 
interfered with MO’s implementation. That was the Challenger accident. The 
accident forced a review of the launching plans for MO as well as for other NASA’s 
missions. After several deliberations, in April 1987, it was officially announced that 
MO’s launch had been postponed for two years. It seems, though, at that point, that 
NASA kept the intention of launching MO on the Shuttle. Later on, as suggested in a 
letter from NASA’s Administrator to a member of the House of Representatives in
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February 11, 1998, another external factor, this time emanating from the Congress, 
kind of forced the Agency to choose an Expendable Vehicle Launcher for MO. As 
stated in the letter, the Authorization Act for FY1988 directed NASA’s administrator 
to take action to provide the launch of MO as well as several other spacecraft on 
expendable launch vehicles (ELYs). Even though, as indicated in this letter, NASA 
was at that point still planning to maintain a dual compatibility (Shuttle and ELY) 
option for launching MO, this probably explains why the Shuttle was replaced by a 
Titan III shortly afterwards.
The change of launcher and the launch slip had several implications on MO project, 
such as cost increase, need for technical adjustments to the spacecraft and for 
redesigning the mission. However, it is fair to say that even though the launch slip 
was triggered by the Challenger accident, NASA could have still maintained the 
1990 launch, either on the Shuttle or on a Titan HI rocket. There were pros and cons 
to such a decision and the circumstances under which NASA made its final decision 
on the slip are also discussed in subsection 6.2.1.3. Thus, it could be said that the 
Challenger accident was a major factor in the launch slip but the final decision on 
this matter rested with the Project and the organisation (NASA).
Regarding the change of launcher, as it seems, NASA was at least strongly induced 
to make a decision based on Congress directions. In that case, this was not a factor 
under the control of the organisation and the decision could have been a direct result 
of external interference.
The same letter mentioned above brought up another problem, emanating from the 
national context, which followed MO project basically all along its implementation. 
That refers to funding restrictions which were imposed on the Project through 
budgetary cuts. In the letter, for instance, it is mentioned that even though the 
Congress was directing the Agency (NASA) to choose another launcher for MO, 
which was going to increase project costs, no provisions were being made in the 
budget at the time to cover these extra costs.
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Further indication of the funding problems observed during MO's implementation 
can be found in some of the news clips selected as part of the documentary evidence 
for this case. The Washington Post news on some findings from the investigation 
panel created to analyze MO’s failure is one example (The Washington Post, January 
6, 1994,p.A3). There it is mentioned that amongst the problems found to be directly 
or indirectly related to the cause of the failure, the investigators (from the panel) 
criticised “inflexibility” in the programme’s management over the years “as it was 
buffeted by external forces, such as congressional funding cuts”.
hi the same way, in the April, 1994 edition of Popular Science (p.58 to 63; p.94), it 
is remarked that along the way (during MO implementation) some members of 
Congress became increasingly reluctant to spend money on space projects, so that 
JPL had to fight each year for an adequate budget for Mars Observer and seldom got 
one.
Comment: This is an illustration of how the Congress “mood” can change and exert 
a critical influence on project's development.
Funding problems in the MO project were present, for example, in FY87 and FY88. 
As noted by Polk (1990, p.34), based on the selected spacecraft and instruments in
1986, the new funding profile for MO would require greater near-term funding in 
FY87 and FY88. The New Obligational Authority (NOA)11 guidelines for these 
years did not provide for these extra needs. In FY87 alone, for instance, there was a 
shortage of $13 million to cover Project's cost requirements. This led the Project to 
accept a “no-reserves” stance for that year. In NASA Current News of February 3,
1987, it was said that there had been a cut of 14,3% in NASA’s proposed 1988 
budget for planetary exploration in general.
Comment: It should be noted here that, in this particular case, the Project and the 
Agency (NASA) were at least partly to blame, as they deliberately allowed the 
mission costs to increase beyond the planned levels.
11 New Obligational Authority (NOA): the necessary authority that precedes budget spending by a 
government agency or department, granted by Congress through appropriations.
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At about the same time, the Project’s funding problems were aggravated by some 
other exogenous aspects, of a different nature than the ones mentioned above. Polk 
(1990, p.34) identified several unanticipated expenses that drew on Project’s 
resources. They came about mainly as a result of changes in the funding policy of 
other NASA's programmes (Comet Rendezvous/Asteroid Flyby (CRAF) mission and 
Galileo). These programmes were expected to share or to fund some parts of MO’s 
instruments. As funds for the development of these parts were not authorised as 
expected, the MO Project had to absorb them. Yet another exogenous factor 
identified by Polk (1990, p.34), coming from the organisational context, involved the 
selection by NASA, in August 1986, of the integration and testing of a Ka-band 
beacon-engineering demonstration in the MO mission. The ka-band beacon- 
engineering demonstration was to be funded by MO without adding to MO funding.
Comments:
1) It looks as if these extra demands on project resources resulted in part from a 
Congressional decision not to approve funds for another mission, like in the case 
of the CRAF mission, and in part from a decision made within another project 
that ended up affecting MO’s costs (the case of Galileo mission). Regarding the 
Ka-band beacon instrument, the correspondent increase in MO’s costs was 
NASA’s responsibility. In all three cases, though, the decisions were not under 
the control of the Project.
2) It should be noted that the contextual influences mentioned above happened 
during the implementation/development of the project and did not affect project’s 
definition/formulation.
3) Finally, it is important to remember that there was a general problem regarding 
cost growth and extra demand on Project's resources after instruments selection, 
around April 1986. As a result, the Project started having problems on how to 
manage the limited funds to carry on the project as planned.
As with some of the exogenous factors identified above, another example of 
problems with other NASA's programmes affecting the resources available to MO is
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provided in the October 9, 1989 issue of the Aviation Week & Space Technology 
magazine (p.79). It is mentioned there that MO had lost $50 million in funding which 
had been shifted to pay for the Shuttle recovery and to keep the space station 
planning on track.
Another example of budgetary cuts threatening the project’s implementation can be 
found in Aviation Week & Space Technology (August 26, 1991). There it is 
mentioned that funding for Titan 3’s launch pad preparations had been cut in the 
congressional budget process by the House of Appropriations Defense 
Subcommittee, due to reasons unrelated to MO project. It is also mentioned that 
NASA was then struggling to reinstate the launch pad funding as soon as possible, or 
MO s launch would have to be delayed for further 2 years.
Comments:
1) Probably the resources reallocation occurred sometime between 1986, when the 
accident happened, and 1989, when the Shuttle started flying again, directly 
affecting MO’s project implementation.
2) It looks as if the decision on the resource reallocation which drew on MO s 
project resources was made by NASA and at least in part (regarding the Shuttle) 
was driven by an uncontrollable external event (the Challenger accident). In any 
event, though, the decision was not under the control of the Project.
3) This situation provides a good example of decisions taken at the organisational 
context which go against the interests of the Project. In this particular case, other 
organisational priorities prevailed over the interests of the Project.
4) The discussions in the previous paragraphs draw attention to two aspects of 
context which have the potential to affect project’s development and outcomes:
• What happens to the funding policies of other concurrent projects or activities 
being developed within or outside the organisation but which draw on the same 
available resources at the organisational or at the governmental level, can 
impact the Project. Usually, these funding policies change as the organisational 
or governmental priorities change over time.
• Likewise, what happens to any activity or organisation upon which the success
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of the project in question is dependent can have a direct impact on the project's 
development and outcomes (e.g. the launcher, the contractors and 
subcontractors etc).
From the evidence presented above, it seems clear that MO project faced funding 
problems in several instances along its development. Taking that as a fact, it is 
important to look at the implications that these funding problems might have had on 
the project outcomes. Thinking in terms of potential implications, the most apparent 
ones would be delays in the implementation. More serious than the delays, however, 
is the possibility that some time and cost-saving decisions may have been made 
which were not in the best interest of the Project. Eventually, these decisions can 
affect the chances of the project’s overall success (it can affect performance, 
technical and science aspects of mission success).
Some selected passages from the documents and news clips reviewed for this case 
indicate that this was very much the case with the MO project, as seen below:
1) Popular Science (April 1994, p.58-63; p.94) -  Here, it is mentioned that the 
funding for MO had ranged from a low $3.3 million in 1986 to $48 million in 
1989 and that this had kept JPL from making changes it thought necessary. It is 
added that Mr. Glenn Cunningham, MO's project manager, called these the “lean 
years” and admitted that they forced many painful decisions. One of these 
decisions, it is said, was to save $375,000 by not testing the radio transmitter 
tubes for shock. Instead, they decided to protect the transmitter by turning it off 
at the time of pressurization.
Comment: In fact, this decision most likely does not have any connection with 
the project’s failure, apart from the fact that if it was not for this decision, the 
transmitter would have been left on and could have kept transmitting data during 
the pressurization procedures (which are believed to have triggered the loss of 
contact). It is alleged that if the transmitters were on, this could have helped 
investigators to find out the cause of the failure. However, even though that does 
not seem to have been the case this time, a decision like this did have the
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potential to jeopardize mission success, as the transmitters could fail due to shock 
during pressurization procedures and cause the loss of contact with the 
spacecraft. This situation illustrates a case where the external context impacted 
the funding for the project, which in turn led project managers to react by making 
risky cost saving decisions with potential to jeopardize project’s outcomes.
2) In the same article as above, John Pike, from the Federation of American 
Scientists, suggested that some project decisions were based on budget rather 
than technology. He mentions, for instance, that systems that should have been 
requalified for interplanetary flight were not. Finally, the author of the article 
suggests that some of these decisions may have contributed to the loss of contact 
with MO.
3) In yet another passage of the same article, the author associates the “on-and-off ’ 
budget decisions, along with political influences and policy shifts, with the loss 
of Mars Observer (p.62). The author added that the project’s “checkered history” 
left too many opportunities for mistakes.
4) The Washington Post (January 18, 1994, p.AlO) -  In this article about Mars 
Observer, the Project’s decision to pressurize the tanks only after 11 months after 
launch, as opposed to 5 days in the original plans, is discussed in connection with 
the project’s failure. This decision was made in February 1992, only 7 months 
before the launch of MO (see Popular Science, 1994). As the check valves, which 
are essential part in the pressurization procedures, had been designed to operate 
only for 5 days and not 11 months, a logical safety measure that could have been 
adopted then was to include additional valves in the mission. However, as 
mentioned by Mr. Glenn Cunningham, MO project manager at JPL, this 
alternative was considered by the team “a relatively simple fix”, but the change 
was proposed too close to the launch date. He then added: “It was a time and cost 
hit that we couldn’t handle”.
Comment: Here again, it is suggested that another important decision, most likely 
in direct connection with mission’s failure (see Mars Observer mission failure
257
investigation, NASA, Dec. 31, 1993), was influenced at least in part by funding 
constraints.
5) The Mars Observer (JPL, Summer 1991, p.2) -  Here Mr. Glenn Cunningham 
alludes to the technical difficulties the project had been going through, and 
mentions the time constraints the project was facing at the time, along with the 
need for extra resources. Then, he associates the need to fit into tight schedules 
and save money to a possible performance degradation in the project. He said: 
“Therefore, our approach has to be to tighten up on our schedules, to be prepared 
to accept some performance degradation (if it saves time and cost)...”
Comments:
1) Mr. Cunningham’s comments above suggest that there might have been other 
time and cost-saving decisions leading to some project performance 
degradation. Whether or not these decisions, whatever they were, played a 
role in the mission failure cannot be confirmed. However, it is reasonable to 
assume that any decision involving performance degradation has the potential 
to affect outcomes.
2) The pieces of evidence presented above show some implications that the 
budgetary constraints had on MO’s project development and indicate some 
potential links between the funding problems and the project’s outcomes.
As final considerations on the influence of funding constraints on MO project, it 
should be recalled, as discussed previously, that the funding problems the Project 
encountered along its implementation were in part self-inflicted. However, there 
were budgetary restrictions imposed on the Project which were due exclusively to 
external factors: Congressional decisions, not under the control of the Project or the 
Agency (NASA), or organisational decisions, with which the Project had to comply. 
The funding problems, internally or externally generated, seemed to have induced or 
even forced “unwise” decisions, some of which may have played a role in MO’s 
failure.
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Another identified example of external context interference on the Project was the 
scientific community and the Congress’ attempts to change NASA’s decision on the 
launch slip, so that the 1990 launch date would be maintained. These attempts took 
place mainly between March 1986 and April 1987. The scientific community tried to 
influence the Congress so that it would write to NASA in an attempt to persuade the 
Agency to stick to the 1990 launch. See, for example, NASA Current News 
(February 3, 1987) and Nature (March 5, 1987), where the scientific community 
complains about the launch slip and says that the Planetary Society was lobbying 
intensively to restore earlier date. In the latter, it is added that the campaign to 
restore the 1990 launch was leaded by the Planetary Society spokesman, Dr. Carl 
Sagan, and that they were lobbying to get support on Capitol Hill for a 1990 launch. 
It is also mentioned in this article that the Planetary Society had sponsored a letter- 
writing campaign in support of MO’s 1990 launch, which resulted in over 20,000 
letters to congressmen and NASA’s officials. Further evidence of this lobbying 
campaign by the scientific community is found in The Washington Post (March 14, 
1987) and The New York Times (March 15, 1987).
However, in this case, despite the manifestations against the launch slip by the 
scientific community, the U.S. Congress, the Project, and even the industry, which 
dragged along for more than a year, NASA did not yield to external pressure and 
finally opted for the launch slip in April 1987. The final decision rested with NASA, 
which exerted its authority over the Project and confirmed the launch slip. However, 
the external pressure did require the Agency (NASA) to do a lot of explaining and to 
thoroughly justify its final decision (see also Congressional Record, May 21, 1987; 
Letters of May 22, 1987, from NASA’s administrator to a member of the House of 
Representatives, and of May 29, 1987, from NASA’s assistant administrator for 
congressional relations to a member of the Senate).
Comment: The situation described above illustrates a clear case of lobbying by the 
scientific community, showing a strong, well organized, and, in this particular case, 
very cohesive scientific community.
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Another external factor that may have had an influence on the implementation of 
MO, as it was suggested after its failure, relates to changes involving the spacecraft 
contractor. The Mars Observer spacecraft was initially assigned to RCA (the 
selection was made in March 1986). However, in 1987 (during MO’s confirmation 
process and at the beginning of project implementation), RCA was purchased by 
General Electric. The previous Astro Electronics Division of RCA, to which MO’s 
spacecraft development had been assigned, became then the GE Astro Space 
Division (see NASA -  Fact Sheet, April 11, 1989). As mentioned in the Mars 
Observer Mission Failure Investigation Board Report (December 1993, V .l, p.E-18), 
Mars Observer was built, tested and launched during GE’s ownership of this 
division.
The possibility that this acquisition and the subsequent organisational changes that 
must have followed it might have had an impact on the development of MO 
spacecraft was raised after its failure. However, the link between these two aspects 
could not be confirmed. It is mentioned here, though, as an example of another 
aspect of a project’s external context which can change over time and, in doing so, 
has the potential to affect a given project’s development and outcomes.
6.2.2.S. Context Influences after Launch Slip and During the Redefinition 
Process (1987 -1988)
There were at least two relevant aspects from MO’s external context which seem to 
have been influential during the project’s redefinition (between July 1987 and 
July/August 1988). Polk (1990, p.57) refers to these aspects as programmematic 
considerations that served as drivers for the project redefinition. One of these aspects 
was the increased national interest in Mars exploration. An article from the 
Christian Science Monitor, of April 12, 1988, mentions, for instance, the strong 
support President Reagan was giving to the American space programme and lists the 
key elements supported by the President to restore US leadership in space. Amongst 
them was a strong support for space science. An even more specific Presidential 
support for manned exploration of Mars was seen during President Bush’s 
Administration and is mentioned in the next subsection below (see 6.2.2.4). The
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increased public support for Mars exploration was also mentioned by one of the 
interviewees as having influenced project’s decisions made as early as 1983. 
Seemingly, this change in the political environment was being observed for quite a 
few years.
The Governmental interest in future manned exploration of Mars affected MO’s 
status and gave it a new role that was not present when the mission was originally 
planned. MO had to be reassessed as a precursor mission for future manned 
exploration of Mars. As such, it should carry out some special tasks. This was 
reflected in some of the project’s changes that were proposed during the redefinition 
phase (see Polk, 1990, p.59, 64).
The second aspect that influenced the redefinition process was an increasing interest 
in international cooperation for the exploration of Mars. This aspect also gave 
another dimension to the MO mission. The most significant event confirming this 
interest was the signature, in April 1987, of the bilateral space agreement between 
the US and the USSR, which included planetary exploration efforts. In December 
1987, the Soviets specifically requested the US to study the addition of a balloon 
relay antenna and receiver to MO. The request was accepted at the time and the Mars 
Balloon Relay became part of the mission that was actually launched in September 
1992.
Actually, the increased emphasis in international cooperation for planetary 
exploration also may have influenced project decisions made prior to launch slip and 
project redefinition. The inclusion of a French electron reflectometer in MO’s 
payload during the pre-slip confirmation process is probably an example of this 
influence (see Polk, 1990, p.60).
Comments:
1) Together, the two aspects mentioned above, the increasing political support for the 
exploration of Mars and the growing interest in international cooperation for 
planetary exploration, are illustrations of changes taking place at the national,
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Governmental level which affected the project. The evidence indicates that they were 
contributor factors in the expansion of mission scope and in the subsequent mission 
cost’s increase that was observed during the redefinition of Mars Observer and, in 
some cases, even before that. This was the case, for instance, of the inclusion of a 
camera in the MO payload back in 1983 and the inclusion of a French instrument in 
the payload during the confirmation phase, between April 1986 and March 1987.
2) It should be noted here that, even though NASA and the Project may have 
suffered strong external influence towards increasing mission scope in some cases 
(such as with the Russian Mars Balloon Relay), it still retained the authority to make 
the final decision. Therefore, the decisions on mission scope increase were mostly 
under the control of the Agency and the Project, who could have avoided them if 
they had chosen to do so. In this particular case, the external context may have been 
strongly influential but not determinant in inflicting changes on the project.
6.2.2.4. Context Influences during Implementation, after the Redefinition 
Process and Mission Descope in August 1988 (1988-1992)
An article in the Washington Times, on August 25, 1989, mentions that NASA was 
preparing a special report for President Bush, who had expressed wish that the US 
sent manned missions to Mars. Another article in the Aviation Week & Space 
Technology journal, on October 9, 1989 (p.79), also mentions the President Bush’s 
call in 1988 for a manned mission to Mars. It is said that this had given new 
prominence to the 1992 launch of MO. It is added that planetary scientists could not 
foresee Bush’s proposal when they recommended in 1983 that NASA committed to a 
remote sensing mission of Mars. Finally, it is said that the appeal of MO’s mission 
was heightened by Bush’s goal.
Comment: This is an example of an external change in the political environment 
which favored the project and which was not under the control of the Project or the 
Agency neither could have been foreseen when MO was initially planned. However, 
in this particular case, the project was already far advanced in its implementation 
phase and totally defined. Thus, the actual influence of this external factor on
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project’s fate is not apparent. Despite that, this illustrates a typical case of 
environmental favorability.
After the project’s descope in August 1988, there is indication that it continued to 
have funding problems all the way up to launch in September 1992. In the June 3-9, 
1991 edition of the Space News Journal (p.4) it is mentioned, for example, that 
NASA was seeking additional $25 million to keep Mars Observer on schedule. It is 
explained that MO needed at least $25 million extra during 1992 to overcome 
technical hurdles and meet the September 1992 launch date. It is added that this 
represented a 35% increase over the 1992 request which was then being considered 
by Congress. The article also mentions that Mr. William Piotrowski, MO programme 
manager for NASA, said that the project was two months behind schedule due to 
parts problems.
Comment: As mentioned before, the Congress decisions regarding the budget for 
NASA’s projects are a very relevant source of external influence on space projects. 
The organisation or the Project may be able to influence them but cannot control 
such decisions. And this was not different in MO’s case. However, it should be noted 
here again, as it was earlier in this document, that part of the funding problems MO 
faced was generated by the Project and by the organisation themselves, as they 
deliberately allowed the mission scope, complexity, and subsequently mission costs 
to increase. As the mission complexity grew it was to be expected that more 
unanticipated technical difficulties would also be found, followed by further pressure 
on project resources.
Finally, even though in a more generic way, not specifically directed to MO’s 
project, an article from The Christian Science Monitor, on April 12 1988, draws 
attention to two strong sources of external influences on NASA’s decisions and 
projects. They are: the Congress and other governmental agencies. The author 
comments: “...the involvement of other governmental agencies (like the Department 
of Commerce, parenthesis added) in NASA’s affairs has become so invasive that 
NASA officials sometimes seem less than masters of their own house”. And it is 
added: “Congress, for its part, has meddled in Agency affairs to a degree that goes
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beyond responsible oversight”. That situation, as observed by the author, was 
particularly aggravated after the Challenger accident, in 1986, when the US Congress 
issued legislative directives of a detail described by a former NASA manager as 
“stifling micromanagement”. In a more specific way, the author draws attention to 
the conflict of interests between NASA and Congress during the decision process 
leading up to the launch slip of MO, and notes that NASA still had not fully repaired 
its congressional relations in this area. Finally, the author mentions yet another factor 
that should influence decisions on space projects in the US: the existence of a 
national space policy. According to him, “the President should see it was enforced 
without internal squabbling”.
6.2.3. MO Outcomes/Success Assessment
6.2.3.I. Initial Considerations
Even though MO was a failure we can still look at some aspects of mission success, 
since the project was successfully delivered and launched. Using the same approach 
employed for the analysis of UARS success, it is possible to look at the project’s 
performance success at the time of delivery and from its launch, in September 1992, 
until the loss of contact in August 1993.
Before discussing MO’s outcomes, it is interesting to look at what were the mission’s 
objectives just prior to launch, in September 1992, as presented in the Pre-launch 
Mission Report (OSSA, September 1992).
Mission Objectives:
1. Place a satellite carrying multiple scientific instruments into orbit around Mars
2. Carry out a scientific survey for one Martian year of the geoscience and 
climatology of Mars
3. Reduce and analyze these data
4. Make the results available to the public and scientific community
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Minimum Mission Success Criteria:
1. Launch a spacecraft to Mars during the 1992 opportunity
2. Insert the spacecraft into Mars orbit
3. Carry out a global survey of Mars during one Martian year to collect at least 70% 
of the science available for acquisition from the scientific instruments.
As explained in the same document, one of the purposes of the prelaunch report is to 
establish critical discriminators selected in advance to measure mission 
accomplishment.
6.2.3.2 .MO's Success Assessment
6.2.3.2.I. Managerial Success (At Project Delivery)
Costs
A general look at MO’s final costs shows that it was delivered in 1992 with a 
significant cost increase as compared to the original plans, in 1984. From the original 
estimates of around $260 million for mission development, the costs practically 
doubled and went up to $511 million. In terms of the overall mission costs, including 
estimates for mission operations and launch costs, the original estimates of around 
$380 million went up to approximately $980 million, two and a half times the 
original value.
However, given the launch slip in April 1987 and the project redefinition that was 
carried out after it, MO’s cost performance should be assessed in two different points 
in time, before and after the launch slip.
Before launch slip, in April 1987
The initial cost estimated for Mars Observer was between $250 and $260 million in 
real year prices for the spacecraft development (including spacecraft, experiments 
and the creation of an operations system), $40 million for operations (after launch)
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and $90 million for launch on the Shuttle plus the acquisition of the upper stage. In 
total, back in 1984, the Mars Observer mission was expected to cost from around 
$380 to $390 million (see Flight International, April 14, 1984, p. 1033). This estimate 
can be partially or totally confirmed in the following pieces of evidence, which 
include information provided by James Begs, NASA’s administrator at the time, and 
by JPL: NASA, January 31, 1984; Star News, February 2, 1984; Los Angeles Herald 
Examiner, February 2, 1984; Defense Daily, April 8, 1985 (p.212) and JPL Universe, 
April 18,1986.
In February 18, 1987, a letter from NASA’s Deputy Administrator to a member of 
the House of Representatives indicates that estimates o f mission costs had increased 
significantly. By this time, the confirmation process, which ended up increasing the 
mission scope, was about to be finalised (confirmation letters were sent to 
investigators in March 1987). In a chart enclosed to the letter, information on 
comparative costs for a 1990 launch on a Titan rocket and a 1992 launch on the 
Shuttle is provided. Mission cost increase is apparent. The chart shows an estimated 
cost of spacecraft development for a 1990 launch of $310 million, as opposed to the 
original $260 million. The estimates for operations had grown too from $40 to $50 
million dollars. The total increase, according to this estimate, was then of $60 to $70 
million, or 20%, exclusive of launch costs.
Comment: This shows that even before the launch slip and the redefinition process, 
mission costs had already increased significantly, seemingly as a result of the 
confirmation process and for different reasons and motivations, internal and external 
to the Project, as already indicated earlier.
By July 1987, the Programme Operating Plan 87-2 (POP 87-2) was already reflecting 
the cost increases resulting from the confirmation process (before launch slip) and 
probably some extra costs already resulting from the redefinition process (after 
launch slip), which was at the beginning. It showed mission development costs of 
$414 million, in FY 1989 dollars.
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After launch slip (From April 1987 to September 1992)
The tendency of cost increase observed during the confirmation/ accommodation 
process became even stronger after the launch slip, when the mission was redefined, 
hi March 1988, the POP 88-1 showed a mission development cost in FY89 dollars of 
$472 million. According to Polk (1990, p.68), after new cost estimates were provided 
by RCA company and the instrument teams for the redefined mission, the total 
estimated costs went up to $560 million. However, several measures were taken then 
to bring costs down and eventually the mission was descoped.
By August 1988, after mission redefinition and descope, the mission funding profile 
showed a total of $419 run-out costs, in FY89 dollars (see Polk, 1990, p.80).
During the four years that followed until launch, between August 1988 and 
September 1992, mission costs suffered further increase. Just prior to launch, in the 
pre-launch report prepared by NASA’s Office of Space Science and Applications 
(NASA/OSSA, 1992), the total cost of the mission is presented as follows, in 
millions of real-year dollars: $511,2M for mission development and $148,7M for 
mission operations (estimates), totalling around $660M. These numbers included 
costs for JPL, NASA Centres, contractors and NASA Headquarters (see NASA, 
Mission Operation Report, 1991b).
Around the same time, other non-official sources also referred to MO’s mission 
costs. On September 26, 1992 and on August 24, 1983, in the Washington Post 
newspaper, it was mentioned that the total cost of Mars Observer, including launch 
and operations, had been around $1 billion. In Aviation Week & Space Technology, 
on October 5, 1992, they referred to MO as being a $891 million mission. The 
differences in comparison with the previous paragraph numbers may be associated 
with the launch costs.
Another interesting aspect of MO’s costs relates to the significant cost increase in the 
fixed-price contract with RCA for the development of the spacecraft. As mentioned 
in April 1994, in the Popular Science Journal (p.62), RCA got the job for $63.9
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million. By 1992, the contract had grown to $203.7 million, more than three times 
the initial value.
If the cost estimates after mission descope, in August 1988, are taken into account 
for comparison purposes, it is seen that between this time and September 1992 there 
was a further significant increase in mission development costs, of about $92 million. 
However, as the cost estimates just prior to launch were in real year dollars and the 
cost estimates after descope were in FY89 dollars, this value is just an 
approximation.
Final comments on M O ’s costs: It is important to note that, for several reasons, and 
in every way one looks at it, MO did not meet its cost requirements. Even if we 
exclude cost increases due to the launch slip, the mission still would not have met its 
budget plans. Before the launch slip, the mission was already showing a tendency for 
cost increase. Mainly, the mission scope grew during the confirmation process 
(before launch slip) and later on, during the redefinition phase (after launch slip). The 
mission descope that followed was not sufficient to put the project back in line, as far 
as planned costs were concerned. Even after the descope, in August 1988, project 
costs continued to increase. MO continued, it seems, to face several difficulties, such 
as development problems with some of the instruments.
Schedule
Mars Observer was launched two years later than originally planned. This 
postponement was triggered by an external factor, outside the control of the Project, 
which was the Challenger accident. However, as the analysis of the evidence seems 
to indicate, this delay could have been avoided if NASA had agreed to launch MO in 
1990 on an ELY (expendable launch vehicle). It was the organisation's (NASA) and 
the Project's decision to discard this alternative. Thus, the delay of two years seems 
to be partly ascribed to the Challenger accident and partly to NASA’s own decision 
to slip the launch. The possible reasons behind this decision were explored earlier in 
this document (see subsections 6.2.1.3 and 6.2.2.2), when several potentially 
influential factors were identified (e.g. opportunity for correcting some difficulties
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and problems the mission was already facing, opportunity for redefining the mission 
in face of new more favourable environmental conditions etc).
If at one side the launch delay could have been avoided despite the problems with the 
Shuttle, on the other it is possible that this delay would happen one way or another, 
as the project was running into some serious problems and difficulties before the 
Challenger accident. In this case, one could speculate that the Challenger accident 
came as a good excuse for redefining the project in face of new internal and external 
circumstances. However, this cannot be confirmed.
If the Challenger accident hadn’t happened, maybe MO would have been delivered 
on time for a 1990 launch, maybe not. Given the facts, though, and even considering 
the possibility of keeping the 1990 launch date that the Agency was given, the most 
apparent cause for the project delay is the Challenger accident and the subsequent 
restrictions on the availability of the Shuttle around 1990.
In summary, the Challenger accident seems to have been the main trigger o f the two 
years launch delay. However, as NASA had the option to maintain the 1990 launch 
by using an ELY instead of the Shuttle, the ultimate responsibility for the delay rests 
with the Agency.
Final Comments on MO’s Managerial Success un to Project Delivery
Mars Observer failed to meet its cost requirements before and after launch slip and 
mission redefinition due to a combination of external and internal, controllable and 
uncontrollable factors. Regarding schedule, the project was delivered 2 years later 
than originally planned, mainly due to an unexpected, unpredictable external event 
outside the control of the Project. However, if one takes into account the project 
redefinition after launch slip, the mission then can be said to have met its schedule.
269
6.2.3.2.2. Technical Success
Launch and Deployment
As mentioned before, for any space mission, the performance of the launch vehicle and 
of the launch operations is vital for its success. These are followed by flight operations 
aiming at deploying the spacecraft in its proper orbit and at testing spacecraft 
subsystems and instruments.
In Mars Observer’s case, just before the expected launch time, there were some 
minor technical problems, mainly associated with the rocket, which caused a small 
delay in launch. An external factor, the occurrence of upper-level winds, reduced the 
launch window from 2 hours to just 1 hour and 41 minutes (see Mars Observer Post- 
Launch Mission Operations Report (MOR) - OSSA/NASA - November 1992).
These problems were sorted out and MO was successfully launched on a Titan HI 
rocket on September 25, 1992. Then, it initiated its 11-month cruise to the Red 
Planet.
Comment: The comments above provide an indication of how the performance of 
the launcher as well as chance factors (such as the reduction of the launch window 
due to the occurrence of winds) can interfere with and compromise the success of 
any given space mission.
During MO’s cruise to Mars there were some technical problems, but they were all 
dealt with successfully until the final loss of contact with the spacecraft, on August 
22, 1993. That was only 3 days before MO was due to enter Mars orbit. In the report 
on MO’s failure prepared by an independent review board, it is recalled that the first 
stage of the launch vehicle had suffered a fuel depletion shutdown during launch, but 
that, in general, all had worked well. It is added that the cruise phase had been 
relatively trouble-free, with only a few anomalies noted.
Some of the technical problems reported during the cruise phase involved the 
Transfer Orbit Stage (TOS) or the upper stage booster, the main antenna, a sun
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sensor, a valve leak, amongst others (see comments regarding these technical 
problems on: The Washington Post, September 26, 1992, and Mars Observer Post- 
Launch Mission Operations Report (MOR) - OSSA/NASA , November 1992; Mars 
Observer Mission Status, April 14, May 10, May 18 and August 3, 1993; Washington 
Times, May 4,1993).
A detailed technical account of MO’s problems between launch and the final loss of 
communications is provided in the Mars Observer Mission Failure Investigation Board 
Report (Volume I, December 31, 1993, p.E-27 to E-32). In this report, 7 anomalies in 
Mars Observer’s performance are reported during this period. Six of these anomalies 
are said not to be a spacecraft issue or not to have any effect on spacecraft operations, 
therefore they could have no possible link with later loss of communications with the 
spacecraft. The other anomaly refers to the spacecraft being switched into Contingency 
Mode, due to loss of inertial reference, five times. From all the anomalies listed in this 
document, one related to malfunctioning of one of MO’s instruments, the Mars 
Observer Camera.
It is interesting to note that, on August 3, 1993, just 18 days before the loss of contact 
with the spacecraft, which put an end to the mission, MO and all its instruments were 
reported to be performing well (see MO Mission Status, August 3, 1993). On this 
same date, MO took the first photograph of Mars since the Vikings missions of the 
mid-1970s.
Final Comments on M O’s Launch and Deployment phase:
(1) Even though a series of technical issues were reported between MO’s launch and 
the final loss of communications with the spacecraft, eleven months later, all of them 
were one way or another satisfactorily dealt with by the flight operators. The 
spacecraft made it to the vicinity of Mars and there is no indication that mission 
success was jeopardized by any of the anomalies the mission had faced until the loss 
of communications. In the two failure reports no links were made between any of 
these anomalies and the final mishap. However, in The Washington Post edition of 
September 26, 1992, it was mentioned that some signs of a minor propulsion valve
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leak had been detected. This problem was not mentioned anywhere else in the 
documentary evidence analysed. One could wonder whether or not this could be 
somehow linked to the most likely cause of the loss of communications with MO 
later on and, if this was the case, whether anything could have been done to prevent 
it. However, this piece of evidence could not be confirmed from a more reliable 
source and, as such, it will be disregarded.
(2) Overall, considering launch activities, spacecraft performance, flight operations 
and instruments performance up to the final loss of communications with the 
spacecraft on August 21, 1993, the hereby called “Launch and Deployment” phase 
can be regarded as mostly successful. However, as communication with the 
spacecraft was lost 3 days before it was expected to enter into Mars orbit, the 
spacecraft deployment was not completed.
Operations
As explained in the UARS case, after the launch and deployment phase is concluded, 
a given mission will move into its operational phase, i.e. will start generating and 
transmitting the data it was designed to collect (as for scientific missions). In order to 
be able to do that, a mission needs to achieve a sufficient degree of technical success. 
In the UARS case, the technical performance of four major aspects of mission 
operations was looked at. They were: spacecraft performance, flight operations, 
instruments performance and data availability. In the case of Mars Observer, contact 
with the spacecraft was lost before it entered Mars orbit, therefore MO never entered 
its operational phase. Even though the actual reasons for losing contact with the 
spacecraft may never be known, all the studies done on the failure of Mars Observer 
strongly indicate that there was a major technical failure leading up to the loss of 
contact.
6.2.3.2.3. Science Success
MO was a science failure, as the mission never went into its operational phase. 
Therefore, it never achieved any of its proposed scientific objectives.
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6.2.3.2.4. Policy Success
MO was not designed to address any particular policy objective, as it was 
specifically the case with UARS. However, MO was designed to be the first mission 
of the Observer series, as proposed by the SSEC back in 1983. As explained earlier 
in this Chapter, the Observer series was part of the SSEC survival strategy for 
planetary missions, developed in response to a general lack of public support and to a 
stringent budget for planetary explorations in the previous several years. The Mars 
Observer which was implemented and launched in September 1992 was radically 
different from the one proposed by the SSEC. In fact, the only aspect of the SSEC 
strategy which survived alterations made before and during mission implementation 
was the fixed-price contract. All the other programmematic assumptions that were 
the basis for the success of the Observers concept were abandoned during project 
definition and development.
If the proposed SSEC strategy is considered as the basis for assessing MO’s policy 
success, then the mission failed, as it did not meet the strategy’s requirements nor 
played its role as the first Observer mission.
M O’s Overall Success Assessment: Even though Mars Observer was successfully 
delivered and also succeeded in its launch and journey to Mars, the loss of contact 
with ground controllers 11 months after launch, seemingly due to technical hurdles, 
made it a technical and, subsequently, a science failure. In terms of project 
performance up to delivery, it also failed to meet original and reviewed planned 
costs. As to the schedule, the mission failed to meet the original estimate but it did 
meet plans as defined after mission redefinition.
6.2.4. Final Analysis on the Role of Context in Influencing MO’s DM and 
Outcomes
To assist with the analysis of the role of context in influencing MO’s final outcomes, 
a causal network was developed which draws an overall picture of possible
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contributing factors to the loss of Mars Observer, ultimately responsible for its 
failure. Due to their level of detail and the fact that not all data used for their 
analysis were included in the main text of the thesis, the causal network diagrams, 
along with a summary of the analysis, were placed in Appendix 3. The main aspects 
explored in the causal network diagrams and relevant results are summarized below.
The causal network depicted in Diagram 1 of Appendix 3 exhibits the near, 
intermediate and remote antecedents to the loss of the mission. It included factors 
from the formulation and implementation phases of MO’s DM and from the internal 
and external environments. Diagram II explores the links between departures from 
the original SSEC strategy created for the development of the Mars Observer’ series 
and the final loss of the mission. Diagrams III and IV open up the mission scope 
increase factor, thought to have been very influential on MO’s final outcomes, and 
explores its antecedents and immediate implications.
Findings from this causal network analysis restate the role o f decision-making 
process in connection with outcomes regardless o f environmental/ contextual 
characteristics and circumstances. On the other hand, it also shows the powerful 
influence context can have on SDM regardless o f  decision process characteristics.
It also came out from the analysis that decision process in the formulation phase 
mattered but implementation and all the decisions involved in this phase, as well as 
in the operations phase, were also crucial for mission success.
Overall, as it would be expected, findings present decision formulation, 
implementation and context as all key factors to explain decision outcomes. The 
analysis also identifies decisive and non-decisive influences o f context and draws 
attention to the very important role that managers had in actually determining the 
final impact o f context changes on M O’s SDM. It showed that a good part of the 
context influences were “manageable” by decision-makers.
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6.3. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDIES AND THE ROLE 
OF CONTEXT
6.3.1. UARS-MO Comparative Table
To conclude the analysis of the case studies, a comparison between different aspects 
of UARS and MO’s project development was made in search for extra information 
on the role of context in influencing decision-making and outcomes of space 
projects.
As mentioned earlier, the two projects were purposely chosen so as to share several 
context characteristics, including the business, organisational and temporal contexts, 
in addition to some aspects of decision specifics, such as size and nature of decision. 
Thus, both projects were of the same nature (scientific), developed within the same 
area of NASA, the Office of Space Science and Applications - OSSA, at about the 
same time. Both projects were large and technologically complex and had similar 
costs, of around US$ 500 million dollars. However, UARS was a success and MO 
was a failure. It was expected that by increasing comparability and by contrasting a 
successful and a failure case, further insight could be obtained at the project level on 
relevant SDM aspects in connection with outcomes of space projects..
The major aspects of the comparative analysis between UARS and MO are presented 
in Table 6.1 below.
Table 6.1 -  Comparative Analysis between UARS and MO Projects
U A R S (Successfu l) M O  (F ailu re)
A S P E C T S  O F  
F O R M U L A T IO N  P H A SE
Initial Stimulus Governm ental mandate Funding constraints
Major drive in the Formulation  
Phase
Scientific C ost-effectiveness
AO -  A nnouncem ent o f  
Opportunities to the Science 
Community
Beginning o f  the m ission  
(typical way)
A fter N ew  Start approval 
(unusual approach)
RFP -R eq u est for Proposal to 
Industry
M uch after A O  (typical w ay) A lm ost sim ultaneous w ith  A O  
(atypical)
Phase B (D efinition) Y es (typical w ay) N o. Phase B and C done 
together after approval 
(atypical)
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Choice o f  spacecraft design Spacecraft selected after 
instruments, to fit m ission  
requirements (typical w ay)
Spacecraft chosen before 
instruments. M ission  
requirements had to be 
accom m odated within  
spacecraft capacities (atypical)
R eview  process F ollow ed  a typical formulation  
phase where the process is 
usually more formal and 
thoroughly review ed
Major decisions regarding 
definition/form ulation w ere 
unusually made after new  start 
approval and thus w ere less 
review ed (significant decisions 
and changes w ere made at the 
project level w ithout further 
review s, allow ing for Project 
judgem ent and interests to 
prevail). This m ight have 
prevented important changes 
that could have im proved  
chances o f  project success.
Duration o f  pre-approval phase 
(decision speed)
V ery lengthy - Project had the 
chance to be review ed as 
expected and to be w ell defined, 
but had its p o licy  outcom es 
affected by too long  
formulation phase
Very, unusually short pre­
approval phase. Project not w ell 
defined w hen it m oved  into 
im plem entation phase
R O L E  O F  M A JO R  
C O M M O N  E X T E R N A L  
E N V IR O N M E N T  E V E N T
Major external influence Challenger accident Challenger accident
Impact on  project Project re-planning, cost 
increase and delay o f  tw o years 
M ission  objectives and scope  
maintained  
Launcher maintained
Project re-planning, cost 
increase and delay o f  tw o years 
M ission  objectives and scope  
altered
Change o f  launcher
Role in influencing final 
outcom es
Strong, but decisive for po licy  
outcom es only
Strong, but not decisive for 
final outcom es
PR O JE C T S O U T C O M E S
Project managerial 
performance:
a) Cost
b) Schedule
a) Under budget, after re­
planned estim ates
b) On time, after re-planned  
estimates
a) Far exceeded original and 
re-planned estim ates
b) On tim e, after re-planned  
estim ates. R easons to 
b elieve it w ould  be late i f  it 
had not been re-planned
Technical performance A chieved, w ith only minor 
problems
Failure
Science performance A chieved, w ith som e loss o f  
data
Failure
P olicy performance Partial N ot a success factor for the 
project
Overall success assessm ent Regarded as very successful Failure
D E C ISIO N  P R O C E SS  
C H A R A C T E R IST IC S
a) Formal Y es Y es
b) Structured Y es Y es
c) Phased Y es Y es
d) Sequential Y es Sequence altered (atypical)
e) Speed Very lengthy C om pressed
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SU C C E S S /F A IL U R E
F A C T O R S*
Solid  engineering specifications 
early in the programme (before 
approval)
N o  Phase B , project definition  
w as com pleted after approval
G ood clean interfaces betw een  
the 9 instruments and satellite 
bus
R em oval o f  payload m odule led  
to several interface problem s
The project managers did not let 
the m ission  grow  and held firm  
to requirements that w ere set 
out early as to  size, w eight, 
pow er allocation
M ission  scope w as increased  
and alterations o f  requirements 
were made several tim es
It held firm to the original 
design, including instruments
M any changes w ere made along  
project developm ent
Industry had a good  
understanding o f  the 
requirements they had to meet
Industry had to start project 
w ork before instruments w ere  
fully defined and had to deal 
w ith changes all the w ay along  
project developm ent
Experienced managem ent team Several new  instrument 
developers
* A ll the aspects listed on the right colum n are success factors as presented by people involved  in the 
project planning/developm ent, including the interview ees for U A R S case.
6.3.2. Comparative Analysis of the Role of Context per Project Phases
In the Pre-Approval Phase: Initial Stimulus and Project Formulation
At the outset, the external environment/context provided an initial stimulus to both 
projects, which in turn affected the content of the decision. In MO's case, a reaction 
to severe budgetary constraints for planetary exploration in the external environment 
led to a design of a more cost-effective interplanetary mission, within the strategy 
developed by Solar System Exploration Committee (SSEC). Accordingly, the 
Committee proposed smaller, cheaper and more frequent interplanetary missions as a 
way of coping with this unfavourable environmental condition. UARS, on the other 
hand, was designed in response to a Governmental mandate. The major initial drive 
for the definition of the mission was scientific and not cost-effectiveness like in 
MO's case. The analysis of the evidence indicated that, at first, costs were not 
regarded as a major constraint. As a result, in sharp contrast with MO, UARS was 
originally proposed as a very large, ambitious and expensive mission.
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In summary, the external context provided initial stimulus to both projects, which 
became a strong drive for the definition of some aspects of decision content (e.g. 
size, complexity, objectives (in UARS case)).
External Context ------ ► Initial Stimulus -------► Decision Content
However, it is interesting to note that the environmental conditions that originally 
motivated the definition of MO and UARS changed over time and came again to 
interfere with the content of the decisions, in fact taking them the opposite way.
UARS, for instance, which had a Governmental mandate supporting its creation and 
was proposed without too much concern for costs, later on had its approval denied 
twice by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on the basis of costs. The 
project subsequently underwent two revisions and had to be scaled down to meet cost 
constraints before finally getting approval for a New Start. From that point onwards, 
the project objectives and scope were maintained all the way through to delivery.
MO, on the other hand, following very unfavourable environmental conditions for 
planetary missions, was proposed as a modest and relatively inexpensive planetary 
mission and was promptly approved. However, as the external environment changed 
over time, becoming more favourable to planetary missions and providing new 
sources of influences on the project (see subsection 6.2.2 of MO’s case study), the 
initial proposal went through major modifications all along project development and 
the MO that was finally delivered was a very ambitious, very expensive mission, 
very much like the other planetary missions designed previously by NASA.
External Context
i
External Context ------ ► Initial Stimulus -------► Decision Content
In great part due to the cost reviews it had to go through, UARS ended up having a 
longer than usual pre-approval phase. In general terms, though, UARS followed a 
typical pre-approval phase, at the end of which the mission was very well defined. In 
contrast, MO was approved in an unusually short period of time. But when that
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happened, the mission was not properly defined yet. It did not have a Phase B, the 
definition phase, which usually takes place before formal approval. They had to do 
Phase B and C together during implementation, which was atypical.
External Context
i
External Context ------ ► Initial Stimulus -------► Decision Content
i
Decision Process (speed)
These differences between the two projects formulation phases also draw attention to 
another aspect that should be noted regarding the actual role played by context in 
impacting decision-making.
As the two projects were embedded in the same organisational and field contexts, 
one could expect that they would follow similar decision procedures and present 
similar decision-making characteristics. As a matter of fact, both decision processes 
during the formulation phase were formal, structured, with distinct phases, basically 
as described by NASA’s Office of Space Science (see NASA’s Office of Space 
Science, 1994).
However, as already indicated above, some important differences between the 
formulation phases of these two projects could be observed. As shown in Table 6.1, 
UARS followed a typical formulation phase for an OSSA project (e.g. AO, RFP etc). 
MO, on the other hand, showed several deviations from these usual procedures, 
involving project phases, their duration and sequence, as well as the nature of 
activities within each of these phases.
UARS, typically, started very early the instruments selection process, with the 
issuance of the AO to the scientific community, and concluded it before selecting the 
contractor. This way, the technical requirements which would be necessary for the 
spacecraft development were clear by the time industry got selected. Also in a typical 
way, UARS had a Phase B or Definition Phase before project approval. This meant
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that, when project was formally approved and went into the implementation phase, it 
was already well defined.
Mars Observer, on the other hand, was very much an atypical project. It did not have 
a Phase B and it issued an AO very late into project development, after it had already 
been formally approved. It had the contractor selection process at more or less the 
same time as the instruments selection process. That meant that, by the time industry 
was selected, the instruments requirements were not clearly defined yet. As discussed 
before, usually the Announcement of Opportunities (AO) for the selection of 
instruments is issued much earlier than the Request for Proposals from the industry 
(RFP) so that instruments have already been selected by the time the RFP is issued.
In the UARS project, again in a typical way, a spacecraft was designed to meet the 
mission requirements, whereas in the MO case a spacecraft design was chosen before 
the mission was fully defined and the mission had to be accommodated within the 
spacecraft constraints.
The example of these two cases shows that, despite the fact that the organisational 
and the project/decisioncontexts can provide a good indication of how the projects 
formulation phase or decision process is supposed to unfold, their influence may not 
be decisive and deviations may occur, at the discretion of decision-makers.
The way context may influence decision-making also became evident in other 
instances. For example, in the UARS case the two denials for a New Start by the 
OMB (external environmental influences) were determinant for the changes made to 
the project, as they were a condition for project’s approval. In the MO’s case, on the 
other hand, the several environmental occurrences with an impact on 
decision/project’s content were mostly not determinant of changes to the project but 
rather a stimulus for change. Such was the case, for example, with the increasing 
political support for the exploration of Mars and the growing interest in international 
cooperation for planetary exploration observed between 1987 and 1988, which seem 
to have stimulated the expansion of mission scope during its redefinition phase, after 
launch slip (see subsection 6.2.2.4).
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In summary, the external environment/context provided different kinds of stimulus or 
influences during the formulation phase of both projects, pulling them one way or 
another as environmental circumstances changed and new events came along over 
time, influencing projects content and decision process. However, as it became 
apparent with the analysis of the two cases, the different sources of influences 
emanating from the external context did not always determine changes but very often 
just offered a stimulus for change or a guidance for decisions, leaving final decision 
in the hands of project’s decision-makers.
In the Implementation Phase/Redefinition
A chance event, the Challenger accident, represented the main external environment 
influence to both MO and UARS projects. As a result of this accident, both projects 
had to be re-planned and both had their costs reviewed and the launch date delayed 
for two years. However, whereas UARS maintained its original objectives, the 
launch with the Shuttle and did just some engineering changes where necessary, MO 
went through a major re-planning, which substantially increased the scope of the 
mission. Additionally, the launcher for MO was changed from the Shuttle to a Titan 
IV rocket, which required further technical adjustments to the mission.
In this case, we observed that the external environment, through the Challenger 
accident, determined some changes to both projects, like the launch delay and cost 
increases, but only provided a motivation for other changes such as the significant 
content changes which occurred in the MO’s case as well as the choice of a different 
launcher. Those were mainly project’s internal decisions made by project’s decision­
makers, which may have been induced by external context events but were not 
determined by it.
External Context Implementation
(chance) Decision Content (redefinition)
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The implementation of both projects was also affected by the external context 
indirectly, via its effects on the decision process. As seen before, the external context 
provided the initial stimulus for the projects, which in turn influenced the definition 
of decision content (e.g. costs and complexity). Some aspects of decision content 
(e.g.cost) came to affect the speed of the decision process, which was subsequently 
found to affect the implementation as well as project outcomes, as explained below.
As discussed before, the time spent on decision-making in the pre-approval phase, or 
decision speed, showed a contrast between the two cases. A very short time in the 
MO’s case implied in the project not being properly defined when it moved into the 
implementation phase. This created several difficulties during the project’s 
implementation, as seen in the case analysis. UARS, on the other hand, had a long 
pre-approval period (even longer than usual) and the project had the time to be 
properly defined and reviewed before moving into implementation, which was seen 
as a facilitator for this phase. A very long pre-approval period, however, also had a 
negative impact on UARS policy outcomes, since timeliness was a success factor in 
this case.
External Context ► Initial Stimulus ► Decision Content (size&cost)
The short formulation phase of MO and the implications it had for the 
implementation phase of the project were further aggravated by one other aspect 
provided by the organisational context. Typically for NASA, the pre-approval phase 
is the phase when projects are more thoroughly scrutinized at different levels within 
the organisation and outside of it. At least that was the situation at the time of the two 
projects approval. After approval, at that time, the Project had quite a lot of 
autonomy to make significant changes without having to go for another approval 
process at higher levels, not even within the organisation. This was so as long as they 
did not ask for more money or time. And, in fact, as it was shown in MO’s case
!
Decision Process (speed)
Implementation Outcomes
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analysis, it did happen that substantial changes were made to the project after its 
approval which were not reviewed at higher levels. The reviews ensure that different 
people within the organisation and outside of it, with different perspectives, have the 
chance to check the project out, identifying problems and suggesting corrections, 
before allowing it to move on. As mentioned earlier in this subsection, and contrary 
to what happened with UARS, MO was neither well defined before nor properly 
reviewed before and during implementation.
One could speculate that, had the project gone through formal reviews or a new 
authorization process for every significant change made during the implementation 
phase, maybe some of those changes would not have materialized, sparing the 
project from several problems it presented further on as a result of those changes.
This situation illustrates a case where the organisational context, regarding NASA’s 
reviewing and authorization procedures (part of NASA’s “way of doing business”), 
has influenced the implementation and most likely the outcomes of a project.
Organisational Context ► Implementation ► Outcomes
On Outcomes
Regarding the role of external environment/context in influencing outcomes, both 
MO and UARS were subject to external influences which did interfere with the 
project formulation, development as well as outcomes. As the analysis of the cases 
showed, a major external factor, the Challenger accident, affected the managerial 
success of both projects, as they were delayed by two years and had their costs 
increased after being re-planned to meet the new schedule and requirements.
External Context ------ ► Implementation -------► Decision Outcomes
Regarding other aspects of project success, changes in the external environment (e.g. 
the signature of the Montreal Protocol), along with the Challenger accident and 
subsequent delay of project delivery, did affect the policy outcomes of UARS. They
283
were both external influences ascribed to chance but their influence on outcomes was 
decisive. However, as discussed previously in subsections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 of MO’s 
case analysis, in the case of MO, even though there were several external influences 
which did affect the project, those were not decisive and the final outcome, with the 
loss of communication with the spacecraft 11 months after launch, was mainly 
ascribed to internal problems and internal decisions, within the scope of the Project.
External Context ------ ► Decision Outcomes
The last part of Table 6.1 shows some explanations given by decision-makers at 
NASA and at the industry for the success of the UARS project. In comparison with 
Mars Observer, it looks as if indeed these seem to have been success factors as they 
were present in the UARS project and not present in the MO project, which was a 
failure. This comparison suggests that defining the project well in its early stages and 
sticking to the original design may be relevant success factors. Similarly, establishing 
good clean interfaces between instruments (the scientific payload) and the satellite 
also seems to be a critical success factor.
Overall, the comparative analysis presented above drew attention to the possibility 
that the following aspects be important in connection with mission success:
1. Define a project well before implementing it (or planning well);
2. Implement what was planned;
3. Allow for project to be fully reviewed by different people at the same and at 
higher levels;
4. Do things in a typical, familiar way;
5. Take the necessary but not too long a time for decision-making;
6. Chance.
As it can be noted, these aspects are associated with activities and characteristics 
from the projects’ formulation (where the mainstream decision process usually takes 
place) and implementation phases, plus the unpredictable, uncontrollable role of 
chance as a source of influence to which the projects (and any other decisions) are 
subject.
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CHAPTER 7
THE ROLE OF CONTEXT IN INFLUENCING SDM IN PUBLIC 
SPACE R&D ORGANISATIONS: FINDINGS AND FINAL 
DISCUSSION
In the previous three Chapters we saw in a progressively focusing way the role 
played by context in influencing two strategic decisions made by NASA, regarding 
two major space projects or missions. In this process it became clear that different 
levels of context, namely business, organisational and Project (implementation 
level), introduced several characteristics to the decision-making processes and 
implementation of these decisions, setting the stage for their development.
The analysis from the three different context levels have also allowed for the 
emergence of specific context aspects and variables which are thought to be 
influential on strategic decision-making across the space sector.
These findings and their relevance to SDM across the public space sector are 
organized and presented below.77.
7.1. Context Levels as Sources of Influence on SDM in the Space Sector
Fig.7.1 below tries to generally illustrate this situation, by presenting the main 
sources of complexity and uncertainty, along with some other SDM characteristics, 
as introduced by the different contexts within which the particular case studies 
developed in this research were embedded.
As discussed earlier in this thesis, a confluence of these characteristics all the way 
down to the decision specifics will confer a particular "wholeness" to each strategic 
decision to be made and provide a good indication of features of the decision process, 
implementation as well as of assessment of outcomes for any given strategic decision.
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The Business context in Fig.7.1 presents characteristics which will apply across the 
space sector, while the characteristics presented under the other context boxes will 
vary across countries, space organisation and decisions. As the Business context has 
a general reach, its characteristics and impacts on SDM in the space sector are briefly 
reviewed below.
F ig . 7.1  C o n te x t  L e v e ls  as S o u rces o f  In flu en ces  on S D M  in th e
S p a c e  S ec to r :  E x a m p le  o f  tw o  S p a c e  P ro jec ts  from  N A S A
B nsin  ess C o n te x t  N a tio n a l &  O r g a n iz a tio n a l P r o je c t  C o n te x t  4& Im p lem  en tation
C o n te x t  L ev e l
Space Business
•technoiogical complexity
• technological uncertainty
•  long-term developm ent
US Government/ NASA
« PublicSpace Business
•  po ttita l uncertainty
• economic uncertainty
• shared authorization process 
(intem ai&  external decision­
making)
• complexity and uncertainty of 
budgetary processes
• policy-making complexity (e.g. to o  many 
participants, decision instances etc)
•  regulatory com plexly (e.g. industrial 
contracting, space safety etc)
• managerial complexity (large and 
diversified organization, complex 
authorization & advisory structure, 
highly open  and participative 
managerial practices etc)
OSSA* Projects
(Same decision nature 
defined similar success 
factors (e.g. launchers and 
sateBHe perform ances, 
instrum ents perform ance, 
control and operations 
perform ance, data 
distribution efficiency)
O S S A * : N A S A 's  O f f ic e o f  S p a c e  S c ie n c e s  and A p p lica tio n s
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Space Business
The nature of the business will, per se, imprint some marks on SDM across decisions 
throughout space organisations around the world. In fact, the space technology 
“business” will introduce elements of complexity and uncertainty to SDM in the 
area. Space projects are inherently complex and characteristically involve long 
development times. Combined, these characteristics generate great uncertainty, 
which is reflected in several ways along the formulation and implementation of 
projects in the area.
The high complexity of these projects usually make it very difficult for the people 
involved in planning and developing them to correctly estimate costs and 
performance or even to stick to original designs and plans. In fact, unforeseen 
technical difficulties and/or new unaccounted for technical requirements will make 
changes in design, schedules and plans, along with alterations of costs and 
performance estimates, a common feature of projects and of SDM in the area. 
Besides, the long periods of time required for their development add to the overall 
uncertainty levels. It increases the exposure of the projects to changes in both the 
internal and external environments, which may affect them and interfere with their 
formulation, implementation and, most of all, with the assessment of their outcomes.
hi summary, the nature of the space business affects the duration or length of its 
SDM processes (they tend to be very long), including both the formulation and 
implementation phases of the projects, and introduces technological complexity and 
technological uncertainty throughout the SDM processes, ultimately making 
outcomes more uncertain and difficult to foresee.
Public Space Organisations
Focusing a bit more, the public nature of the space organisations looked upon in this 
research implies that part of the SDM processes carried out by them takes place 
outside the organisation’s boundaries and is carried out by politicians. As pointed out 
before in this thesis, strategic decision processes are therefore a mix of organisational
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decision-making and policy-making, where ultimate decision power lies in the hands 
of politicians, who decide what is and what is not to be approved and provide the 
resources for their implementation. Additionally, usually they also set the general 
direction, provide guidelines and establish the priorities for the organisations’ 
activities. All that happens externally to the organisations and, even though these 
decisions may be influenced by the space organisations, they cannot be controlled by 
them. Thus, SDM processes are only partially controlled by public space 
organisations. These aspects of public space organisations will leave them directly 
exposed to national, political and economic oscillations.
As an important part of SDM processes takes place outside the space organisations, 
in the policy-making arena, decisions will unavoidably be affected by political 
motivations and competing interests which are extraneous to those of the 
organisations themselves and of the space projects they want to develop. 
Consequently, decisions’ contents will often have to be modified to accommodate 
external demands and interests rather than their own. The external control and the 
influence of politics will also clearly interfere with the formulation phase of 
decisions and, in most cases, will be felt in the implementation phase too, as 
resources and political commitment can sometimes be withdrawn or change during 
the development phase of the projects. Also, as a result of the influences suffered 
throughout the SDM phases, the decisions outcomes may also be affected.
In summary, the public nature of the space organisations looked upon in this research 
implies that ultimate decision power is transferred from the organisations and placed 
in the hands of politicians, thus introducing a strong political component to SDM in 
the area. This is external to and outside the control of the organisations and provides 
the essential means by which decisions get approved and resources get appropriated. 
Overall, external control and political component are major characteristics imprinted 
on SDM in public space organisations throughout the world as a result of their public 
nature.
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As indicated before, other aspects of SDM processes will be attached to the 
particular characteristics of different space organisations and to the specifics of the 
strategic decisions investigated.
7.2. Macroview of Context Influences on SDM in the Space Sector over time
As mentioned before, this Subsection presents the main context aspects and variables 
identified as relevant in connection with SDM in the space sector during the analysis 
process.
Fig.7.2 Strategic Decisions in the Space Sector: General Framework of Context Influences over Time
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These identified context aspects and variables are plotted in Fig.7.2 above, as 
distributed through the different external environments within which any particular 
decision is embedded: international business&general environment, national 
business/general environment, organisational environment and the Project level. The 
variables shown in the Figure are by no means exhaustive, but illustrate the ones 
which stood out from this thesis analysis.
The context variables are juxtaposed to the project development phases, side by side 
with the decision-making phases, as a reference to indicate that they will influence 
the project/decision throughout its development phases, from the 
formulation&authorization (decision-making process) phase through to 
implementation and all the way up to delivery and assessment of outcomes.
As illustrated in Subsection 6.3.2. of Chapter 6, the context may influence decision 
processes, implementation and outcomes of strategic decisions directly or indirectly. 
It can influence decision processes indirectly via influences on decision content and 
implementation via influences on decision content and/or decision processes. 
Regarding outcomes, it can influence them indirectly via influences on decision 
content, process and implementation (see Subsection 6.3.2. in Chapter 6).
As it was also observed from the case studies developed in this thesis, there is a 
constant back and forth interaction between the project level and the other levels of 
context, which may involve the main agents and participants at all levels. In this 
interaction, the influence direction can work both ways, from the external 
environment to the project level and from the project level to the environment, or one 
way, from the external environment to the project level . The back and forth 
interaction between the decision level and the external context is indicative of the 
fact that context can influence the decision level but can also be influenced by it. 
This possibility suppports the view that context is not given but enacted via the 
perceptions and actions of the people involved. Taking the US space context and 
NASA as a reference, one example of opportunity for this kind of influence, for 
instance, occurs at the Congressional hearings in the US, when NASA has the
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possibility to defend its interests and subsequently to influence Congress views and 
actions regarding them.
The ways according to which the interactions between the external environment at 
different levels and the Project level occur may vary: the Project may receive a 
direct, “decisive” influence from the external environment (illustrated with the one 
way arrow in Fig.7.1), or it may just receive a stimulus from the environment which 
may or may not trigger change (presented in Fig.7.1. with a one way dotted arrow). 
The decisive influence will leave no room for decision-makers or managers to act, a 
it was the case, for instance, when the 2 consecutive denials of New Start approval 
for UARS by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) automatically delayed 
the project’s implementation for 2 years. On the other hand, the “non-decisive” 
influence will impact the Project (implementation level) through the perceptions and 
actions of decision-makers/managers. This was the case, for instance, with the 
différents ways the same external environment factor, the Challenger accident, 
influenced the MO and UARS projects in the case studies presented in Chapter 6. 
The Challenger accident prompted a reaction but this reaction was ultimately defined 
by the decision-makers at the Project level, via their actions, based on the own 
judgment of the situation.
Observation from the case studies analysis also indicated that, in addition to the 
direct interactions between the external context and the Project level, as it has just 
been discussed, the different levels of context and the different variables within them 
may also interact between themselves and only then interact and influence the 
Project level. This was the case, for instance when, during the MO’s implementation 
and after the Challenger accident, the scientific community lobbyied the American 
Congress to try to maintain the original launch date for the mission, avoiding the 
proposed two years delay by NASA. Or when, during the formulation phase of MO, 
the Hughes Aircraft Company filed a bid protest with the General Accounting Office 
(GAO) complaining about irregularities on the procurement process and asking for a 
review or cancellation of the selection process. These new vertical and horizontal 
interactions between the external environment levels and/or different variables within
291
them are indicated in Fig.7.1 with the small horizontal full line arrows crossing 
through different context levels.
Another very important aspect of context which is portrayed in Fig.7.1 is its dynamic 
nature. As it became clear during the data analysis process, context is not static and 
will change over time. As discussed before, the characteristics of the context 
variables at any given time will set the central stage for decision-making to unfold. 
However, as these variables and their characteristics change over time, the ways 
according to which they influence decision processes, implementation and outcomes 
also will.
It is a constantly changing scenario where context variables may change their 
behaviour and characteristics several times during the development time of a project, 
though at different times or time intervals and with different degrees of intensity.
The dynamic nature of the context variables is indicated in Diagram 4.9 with the “ti” 
sign associated to it, representing the specific characteristics or attributes of each 
context variable at any given point in time during the development of a particular 
strategic decision. The “ti” indication also draws attention to the possibility of 
alterations in the way these variables impact strategic decisions over time.
7.3. Revised Conceptual Models of SDM
The thesis findings led to a revision of the conceptual models of SDM introduced in 
Chapter 2 (Fig.2.1 and Fig.2.3). In Fig.7.3 below, additionally to introducing the
Context
Content
Process Oucomes
Implementation
Fig.7.3 Revised Basic Model for SDM 
(based on Bell etal (1997))
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implementation of decisions to the original Bell’s model (Bell et al, 1997), it also 
indicates context as not given, but subject to influences from the other four elements 
of the typology, namely: content, process, implementation and outcomes.
Regarding Fig.7.4 below, additionally to introducing decision implementation, it also 
acknowledges the direct influences that each element of broad context can have
Managerial
Cognition:
P ercep tion s &
in te p r e ta tio n so f
c o n te x t
M anagerial
Actions:
Rational actions  
Political action s
BROAD CONTEXT
STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING
Im plem entation Decision O utcom es
Business & 
G eneral 
Envirom ent 
C&E
O rganizational
C ontext
C&E
SDM Process
Decision C ontext 
(Decision Specifics)
11,12,13,14: In flu en ce f lo w s  
C&E : C haracteristics and E vents
Fig. 7 .4  Revised M ulti-Theoretic M odel of SDM Process 
(based on Rajagopalan e t  al (1997))
on decision implementation and on decision outcomes, in addition to the more 
commonly studied influences on decision processes. As in Fig. 7.3, this model
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reaffirms the view of context as enacted, not given. Thus, as shown in Fig 7.4, 
context is seen to influence decisions (II and 12) as well as to be influenced by them 
(13 and 14).
hi addition to the direct influences, 12 and 13 illustrate the indirect or “non-decisive” 
set of influences which will impact decisions (12) or context (13) through the 
cognitions and actions of managers, who will act and react based on their perceptions 
and assessments of the situations posed to them. As recalled by Rajagopalan et al 
(1997), after “filtering” the internal and external context, managers can act rationally 
and/or politically towards reaching their goals. Even though this research did not 
look into aspects related to managerial cognition, it acknowledges its role in 
influencing strategic decision-making and in partially mediating the relationship 
between context and SDM. As noted by Rajagopalan et al (1997), managerial 
cognitions could explain why, even under similar contextual conditions, SDM 
processes can significantly vary across organisations. As already mentioned before, 
managerial cognitions were also behind the different ways according to which the 
Challenger accident affected each of the two case studies, even though they were 
embedded in very similar contexts.
The direct and indirect set of influences between context and strategic decision­
making will establish a flow of back and forth interactions throughout the decision­
making process, implementation and observation of outcomes.
In addition to the SDM influences on elements of broad context which can happen 
throughout the decision processes and implementation, 14 also draws attention to the 
learning effect that SDM processes and outcomes can have on broad context, which 
may change in reaction to them, thus also changing the ways according to which they 
may influence future decision processes.
Finally, in the reviewed model, one other additional link was included to indicate the 
direct influence that decision processes can have on outcomes, as observed 
empirically from the analysis of the case studies. The observed overlapping between 
decision process and decision implementation is also illustrated in Figure 7.4.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS
8.1. General comments
This thesis focused on the influences of broad context on SDM processes and 
outcomes of public R&D organisations from the space sector. To address this topic it 
examined the role of context in influencing the strategic decision-making of two 
large space projects developed by the American space agency, NASA: the Upper 
Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS) and the Mars Observer (MO).
This research project came about after a review of the literature indicated an 
increased role ascribed to context in SDM studies and identified a call for more 
integrative and encompassing studies, in the hope that those might help explain some 
of the contradictory findings available in the SDM literature. The emphasis on more 
integrative works to address the complexities of SDM has recently been restated by 
Elbanna (2011), who present them as the way towards the development of a “more 
fruitful theory of the SDM”.
hi an attempt to respond to this call, this thesis offers a new empirical study on the 
influences of context on SDM and outcomes and joins a small group of works which 
approached this topic in a more integrative and encompassing way, by adopting a broad 
view of context and employing a qualitative design within a multi-theoretic perspective.
Through a progressively focusing approach, vertical layers of context and their 
influences on the horizontal levels of project development were examined, involving 
the SDM process, implementation and outcomes of two NASA’s large space 
projects.
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Findings, as expected, revealed a much more complex strategic decision-making 
reality than usually depicted in the majority of studies in the area, supporting the 
view that more flexible and encompassing research methods need to be adopted, 
which are capable of acknowledging and dealing with this overall complexity.
8.2. Summary of Findings
8.2.1. On SDM in the space sector
As mentioned above, findings from this thesis pointed out to a much more complex 
strategic decision-making reality than usually depicted or approached in studies in 
the area. Several observations from the data analysis contributed to this view. They 
also led to a revision of the conceptual models of SDM (Fig. 7.3 and 7.4) which had 
initially been introduced in Chapter 2 (Fig. 2.1 and 2.3).
Amongst the observations was the fact that the two strategic decisions studied in the 
thesis were associated with and took their final shape through a chain of 
interdependent decisions and sub-decisions where beginnings and ends were not very 
well delimited and where one impacted the other. This way, there was not one 
decision process but several associated decision processes.
In this continuous flow of associated decisions and decision processes, it was not 
possible to single out a specific situation or moment in time when the decision 
actually took place. Instead, it was possible to identify decisive moments or “decisive 
acts”, as referred to by Hendry (2000), which could be used as reference points for 
the analysis process.
Thus, for instance, in NASA’s case studies, a project milestone, the New Start 
Approval, was regarded as a “decisive act” officially marking the beginning of a 
project’s development. This milestone was then used as a reference point around 
which the analysis revolved. Project development was then separated in the 
formulation & authorization phase (pre-approval), implementation phase 
(immediately after approval) and operations phase, after project delivery.
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As significant as this “decisive act” may be for the projects, though, it was seen as 
part of an ongoing process that started much before it reached this point. Thus, in the 
phase preceding the New Start, the hereby called “pre-approval” phase, several 
formulation or definition activities took place along with other internal decisions and 
authorization procedures, such as the internal authorization process leading up to the 
organisation’s (NASA) decision to submit the project for appreciation and approval 
by the Government.
Data analysis has also shown that the formulation and implementation phases of the 
projects overlapped, as the original “decision” was revisited, adjusted and modified 
several times during the implementation phase. Also, several definition activities, 
typical of the formulation phase, were detected during decision implementation. In a 
parallel with strategic decision-making, it can be said that the boundary between 
decision process and decision implementation was diffuse, with activities typical of 
the decision process extending over to the implementation phase.
As expected, this research has confirmed the relevance of looking into decision 
implementation, which, as mentioned before, has been largely neglected in the SDM 
literature. In the space sector, the typically long implementation phase of space 
projects, usually involving several years (7 to 8 years in the two cases examined in 
this thesis), is far too long a time to be ignored or left out of any conceptual model or 
empirical study on SDM. In the two case studies developed in this thesis it was 
possible to observe several critical activities taking place during the implementation 
phase with a significant impact on the outcomes of these decisions. These included 
redefinition activities leading to major changes in decision content, in a seemingly 
common interface with the formulation phase. Also, during the long implementation 
periods, the projects, as expected, have been exposed to several context influences 
which affected the implementation and subsequently the outcomes of the decisions.
Considering that decision implementation intermediates decision process and 
decision outcomes, it is possible that the implementation phase of decisions may 
have a key role in explaining some of the controversies found in the SDM literature
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regarding the relationship between decision process and outcomes. It should be noted 
that the longer the implementation phase the greater the exposure of the decision to 
context factors and context changes, which in turn may require adjustments, force 
adaptations and create too many opportunities for change. This situation tends to 
take the decision which is finally delivered further away from original plans, 
contributing to make outcomes even more uncertain.
Context factors, organized in four levels, namely: international, national, 
organisational and Project level, were seen to influence decisions through a constant 
flow of back and forth interactions between the implementation level of the Project 
and the other context levels, throughout Projects' development. Adding to the overall 
complexity, decision-making spanned across three of these four levels of context, 
namely: the Project level, the organisational level and the govemmental/or national 
level, the latter being a result of the public nature of the organisations which are 
focus of this research12.
In the flow of associated decisions and sub-decisions processes, such as, for instance, 
the Announcement of Opportunities (AO) for the selection of instruments to fly 
aboard a space mission or the Request for Proposals (RFP) sent out to industry for 
the selection of contractors for the project, elements from different decision models 
and from different decision-making perspectives could be detected.
Thus, for instance, the AO in the case studies clearly presented elements of the 
rational/comprehensive model of decision-making (formal, phased, sequential, 
analytical, participative) whereas the decision process leading up to MO’s launch slip 
exposed the conflict of interests between NASA, Congress and the scientific 
community, features typical of the political model of decision-making.
Likewise, features from all the three different decision-making perspectives, namely 
rational, action and interpretative, as classified by Hendry (2000) (see section 4.2 of 
Chapter 2), were also observed. Accordingly, it was possible to observe intentions
12 It should be noted that the two case studies developed in this thesis were national projects. Had they 
been developed in cooperation with other countries, another decision level would have to be 
considered, adding yet more complexity to the general picture.
298
and decisions preceding actions, as within the traditional perspective, but also actions 
preceding decisions as in the action perspective. Additionally, the analysis of the 
case studies pictured SDM not as isolated or detached events but as ongoing 
processes, embedded in the organisational and other levels of a dynamic context, 
which was acknowledged as enacted, not given, via the interpretations and actions of 
decision-makers and participants, all features of the interpretative perspective of 
decision-making.
These findings support the view, defended by some (e.g. Laroche (1995), Hendry 
(2000)), that the full complexity of SDM cannot be fully observed if confined within 
the precincts of any single SDM model or SDM perspective. This way, it also 
reinforces the importance of choosing research methods which are more flexible, 
allowing for more encompassing research to be developed and for taking in more of 
this overall complexity.
8.2.2. On the role of context in influencing strategic decision-making in the 
Space Sector
Regarding the role of context, several aspects were observed. As mentioned 
previously, this thesis adopted a broad view of context, which was represented in 
four levels. These four levels included three levels of external environment 
(business/international, business/national, organisational13) plus the Project level or 
the decision “internal environment”, unique to each decision.
At a more general level, these four levels of context were seen to introduce different 
sources of complexity and uncertainty as well as to define several characteristics of 
the strategic decision-making process and implementation of the two case studies 
developed in this thesis. These sources of complexity and uncertainty identified 
within each context level should apply across decisions belonging to that same 
context level. Thus, the business context introduced technological complexity and
13 It should be noted that for the strategic decisions analyzed in this thesis the organisational level o f context was 
regarded as part o f the external environment, as there was one more context level, the Project level. For many 
strategic decisions, though, the organisational level is not part o f the external environment but it represents the 
internal environment where decision-making takes place.
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uncertainty as intrinsic characteristics of strategic decisions across the space sector, 
hi the same way, the public segment of the space sector, which is the focus of this 
research, introduced political uncertainty to strategic decision-making across the 
public space organisations. NASA’s organisational context, on its turn, introduced 
managerial complexity to strategic decisions across this organisation. Finally, the 
Project context brought in the decision specifics, or the main characteristics of the 
two strategic decisions studied in this research (e.g. nature of decision, decision 
content and size, nationality etc). These were found to be very influential on the 
strategic decision-making of the two cases.
The different sources of complexity and uncertainty were seen to affect strategic 
decision-making processes, implementation and outcomes in different ways. 
Combined, the high levels of complexity and uncertainty displayed at the various 
context levels pointed out to decisions outcomes which are less predictable, less 
controllable, and therefore more uncertain and “unprogrammemable”.
Within each of the four observed context levels, several variables were identified as 
influential, to a lesser or higher degree, on SDM in the space sector, involving 
decision process, implementation and outcomes. The case studies allowed for the 
observation of some of these variables in action, along with other specific 
environmental occurrences which impacted the two decisions studied. They also 
revealed that there can be two kinds of context influences on decisions: “decisive” 
and “non-decisive”. In the first situation, a “decisive” influence will affect decisions 
directly, without leaving room for the intervention of managers or decison-makers. In 
the second case, a “non-decisive” influence will provide a stimulus for change or 
trigger a reaction, but it will be left to managers & decision-makers to decide, based 
on their interpretations of the situation and subsequent actions, how they will actually 
impact the decision. As a result of this situation, and as confirmed in the case studies, 
the same context factor may impact decisions in different ways, depending on how 
decision-makers perceive the situation and on how they react to it.
Furthermore, the case studies analysis allowed for the identification of “horizontal” 
interactions between context variables from the same or from different context levels
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which can occur before they actually influence SDM. This can be seen as yet another 
indirect way of context to influence decisions.
All kinds of context influences, direct and indirect, will work together to shape the 
decision which will finally be carried out and to guide the decision process and 
implementation towards final outcomes, creating a path which will be unique to each 
strategic decision.
Another very important observed aspect of context was its dynamic nature. Contrary 
to the way it has been approached in the majority of studies on SDM, context is not 
static and will change over time. In the two case studies, for instance, the initial 
context circumstances which motivated the two projects’ proposals in the first place 
were not present anymore half way through the projects’s implementation. In fact, 
they were quite the opposite in the Mars Observer case, for example. It should also 
be noted that these context changes are not impermeable to influences by decision­
makers and participants from the Project level or any other decision level. Actually, 
the data analysis provided several opportunities to observe decision-makers 
interacting with the external context in attempts to influence it, some of which may 
have been successful. These findings support the view of context as enacted, not 
given, and subject to influences emanating from the decision levels. Thus, context 
may change and evolve along with the strategic decision-making phases. As it 
changes over time, so it will its influence on SDM. Thus, at any given time, the ways 
according to which context variables are likely to influence decision processes, 
implementation and outcomes will depend on their characteristics at that particular 
time. Additionally, and as mentioned before, it should be noted that these changing 
characteristics may be partially the result of back and forth interactions between 
context and the decision level, which adds to the overall complexity involving the 
role of context in influencing strategic decision-making and outcomes.
Thus, the temporal dimension of context variables may have a significant role for the 
understanding of context influences on SDM and should not be neglected in studies 
in the field. So far, though, the more common cross-sectional, static, quantitative
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studies available in the related literature have been unable to capture the dynamic nature 
of context and its influences on SDM.
Amongst the context variables detected at different layers of context, the ones related 
to decision specifics at the project level stood out as highly significant to the 
understanding of strategic decision-making in the space sector. Thus, for instance, 
the nature of decision regarding the two case studies, both under NASA's Office of 
Space Science and Applications (OSSA), was indicative of several characteristics of 
the correspondent decision-making processes. Accordingly, it was seen that decision 
processes related to projects of the same nature developed within OSSA typically 
displayed several elements of rationality, being formal, phased, structured and highly 
participative. Additionally, the nature of the decision was also seen to provide 
indication of critical factors upon which decision success was dependent, such as 
performance of launcher, performance of instruments, quality of operations, data 
distribution efficiency etc. The content of the decision, through its objectives, 
provided the main criteria for success assessment and also some indication of how 
context could influence it. Such was the case, for example, with the policy objective 
of UARS, which indicated that its success assessment could be affected by ozone 
related events taking place at the external environment. This was also the case when 
timeliness was seen as critical for at least part of the success assessment of UARS, 
thus driving the attention to context influences which might have an impact on 
decision schedule.
Another characteristic of strategic decisions, the initial stimulus (or motivation) for 
their development, was also seen to play an important role in strategic decision­
making. In both cases studied in this thesis, the initial stimulus had a strong influence 
on decision content, being determinant for the definition of several of its 
characteristics, such as objectives, size, number of satellites, expected launch dates 
etc. In the UARS case, the initial stimulus also showed that it could affect the 
duration of decision process, by attaching an “urgency” label to the decision. Lastly, 
the decision complexity and degree of innovation, as observed in the Mars 
Observer’s case, were associated with troubles faced during the implementation 
phase and indirectly with the outcomes of the decision. In a general way, this finding
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suggested that the higher the complexity and innovation degree of the decision the 
greater the degree of implementation difficulty and the higher the degree of 
uncertainty of outcomes.
The contextualized view of decisions have also allowed for the identification of 
variables which, despite not being directly linked to the “mainstream” decision­
making process under observation, can affect the “fate” of the decision, such as: 
concurrent projects & activities competing for the same organisational resources; 
concurrent projects & activities competing for the same resources from the national 
budget; concurrent projects & activities being developed in similar areas or with 
similar objectives at the national and international environments. Several examples 
of this kind of influence were found in the analysis of the case studies, such as 
satellite missions and experiments launched before UARS which were going to 
provide similar measurements, or when NASA's Office of Space Science and 
Applications, under which UARS and MO were developed, suffered budgetary cuts 
as a result of the need to transfer resources to the space shuttle programme, following 
the Challenger disaster.
Finally, one other aspect which became apparent during the analysis of the two cases 
and that was present across the different context levels, was the “chance” factor, or 
the random events which can affect the decisions. As seen in the analysis, these 
unpredictable, uncontrollable events can either favour or jeopardize the decision­
making process and outcomes, taking them one way or another, and producing 
impacts ranging from minor to major, vital ones. Some chance events that came to 
interfere with the two case studies were, for instance: a successful manoeuvre of the 
space shuttle which placed UARS in a higher orbit than originally planned, saving 
energy; a new US president who favoured interplanetary missions and, in particular, 
Mars exploration missions; the Challenger accident, which forced either a change of 
launcher for both missions or a launch delay; and a potential collision with an 
asteroid, raised as one of the possible explanations for the loss of contact with Mars 
Observer. As previously acknowledged by several authors (e.g. Miller (1997), 
Alexander (1986) and Whipp et al. (1987)), these unpredictable occurrences are 
inherent to decision-making and implementation processes. As such, and considering
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their power to significantly impact decision processes and outcomes, they cannot be 
neglected in the empirical studies in the field.
Overall, the most important set of context influences on both cases came from the 
Governmental/national context level, more specifically from decisions made by the 
executive and legislative branches of the Government, but then this was one of the 
decision levels. It is reasonable to assume that, had this study involved private 
companies instead of public ones, for example, the influences from this context level 
would have been smaller, as it would not have been a decision level too. In the same 
way, had the project been developed through international cooperation, the 
importance of the international context level in influencing the decisions would have 
been bigger, as other context variables associated with the international partner 
would have to be brought into consideration.
8.2.3. Context influences on outcomes
Regarding the influences of context on outcomes, as seen in the analysis, this may 
happen directly or indirectly and in a decisive or non-decisive way. The indirect 
influences can happen through influences on decision content, process and 
implementation. Regarding the non-decisive influences, as opposed to the decisive 
ones, which will leave no room for maneuver, they will impact the decision through 
managers’ perceptions of the situation and subsequent reactions to them. They will 
be ultimately responsible for determining the exact way according to which the 
context “stimulus” is going to affect the decision.
Beyond taking into account the different ways according to which context can 
influence strategic decisions and their outcomes, the final role played by context was 
also seen to be dependent on how outcomes are assessed and on which aspects of 
outcomes are being observed. The criteria for success assessment, on their turn, were 
found to be context specific (e.g. space projects of the same nature) with some of 
them being decision-specific (e.g. UARS policy objective).
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The analysis of the two cases showed that outcomes could be assessed through 
different perspectives, objectively and subjectively, through stated and non-stated 
objectives. The outcomes of the two cases were assessed objectively based on 
previously stated objectives. The managerial, technical and scientific outcomes were 
compared with initial objectives and the degree to which these objectives were 
reached was discussed. In the UARS case, though, a less objective non-stated aspect 
of success, the policy success, was also discussed. The role of context in influencing 
each of these aspects of outcomes was different.
Another aspect observed in the cases analysis was that the success assessment is time 
dependent and standpoint dependent. For instance, UARS success assessment at the 
end of the project’s operations time could not fully appreciate the scientific outcomes 
of the project, as those continue to develop far beyond this time. Besides, some 
aspects of decision outcomes would continue to be influenced by changes in the 
external context even after the end of the expected life-time of the project, and could 
give a different significance to the project. This was the case, for example, with the 
ozone related events and the scientific discoveries which continued to happen in the 
national and international environments after the end of UARS operational life. 
Regarding the standpoint perspective on outcomes, it was also seen that different 
stakeholders would see projects’ outcomes in different ways. In the UARS case, for 
example, even if the project was not regarded as a policy success, as it did not come 
in time to change policy, its significance to the scientific community, one of the 
stakeholders, remained great.
In summary, some aspects of decisions outcomes were seen to be fluid. Thus, even 
though objective criteria for assessing outcomes may produce some undisputable 
results, less objective ones may lead to different views by different people at 
different points in time. This fluidness in the assessment of outcomes, along with the 
different perspectives from which they can be assessed, may be behind some of the 
controversies found in the literature, in particular regarding the contingent models 
which focus on the relationship between decision processes and decision 
effectiveness or outcomes.
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Finally, the analysis of the two case studies developed in this thesis, unsurprisingly, 
suggested that project management was a very important aspect in connection with 
decision outcomes, regardless of context influences. It also came out from the 
analysis (Mars Observer’s case) that decision process in the formulation phase seems 
to matter despite the crucial role that context and implementation may have on 
projects outcomes. On the other hand, the analysis of both cases also suggested that 
context influences can seriously affect projects’ outcomes, regardless of the 
characteristics of decision processes in the formulation phase. Overall, these findings 
support a more general view of decision outcomes as a multifaceted variable, 
dependent upon a combination of factors which need to join up to ensure success.
8.2.4 General overview of findings
Drawing on the discussions presented in Chapter 7 and above, a summarized list of 
the main findings of this research is presented below, according to their general or 
specific nature:
Findings o f general nature
• Results corroborate the view of SDs as unique and context specific, therefore 
“unprogrammemable”;
• Research confirmed the relevance of implementation to decision 
effectiveness and observed that formulation and implementation overlap;
• Context influences SDM and outcomes directly and indirectly, in a decisive 
or non-decisive way;
• In non-decisive kind of influences, same context factors can impact decisions 
in different ways, through perceptions and actions of managers and decision­
makers;
• Research supports view of context as enacted, not given, dynamic and subject 
to influences emanating from the various decision levels;
• Temporal dimension of context variables may have a significant role in 
understanding context influences on SDM as well as in resolving some of the 
related controversies found on the literature;
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• Research identified inter and intra context levels interactions between context 
variables before they actually influence the dm level;
« Role of context in influencing outcomes varies according to aspects of 
outcomes observed;
• Some aspects of decision outcomes are fluid as they are time dependant and 
standpoint dependant;
• Fluidness in assessment of outcomes mal also be behind some of the 
controversies involving contingent models on the relationship between 
decision processes and outcomes;
• Supports the view that decision process matters regardless of context 
variables.
Findings o f specific nature:
• Decision specifics stood out as highly significant for understanding SDM in 
the space sector;
• Chance was a present factor in both decisions studied and has the potential to 
jeopardize success at any point and in spite of any other aspects or 
characteristics of SDM;
• The governmental/national context level stood out as the most influential 
context level in the SDM of the two studied cases in the space sector.
8.3. Research Contribution
This research has addressed some of the substantive and methodological priorities for 
SDM research, as recently pointed out by Papadakis et al (2010). The distinctive 
features on which its strength is believed to lie are:
• It looked on the effects of broad context on SDM and outcomes and not only 
on effects on SDM processes, as in the majority of studies in the area;
• In addition to decision content, context, process and outcomes, it also took 
into account the implementation of SD’s;
• Its research design, with the choice of qualitative case studies and of an
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“organisational discourse” approach, has allowed for taking in more of the 
overall complexity associated with SDM and the ways according to which 
context variables can influence SDM processes, implementation and 
outcomes. It has allowed for the observation and acknowledgement of 
features from different decision-making models and perspectives and for 
relevant variables to emerge from their natural setting and not through 
theoretical pre-selection. Besides, the number and nature of variables that 
could be examined were not bounded by methodological constraints;
• Its case studies emulated a longitudinal design, allowing for clear observation 
of the direction of the relationships between variables.
Findings have allowed for the development of a general framework of the influences 
of context on SDM processes and outcomes in the space sector (Fig.7.2) which more 
closely mirrors the reality of organisational decision-making as experienced by 
practitioners in the field. It draws attention to the temporal dimension of SDM and to 
the dynamism of context.
Additionally, the general framework served as the basis for the proposition of a 
revised basic and multi-theoretic model of SDM (Fig.7.3 and Fig.7.4) which 
confirms previously identified relationships and relevant aspects, as well as add new 
ones. Those include decision implementation and the acknowledgment of the direct 
impacts that broad context can have on decision implementation and on decision 
outcomes, in addition to the more commonly observed effects on decision processes.
Practical Applications
Contrary to what usually happens in the large-sample, deductive survey studies, this 
thesis has produced results to which managers can more easily connect. The 
integrated approach to the study of context and SDM which was adopted in this 
thesis, allied with its qualitative case study design and inductive approach allowed 
for the development of a contextualized view of strategic decision-making in the 
space sector which more closely resembles the reality with which decision-makers in 
the field are usually confronted. An immediate practical implication of this is the
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increase of its managerial relevance, which should be higher for similar decisions 
from the same area within NASA and decrease as decisions move further away from 
the context studied in the case studies.
hi fact, as mentioned by Papadakis et al (2010, p.61), a study which was in progress 
at the time at London Business School seemed “to verify the argument that 
practitioners on average consider small-sample inductive studies as more likely to 
yield managerially relevant results than large-sample hypothetic-deductive studies”. 
The contextualized view of SDM offered in this thesis illustrates the relevance that 
the knowledge of the broad context within which a decision is embedded and its 
dynamics can have for managers and decision-makers in general.
Initially, a first round general assessment of the SD' s  context at the different levels 
(macro, meso and micro) can provide general information to managers as to what are 
the main context-inherited characteristics and constraints to which decisions in the 
same business, organisation and area are subject. They will also give managers a 
preliminary idea of the ways according to which these characteristics and constraints 
are likely to impact the decision process, implementation and subsequently decision 
outcomes. As shown in Fig. 7.1, these are intrinsic characteristics to decision-making 
in similar contexts about which there is little managers can do at any specific point in 
time.
Then, at a closer view, such as the one provided in Fig. 7.2, the knowledge of the 
business and of the organisational contexts (macro and meso contexts), allied with 
the specific knowledge regarding the characteristics of the decision to be taken 
(micro level), can provide managers with further relevant information as to how 
much complexity and uncertainty they are likely to face, what are likely to be the 
main sources of context influences on the decisions being made, as well as the main 
aspects that may threaten the decision implementation and outcomes .
This broad context “awareness” will generally inform managers on the uncertainty 
and levels of risk involved in their strategic decision-making and can drive their 
attention to what features of the context in which they are embedded should deserve
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more attention and be followed more closely. For example, in the UARS case, the 
awareness of the policy objective of the mission -  provide the scientific evidence that 
ozone depletion was being caused by man-made pollutants so as to induce 
environmental policy changes -  would automatically draw attention to other similar 
missions, experiments or events being developed or taking place at the national 
and/or international context which could influence UARS ability to fulfill its policy 
objective. In fact, as it was shown in the UARS case analysis, other events that took 
place in the external context did induce the policy changes that UARS was originally 
expected to promote, affecting its effectiveness in meeting its policy objective. In 
another example, the knowledge of NASA's insertion in the US federal bureaucracy 
and budgetary process would indicate that what happens with veterans health care 
and housing for the poor and homeless (at the time of data collection) can directly 
affect the organisation's budget and subsequently its projects, as NASA competes 
directly with this area for resources in the US budgetary process.
Finally, and here is where the greatest managerial relevance lies, the knowledge of 
the broad SDM context and its dynamics will also open up the possibility for 
managers to actually identify areas where they can and/or should act to try to 
influence decisions towards desirable outcomes. Notwithstanding the 
unpredictability and “unprogrammemability” of SDM, to which this thesis provided 
further evidence, it also became clear, as illustrated in Fig.7.2 and Fig. 7.4, that 
managers have an important role to play as they interact with the different context 
levels in reactive as well as proactive ways.
As discussed earlier in the thesis, for the so-called “non-decisive” context influences, 
the ultimate impact of these contextual variations on decisions will be determined by 
managers and decision-makers’ particular reactions to them, which will pass through 
their own perceptions and judgments of the situation. Thus, this is an area where 
decision-makers (and stakeholders alike) can work on to try to influence decisions. 
An example of this in Mars Observer’s case study, for instance, was the lobby made 
by the scientific community (stakeholder) in the US Congress (national context) in 
an attempt to influence NASA’s decision on the mission’s launch slip, after the
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Challenger accident (micro, project level). Despite this attempt, the final decision by 
NASA's project managers confirmed the launch slip of two years.
Additionally, managers can act proactively to influence context towards a desired 
outcome or direction. A framework such as the one presented in Fig. 7.2 may 
indicate areas and channels through which they can exert this kind of influence at the 
different context levels, such as, for example, the advisory structure, the 
authorization structure and the budgetary process. Future similar case studies could 
even lead to the identification of which of those areas hold the better chances to 
produce the desired effects on the decisions being made.
Another aspect of this thesis findings that can be of practical value to managers 
regards the observed fluidness of outcomes assessments. Findings have shown that 
beyond objective measures, some aspects of outcomes assessment are fluid and may 
vary as a function of time and of the standpoints and perceptions of different 
managers and stakeholders (see discussion in Section 8.2.3 of Chapter 8). Managers 
can use this characteristic of outcomes assessment to their advantage, by exploring as 
desired different assessments of decisions outcomes taken from a broader spectrum 
of views and points in time.
Finally, other aspects which surfaced from the case studies analysis may also be of 
practical significance to managers. However, they still require verification and 
confirmation through further evidence, which can be obtained, for instance, through 
replication of the case studies developed in this thesis. Some of these aspects 
observed in the two case studies are:
The knowledge of the decision specifics (e.g. nature, size, complexity) is 
highly significant for understanding SDM in the public space sector;
- The Governmental/national context level tends to provide the most significant 
context influences on SDM in the public space sector;
- The implementation phase of decisions is very relevant in connection with 
decision effectiveness;
- Decision process matters regardless of context characteristics and variations;
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- Context can have a powerful influence on SDM regardless of decision 
process characteristics;
- Context, decision process and decision implementation are all key factors in 
explaining decision outcomes.
Additionally, the cross-case analysis suggested that the following aspects from 
decision processes and decision implementation, some of which are related to good 
project management, may be relevant in connection with decisions outcomes (see 
Section 6.3.2 of Chapter 6):
- Define a project well before implementing it; implement what was planned; 
allow for project to be fully reviewed by different people and at the same and 
at higher levels, do things in a typical familiar way; take the necessary but not 
too long a time for decision-making, chance.
8.4. Research limitations and recommendations for future research
This study proposes a dynamic framework of context influences that should 
generally apply to strategic decision-making in public space R&D organisations. It 
also provides some evidence that the role of context variables and the relative 
significance between them in terms of impacting SDM are context specific, 
depending on the country and organisations involved. In fact, taking into account the 
particular characteristics of a given strategic decision and of the people involved in 
the decision-making process, the temporal dimension of SDM and the dynamism of 
context, along with the specific environmental occurrences taking place throughout 
the formulation and implementation phases of SDs, it becomes clear that the 
influence of context will also be decision-specific. However, this does not prevent 
the possibility that relevant commonalities and consistencies relative to the role of 
context variables can still emerge through studies of a variety of strategic decisions 
in the area across different organisational and national contexts.
Although the first part of this thesis data analysis involved several space 
organisations throughout the world and unveiled relevant context variables and SDM
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commonalities between them, the case studies focused on only one country, one 
organisation and one kind of space decisions. This way, it would be important to 
expand knowledge of decision-making in the sector by developing similar case 
studies across different kinds of space decisions, space organisations and spacefaring 
nations. This could include military space, for example, and the verification of how 
military rationale would affect the influence of context on SDM. It could also include 
the private space sector and the analysis of how ownership tends to affect the role of 
context in influencing SDM in the sector.
Findings from a variety of similar studies in the area could allow for adaptation and 
further specification of the hereby proposed framework, as well as for the 
verification of potential commonalities and idiosyncrasies between the different 
segments of the space sector.
Within a broader picture, similar studies covering large high-tech projects in 
different sectors could help identify intrinsic features of SDM on this kind of 
decisions and generate knowledge which may be transferable from one sector to 
another. In that respect, an approximation between the project management literature 
and decision-making research could be instrumental. In fact, the “disjunction” 
between these two fields had already been noted by Hickson et al (2003).
Lastly, taking the view, as defended by Bell et al (1997, p. 175), that findings in this 
field are unlikely to be broadly generalizable, but rather be context or content 
specific, it would be interesting to see similar studies developed within the context of 
different businesses. Thus, studies which are more integrative, encompassing of 
different SDM perspectives and that provide real or emulated longitudinal account of 
SDM processes, as applied to a variety of businesses, could generate insight and 
understanding which, though not transferable between businesses contexts, could 
still be of great relevance to practitioners within those studied contexts.
Following this reasoning, this thesis takes the view that before new attempts to make 
broad generalizations bring more inconsistencies to the literature in the area, it may 
be of more relevance to practitioners and academics alike to generate more
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knowledge on the specificities of SDM in different businesses and across different 
natures of decisions.
If broad generalizations may not have a good prospect in SDM research, an area 
which seems particularly promising and certainly more amenable to bring managerial 
relevance is the study of managerial cognitions and managerial actions. As pointed 
out by Nutt and Wilson (2010), decision-making research has become “de­
humanized” and reversing this trend may represent a significant challenge.
As previously mentioned, part of the context influences on strategic decisions, the 
hereby called “non-decisive” influences, will have their final impact on decisions 
determined by managers’ perceptions of the context and their reactions to it. Allied 
with knowledge of aspects of decision-making process and implementation known to 
be positively related to outcomes, for example, knowledge on the links between 
managerial cognitions and actions may be one of the areas in SDM research where 
some prescriptive theory may still emerge.
Even though this research’s design did allow for the observation and 
acknowledgement of the role of managers in impacting strategic decisions through 
their “interpretations” of context and resulting actions, it did not allow for any deeper 
understanding of this role. As the central goal of the inductive methodology 
employed in this research was to allow for a broad view of context and its influences 
on SDM to emerge, without any pre-selection of context variables, relationships or 
models to be tested, this outcome, though not planned, is understandable.
Notwithstanding the fact that, as a promising area in terms of managerial relevance, 
the study of managerial cognitions and actions does deserve further attention, any 
deeper investigation in this field, such as for example, what predisposes managers 
and decision-makers to perceive and act in a certain way, would certainly require a 
different specific design which was beyond the scope of this research.
Another interesting area which can be positively impacted by further knowledge on 
managers’ cognitions is the assessment of decisions outcomes. Different ways of
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perceiving outcomes may lead to different outcomes assessments. Even though 
objective measures of outcomes cannot be changed, there seems to be plenty of room 
for working on the subjective ones.
A last recommendation is that future integrative and encompassing research, which 
has been supported by many authors (e.g. Papadakis and Barwise, 1997; Papadakis et 
al, 2010; Elbanna, 2011), should be able to contemplate the temporal dimension of 
SDM and the dynamic nature of context, as well as to open up for the observation of 
inter and intra context levels interactions between context variables and of how these 
interactions combine together to influence SDM.
Finally, despite the fact that findings in this research expose a level of complexity 
and uncertainty to SDM in the space sector which attests to the unpredictability and 
“unprogrammemability” of decision-making and outcomes, it defends that the 
overall understanding of the dynamics of the context within which decisions are 
embedded and of its influences on strategic decisions can only help putting 
expectations in perspective and identify the realm within which managers can act in 
attempts to lead SDM processes to the desired direction and academics can work to 
try to advise how.
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APPENDIX 1
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE FROM CASE STUDIES 
(CASE STUDIES DATABASE)
Case Study 1: Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS)
Reports
• NASA/JPL. Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite Programme: final report o f 
the Science Working Group. July 1978 (JPL Publication 78-54).
• NASA. UARS Mission Operation Report (Prelaunch). Washington, D.C., Aug., 
1991a. Report n°S-678-48-91-01.
• NASA. UARS Post Launch Mission Operation Report. Washington, D C., Sept. 
1994. Report n° U-678-48-91-02.
News Clippings & Journal Articles 
— General
• New York Times:
Sept. 8, 1991, p.20;
Sept. 10, 1991, p.C4;
Sept. 14,1991, p.8;
Sept. 15, 1991, p.28;
Sept. 16, 1991, p.B8;
Dec. 17, 1991, p.C13;
Apr. 15, 1993, p.7.
• Popular Mechanics: July, 1985, p.65.
• USA Today: Jan. 26, 1984, p.20.
• Washington Post:
Sept. 1991 (Science: Atmospheric Studies); 
Sept. 8, 1991, p.A18;
Sept. 13, 1991, p.A3;
Sept. 15, 1991, p. A4;
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Sept. 16,1991, p,A5;
Dec. 16, 1991, p.A2;
Feb. 4,1992, p. Al;
Feb. 4,1992, p. A4;
June 14, 1992, p.A4;
Dec. 20,1992, p.A4.
• Washington Times'.
May 6,1985, p.7B;
Aug. 13,1991, p.A5;
Sept. 9, 1991, p.A2;
Sept. 16, 1991, p.A3;
Dec. 13,1991, p.A5;
Dec. 20, 1994, p.A8.
— Dedicated
• Aerospace Daily:
Jan. 26,1982, p.121;
Aug. 4,1982, p.180;
Aug. 26,1982, p.314-315;
Aug. 31,1982, p. 343;
Aug. 19,1983, p.275-276;
Aug. 25,1983, p.307-308;
Sept. 6,1991, p.373-374.
• Aviation Week & Space Technology. 
Apr. 9,1984, p.76-77;
Apr. 15,1985, p. 16;
Sept. 9,1991, p.63-65;
Sept. 23, 1991, p.62-63;
June 22,1992, p.72.
• Daily News in Brief. Sept. 10, 1991.
• Defense Daily.
Feb. 18,1981, p.245;
Aug. 4,1982, p.180;
Feb. 3, 1983, p. 190;
Feb. 8, 1983, p.218;
Feb. 10,1983, p.233;
Feb. 17,1983, p.265;
Sept. 9,1983, p.20;
May 31, 1984-p.l67;
Nov. 7,1984, p.37;
Apr. 18,1985, p.279;
Aug. 7,1985, p.203.
• Goddard News: v.34, n.12, Jan. 1989.
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• NASA Facts: Dec. 1986.
• NASA Headline News (Headquarters): Sept. 18, 1991.
• NASA News:
Apr. 25, 1980 - Release n° 80-56;
Dec. 7, 1981 - Release n° 81-190;
Feb. 4, 1985;
Mar. 6, 1985 - Release n° 85-32;
July 27, 1990 - Release n° 90-105;
Mar. 21, 1991 - Release n° 91-44;
May 28, 1991 - Release n° 91-71;
July 5, 1991 -N91-48;
Aug. 28, 1991 - STS-48/UARS Launch Advisory;
Sept. 26, 1991 - Release n° 91-155;
Dec. 5, 1991 - Release n° 91-199;
Feb. 3, 1992 - Release n° 92-18;
Apr. 30, 1992 - Release n° 92-56;
July 20, 1992 - Release n° 92-117;
Dec. 19, 1994 - Release n° 94-215.
• Space News:
Sept. 16-22, 1991, p.8;
July 6-19, 1992, p.15;
Sept. 1991, n.d.
• Space World-StaffReport: Dec. 1983,p.17-18.
• Spaceflight:
v.26, Dec. 1984, p.455-457; 
v.33, Oct. 1991, p.346-348.
Internal Documents
• October 1986 baseline. Shuttle launch schedule. Oct. 3, 1986.
• Shuttle Status: launch minus one day Shuttle status - Discovery STS-48/UARS. 
Msg: NJJB-2968-5988. Sept. 11, 1991.
• Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS) status report #4. Sept. 15, 1991.
• Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS). 1992. Note: Summary of major 
characteristics of the mission.
• Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS). OSSA Flight Project Data Book. 
n.d.
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Statements & Presentations
• Vandekoppel, R.W. UARS. Programme status and programme scope. Nov. 18, 
1980.
• Beggs, J.M. FY 1985 Statement. Jan. 31, 1984.
• Luther, Michael R. UARS programme manager. Aug. 15, 1991.
• McNeal, Robert J. UARS programme scientist. Aug. 15, 1991.
Letters 
— Internal
• From: R. M. Homstein to: C. T. Force. Subj.: Review of Upper Atmosphere 
Research Satellite, June 25, 1985. (E-mail)
• From: PAO. KSC to: P, PF, PAO. Loop. Subj.: Shuttle Status, Sept. 11, 1991. 
(E-mail)
Others
• Common Appropriations Bill. May 12, 1981.
• World Meteorological Organisation -  WMO (1992) “WMO and the ozone 
issue”. Geneva, Switzerland. WMO No. 778.
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Case Study 2: Mars Aeronomy Observer (MO)
Reports
• NASA. Mars aeronomy observer: report o f  the science working team. Oct. 
1986. NASA TM 89202.
• United States. General Accounting Office. Space exploration: cost, schedule, and 
performance of NASA’s Mars Observer Mission. May 1988. GAO/NSIAD-88- 
137FS.
• Polk, C. 1990. Mars Observer Project History. JPL, 1990. JPLD-8095.
• Office of Space Science and Applications. Strategic plan 1991.
• General Electric, Astro Space Division. Mars Observer Mission and Systems 
Overview. [1991]
• NASA. Mission operation report: office o f space science and applications. Nov. 
1991b. Report n°S-838-92-01.
• NASA. Mars Observer. Washington, DC, Sept. 1992.
• NASA. Mars Observer loss o f signal: special review board final report. 
Pasadena, CA: JPL, 1993. JPL Publication 93-28.
• NASA. Mars Observer mission failure investigation: board report. Dec. 31, 
1993. v. 1.
• Tom Heinsheimer. If market forces can repair Russia why not let them drive 
mars exploration? Aug. 30, 1993. (Mars Exploration Article).
News Clippings & Journal Articles 
— General
• Chicago Tribune:
Aug. 31, 1993.
• Financial Times:
Feb. 10, 1987, p.4.
• Houston Post:
Aug. 25, 1993.
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• Houston Chronicle:
Aug. 27, 1993;
May 1, 1994, p. 1 A.
• Huntsville Times:
May, 1, 1994, p.lA.
• Los Angeles Times:
Sep. 2, 1993, p.AlO.
• Nature:
Mar. 5, 1987, p.7.
• News & Comment:
Feb. 13, 1987, p.743.
• New York Times:
Mar. 15, 1987, p.25;
Mar. 17, 1987, p.5A;
Aug. 24, 1993;
Aug. 28, 1993, p.7.
John Noble WilforcLNASA has new plans for exploration of Mars 
[1993].
• Philadelphia Inquirer:
Sep. 1, 1993;
Sep. 2, 1993.
• Plain Dealer:
Aug. 27, 1993;
Aug. 30, 1993.
• Popular Science:
Apr., 1994, p.60-63, p.94.
• Science:
Mar. 27, 1987, p. 1568.
• Wall Street Journal.
Aug. 26, 1993;
Aug. 30, 1993, A10.
• USA Today:
Aug. 26, 1993;
Aug. 26, 1993, 9A.
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• Washington Post:
Mar. 14, s.d., p.9;
May 30, 1989, p. Al 7;
Aug. 29, 1992, p.A9;
Sept. 24, 1992;
Aug. 24, 1993, p.A10;
Aug. 25, 1993, p.A3;
Aug. 26, 1993, p.Al; A16;
Aug. 27, 1993, p.A22;
Aug. 27, 1993;
Aug. 27, 1993, p.Cl-C2;
Aug. 28, 1993, p.A5;
Aug. 29, 1993, p.A17;
Sep. 4, 1993, p.Bl;
Nov. 13, 1993, p.A14-15;
Jan. 6, 1994, p.A3;
Jan. 10, 1994, p.Al;
Jan. 10, 1994, p.AlO;
Jan. 11, 1994, p. A3;
Jan. 11, 1994, p. A9;
Jan. 18, 1994, p.Al;
Mar. 23, 1994.
Fixing rockets and reputations: Martin Marietta’s Norman Augustine Leads a 
Self-Examination of Space Mishaps [ 1993].
• Washington Times'.
Aug. 25, 1989, p.A5;
Aug. 18, 1993, p. A6;
Aug. 24, 1993, p.A3;
Aug. 25, 1993, p.A8;
Aug. 25, 1993, p.Al;
Aug. 26, 1993, p.C2;
Aug. 27, 1993, p.A3;
Aug. 28, 1993, p.C2;
Aug. 29, 1993, p.B5;
Sep. 1, 1993;
Sep. 1, 1993;
Jan. 6, 1994;
Jan. 11, 1994, p.B9.
• Weekly World News:
Sep. 14, 1993, p.4-5.
— Dedicated
• Aerospace Daily: 
Nov. 30, 1983, p.146.
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• Aviation Week & Space Technology: 
Nov. 19, 1984;
Mar. 31, 1986, p.23;
Apr. 6, 1987, p.76;
Mar. 23, 1987, p.24-25;
Apr. 27, 1987, p.27;
Oct. 9, 1989, p.79-82;
Aug. 26, 1991, p.60;
Oct. 5, 1992, p.22-26.
• Defense Daily:
Sept. 25, 1984, p. 113;
Oct. 31, 1984, p.315;
Apr. 8, 1985, p.212;
Nov. 26, 1985, p.133;
June 23, 1986, p.293-294;
May 12, 1987, p.70.
• Defense News:
Mar. 29/Apr. 04, 1993, p. 14;
• Flight International:
Apr. 14, 1984, p.1033.
• JPL Universe:
Apr. 18, 1986, p.3.
• Mars Observer:
Springer 1991, p. 1;
Summer 1991, p. 1;
Winter 1991, p. 1;
Fall/Winter 1991/92, p.l;
Spring 1992;
Summer 1992, p.6-7;
Aug. 30, 1993.
• Nasa Current News:
Feb. 3, 1987;
Apr. 12, 1988;
May 4, 1993;
Aug. 26, 1993;
Aug. 31, 1993;
Sep. 1, 1993.
• Nasa Daily A ctivities Report:
Jan. 25, 1988.
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• Nasa Earlybird News Summary:
Aug. 26, 1993.
© Nasa News:
Feb. 4, 1985;
Jan. 6, 1986 - Release n° 86-1;
Mar. 25, 1986 - Release n° 86-34;
Apr. 21, 1986 - Release n° 86-47;
Nov. 26, 1986 - Release n° 86-57;
Mar. 13, 1987 - Release n° 87-32;
May 6, 1988 - Release n° 88-24;
Nov. 16, 1989 - Release n° 89-64;
Oct. 12, 1990 - Release n° 90-138;
Dec. 5, 1990 - Release n° 90-158;
Apr. 2, 1992 - Release n° 92-45;
Aug. 14, 1992 - Note to editors: N92-74; 
Sept. 2, 1992;
Sept. 18, 1992 - Note to editors: N92-82; 
Mar. 17, 1993 - Release n° 93-48;
Aug. 5, 1993 - Note to editors: N93-43; 
Aug. 22, 1993 - Mission Advisory;
Aug. 26, 1993 - Release n° 93-153;
Aug. 27, 1993 - Mars Observer Advisory; 
Sep. 1, 1993 - Release n° 93-157;
Sep. 10,1993;
Oct. 1, 1993;
Jan. 3, 1994 - Editors Note: N94-1;
Jan. 5, 1994 - Release: n° 94-1;
Jan. 5, 1994;
June 15, 1994 - Note to editors: N94-43.
• News Clips - JPL:
Feb. 2, 1984.
• Planetary Report:
July/Aug. 1986, p.16.
• Science News:
May 24, 1986, p.22.
• Spaceflight:
July, 1993, p.230-231.
April, 1994, n.d.
• Space News:
June 3,1991, p.4;
Aug. 30/Sep. 5, 1993, p.3,12;
Nov. 8-14, 1993, p.8.
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Martin Wins Deal to send Mars Observer into Orbit [Before 1992].
• Space Times 
Nov./Dec. 1992, p.8-10.
• Space World:
July, 1987, p.27-30; 
Mar., 1988, p.22-24.
• Star-News:
Apr. 7, 1986, p.5.
Internal Documents
• NASA. Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Fact sheet: Mars Observer. Apr. 1989.
• NASA. Flight Projects Office. Mars Observer: Mars orbital mapping mission. 
Oct. 1990.
• Mars. Observer Management team; Programme Cost; Previous Mars Missions
• Mars Observer (MO). OSSA Flight project data book, 1991.
• Mars Observer (MO). Note: Summary o f  major characteristics o f the mission.
1992.
• Mars Observer fact sheet. [1992].
• NASA. Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Mars observer mission status. May 18, 1993; 
Aug. 22, 27, 31 1993; Sept. 15, 22, 27 1993.
• NASA. Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Planetary mission status. June 29, 1993; 
Sept. 30 1993.
• NASA. NASA Response to Mars Observer Loss o f Signal Failure Review Board 
Reports: Executive Summary. Aug., 1993.
• NASA. Status o f Mars Observer. Sept. 15, 1993.
• NASA. Mars Observer Management Team. Mar. 17, 1995.
Statements & Presentations
• Beggs, J.M. FY 1985 Statement. Jan. 31, 1984.
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Letters
— Internal
• To:Paoloop. NASAMAIL Subj.: HQ Launch Advisory: Mars 
Observer, Aug. 28, 1992. (E-mail)
• To: Paoloop. NAS AM AIL/NAS A Subj.: Mars Observer Status, Mar. 18, 1993; 
Apr. 14, 1993; May 10, 1993; Aug. 26, 27, 30, 1993. (E-mail)
• From: HQ Newsroom to: Paoloop. NASA MAIL Subj.: HQ 93-068/Ozone 
winter 93, Apr. 14, 1993 (E-mail)
• To:Paoloop. NASAMAIL/NASA Subj.: MO Advisory, Aug. 27, 1993. (E- 
mail)
• From: Robert M. Homstein (Director, Ground Networks Division - NASA) to: 
Associate Administrator for Space Communications - NASA Subject: Mars 
Observer Project NASA Support Plan (NSP), October, 15, 1991
• From: James A. Costrell to: Goddard Space Flight Center - NASA Subject: 
Mars Observer Launch Vehicle Coverage, August 19, 1992
— External
• From: John F. Murphy (Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs - NASA) 
to: Committee on Science and Technology - House of Representatives. Apr. 3, 
1986.
• From: James C. Fletcher (Administrator - NASA) to: Committee on Science and 
Technology - House of Representatives. Dec. 31, 1986.
• From: James C. Fletcher (Administrator - NASA) to: Committee on Science and 
Technology - House of Representatives. Jan. 2, 1987.
• From: James C. Fletcher (Administrator - NASA) to: Subcommittee on HDD- 
Independent Agencies. Committee on Appropriations - House of Representatives. 
Jan. 2, 1987.
• From: James C. Fletcher (Administrator - NASA) to: Committee on Science, 
Space and Technology - House of Representatives. Oct. 22, 1986.
• From: James C. Fletcher (Administrator - NASA) to: Committee on Science, 
Space and Technology - House of Representatives. Jan. 15,1987.
• From: Dale D. Myers (Deputy Administrator - NASA) to: Subcommittee on 
Space Science and Applications. Committee on Science, Space and Technology - 
House of Representatives. Feb. 18, 1987.
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• From: John F. Murphy (Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs - NASA) 
to: Members of the House of Representatives (21 letters) - Feb./Mar./Apr. 1987.
• From: John F. Murphy (Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs - NASA) 
to: Members of the United States Senate. House of Representatives (5 letters) - 
Mar./May/Jul./ 1987.
• From: Dale D. Myers (Deputy Administrator - NASA) to: Committee on 
Commerce, Science and Transportation. Apr. 20, 1987.
• From: James C. Fletcher (Administrator - NASA) to: Committee on Science, 
Space and Technology - House of Representatives. May 22, 1987.
• From: James C. Fletcher (Administrator - NASA) to: Subcommittee on Space 
Science and Applications. Committee on Science, Space Technology. House of 
Representatives. Feb. 11, 1988.
• From: C. R. Gunn (Director, Expendable Launch Vehicles and Upper Stages 
Office) to: DSN Operations Programme Manager Subject: Code o Support 
Requirements for Mars Observer Mission, August 11, 1992.
Others
• Boyer, William H. On The Martian Front. Nov./Dec., 1993.
• BRF - Weather Satellite. Washington, Aug. 26, 1993.
• Budget Plan: Fiscal Year 1985. Washington, DC, NASA Feb. 1984. p.3-4.
• Communication on Mars Observer failure Released by the Public Information 
Office JPL-NASA/Califomia Institute of Technology.
• Congressional Record - House. May 21, 1987.
• Congressional Record - Senate. May 21, 1987.
• Faulty transistors suspected in Mars probe. Pasadena, CA, Aug. 26, 1993.
• Fiscal Year 1985 Budget Press Briefing. Washington, DC, NASA, Jan. 31, 1984. 
p.5-11.
• Fitzpatrick, Michael. Mars Observer Contact Loss Linked to Transistors. 
Pasadena, CA, Aug. 26, 1993.
• Fitzpatrick, Michael. Mars Observer Lost in Space? Pasadena, CA, Aug. 25,
1993.
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• Friedman, Louis D. Triumph and Failure: The Way o f Planetary Exploration. 
s.d.
• Friedman, Louis D. What Happened to Mars Observer? 1993.
• Mars study team named. Washington, Sep. 1, 1993.
• NASA pulls out all stops to rescue Mars probe. Pasadena, CA, Aug. 25, 1993.
• Note to editors: N93-43. First Photograph o f Mars From Mars Observer 
Available. Aug. 5, 1993.
• Raeburn, Paul (AP Science Editor). Ozone Victory. New York, Aug. 25, 1993.
• Rosenthal, Harry F. NASA - Mars. Washington, Sep. 1, 1993.
• Sagan, Carl. Return to the Wonder World: Mars Observer in Perspective, s.d.
• Siegel, Lee (AP Science Writer). Mars Observer. Pasadena, CA, Aug. 26, 1993.
• Siegel, Lee (AP Science Writer). Mars Observer. Pasadena, CA, Aug. 27, 1993.
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NASA SUPPORTING EVIDENCE
Audio visual material prepared by NASA-0SSA for the SSAAC Strategic Planning 
Workshop. 1992. July 29 - August 2.
Logsdon. J.M. 1989. The survival crisis o f the U.S. solar system exploration 
programme. Washington, DC, NASA History Office, June.
NASA. 1991c. 1991 integrated technology plan for the Civil Space Programme.
Washington, DC.
NASA." 1994. Space science for the 21st Century: strategic plan for 1995-2000.
NASA Advisory Council, Committees, Subcommittees, Task Forces. 1995. Material 
obtained at NASA Library. Washington, DC.
NASA. 1994. FY 1996 budget to Congress office of space access & technology.
NASA. Management Instruction. Management o f major systems and projects. NMJ 
7120.4 A.
The NASA Mission. 1995. Statement and organisational charts for headquarters 
offices. Material obtained in NASA Library. Washington, DC.
NASA strategic plan. 1994. Washington, DC. Feb.
NASA strategic plan. 1994. Washington, DC. May.
NASA strategic plan framework. 1995. Parts of internal documents obtained in 
interview with Mr. Alan M. Ladwig. (Associate Administrator for Policy & Plans)
NASA Budget Press Conference. 1995.
NASA reinvention process review activities. 1994.
NASA. 1995. FY 1996 Budget Briefing. Feb. New Release.
NASA’s Office of Space Science and Applications: process, priorities, and goals. 
1992. Washington, OTA, Jan.
NASA’s Office of Space Science — Flight Programme Management Process Manual.
1994. Washington, DC. April.
National Space Transportation Policy. 1994. Presidential decision directive/NSTC- 
4. Aug. 5.
The National Science and Technology Council. (NSTC). 1994. FY 95 programme 
document. Mar. 17.
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Remarks prepared fo r  delivery by the honorable Robert S. Walker (Chairman of the 
Committee on Science - United States House of Representatives to the National 
Space Club). Washington, DC, Feb. 1995.
Rosetta Mission: surface science instruments for Champollion. 1995. Washington, 
DC, NASA Announcement of Opportunity, Mar. (AO N. 95-OSS-Ol).
Welcome to NASA. 1995. Washington, DC, Jan.
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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) - USA Space Agency
Dr. C.Kennel (Associate Administrator for Mission to Planet Earth) and Lisa Shaffer 
(Assistant Associate Administrator for External Coordination - Acting). Office of 
Mission to Planet Earth, NASA-HQ.
Dr. Wesley Huntress (Associate Administrator for Space Sciences). Office of Space 
Sciences, NASA-HQ.
Dr. Wayne Littles (Associate Administrator for Space Flight). Office of Space 
Flight, NASA-HQ.
Mr. Alan Ladwig (Associate Administrator for Policy and Plans). Office of Policy & 
Plans), NASA-HQ.
Mr. Michael Luther (Programme manager of UARS; Director for the Flight Systems 
Division of the Office of Mission to Planet Earth). NASA-HQ.
Mr. Robert H arris (Director of the Science Division of Mission to Planet Earth). 
NASA-HQ.
Dr. Alphonse Diaz (Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Sciences and 
Applications during the Mars Observer decision). NASA-HQ.
Mr. James Zimmerman (Representative of NASA in Paris. Represented NASA's 
space cooperation interests with all Western Europe).
CNES (Centre National d 'études Spatiales) - French Space Agency)
Mr. Michel Auger (Chief of the Division of the Programme of Research and 
Development at CNES).
Mr. Blamont (Scientific Advisor to CNES director general; professor at the 
University of Paris).
Mr. G. Brachet (Director of Programmes for Industry and Policy).
Mr. Jacques Breton (Director of Prospective Mission and Evaluation).
M r. Jean Jaques Sussel (Adjoint Director General).
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ESA (European Space Agency)
Mr. Barbera (In replacement of the Director for Manned Spaceflight and 
Microgravity).
M r. Roger Bonnet (Director of the Scientific Programme of ESA).
M r. F.Emilliani (Director of Earth Observation).
M r. F.Egstrom (ESA HQ).
M r. Livio Marelli (Remote Sensing officer in EarthNet/ESRIN-Italy).
Mr. Gerard Leroy (Director of Business Development of the Space Division in 
Aerospatiale).
INPE (Brazilian National Institute for Space Research)
Dr. Decio Ceballos (Director for New Satellites).
Dr. Oscar Pereira Dias (General Coordinator for Engineering and Special 
Technology).
Dr. Fernando Mendonca (Former INPE’s Director General).
Dr. Marcio Barbosa (INPE’s Director General at the time).
Other Space Agencies
(BNSC:British National Space Center, Russian/Canadian/Dutch Space Agencies)
Prof. David Southwood (BNSC; Chairman of ESA’s Space Science Committee; 
Head of the Physics Department at Imperial College).
M r D.Davis (BNSC).
M r D.Williams (BNSC; Assistant Director for Earth Observation Programmes).
M r Y.Milov(Head of Russian Space Agency).
M r K.H.Doetsch (Acting Director of the Canadian Space Agency).
Mr. DeHoop (Dutch Space Agency).
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APPENDIX 2
RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS AND ILLUSTRATIVE DATA 
DATA COLLECTION AND DATA ANALYSIS PHASES
A2.1 - Decision scenario + questionnaire (Phase 1 of Data Collection) -
Used as part of the Pilot Study -  Applied at the Brazilian National Institute 
for Space Research -  INPE -  Example of one of 4 answered questionnaires. 
A2.2 - Guide for the first-round semi-structured interviews (Phase 1 of 
Data Colllection) - Representatives of space organisations from USA, 
France, European Space Agency, Netherlands, Russia, England, Canada. 
A2.3a - Second-round "stimulated" interviews -  ESA, CNES and NASA 
(Phase 2 of Data Collection)- Extracts of one narrated interview from ESA 
+ Decision model employed to stimulate interview.
A2.3.b - Decision-making model used in the second round “stimulated” 
semi-structured interviews.
A2.4 -  Extracts of content analysis of data from second-round 
“stimulated” interviews. Sample: Interviews from CNES.
A2.5 -  Extracts from Case Study Interview on Mars Observer (Case 
studies data collection phase).
A2.6 — Extract of MO s Case Study Chronology (First stage of case 
studies data analysis).
A2.7 -  Extracts from one of the UARS case reports (From Case Studies 
Data Analysis Phase)
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A2.1 - Decision scenario + Questionnaire 
(Phase 1 of Data Collection -  Part of Pilot Study)
Note: Applied at the Brazilian National Institute for Space Research -  INPE -  
Example of one of 4 answered questionnaires by top manager of INPE.
My name is Rozane Silva and I have worked for the  Brazilian Space Research 
Institute (INPE) since 1982. Presently, I work as a Technological Development 
Analyst a t INPE’s Strategic Planning Group. As far as my academic background is 
concerned I did my degree in Economics and my MSc in System  Analysis and 
Applications, the  latter a t INRE. My MSc thesis w as related to  the Diffusion of 
Space Applications, with particular reference to  remote sensing technology. 
Currently, I am  undertaking a Phd in M anagement a t Imperial College (London), 
under the  supervision of Professor Sandra Dawson.
The study I am developing a t the moment, on behalf of INPE, aims to  better 
understand how  different space agencies make strategic decisions regarding R&D 
space programmes and how the nature of the  decision-making process relates to  
the final outcom es of the decisions made. The enclosed questionnaire is part of this 
research and is being sen t to  key decision-makers from 21 space organisations. I 
understand you are very busy, but I would be m ost grateful if you could dedicate 
some of your time to  complete the enclosed questionnaire. Your views are of great 
relevance to  my research.
If there is anything you would like to discuss or any points you would like to  clarify 
about the enclosed questionnaire or about my research as a whole, please let me 
know.
The information obtained through the questionnaire will be treated as strictly 
confidential. However, I will be very happy to  make the general findings of my 
research available to  you and your organisation.
Thank you very much for your valuable cooperation.
Tel: 071 589 5111 Ext.49146; 071 594 9146(Direct); 071 262 836 2  (Home) 
Fax: 071 823 7685
R.F. Silva
The Management School 
Imperial College 
'5 3 , Prince’s  Gate 
Exhibition Road 
London SW 7 2PG 
U.K.
fiu - do*
Scft>  d(*> C o ip r r s p ^ f j  S ?
cj& rtcl& n J
Rozdjre da Fonseca e Silva 
PhD studen t
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A
DECISION MAKING IN SPACE AGENCIES 
(Decision Scenario +  Questionnaire)
The attached material is designed to obtain information about how your organisation and 
others in the space sector make decisions on large R&D programmes. This information will 
remain strictly confidential. Therefore, the final results will not identify specific individuals 
or organisations.
The first section of this material describes how a hypothetical space agency made an 
important decision on a new R&D programme. The case is described in terms of 3 steps:
a) Generating alternatives;
b) Evaluating alternatives;
c) Integrating the decision.
This hypothetical case does not show how things should happen. It just gives an example 
of how things can happen.
The second section of this piece requires you to think about YOUR ORGANISATION and 
asks you to consider how such a case would have been tackled in YOUR ORGANISATION.
SECTION ONE: DECISION SCENARIO 
Introduction
By the middle of the seventies, some senior managers and engineers for the Space Agency 
XXX felt that the time was most appropriate for them to start thinking about acquiring or 
developing their own orbital remote sensing system. They believed that independence from 
international systems was highly desirable and even compelling, given the international trend 
of commercialization of remote sensing systems. They were worried that this trend could 
ultimately lead to the end of the Non-Discriminatory Policy of data distribution or even to 
prohibitive prices. Besides, a recent disruption on the services of the most important 
international system available at the time, due to technical problems, exposed their 
vulnerability in terms of ensuring the offer of remote sensing data for national users.
Some informal references to this subject were occasionally made during routine meetings with 
senior members of the organisation's administration. The point was eventually reached where 
it was felt that something more structured should be done.
The director general of the space agency then decided to assign this responsibility to the 
organisation's Strategic Planning Department, which immediately started a series of internal 
discussions to find an appropriate way of taking the matter further.
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It was decided that a "brain-storming" meeting should be arranged involving engineers and 
key managers regarded as having the potential to contribute with innovative ideas as well as 
to make critical comments on eventual alternatives.
p ie  decision about who should take part in the meeting was based only on the subjective 
judgment of the members of the Strategic Planning Department. A list of names was 
elaborated and the participants were consulted about their availability. A letter from the 
Director General stressing the relevance of their participation was enclosed. The first meeting 
was then arranged.
Step One - Generating Alternatives
The meeting gathered 15 persons in total, all of them insiders. Its membership ensured 
representation of the different interest groups within the organisation.
The first interest group, representing the area of space applications, stressed the essential role 
that would be played in the next decade by the remote sensing systems operating within the 
m icrow ave band. They came up w ith a proposal fo r the design , development and operation  
of a radar satellite system for remote sensing applications which would be comparable to 
other international systems presently in orbit or planned to be launched, such as ERS 1 and 
RADARS AT. They argued that they could largely benefit from the system's capability of 
pervading clouds (an advantage as opposed to optical systems), which would give them 
independence from the predominantly bad weather conditions, typical o f  som e reg ions o f  the ir 
country, making it feasible for the first time that longitudinal studies could be regularly 
carried out in these regions.
The second interest group came up with the proposal for a programme involving the design, 
development and operation of a series of small observation satellites, with conventional optical 
sensors, specifically defined to offer complementary data to the available international systems 
(filling in some existing information gaps), of direct interest to national projects. They argued 
that this alternative could be implemented without great risk and with practically no 
uncertainty about the technical feasibility of the project. That was justified on the grounds that 
the experience and know-how recently acquired by the space agency in successfully building 
a meteorological satellite could now  be applied to this project. The same platform could be 
employed and, subsequently, they could count on the availability of the same contractors for 
the development of specific sub-systems and components. Only the sensors would differ 
radically from the meteorological mission, but they had capacity to develop them within the 
laboratories of the space agency. They also had some previous experience developing similar 
sensors to be tested in an international mission, as part of a cooperation programme.
T he third interest group  advocated that they should try  and find a  technically advanced 
international partner lor the development of a cooperation programme. The programme would 
involve the development of a large remote sensing system, the ground station & control 
facilities and the mission centre. The space system would employ optical sensors and have 
ground resolution compatible with the international system they were using at the time. They 
believed that the proposed system would be able to provide a real alternative to the existing 
available remote sensing systems, without implying significant technical risks. Besides, this 
alternative cou ld  place the country, in a com peting  position in the m arket fo r optical rem o te  
sensing data. T hey  also  believed that this p ro ject w ould enable them partially to overcom e the
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3large technological gap existing between them and other bigger space agencies and to develop 
the kind of competence (at least in one or two subsystems) which would ultimately allow them 
to work in partnership in more sophisticated international missions in the future. Finally, they 
argued for the great industrial benefit which would stem from the project and the positive 
impact on the international image of (heir organization and country, giving them respectability 
as space partners.
Step Two - Evaluating the alternatives
The first of the three main ideas which emerged in the meeting was aggressively contested 
on the basis that it was not sensible for a country to undertake such an expensive and risky 
project alone, at a time of increasing international cooperation, which had gathered pace after 
the end of the cold war. It was also argued that they did not need radar data for the whole 
country, for the more conventional data, regularly obtained from international systems, were 
satisfactory for most of their regions. In that case they would really need to buy new data 
only for covering a small area of the country, which reduced still further the necessity for a 
national radar satellite system. Finally, the issue of the complexity of using radar data was 
brought to the attention of the participants. The user community was not prepared for using 
such sophisticated data and, even if the technological mission itself was a success, a high risk 
of failure in terms of the derived applications would remain.
The arguments against the proposal of the first interest group were accepted by the majority 
of the participants and no further discussion ensued.
As regards to the two other alternatives, a long debate followed on the pros and cons of each 
of them and it was made clear that no agreement could be reached without a more detailed 
analysis. It was agreed that the author of each alternative should prepare a written report in 
support of their proposal together with a feasibility analysis.
They were given two months to carry out the task and during this time no further general 
meetings took place. On the other hand, informal departmental meetings took place and 
further.information was collected.
Not long before the first discussions on the appropriateness of acquiring their own remote 
sensing system were held, a consultancy company had been hired by the Director General to 
develop a strategic plan for the space agency for thé next two decades. He alone had made 
the decision, without any consultation with other managers. He resented the lack of a general 
strategy for the organisation, which was making strategic decision-making much harder for 
himself and, In his view, had been the cause of several mistakes in the past. The consultancy 
work was about to start when the general "brain-storming" meeting, as mentioned In the 
In troduction , took place, it had been ag reed  that the first phase o f  the consu ltancy  should last 
five m onths and should re su lt in a set o f  gen era l guidelines fo r the organisation as well as 
fo r the d iffe ren t dep artm en ts . T h e  study  was to  take in to  acco u n t the weak and  strong aspects 
o f  the o rgan isa tio n , com b ined  w ith  an eva lu ation  o f  the  ex te rn a l en v iro n m en t, bo th  on  a  
national and in te rna tiona l level. It was dec id ed  then that the consultancy g ro u p  should re p o rt 
to the S tra teg ic P lann ing  D ep a rtm en t fo r gen era l guidance and any  in fo rm atio n  they  m ig h t 
need. T his phase did not include any m arket o r  fo recast s tud ies, w hich  w ere  to be d o n e  in 
subsequent ph ases o f  th e ir  ag reem en t.
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4After ihe "brain-storming" meeting the Director General decided it may be a good idea to 
wait for the first phase of the consultancy study to be concluded before they made a final 
decision on which alternative to choose. In this way, the final decision over which project to 
undertake would also take into account how well the project would fit into an overall long­
term strategy for the organisation. He spoke to the Strategic Planning Group and asked them 
to delay for 3 months any further meetings to discuss the two proposals. He did not feel this 
time would be critical in terms of starting the development of a new mission.
Step Three - Integrating the decision
After five months, the first phase of the consultancy study had been concluded and a general 
strategy for the organisation was approved in a general meeting one month later. Immediately 
after that, a commission (composed of members of the Strategic Planning Department and two 
engineers) was created to make further analyses on the two alternatives, in the light of the 
new directives set for the space agency. They were to produce a report in two weeks.
The analysis clearly indicated that the alternative of an international cooperative programme 
was the one which best fitted the overall organisation's strategy. This is due to the fact that 
it had been decided that all the large programmes proposed by the space agency should be 
very much in line with general priorities set tor space activities in the country. Such a course 
of action would increase the chances of obtaining political approval for the projects and of 
getting commitment of resources in the long-term. The government plan for space activities 
at the time assigned high priority to projects which could produce more tangible benefits to 
society and a higher prospect of return on investment. It also assigned high priority to the 
participation of the country in large international space missions. These government priorities 
clearly indicated a change of orientation in national space policy and exposed a reluctance to 
invest in high risk projects without sound guarantees of practical applications.
A general meeting composed of all the most important decision-makers in the organisation 
(from all areas) was held two months later. The two alternatives were presented, but the 
committee explained that they thought the second alternative should be chosen. A potential 
partner that had great know-how in most of the technical areas in which they did not have any 
previous experience had been identified. The feasibility study for the second alternative (as 
well as for the first) had proved satisfactory and within acceptable costs. They estimated that 
the whole project might be developed in a ten year period and would cost USS 200 millions 
to make the complete system operational.
Despite all the controversy and contradictory comments which followed the presentations 
mentioned above, the wish of the director general and senior managers prevailed over the 
arguments of the representatives of the other interest groups and the second alternative was 
chosen.
T he negotiation of the term s of th e  technological coo peration , fo llow ed by  the eng ineering  
design of the second alternative started  im m edia te ly  a fte r the m eeting . A t the  sam e tim e a  
com plete and deta iled  account of the project proposal w as to be  prepared  for submission to 
the ministry of state for space.
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5SECTION TWO: DECISION MAKING QUESTIONS 
How would things have been done in YOUR ORGANISATION?
INSTRUCTIONS: There are four sets of questions on the next several pages that ask you 
to indicate how YOUR ORGANISATION would have proceeded if it had to make a similar 
decision as described in Section One. You will be able to respond by simply making a check 
(X) or circling a number. However, before you begin to answer the questions please be aware 
that:
1. There are no correct answers. Simply answer each question by indicating what you believe 
would be done in YOUR ORGANISATION, based on your experience. For this research to 
benefit your organisation it is extremely important that you indicate how decisions are actually 
made in YOUR ORGANISATION, not how you think they should be made.
2. AlLouestions should be answered. This research is interested in how different space 
agencies make important decisions. Therefore, questions that may seem unrealistic for your 
organisation have been included for a specific reason. Please do not skip any questions or 
write in responses that are not listed. Simply make a check (X) or circle the number that best 
describes what would be done in YOUR ORGANISATION.
3. Following the Introductory Questions, 3 sets of questions are presented that refer to what 
would be done in YOUR ORGANISATION in each of the steps (1, 2 and 3) of the decision 
making case you have just read. Each set of questions refers to a particular step in the case. 
Finally, you will be asked to answer some questions of general nature.
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Introductory Questions:
The following questions are to assess how significant a decision such as the final one 
presented in the decision scenario would be for YOUR ORGANISATION.
1) How difficult would it be for YOUR ORGANISATION to secure the money to 
implement the decision?
Very Not difficult
Difficult at all
1
2) How difficult in technological terms would the decision be for YOUR 
ORGANISATION?
Very Very
Difficult _ Easy
Ï
3) How critical a problem would it be for YOUR ORGANISATION if the decision turned 
out a failure?
Very
Critical
Not Critical 
at all
?Step One Questions: Generating Alternnlivts
Questions 4-13 ask you to indicate what YOUR ORGANISATION would do to generate 
alternatives to the proposed project as described in the decision case. If you would like to 
refer back to Step One: Generating Alternatives in (he decision scenario, please do so.
To answer questions 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 below check the one choice that best describes what 
would be done in YOUR ORGANISATION.
4) In attempting to identify possible alternatives, YOUR ORGANISATION would (check 
only one):
 a) not be willing to rely on outsiders for any assistance
b) be willing to rely on outsiders to provide a small amount of assistance
 c) be willing to rely on outsiders to provide a moderate amount of assistance
 d) be willing to rely on outsiders for significant assistance
 e) rely entirely on outsiders if necessary
5) In YOUR ORGANISATION possible alternatives would be identified primarily through 
(check only one):
 a) the ideas of a single individual
 b) informal discussions
Yc) scheduled meetings
6) In YOUR ORGANISATION possible alternatives would be identified with the help of 
(check only one):
 a) extensive background analysis
X_b) some background analysis 
 c) no background analysis
7) In YOUR ORGANISATION an alternative would be dropped from further consideration 
primarily because it was judged unsatisfactory based on (check only one):
 a) the opinion of a single individual
 b) the opinion of several participants through informal discussions
y  c) the opinion of several participants through scheduled meetings
8) In YOUR ORGANISATION an alternative would be dropped from further consideration 
primarily because it was judged unsatisfactory based on (check only one):
 a) extensive b a c k g ro u n d  an a ly s is
^ _ b )  so m e b a c k g ro u n d  an a ly sis :
 c ) no  b a c k g ro u n d  analysis
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0*ies*ion 9: Simply make a check to indicate the number that is most annrnnriam fnr YflTTR 
ORGANISATION.
9) Approximately how many people would be directly involved in identifying alternatives for 
the proposed project?
 a) only 1
__b) 2-5 
_ c )  6-10 
j (d )  H-20 
_ e )  21-30 
_ J )  31-40 
__g) 41-50 
 h) more than 50
Question;; 10-13 ask you to indicate what YOUR ORGANISATION would do to generate 
alternatives. Please circle one number from I to 5 on each line, according to the options 
below.
The ontions for the answers are: Very Unlikely - I; Moderately Unlikely - 2: Neither 
Likely nor Unlikely - 3; Moderately Likely - 4; Very Likely - 5.
10) How likely is it that some of those involved in identifying alternatives would have 
significant expertise in:
a) project design and engineering
b) project management...
c) corporate planning......
d) project planning..........
e) national politics .
f) use of space technology for scientific and applications purposes
2 3  4
( 0  2 3 4
11) How likely is it that any of the following outsiders would be contacted to help identify 
possible alternatives:
a) individuals from other space agencies.................................. ,  ! &  
.. ï  CD 3
34:;: 0
b) Consultants/ experts on strategic planning ................ ii: 4 s
c) Consultants/ experts from the national space industry ... .. CD z 3 4 5
d) Consultants/ experts from the international space industry 3 (4) 5
e) National politicians ...................................................... # # # 3 4 0f) Consultants/ experts in market analysis.
technological forecasting and the like ....................................... 1 2 (5 ) 4 5
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The opîions for the answers wre: Very Unlikely - I. Moderately Unlikely - 2. Neither 
Likely nor Unlikely - 3, Moderately Likely - 4, Very Likely - 5.
12) How likely is it that each of the following factors would receive major emphasis in 
. eliminating early alternatives:
a) Available and expected fu n d in g .........................
b) Personnel capabilities needed ................
c) Time required to implement an alternative
d) Lack of previous experience with an alternative
e) Lack of governmental support for an alternative
1 2 3
' 2 dt
1 2 3
w w
13) How likely is it that the following professionals would take an active part in generating 
alternatives?
a) E n g in ee rs ............................
b) Scientists/Space Applications Exp
c) Technicians
d) M an ag ers ............................
e) Users (insiders and outsiders)
rts ' 3 &  5
I 6 '  3 4 5
1 ( J l  3 4, 5
1 2 3 A ) 5
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lv:ov.- ;i4. y eu io inniocv- wir:l >'OVR ORGANISATION1 \ ojld  do M 
n?lir-l'.U ]i i : r i ^ l k x i  £■■■>■'■"* :>• tl.v o-:ol dvpictvd in the ceoiiio:: i,e.;:tariu. If \ou  >vot>hi !ii:e to 
rerer i r e z . ,  to Kh:n_:,L,_T;\,,,;!n i,„jn;-„.ii e ANen.atiyr'- ir: tr.e JeeiAon i-eena::;), ple:ti.e do yo.
To anv,ver question! 1 4 .1 5  r.nd 1C bvlo'.v ciseclr the on.' oitoiee thr.t r‘,-A..":-'eriiv-, wl.at would 
be done in YOUR ORGANISATION.
I -11 In ev; :uatinp different niter;,utives to i; project sec it r.s tne one descriivcd in the decision 
case YOUR ORGANISATION would «check vnh pne):
 n) i,o: he willing to re A on outsiders for t-.r.y t-.ssisAnce
 b) be willing to rely on one or two outsider: to provide staul! r.n.our.t cf ac.dstnnce
.N.c> he willing, to rely cn one ;,r two outsider.' to provide moderate nmount o f  assistance
 d) he willing to rely on outsiders for significant r...■ -.stance
 et rely vnoreiy on outsiders If neces/ury
1 5 )  In YOUR ORGANISATION a uecision to undciinLe o">c o f the specified alternatives 
wisuit! l-.v octet mined pi'iniueily Üituur h (uiuvi: only onp::
 ;A the iucu:. o f a sing It indo. idua'
K i i  In YOUR ORGANISATION ;. uccudon to uu_cr:; l u  or.e o f tnc >pce:t:cU alternat:'.cs 
w o1'id uv. ueteririnvd primurily Otough fcîivc!: only opr;;
 a) extensive background analysis
 c). no background analysis
To roe; ver cnva'.i n.s IT ; nr. I If tin.oiv inula ;. euccd to ;n,j:a: tv tin: uuiui-cr that is -ye-.t 
îtPITJTYÎ':-- tor Y' 'UR GRG XNISATION.
17) Approxiina mi y !\:w  it.any people v. ouid he c'ueetly involved in obtain:;.p informr.tion and 
eat,dueling an.'y.ueu to (Uternii: u tne h.-%t .. t e : e to he p.ar.aed icdteci; uni y one;:
__d) 11-20
_ f )  3M 0 
__g) 41-50
 h) more than 50
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1£) A^proximrîe'y h c v  h r  in y..-:.; - v o j id  nny a:;;Jy.sÏ5. and calcnir.h:):/ f v.y. :narL(: 
c:u«iw. :ac-hn.-iop3;;i icrwons: iV.:d;oM to w.dvrnv :!:-_• rJrarradv;-,. rc -chcai:
 a) K v proiv-rdvT ,-^ui;.' ‘v  r.ndc
j^b) 3 years or less
..„>•) ' - ( '  } -.v.r;.
 ci; 7 - 9  \ j ^ : s
 v) 10-If yean
 0  16-7;; year:;
 l) more than 20 y can
n j :K S T I ( ) \S .J ^ 2 J  :-m: ;•» in ; ! :a n a  w i.n t  m . ! R  f'K fl \N IS A r=7C>N would do in
s.:an ;s  ir;e c:x-:, describe.: in ine deoiaon ;\:,v. Idvaxe circle one
nundicr frvn; i m 5 in c  j :  '-ne. ;; vur.iinc !a tin  oytion;. I eiev..
Ti.!:‘Jdi:LX.L_litI_:ilUtL'7JL U : / :  Vf."} rnllK el) - I .  Modi-ratvix VulikLlv - 2 , N citlicr  
Like!) r.or t'ni;kvl< - è , M od -.m u h  Likv!> - -I, N't-ry Likely - 5.
19} Kov. ii!:clx ::< :n ','OVL ULCj/.NiSA Ti; ;N tin1.; - ;:nn o f  ihn.,.- i::voiv_ti in naVdr.n
deciLons : ucr the one de.-crrtvd in tire dennun cn- e^ v.oeid in va ^r^çaiUjtll'L-irJ;:--
a) project design and engineering
b) project management
c) corporate planning
d) project planning ...............
e) national politics ...............
20} How iikdy is it that arty o! titc îbüuwin:: iMlfrid-T- ccvuld rv a;ivci : • yr^vidc 
inforrr.ation r :  advic;- r;tore tire dccisxra ;s atattvV
a) Individuals from other space agencies ...........................
b) Consultants/ experts on strategic planning ...............
c) Consultants/ experts from the national space industry ...
d) Consultants/ experts from the international space industry
e) National politicians ...................................................
f) Consultants/ experts in market analysis, 
technological forecasting and the like ...........................
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3 M l S
^ L L T ^ i l ^ f o ^ ^ i ^ r ^ r ; - :  V ery l-'uH i.m  - i .  VotWmu-U U n lik  j v  - 2 . N d d u -r  
i^sl.ily n o r  L n h k c h  - .i. .^:>u-;n;u-!> IJks-îy - .î, \'v r y  L Ik fh  - f .
*:i)  Ir. tl^uiK’ÿ to urdvru.kv c s -v if lo  rroivut iu:!, t.s :i,c ui.j c i^ cr ib -i iî; tii^ :i-iM on  
t--,t..arir- ! ou r.i.a.y i£ :t iîial c.:-:.!i i>t tl.e ioiknvin;: criteria v.o-.tiu bo u;.ud:
a) specific reium on investment
b) technological benefits
c) scientific benefits ...............
d) social benefits ...............
e) political benefits ...............
f) large spectrum of applications
g) impact on organisation's image and influence
h) fits within organisation's expected funding capabilities
22) How likely is it that any proposal documents would:
a) include financial analysis..............................................................  ;
b) address the feasibility of implementation ... ...............  %
c) state the assumptions on which the project evaluation was based I
d) provide contingency plans for possible occurrences .......  I
e) attempt to identify a wide range of outcomes for each alternative 1
f) directly compare several alternatives ....................................... ;
23) In deciding to undertake a new project such as the one described in the decision scenario 
how likely is it that the analysis in YOUR ORGANISATION would:
a) include a tentative equipment configuration
b) specify the desired level of technical sophistication
c) analyze the market for similar technologies
d) include feasibility studies......................................
e) specify funding ................................................%
24) How likely is if that the following prolessionals would take an active part in evaluating 
alternatives?
a) E ngineers.......................................
b) Scientists/Space Applications Experts
c) Technicians ...........................
d) M anagers......................................
e) Users (insiders and outsiders)
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Sleo Three Questions - Infecmline a drrkmn
P u i o n s  2^31 below ask you to indicate what you think YOUR ORGANISATION would 
do to iolfitel^I&A d ecision  such as the  one described  in the dec ision  scenario  in to  the overall 
strategy tor your organisation. (Even if your organisation does not have a formal strategy, 
you should still answer the questions below based on what would be done in YOUR 
ORGANISATION to try and ensure that the decision to be made is compatible to more 
general organisational interests and goals.)
To answer questions 25-28 below check the choice that best describee what would 
be done in YOUR ORGANISATION.
25) In determining how the decision would impact on its overall strategy YOUR 
ORGANISATION would: '
a) not be willing to rely on outsiders for any assistance 
j&b) be willing to rely on one or two outsiders to provide a small amount of assistance
 c) be willing to rely on one or two outsiders for a moderate amount of assistance
 d) be willing to rely on outsiders for significant assistance
^_e) rely entirely on outsiders
__f) there would be no consideration of the decision's impact on overall strategy
26) In YOUR ORGANISATION the process of integrating the decision into the overall 
strategy would take place primarily, in:
 a) the mind of a single executive
 b) informal discussions
j&c) scheduled meetings
27) In YOUR ORGANISATION the process of integrating the decision into the overall 
strategy would take place primarily through:
_ a )  extensive analysis (e.g. written strategic plans) 
j(_b) some analysis 
 c) no analysis
28) Departments or areas affected by the decision would be:
 a) informed of the decision after it was made
 b) informed of progress as the decision was being made
j^c) involved in making the original decision
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To answer question 29 simply make a check to indicate the number that is most 
mnnronriate for YOUR ORGANISATION.
29) Approximately how many people would be directly involved in integrating the decision 
into an overall strategy in YOUR ORGANISATION (check only one):
__a)5"orless 
Kb) 6-10 
_ c )  11-20 
_ d )  21-30 
_ e )  31-40 
__f) 41-50 
  g) more than 50
Questions 30-32 below also ask you to indicate what YOUR ORGANISATION would do to 
integrate a decision, such as the one described in the decision scenario, into an overall 
strategy. Please circle &n& number from I to 5 on each line, according to the options below.
The options for the answers are: Very Unlikely - I, Moderately Unlikely - 2, Neither
Likely nor Unlikely - 3, M oderately Likely - 4 , Very Likely - 5 .
30) How likely is it that some of those involved in integrating a decision, such as the one 
described in the decision scenario, into the overall strategy for YOUR ORGANISATION
would have sienificant expertise in:
a) project design and engineering ;.. ... ... ... ...
b) project management ..............................................................
c)corporateplanning ... ... ... ... ...
d) project p la n n in g ..........................................................................
e) national politics ............... ... ... ... ...
f) use of space technology tor scientific and applications purposes
31) How likely is it that any of the following outsiders would be asked to help ensure that 
the decision contributes toa coherent strategy for YOUR ORGANISATION:
a) individuals from other space agencies ... ... ...
b) consultants/ experts on strategic planning ...........................
c) consultants/ experts from the national space industry ...............
d) consultants/ experts from the international space industry
e) national politicians ..............................................................
f) consultants/ experts in market analysis, 
technological forecasting and the like .......................................
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The omions for (he answers nre: Very Unlikely - I, Modcmlely Unlikely - 2, Neither 
Likely nor Unlikely - 3, Moderately Likely - 4, Very Likely - 5.
32) How likely is it that the following professionals would take an active part in integrating
the decision into an overall strategy for YOUR ORGANISATION?
a) E ng ineers....................................................................... 1 2 3 4 ®
b) Scientists/Space Applications Experts ........................... ... 1 2 3 4 (5;
c) Technicians ..........................................................................  1 @  3 4 5
d) Managers ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1 2 3 4 ®
e) Users (insiders and outsiders) ..................................................  1 2 A )  4 5
:1
16
■eta
Highly Comprehensive &
Inclusive
Simplihed
7
e * »
Highly Comprehensive & 
Inclusive Highly
Simplified
* e i
Highly Comprehensive & t,. . ,
Inclusive
Simplified
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36) Compared to 10 years ago, how difficult is it for a space agency to be "successful"
Much more Much less
difficult difficult
today today
37) How many years have you worked for this organisation? =2/4 Years
38) How long have you been in your present position? -K Years
39) How many years have you worked for the space sector? (or with space related activities?)
40) Approximately how long did you take to complete (his exercise? 6 ^  Minutes
41) Are there any further comments or remarks you would like to make?
Thank you very much for taking the time and trouble to complete this questionnaire
A2.2. GUIDE FOR FIRST-ROUND SEMI-STRUCTURED
INTERVIEWS 
(PHASE 1 OF DATA COLLECTION)
(Made with top managers from space organisations from USA, France, European 
Space Agency, Netherlands, Russia, England, Canada)
Initial Comments:
The purpose of this interview is to obtain information on how your organisation 
makes important decisions. The focus is on decisions involving large R&D space 
projects/programmes.
The answers should be based on your personal judgment and experience within the 
organisation.
The content of this interview will remain strictly confidential, for the final results 
will not identify participants individually.
Interview: (recording)
1) Introduction -  Date and name of the organisation
Questions:
2) Your name and position, please.
3) How long have you been working for this organisation and what is your 
length of service in your present position?
4) What are the major problems currently facing your organisation (both at the 
national and international level)
5) Which would you say to be the most important sources of uncertainty and 
complexity involving strategic decision-making processes in your 
organisation and how do you see their influence over the way the decisions 
are made, their implementation and final outcomes?
6) What are the main external forces significantly influencing decision-making 
in your organisation (e.g. stakeholders, political lobby, need for public 
support etc)
7) Taking into account the most usual criteria to classify a decision as strategic 
(e.g. decisions involving large amounts of resources -  both human and 
material -  and which can threaten the organisation’s survival), could you give 
examples of projects or programmes developed by your organisation which 
could be considered as strategic?
8) Aiming at better understanding the criteria for assessing the successfulness of 
decisions (in terms of their outcomes), could you mention an example of a 
decision you see as particularly successful or non-successful and justify?
(More specific questions on how the organisation makes strategic decisions)
9) Would you say that there is a significant discrepancy amongst the ways 
distinct strategic decisions are made in your organisation or would it be more 
accurate to say that there is a standardized process of decision-making? 
(taking into account, for instance, the initial stimulus for the decision, the 
nature of participation, the criteria to select and evaluate alternatives etc)
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(Initial Stimulus)
10) How a new programme/project most often emerges within the organisation? 
How the need or opportunity for developing a new programme is perceived 
by the organisation and how it turns into a new programme/project proposal?
(Comprehensiveness and nature of participation)
11) Assuming that a decision of the same kind as the ones previously mentioned 
was to be made today, who would most likely participate in the decision­
making process and what would be the degree of involvement? (e.g. 
professional profile -  scientists, engineers, technicians, politicians, planners; 
in which phase of the process; active or passive participation etc)
12) Could you give the names and positions of the most important decision­
makers in your organisation, so that they can be contacted in the subsequent 
phase of the research?
(Implementation Phase)
13) Which are the main difficulties your organisation usually has to face during 
the implementation phase of the decisions made which can seriously affect 
their final outcomes?
14) Does your organisation make any sort of contingency plans for uncontrollable 
problems in both internal and external environment?
15) How do you see the formal planning process in your organisation and its 
relationship with the strategic decision-making processes & implementation 
of decisions?
(Outcomes)
16) How do you see the influence of unpredictable factors and chance over the 
final outcomes of the strategic decisions made in your organisation?
(Integration)
17) Does your organisation attempt to integrate the decisions made into an overall 
strategy?
(General)
18) Do the costs involved in decision-making are taken into account in your 
organisation? How?
19) In your belief what, if anything, should be done in order to improve the 
strategic decision-making on R&D programmes in your organisation and with 
which priority:
• changes in the level of participation in the decisions;
• use of additional and more advanced management techniques(which 
ones);
• use of external consultancy;
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• improvements on the information system, trying o reduce uncertainty;
• search for agreement and consensus in order to get commitment and 
facilitate implementation;
• integrate the decisions into an overall strategy
365
A2.3.a. SECOND-ROUND ^STIMULATED” INTERVIEWS 
NASA, CNES AND ESA 
(PHASE 2 OF DATA COLLECTION)
(Extracts of one narrated interview from ESA 
+ Decision model employed to stimulate interview)
INTERVIEW WITH SUBSTITUTE OF DIRECTOR OF MANNED 
SPACEFLIGHT AND MICROGRAVITY FOR ESA
Sept. 12, 1995 ESA HQ -  Paris
(He was shown the model)
TAPE 1 -  SIDE A (Real beginning of the interview)
He found the model very useful to structure the discussion, because it was applicable, 
mutatus mutandis to their own reality.
He said the pre-approval phase of a programme in the Agency is complex, mainly for 
two reasons. The first of them being the need for raising funding and getting 
consensus of several countries. The second reason is that the position of the countries 
is driven sometimes from political (strategy) objectives, but more often by the 
interests of individual users community (e.g. scientific community, earth observation 
users community etc) inside each country.
Then he talks about the mandatory and optional programmes. He mentions that in the 
first case, the budget and the participation of each member state is fixed. Then, they 
only have to choose the programmes. Thus, the funding uncertainty is removed. So, 
what remains uncertain is the selection o f a specific mission, but for that there is 
an established system o f committees and there is a process o f convergence ... 3 or 
4 phase As, some go to phase B ...Thus, this programme is more organised and 
established.
Talking specifically about his programme (large space infra-structure, in particular 
for manned spaceflight), he said it is quite unique. His programme derived 
(originated) from an international initiative, it derived from a decision in the US in 
the early 80s to (continue to?) build the space station. They took the decision to open 
the programme to international cooperation. The US officially made an invitation to 
several potential international partners, amongst with it was ESA (they had received 
the invitation from President Reagan). So, the origin o f their programme was very 
political. Europe responded positively to that invitation in 1985. So, they had to start 
discussing what could be their role and also they needed to set up the rules governing 
this cooperation (who is in charge, how much to pay, what would be the use of this 
facility ...). Thus, his programme started as a result of an external imput.
...He talks a bit about the complexity of the space station programme.
The only programme they had at the moment was the space station and some other 
specific cooperation agreements to fly astronauts, for instance. But this is not really a 
programme.
R. How do you work together, what sort of problems you are likely to face in the 
implementation ... ?
... He then said what they had in Europe was an authorisation and the funding from 
member states (calling?) up to that phase. (Their initial commitment was only up to 
phase B or definition. There was no long-term agreement). After the initial positive 
response of ESA to the US invitation they spent 2,5 years in this definition phase
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(phase A and B). In the meantime they made an agreement with NASA to cooperate 
in this phase, even though it was not joint development. Then, in 1987 they got 
approval from the member states to go into phase C/D. He recalled that the key for 
financing this programme is not fixed and mentions that each member is totally free 
to decide to participate and how much money to put in it. Then he said that the 
difficulty at this stage is to manage to match the contribution that each country is 
willing to give with the anticipated costs of the mission. He added that sometimes 
they don’t succeed. He explained that they prepare a proposal for the programme, 
with the technical definition, with the programmematic definition in terms of costs 
and calendar, and they submit this proposal to their member states .. He recalled that 
there are specific bodies of government that look after their programme and meet at 
regular intervals. There is one specific programme board which deals with manned 
spaceflight and the members of the programme boards are representatives for the 
countries.
The proposal is prepared by them (in his department). (He then showed me how a 
proposal for a phase C/D looked like. He mentioned all the major items involved and 
one of them was the association of that programme with other programmes they had 
in the Agency. The overall proposal involved technical elements, costs, features, 
performance etc etc.)
He agreed that his office decides on the project definition, on the involvement of 
industry.
He said at that point (for the space station, probably) they had done phase A, they 
had done phase B and they were then discussing a proposal for phase C/D and part of 
the phase E. He said that the funding was first specific for phase A, then they got 
approval and funding just for phase B and then they needed approval again to move 
on.
I recalled that in the case of the science programme they used funds from the 
general budget to undertake phase A. He said in the optional programmes they 
could not do that, they needed specific approval. But he recalled that because 
these two phases are not so long neither so expensive the approval is not as 
difficult as in the case of phase C/D. He said actually what was making this 
approval even more difficult was the operations part, as they would need 
significant funds to operate the facility (space station). In their particular case, the 
operations costs were going to be more important or much more than usual than the 
development costs.
He also mentioned another case which is the development of a launcher. He said they 
have a very important development cost, but then once it is developed there is no 
further cost. They do just the development and then, as soon as it becomes 
operational, it is up to a commercial entity to run it, to get the profit or losses from it. 
They don’t have operational costs for this kind of programme.
When I asked about how comprehensive they were in terms of concerning with all 
possible problems that could develop in the implementation phase, in the operations 
phase etc, he said that generally they are.
Then, he said that usually the first phases get through more easily because it is 
cheaper, faster etc. He said that these parts are also responsible for the marketing 
o f the programme. They are trying to sell it. He said there is a certain tendency to 
sell the programme at a lower cost than the real one, because if there are technical 
uncertainties, the idea is that during the phase C/D they will solved them.
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He said they are dealing with very advanced technologies, so very often even the best 
engineer can not anticipate all the difficulties and costs which will be associated with 
a certain mission.
He continued saying that there is a tendency that at phase A and B people tend to be 
a bit easy going and leave to the later phase of development sometimes the solution 
of technical problems that could have been anticipated. He said even when there are 
justifiable reasons for underestimating the programme, he said that for politicians 
even the best engineering arguments sometimes are not enough. And in the end, he 
added, this could have a “boomerang” effect on the credibility of the programmes 
and create a sort of “disaffection?” amongst the political authorities, which could say 
that this space business became an expensive toy amongst a restrict group of people 
and we know that when they ask for x it is going to cost 5X.
He said that this is not justifiable anymore. He said the programme he was running  
was becoming more like an industrial programme, a serious business, not a 
university thing ...
Comment: He seems to suggest that they do purposely underestimate programmes 
sometimes. And this goes against what has been suggested by all the other ESA 
interviewees, who actually kind of praised ESA for being more precise, as precise as 
possible when estimating costs.
I made a comparison with the science programme saying that they have to be more 
precise in the cost estimates because they work with a stricter budget, with less 
flexibility, and it is difficult for them to get extra money for a project.
Mr. Barbera agreed with the first assertion but said that, regarding the difficulty to 
get extra money, the mechanism for it was the same for all over the Agency, 
including optional and mandatory programmes.
He said what happens is that in the science programme, the participants are very keen 
in controlling the expenditures, since they are obliged to pay, it is not their choice, 
they are also more critical. In the optional programme, sometimes the specific 
interest of one or more countries (for technological, political or strategic or any other 
kind of reason) makes them very committed, very supportive of one programme. 
Then, when the programme is facing some financial difficulties these countries feel 
more obliged to attend to them, because they were the ones who actually pushed for 
the programme at the beginning. Then, he said that apart from this stronger or 
weaker support the mechanism for extra funds is the same in the Agency.
When the development of a programme is approved, the full budget is 
committed, contrary to what happens in NASA where the budget is released 
year by year and it is uncertain. In their case, once the programme is approved, 
the funding (the approved funding) for this programme is secure until the end.
If there are no cost overruns the commitment is irreversible. (R. Every time you 
approve a programme you also have to have full agreement on the budget? He said 
yes).
When a country faceS financial difficulties, they try to find a mechanism to help that 
country during that year or the period when this is necessary. So, they could pay less 
in one year and more in another, but their obligation, their commitment remains.
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A2.3.b. Decision-making model used in the second round 
“stimulated” semi-structured interviews
(D *
^ s* A
/>
4; o
0 +*
*  <4*
e  e
«  B
# *
B Bk H
A A
Bk w
A V
CO
:
B.
B
1
K
A
G  0 3
60 O
a
o  o D-t «—5 o  o
CL O
5 #8
M  CL
% "O
Q U
<  CL
369
A2A. EXTRACTS OF CONTENT ANALYSIS OF DATA FROM
SECOND-ROUND "STIMULATED" INTERVIEWS 
SAMPLE: CNES
(Note: All information provided by all CNES informants was grouped in categories 
and answers from different respondents were compared to get insight on each of the 
categories observed. Contradictory evidence was cross-checked, when possible, with 
documentary evidence & archival data.)
C N E S
INFLUENTIAL ASPECTS ON DECISIONS
SUSSEL
National culture, space policy, sciences community, industry (but not as much as in 
the US or other countries like Germany and the UK), budget cuts (even though for 
CNES seemingly and usually this was not as serious a problem as it was for the US.
- international pressure and industrial lobby can be factors in making the Congress 
interfering a bit more in space, but never too much as in the US anyway.
- The members of ESA can put pressure for France to take part in some programmes, 
thus some decisions on involvement in some programmes are made basically due to 
political pressure coming from the participants of ESA
- The space policy in France does seem to guide decisions in general and to be a 
strong factor in decision-making in France
- Agrees that despite the politics involved it is also important to do a good technical 
work.
BRACKET
External factor: decisions made by partners 
BLAMONT
When talking about the TOPEX programme, he mentioned the decisive influence of 
one minister who had interest on the programme (thus showing how power can be 
decisive) and also he mentioned a number of people intervening in favour of the 
project (thus showing the existence and importance of lobbying -  probably the 
authorities -  in favour of a programme)
He mentioned forces outside CNES which did not want them to have a programme 
of small scientific satellites (this basically influencing internal decisions). When 
asked about which forces, he mentioned the minister of finances, for instance.
See above for details: Thus, national culture can be very relevant in connection 
with making decisions faster and easier (my comment).
Another kind of influential factor, (mentioned by Mr. Blamont) was the fact that in 
France it is very common that there is an interchange of players, such as people from 
the ministry of finances coming to work at CNES. They would then bring their 
understanding of their department, as well as the support of their friends.
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- He drew attention to one important aspect, according to him: the dishonesty. He 
said that very often you lie when you want to have a project, you live many things 
disclosed. I think space and all modern technology is very dishonest. If they 
would explain first of all what is the real objective and second how much it 
would cost, then they would, (everything would fail)”...(Comment: this is an 
important aspect to consider, as this might have influence on findings, e.g. 
analysis of outcomes vis a vis stated objectives, or analysis of performance in 
terms of costs). Thus, this seems to be also a strategy for programme approval 
He said I should approach this aspect, as nobody wants to mention it. This dishonesty 
has to do with hiding the real objectives, for instance, like in the case of the Shuttle.
- Also drew attention to the fact that good management is important. Even 
suggested that a good study, a good understanding o f the complexity o f the project, 
can be more important than politics. He gave the examples of Arianne and 
Guyanna. And the counter example of Hermes.
AUGER
He mentioned politics and industrial influence, and the power of one person as, in 
some cases, being responsible for the decision to carry out a project. And he gave the 
example of Hermes. (My comment: All that basically interferes with a rational 
decision-making process).
BRETON
Also suggests that politics is an issue and that decisions could be made first by 
somebody who has the power (“I decide that I will do the Space Centre Guyanna, 
I decide that I shall do Ariane or so” -R: the French Government, he meant.)
And he mentioned other non-rational aspects which could influence decisions: “ It 
is a mixture o f position o f yrestise. self “affirmation”.
Him too, in accordance with what another interviewee said, suggested that lying 
is part o f the process. ( “. . . if we present the situation very clear cut, figure and so 
on, it doesn’t leave room for ambitious generation, visionary, well, it is a 
problem, It is true that unfortunately the big spatial decisions they have often 
been like that . They have been done in a not very rational way and when the 
decision is a bad one this "poisons” the whole scenario.”)
BUDGET AND FUNDING PROBLEMS
SUSSEL
Said their budget does suffer cuts like everywhere else, but their cuts usually are not 
very significant and usually is less than in the other areas. In that particular year they 
had a cut without precedents which would probably make them stop a programme (a 
very rare thing to happen). The options then to absorb the budgetary cut were to stop 
a programme in its beginning to avoid further damages or to reprogramme some 
existing programmes.
He said they defend their budget based on “political rationality” and they have 
managed well so far
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BRACKET
He gave the impression, as opposed to what other interviewees said, that every year 
they do have to fight for the budget of each project (the others said the budget is 
discussed as a whole, not by project). But maybe he was talking about getting the 
right amount of money for each project internally? But he said usually their fight 
for budget of the projects is marginal, within 10% of the requested value (not 
much, by the way). He said that their ministry would prevent big cuts in their 
budget from happening.
He said that what happens to NASA, that the Congress discuss even the merits 
of a project 7, 8 years after it has been approved, does not happen in CNES or 
in ESA or in Germany. It does happen to Italy, though, he said. Except for Italy, 
he said that once the commitment is made to a programme, the decision is not put 
in question any longer in the following years.
He explained that with Hermes, the decision to stop the programme was made at a 
stage where the programme had not been formally approved yet. (Seemingly it was 
in phase B, even though it had already consumed a lot of money.
Comment: So, in France and ESA, once the decision has been made, the only 
main thing that can bring uncertainty into the project is the actual level of 
annual funding, but even that, it is usually not much. Well different from the 
US.
BLAMONT
He talks a bit about the budget process in France and the importance of the ministry 
of finance in saying the last (or almost last) word and of the prime minister.
AUGER
Suggested I would talk to Mr. Sussel about budget.
Regarding the influence of the parliament on decisions: “In France the parliament 
interfere very little with the choice o f the project, or basically it doesn ’t interfere at 
all ..It will interfere maybe on the global envelope o f  the (research), o f the budget 
o f CNES, but it interferes very little, it does not interfere with the choice o f a 
project”.
When asked if the parliament could cut the CNES budget proposed by the prime 
minister he said that that never happened. He agreed that at the level of CNES the 
budget would be approved, once proposed (??). (similar to what happens in Brazil.) 
But said I should discuss that with Mr. Sussel.
He explained that it was always the ministry of budget that would cut the budget, not 
the Congress. And that the Congress, the whole thing was very political, if the 
majority supported the government, then they are going to approve what the 
government proposes. There might be some changes but that would be about very 
important things. He implied that these would not come down to the level of CNES 
and that the budget was treated globally, in the case of CNES, as the envelope . He 
added: “Well, there is a whole thing.. and this budget generally is taken globally, 
so it is the executive which is (allpowerful), surely. ”
He mentioned that when they have budget problems, usually it does not affect the 
large programmes or even whole programmes. It affects usually small programmes
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which are at the beginning and can be stopped. And usually they try to cut down on 
scientific experiments and if necessary then they might have to stop a programme. In 
that case, they try to stop a programme (or scientific experiments) which are in the 
earlier phases. Often they have to delay programmes. But seemingly, all these 
decisions are almost always left for CNES to decide. And once the project has been 
started they don't go back before the parliament fo r decisions.
He said they did not have an example of an important programme that they had 
stopped after approval (?). He stressed that CNES have a certain freedom to propose 
the necessary economies. The government does not give them an ultimatum like: you 
should stop this programme or things like that. The exception is, for political 
reasons, when it involved ESA, as in that case, the government might say: you 
don't change these, because they involve European commitments. Then, they have 
to make the savings in the national programme. He added that the government 
tends to be very firm in the part o f  their budget regarding the ESA's commitments. 
(My comment: Thus, even in relation to the executive, it seems that CNES still 
retains quite a lot of freedom to decide how to adjust to budgetary cuts).
He mentioned that once they go into the implementation phase they try not to make 
use of funding from the R&D department to complement the project’s budget, they 
try to work within the budget of the project.
BRETON
Also said that basically budget cuts are usually within a reasonable small margin so 
they can organize themselves quite well, as they know more or less what to expect. 
As he said, even though the budget is France is also annual, it is not as fragile as it is 
in the US. He also mentioned that they do not discuss project by project when it 
comes to budget (meaning the parliament, probably).
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A2.5. EXTRACTS FROM CASE STUDY INTERVIEW 
ON MARS OBSERVER 
NASA HQ - Washington DC 
April 7 th, 1995
Note: Extract from transcribed interview.
Legend: I = interviewee R = interviewer 
Your name and position, please.
I. My name is Alphonso Diaz, my position is Deputy Associate Administrator for Space 
Sciences.
R. Length of service within the organisation and in your present position.
1.1 have been in my present position since 1989, so that is about 6 years, and I am with 
NASA 30 years.
R. Could you tell me a bit more about your previous experience within the space sector, 
your background?
I. I have always worked in space science while in NASA, except for, in my career, 
except for a brief period when I was in the technical services business with General 
Electric, but otherwise I have always been in space science. I started at Langley 
Research Centre where I stayed for 15 years, 10 years of which I worked on the Viking 
project, where I was an instrument developer. And then in 19811 came to NASA HQ as 
a planner, an advanced planner in the Planetary Division, and since that time have 
moved through various positions to the one that I am in now. And some of the ones that 
I have been in, I was the programme manager for Galileo, for Ulysses, I was the Deputy 
Division Director for the Planetary Division, I was the director of strategic planning for 
the Space Station for a while and this job.
R. It is very impressive.
I. And very exciting.
R. The main thing that I would like to discuss with you today is the decision-making 
process on MO, because I know you have been directly involved in this decision. So, 
there are some things I would like to ask you, about your opinions and according to 
your recollections of what it was or how it was like. So, first of all, about the initial 
stimulus. I know that there was, at least from what I read, there was a previous strategy 
which was defined for planetary missions and then a mission like MO was defined to 
meet this strategy. Is that correct?
I. Yes. The way all of our programmes are formulated is that we begin with a strategy 
for exploration or science that comes to us from the National Academy of Sciences. 
And that strategy is used to develop various programme options, different sizes of 
programmes, to see how small or large a bite we want to take in each project for the 
strategy.
R. So, the National Academy of Sciences is always providing you with this strategy, 
overall strategy for science.
I. Yes, and they typically update those on, I think it is 3 to 5 years, and they do it for a 
10-year period of time. So we always know more or less what they are thinking about 
for the next 7 to 10 years. And what questions they have, based on their knowledge of 
the field at the time. And we have various committees in the National Academy, 
including Astrophysics, Space Physics, and various planetary committees. We use those 
to develop a strategic plan. At the time that we developed the plan for the MO there was 
a general decline in the space sciences. We had not, after completing the Viking project
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we had started two very large projects in the 1979 or 80 time frame, they were Galileo 
and what became the Hubble Space Telescope. But by and large most of our resources 
were going into those two major projects. The planetary programme had more or less 
been, since Galileo there had been no major investments made in it. And a strategy was 
devised because of the feeling about the budgetary climate, that involved essentially a 
contract with the Administration that said that we will do a set of projects in planetary 
that would not exceed about $250 or $300 million dollars each, if they would allow us 
to do some extended, some missions that would follow in sequence. We did many 
studies and found that there were several projects that could be very much alike, a Mars 
Orbiter was one, a Lunar Orbiter was another, there was an asteroid mission and so 
forth. And we were successful in persuading the Administration that we should be 
allowed to do this serious of missions, and the first one that was selected was a Mars 
Orbiter mission which we then called the Mars Observer because we later called the 
whole line of spacecraft the Observers, more or less to characterize them in a way that 
they were much simpler and focused more on continuous observation as opposed to 
exploration.
R. Would you say that this strategy was mainly defined to meet Administration...
I. To meet a budgetary environment, that was from the Administration, from the 
Congress, yes.
R. So you had to accommodate these constraints in your strategy.
I. Right. The strategy actually involved trying to gain some efficiencies in doing all of 
these missions by building a spacecraft bus, a carrier spacecraft that was more or less 
insulated from the payload in the sense that the carrier spacecraft was a very simple 
spacecraft, it could be like a communications satellite, and it was separated from the 
scientific payload, scientific investigations by a physical interface that separated the 
complex part of the mission from the simple part of the mission. We had convinced 
ourselves through studies was that if we did that we could do the carrier spacecraft very 
cheaply and concentrate our resources on building a very good scientific payload. And 
so that is what led us to the Mars Observer and in fact that is what led us to the problem. 
R. So, that was also the origin of the problem. So, would you say that the strategy was 
politically correctly defined but not feasible?
I. It was feasible, but.. I separate problems encountered in my experience into two 
different categories and it is convenient that you have your picture this way. One in the 
pre-project and then in project implementation. There are two kinds of problems in my 
experience. One is when you don’t study enough and therefore don’t understand well 
enough what it is that you are going to do and then you run into problems because when 
you try to do it, it is much much harder than you expected it to be. The other problem is 
when you study enough but then you don’t do what you studied, in other words you 
change the job in the process and don’t change the resources that are available and so 
you end up trying to do more than what you had planned to do originally.
R. Why this would happen?
I. Because the environment changes. In the case of the Mars Observer there was an 
environmental change that occurred.
R. So MO would be in the second case?
I. Yes, we did a lot of studies, but we didn’t do what we planned. When we started the 
MO there was very little interest in planetary missions. And as a consequence we 
decided that the strategy would be, we would do as much science as we could with the 
money that we had. And so, we selected a payload that would maximize the science. 
Initially there was no camera on the MO, the political environment changed and people
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started then talking about human exploration of the Moon and Mars. What that led us to 
was a discussion in our scientific community about the new importance of this mission, 
because now it was a precursor mission to a much more, what they thought at the time, 
was going to be a much more significant kind of exploration activity. And that led them 
to the question of whether or not we could reasonably fly a mission to Mars without a 
camera. In the final analysis I believe that it was that discussion and that decision 
that led us to the problems that we had in development, in terms of cost and to 
some degree that was related to, that was a contributor to the ultimate loss of the 
MO, I believe. Let me describe... how that happened.
The original scientific payload completely used all of the resources that the launch 
vehicle provided so that we couldn’t carry anymore weight. When we had this debate 
and decided that we could in fact add a camera to the MO, we thought we could find the 
money for the camera, but the single biggest problem was we didn’t know how to get 
the weight of the camera accommodated. And what we did was we said ok, one way to 
do it is to take out this physical interface between the carrier spacecraft and the payload. 
Now, that seemed like a simple enough thing to do at the time and so we did it. We 
knew what the spacecraft was that we were going to fly on, which was a standard 
communication satellite bus that was built by RCA. So we knew that that was enough 
weight involved in this physical interface, we called it the payload data system, it was 
actually a plate that took all of the complex outputs from the space carrier, the 
instruments, and turned it into a single data stream to go through this communication 
satellite communication system and then it took the stream of commands that went up 
to the spacecraft and it sent those commands to the different instruments. We took all of 
that out because it appeared that the spacecraft could accommodate the absence that is 
we could actually put the instruments physically on the spacecraft and we could in fact 
use the spacecraft data system to do some of the things that...
R. How far you were in this process (decision-making process, probably) when we 
made that decision.
I. The project had been approved and we were very early in the design phase. The thing 
we didn’t realize we had done though at the time was that by taking that physical 
interface out we then put ourselves in a position where you needed the spacecraft to test 
the instruments and you needed the instruments to test the spacecraft. There had to be 
this communication ... before we were going to mount the instruments on this payload 
data system and the only thing you needed to test the spacecraft was the payload data 
system. You could put through a simulated data stream. We didn’t think about that at 
the time. But what that did was, it put us in a situation where you couldn’t do these two 
things in parallel, you couldn’t do the spacecraft and deliver it to the launch site and 
then do the instruments and deliver it to the launch site and put the two together and 
launch it. You actually had to take each of the individual instruments, deliver them to 
the factory, had the contractor put the instruments on, do the testing with all of the 
instruments and even more than that. Any changes in the instruments which were very 
complex instruments had to be accommodated by changes in the spacecraft, not in this 
physical interface. That led to a lot of, by the way, the instruments were being done by 
universities on a cost reimbursement basis and the spacecraft was being built by a 
communication satellite manufacturer on a fixed-price. A nd...
R. How does that differ from the way you worked before, because the universities 
always get involved...
I. We never did a spacecraft on a fixed-price before then..
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A2.6 — Extract of MO s Case Study Chronology 
(First stage of case studies data analysis)
POST-LAUNCH 
BEFORE LOSS OF CONTACT
1) November 1992 - Mars Observer (MO) Post Launch Mission Operations Report 
(MOR) - By L.A. Fisk - Office of Space Science and Applications - Report No. S-838- 
92-01 - It mentions MO was successfully launched on September 25, 1992 and that, 
at the time, the spacecraft was in a stable planned configuration on the proper trajectory 
to Mars.
It is mentioned that the objective of these reports is to establish critical 
discriminators selected in advance to measure and assess mission accomplishment 
and provide an accountability of technical achievement. They provide mission 
statues and progress in meeting mission objectives.
There is a discussion on how the launch worked out, which shows the high 
dependency of the spacecraft on the good performance of the rocket and the 
launch itself for its success. They present some minor problems, mainly in association 
with the rocket, which caused a small delay in launch. It also showed the influence of 
external factors, such as in this case, the occurrence of upper-level winds, on the 
success of the mission. In this particular case, the launch window was reduced 
from 2 hours to just 1 hour and 41 minutes.
Some problems presented by the spacecraft shortly after launch were also presented 
and they were mainly 3. One of them already related to the high gain antenna, 
which did not latch at first. Another was related to a sun sensor which was not 
functioning. All of them, though, are said to have been fixed shortly afterwards. It is 
also said that all spacecraft deployments expected at the time had been completed. All 
the scientific instruments had been turned on and seemed to be functioning properly. At 
the time, they already foresaw a faster transition from MOI to mapping orbit, due 
to mid-window launch and nominal injection. They expected to anticipate the 
transition by a month. It is also shown that complete initial instrument checkout had 
been achieved on October 10,1992. A table with all significant MO mission events is 
also shown.
Comment: It shows here too another external factor, involving the launch window, 
positively influencing outcomes of the mission.
2) November - December 1992 - The Space Times - p. 8-10. The New Era In Mars 
Exploration - By Wesley Huntress
This was an article by Dr. Wesley Huntress, published two months after MO had been 
launched, and before the lost of contact with the spacecraft. Dr. Huntress describes 
the interest on MARS, above all the other planets of the Solar System, and the plans for 
MARS exploration. He discusses in more details what NASA expect to learn from 
MARS with MO and what is to follow after MO completes its mission. He also reviews 
briefly the history of Mars exploration (from the Mariner's in the 60's up to the Viking's 
in the 70's). MO was the first MARS mission after 17 years. Essentially MO was to 
produce complete and detailed mapping of Mars surface, in preparation for subsequent
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missions and further exploration of the planet. He also mentioned the US participation 
on the Russian MARS 1994 mission and the Mesur Pathfinder Mission (an engineering 
test of the mesur network lander), to be launched in 1996. Then, he mentioned the 
launch of about 16 landers over the next two launch opportunities in 1999 and 2001. 
And he added that they would be followed by rover and sample return missions in 2003 
and 2005. He also mentioned other planned international missions to MARS and the 
large international involvement existing in MO and the two planned Russian missions 
to MARS. Amongst other international planned missions to MARS, he mentioned a 
Japanese orbiter mission in 1996, named Planet B (the spacecraft). He then strengthened 
the importance of international cooperation in this second age of Mars exploration and 
said that we should go now for joint missions instead of simply cooperative missions 
springing from national plans.
(Initial Problems Occur from January, 1993)
3) March 17, 1993 - NASA News - Three Spacecraft to Conduct 3-week Gravitational 
Wave Search - It discusses the use of MO along with two other spacecrafts for detecting 
waves of gravity in space.
Comment: This shows that when a spacecraft fails, the consequences can reach far 
beyond just the planned objectives for the mission, as the spacecraft can be used for 
other experiments as well. In this case, however, when MO was lost, the experiment 
had already been concluded. But in another similar example, it didn't succeed due to 
Mars loss. This is related to the fact that they expected MO to be used to relay data back 
to Earth from the Russian MAR's mission in 1994 and maybe in 1996.
4) March 18, 1993 - Mars Observer Mission Status - It mentions that everything was 
going fine with the spacecraft and that it should be captured in Mars orbit by August 24, 
1993. It also mentions that communications are being made through the use of the high- 
gain antenna, which had been activated in early January.
5) March 30, 1993 - The Washington Times - p.2 - Spacecraft to start studying Mars 
early - They expected the that MO would gain three weeks in descending to proper 
orbit, due to extra fuel.
6) April 14, 1993 - Mars Observer Mission Status - Expected rendez-vous with the Red 
Planet on Aug.24, 1993. All spacecrafts subsystems said to be performing well. The 
second incident with the high gain antenna (actually due to a software failure 
which resulted in a slight change of attitude) is reported as it is the solution found 
by NASA's ground controllers. This was due to software problems only and no 
hardware problems were reported. On April 13, operations were back to normal.
7) May 4, 1993 - The Washington Times - Mars spacecraft ok after malfunction - It 
mentions the previous failure of MO’s main antenna. It says that the antenna failed to 
point at Earth three times in four months. They say that the malfunction, which lasted 
for about two days was not serious and had been fixed. The other failures occurred 
April 9 and at the beginning of the year.
8) May 10, 1993 - MO Mission Status - It seems that attitude problems with MO 
persisted, resulting in the high gain antenna pointing at the sun instead of the Earth. The 
automatic mode switches to the low gain antenna, which solves the problem 
temporarily. In this mission status, it is mentioned that MO's flight controllers decided
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to switch MO into contingency mode again, in order to try and improve the spacecraft's 
attitude co^rol performance before returning to the normal outer cruise mode.
9) 1993 - MO Mission Status - MO was returned to normal cruise mode on
May, 17 (after 9 days since it had switched to contingency mode). Some measures were 
aken to improve the spacecraft's attitude performance. It was mentioned here that had 
a much longer period of time elapsed, perhaps four to five times longer than that 
experienced during that contingency mode incident, the spacecraft’s trajectory 
could have been affected. It was said here, though, that despite the problems, the 
spacecraft was still on course for arrival on Mars on Aug. 24,1993. It was also said 
that all spacecraft subsystems were operating well and that the science payload would 
be powered on again. Two-way communication also had been restored using the high- 
gain antenna.
10) June 29, 1993 - Planetary Mission Status (NASA, JPL, CIT) - It is mentioned that 
MO's performance is normal and that it is expected that it will enter Mars orbit on 
Aug.24, 1993. They also present comments on other contemporary missions, such 
as Galileo, Magellan, Topex/Poseidon, Ulysses, and Voyager 1 and 2. Science 
operations were planned to start on Nov.24, after being manoueveured into a 
mapping orbit on Nov.8.
11) July 1993 - Spaceflight, Vol.35 - The Soviet Mars - By Timothy Varfolomeyev - 
This is not about Mars Observer, but an article on the Russian experience regarding 
interplanetary missions to MARS. It presents an interesting chronological account of 
Russian missions to Mars up to 1988.
12) August 3,1993 - Mars Observer Mission Status - It is mentioned that MO had taken 
the first photograph of Mars since the Vikings missions of the mid-1970s. It is said that 
MO and all its instruments are performing well. It is also mentioned that the 
spacecraft had, on Aug. 1, switched to an automatic contingency mode due to the 
same attitude problems which had occurred before. Full recovery to normal cruise 
mode was completed on Aug.2.
13) August 5, 1993 - NASA News - First Photograph of Mars from Mars Observer 
available - Same as before regarding the first photograph obtained from MO.
14) August 18, 1993 - The Washington Times - My favourite martian - Just some 
comments on the group of scientists who defended that NASA may have found and 
withheld from the public in the past evidence of the existence of some artifacts in Mars, 
which could be regarded as evidence of the existence of intelligent life in this planet 
half a billion years ago.
(The First Photograph)
(First news on loss of communication with MO and first possible causes)
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A2.7 -  EXTRACTS FROM ONE OF THE EARS CASE REPORTS 
(FROM CASE STUDIES DATA ANALYSIS PHASE) 
C A S E  S T U D Y  I: U A R S  
ANALYSIS REPORT
I - THE UARS DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
INITIAL STIMULUS: A mounting concern with the depletion of the ozone layer as a 
result of the presence of man-made pollutants in the atmosphere has led the US 
Government to issue a mandate in 1976, which was reiterated in 1977, directing NASA 
to conduct a comprehensive research and technology programme aimed at 
understanding the processes involved as well as maintaining the chemical and physical 
integrity of the upper atmosphere.
hi response to that mandate, a series of initiatives within NASA were taken, which 
included the establishment of the Upper Atmosphere Research Programme (UARSP). 
These initiatives eventually led to the point where it was commonly agreed by scientists 
that, amongst other complementary undertakings, a long-term satellite observational 
programme should be proposed. The process leading up to this decision involved 
consultation with NASA’s advisory structure for science and, in particular, for 
stratospheric research, and both the internal and external scientific community.
We take from that point onwards to investigate the UARS decision-making process.
FIRST MAJOR STEP: ’’Which satellite programme to propose?”
What was involved
In order to meet the recommendations above mentioned for the creation of a long-term 
satellite observational programme, a Science Working Group (SWG) was established in
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October 1977 by NASA to develop a satellite programme to conduct research on the 
chemistry, energetics, and dynamics of the upper atmosphere.
As shown in the JPL Report (1978, p.iv), the group consisted of 14 scientists, 7 of 
which from 3 NASA centres, 2 from the National Centre for Atmospheric Research, 
and 5 from 3 American universities. The group held monthly meetings until May 1978. 
In July 1978, they produced a report (SWG Final Report, 1978) with their conclusions 
and recommendations. As discussed in that document (p.42), the report was intended as 
a feasibility exercise. And though it was not a complete mission definition study (p.42), 
it did provide a "fair idea of the potential scientific benefits that would be derived from 
the first phase of the programme" (p.43), referring to the first of the two satellites 
proposed then.
This part of the overall decision-making process for UARS can be regarded as the first 
major step towards the shaping of the mission. At the end of this phase, NASA's 
scientists, endorsed by representatives of the much larger American scientific 
community, had produced a report which, as suggested by the evidence provided 
before, was conveying a "fair idea" of what sort of scientific mission the scientific 
community would like to be developed.
At this stage, they were proposing that two upper atmosphere satellites should be built. 
The first of them was to be launched in 1983 and the second one year later, in 1984. 
Also, they expected measurements should be made during two northem-hemisphere 
winters.
It is also interesting to remark here that the mission proposed by the SWG in 1978 
was expected to "meet the needs of the period 1983 to 1988 for obtaining knowledge 
necessary to understand the processes influencing the chemistry and dynamics of the 
upper atmosphere" (JPL Report, 1978, p.3).
Analysis of the process:
Some of the characteristics of the decision-making process leading up to the generation 
of the SWG Final Report are discussed below.
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A means-end approach
The decision-making process in question was clearly one which adopted a means-end 
approach.
From the beginning the process was oriented towards meeting the general guidelines 
provided by the programme plan and the measurement strategy which had been 
developed for the Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite Programme (UARSP), with the 
substantial involvement of NASA Stratospheric Research Advisory Committee (SRAC) 
(see JPL Report, 1978, p.3). The following extract from the JPL Report (1978, p.43) 
can confirm this assertion: "The missions described below (the two satellites proposed 
as part of the UARS mission) meet initial requirements with respect to the basic 
UARSP guidelines" (JPL Report, 1978, p.43, parenthesis added).
hi addition to those guidelines above mentioned, the evidence suggests (see JPL Report, 
1978, p.3) that the Science Working Group also took into consideration specific long­
term atmospheric measurements recommended by the National Academy of Sciences' 
Panel on Atmospheric Chemistry (1976, 1977), the Committee on Stratospheric Change 
(1976), and the Geophysics Research Board. As one of the interviewees for UARS 
explained, this seems to be a common practice when scientific projects are concerned. 
With this background, they set out to list and prioritise key scientific questions which 
they understood should be addressed, and then started designing a mission which would 
be able to provide answers to these questions. This means-end approach can be further 
confirmed by the additional pieces of documentary evidence provided below:
"The approach taken by the SWG has been to identify what it believes to be the key 
scientific questions that must be answered to understand the fundamental character of 
the upper atmosphere. With these scientific goals in mind, the first two satellite 
missions of a long-term research programme have been identified; these missions meet 
additional constraints related to instrument and spacecraft technology" (JPL Report, 
1978, p.2).
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As also mentioned in the JPL Report (1978, p. 19), the key scientific questions which 
were identified served as "the basic guideposts needed for the design of an effective 
satellite-oriented research programme". And in the same page of the JPL Report, it was 
added: "To develop a rational programme of research based upon these scientific 
objectives, it has been necessary to prioritise the questions in terms of their scientific 
importance".
Finally, in the same report we find the following comments: (1) "Given a basic set of 
high priority scientific objectives, a set of measurement requirements has been 
generated" (JPL Report, 1978, p.42); (2) "... considerable care has been taken to ensure 
that the recommended measurements programme satisfies the specific scientific goals 
set forth..." (JPL Report, 1978, p.34).
(TEXT REMOVED)
SECOND MAJOR STEP: ”Which scientific instruments and experiments should 
be part of the mission?"
What was involved
Right after the publication of the Final Report of the Science Working Group with the 
preliminary definition of the UARS mission, back in 1978, NASA issued an 
Announcement of Opportunities (AO) for the scientific community. The AO is one of 
the main procurement methods employed by NASA and is used to select scientific 
investigations.
In general terms, the AO is a formal invitation to the scientific community at large 
(internally as well as externally to the country) to come up with proposals of 
experiments and/or instruments to fly aboard some mission the agency (NASA) is 
planning to submit for Congress approval sometime in near future. That is what is 
involved in this second major step of the UARS mission decision process.
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Analysis of the process:
As mentioned above, this second part of the process involved the choice of the 
instruments and experiments to he flown aboard the UARS mission. As a result of this 
process, the mission took its "final" shape in what concerns the scientific mission the 
scientists would like to see approved.
Though the data collected on UARS give no explicit information on how the specific 
AO process was conducted, we could rely on the Flight Programme Management 
Process Manual (1994), issued by NASA's Office of Space Sciences, for a detailed 
description of how the selection of scientific payload (instruments and experiments) is 
usually conducted through an Announcement of Opportunities. Based on this 
description we did the analysis of the decision-making process regarding this step.
The reason why we could do it is because the AO is such a formal and common method 
employed by the agency for the selection of scientific payloads for its missions. As 
such, the procedures involved are well understood and clearly defined. Besides, there is 
no reason to suspect that UARS' AO process would have been conducted in any 
different way than the one described by the OSS's Manual mentioned above.
(TEXT REMOVED)
THIRD MAJOR STEP: ’’What can be done with less money?”
What was involved
Due to their major scientific orientation and to the broad participation of scientists, as 
discussed before, the first two steps resulted in a scientific mission proposal which 
represented the project the scientific community and, in particular, NASA's scientists, 
would like to be developed.
However, any proposal which will be formulated within the Agency has to follow an 
internal as well as an external authorisation process in order to move forward towards
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approval and implementation. As they move further along the major project phases*, 
funds will have to be made available. For this purpose it will be necessary to get formal 
authorisation at different hierarchical levels within and outside NASA's organisation to 
proceed. (*A detailed discussion of what these phases are, what they stand for and what 
formal authorisations are required at each stage is presented at the initial part of this 
Chapter.)
In the UARS specific case, the analysis of the evidence, as it will be shown below, 
suggests that the authorisation process involved in different phases of the project 
introduced new requirements and constraints to the decision process rather than the 
almost exclusively scientific ones which had driven it so far.
Thus, at different stages in the process, the original proposal had to be reviewed and 
was finally substantially changed to meet these new requirements.
The resulting mission designed to meet these requirements and constraints and, at the 
same time, to accommodate as much as possible of the scientific objectives of the 
original mission was one which altered the nature of what was being proposed.
And it was precisely to stress the fact that what happened in this third phase did change 
the essence of "what" was to be done that we chose the question "what to do with less 
money" to depict it, instead of a seemingly also pertinent question "how to do it with 
less money".
More details on this third phase, as well as some selected pieces of evidence, are 
provided below.
Analysis of the process
UARS underwent two major cost reviews. One from June to October 82 and another 
one from February to August 83.
The first cost review can be confirmed by the comments made by Mr. Pete Burr (then 
Project Manager to UARS from the Goddard Space Flight Centre), as published in
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Space World (see Staff Report) in December 1983. He mentioned that the cost review 
had occurred in June 1982 and that the final selection had been made in October the 
same year. In the same publication it was also mentioned that the 72 degree spacecraft 
had been dropped and that the other one, of 57 degrees to the equator, had remained.
In August 4, 1982, as published in Defense Daily (p. 180), NASA was still hoping that 
UARS would be granted a New Start for FY 1984 (which would commence in October 
1983 and which should be announced or confirmed in February 1983). As the evidence 
mentioned above suggests, at this time NASA was half way through the cost review of 
UARS, which should be concluded by October. However, some important changes on 
the UARS original proposal were already announced in this same publication. One of 
them regarded the use of the Multimission Modular Spacecraft (MMS) bus as a cost 
saving alternative. The other one regarded the number of instruments to fly aboard the 
satellite which came down from the originally proposed 19 (as in December 81,..) to 10
It was also mentioned then that the changes were due to both the complexity of the 
project (suggesting technical reasons) and budgetary limitations. However, as it will be 
discussed in the next paragraphs, the changes had to be made essentially to meet the 
White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) cost constraints imposed on 
the proposal. It thus suggests the major driver for the decisions made in this step was 
economical rather than technical or any other.
In February 1983 the deletion by the White House OMB (Office of Management and 
Budget) of a new start for UARS in FY 1984 was announced (see Defense Daily, Feb, 
3, 1983, p.190; Feb.8, 1983, p.218). As it was published by Defense Daily on February 
10, 1983 (p.233), the rationale for the OMB deletion of the UARS from the FY'84 
NASA budget request was that it wanted NASA to reinvestigate the possibility of 
coming up with a lower cost design for the spacecraft(see Defense Daily, Feb. 17, 1983)
Though it was not directly mentioned in the evidence collected, it is suggested that the 
changes in the UARS proposal made during the first cost review were made to meet the 
demands of the OMB, as it was also the case with the second cost review. As it was 
shown above, NASA was asked by the OMB to reinvestigate the possibility of a lower
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cost design. This assertion seems to indicate that NASA had been asked before by the 
OMB to come up with a lower cost design and failed to satisfy its demands.
As a result, NASA had to undergo a second cost review, again aiming at satisfying the 
cost constraints imposed on the UARS proposal by the OMB and at finally gaining 
approval for a new start, now delayed by a year, from FY 1984 to FY 1985. It is 
interesting to note at this point that what was in question here was not so much the 
approval of the mission in itself, but more the approval of the costs of the mission. As 
mentioned in the Defense Daily (Feb. 10, 1983, p.233), "funding for UARS instruments 
was approved, so eventual project approval is not in question". In fact, by the time 
NASA was asked to undergo the second cost review the instruments were already being 
developed and continued to be developed normally, regardless of the fact that UARS 
had not been granted a new start yet.
This second cost review was concluded in August 1983 (see Aerospace Daily, Aug. 19, 
1983, p.275). In January 31, 1984, NASA's Administrator James Beggs announced 
UARS had been contemplated for FY 1985 budget (see Beggs FY 1985 Statement, 
Jan.31,1984).
(TEXT REMOVED)
II - ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES OVER UARS DECISION PROCESS 
& OUTCOMES
The influence of the environment, in particular as a moderator, over the relationship 
between decision process and outcomes has been broadly acknowledged in the 
literature. For that reason, a discussion on major environmental interferences that might 
have played a role in UARS decision-making process and outcomes is presented below. 
UARS decision process most likely suffered the influence of a diversity of 
environmental factors. Identifying all of them and the extent to which they affected the 
decision process might prove an arduous task, if not impossible.
However, as the major motivation leading up to UARS conception and development 
was related to the concern with atmospheric ozone depletion, the analysis of influence 
of environmental factors presented here was focused on ozone related major events
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which took place before and during the UARS decision-making process, 
implementation and operation phase.
These major ozone related events are listed in Appendix ... in chronological order and 
are grouped in accordance with major steps of the UARS decision-making process and 
project phases, in order to facilitate the analysis.
2.1 - Environmental influences before UARS
Before UARS conception, as mentioned earlier, growing concerns amongst the 
scientific community and the public in general over ozone depletion being caused by 
man-made pollutants led the American Congress to mandate NASA to carry out studies 
to investigate the problem thoroughly.
In response to such a mandate, NASA created an Upper Atmosphere Research 
Programme from which the UARS project was later derived, being one amongst a 
series of other initiatives to investigate atmospheric issues.
At this stage, we can see that a series of events and findings in the external 
environment (see list in Appendix ... - Before UARS), like the studies conducted by the 
World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), were ultimately responsible for the 
decision to develop UARS.
2.2 - Environmental influences during the UARS decision-making process
UARS formal decision-making process took place between October 1977 and February 
1984, when it was formally granted a new start by the American Government. The 
whole decision process totalled 6 years and 4 months.
During this period when UARS was being shaped to tackle the ozone and other 
atmospheric issues, some important events were taking place in the environment, 
basically revolving around two main aspects. One aspect relates to the fact that other 
satellites were launched which carried instruments designed to provide ozone 
measurements. The two major instruments, launched in different satellites, were:
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TOMS (Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer) and SAGE (Stratospheric Aerosol and 
Gas Experiment). Data from TOMS, for example, underpinned several international 
agreements to phase-out the use of CFC's and other ozone depleting chemicals.
The other aspect relates to the fact that initial moves towards changing environmental 
policy regarding the production and use of CFC's and other ozone depleting substances 
were already being made at that time. Most likely, the new data from the two satellite 
instruments mentioned above, along with other nonspace-based measurements, were 
behind these initiatives, to the extent that they were able of providing increasing 
evidence that there was a cause for concern in relation to the production of CFC's.
If we look at the chronological account of ozone related events we see that, as early as 
1977, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) created a co-ordinating 
committee on the ozone layer. Later, in 1981, UNEP decided to develop a global 
convention to tackle the problem of ozone depletion. Also, in the late 70's / early 80's 
some national Governments (e.g. USA, Canada and the Scandinavian countries) took 
some specific initiatives to control the production and use of CFC's.
As suggested by the evidence (see ...), one of UARS expected outcomes was to change 
policy with regards to ozone depletion. UARS was supposed to provide the scientific 
evidence to confirm that ozone layer was being depleted by man-made chemicals and, 
this way, lead politicians and environmental authorities to change policy in order to 
tackle the problem.
However, as it seems, on the way of conceiving a programme to do this (tackle the 
ozone depletion problems and other atmospheric related issues) and getting it approved, 
the policy changes that UARS was meant to influence started taking place regardless of 
what was going on with the UARS project and of the data it was supposed to provide. 
(TEXTREMOVED)....
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APPENDIX 3
Conclusions from the Causal Network Developed to Explain MO 
Mission Failure
Assumption: Even though there is a possibility that the original plans for the 
development of Mars Observer, in accordance with the SSEC strategy, were 
unrealistic from the beginning, it was assumed for analytical purposes that the 
strategy was feasible.
Summary of the Analysis:
All the most significant intermediate antecedents (B, C, D and G in Diagram I) in 
connection with the loss of the mission are ascribed to decisions, non-decisions or 
states from the formulation as well as from the development or implementation 
phase. At the same time, 2 out of the 3 most influential remote antecedents (numbers 
3 and 4 in Diagram I) are totally or partially from the formulation phase. The 
“mission scope increase and mission changes over the years”, the remote antecedent 
number 3 in Diagram I, is related to decisions made in both phases. However, as it 
was shown in Diagram H, decisions or non-decisions from the formulation phase are 
a strong component of this antecedent (see analysis of this antecedent below). 
Finally, 5 out of the 9 most significant remote antecedents identified as having 
potentially contributed to mission failure are related to decisions from the 
formulation phase alone (numbers 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 in Diagram I). Two others 
(numbers 3 and 8 in Diagram I) are partly from the formulation phase and partly 
from the development phase.
Overall, the analysis from the diagrams seems to indicate that decisions or non­
decisions from the formulation phase of MO project were very influential in 
connection with final outcomes, regardless of the environmental influences observed 
during project formulation and implementation. As it can be seen from Diagrams I 
and II, the majority of these decisions from the formulation phase were under the
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control of the Project and/or of NASA (indicated by a P for Project, N for NASA or I 
for internal in the Figures). Out of the 7 remote antecedents identified as being either 
totally or partially from the formulation phase only 3 suffered external influence or 
were external factors (numbers 1,3 and 9 in Diagram I). Out of those, two of them 
(numbers 1 and 3 in Diagram I) could have been at least partially controlled by the 
organisation, as explained before.
Given their relevance in connection with final outcomes of the mission and the fact 
that most of the decisions were at least partially under the control of the Agency, it is 
reasonable to think that if different decisions had been made by the Project or the 
Agency in the formulation phase the chances of mission success could have been 
altered for the better.
Then a search was made for any gross omissions in the decision-making process in 
the formulation phase which might have contributed for the “wrong” decisions made 
in this phase, which potentially contributed to the mission failure. At least three 
important omissions were identified, which are described below:
1. Not fully analysing the implications of removing the payload module at the very 
early stages of project formulation. This decision led to technical complications 
and need for changes which were aggravated given other characteristics of the 
project, such as the fixed-price contract;
2. Not reviewing the SSEC strategy after initial changes seriously jeopardised its 
chances of success (see Diagram III to follow how departures from the original 
strategy led to a series of problems in mission development and might ultimately 
have contributed to the mission failure);
3. Not allowing for substantial changes to the project, such as the ones that occurred 
with MO (see Diagram III, for some examples), be reviewed by people at higher 
levels or external to the Project, so that the need to re-evaluate the original 
strategy could be identified and acted upon.
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In the specific case of the decision to remove the payload module, it seems that the 
Project lacked analytical comprehensiveness in evaluating the impacts of this 
decision.
In the second case, in a more general way, it seems the Project failed to react to the 
substantial changes the mission went through from the very beginning and all along 
its formulation phase. Apparently, the mission strategy should have been reviewed 
and some aspects of it changed, such as the fixed-price contract. People involved in 
the Project failed to do so, possibly due to not fully evaluating the impacts of the 
changes on project chances of success (lack of analytical comprehensiveness).
In the third situation, it could be said that the organisation failed too, in that it 
allowed that substantial changes would be made at the Project level, without the need 
for reviews and authorisation at higher or external levels. By allowing this to happen, 
one good opportunity for the identification and correction of problems with the 
project implementation strategy was missed (lack of participation at higher or 
external levels).
In all the three cases, had the decision process allowed for a better understanding of 
the impact of changes on mission development, or for further participation at higher 
or external levels, it is likely that adjustments to mission strategy would have been 
made. For instance, the maintenance of the payload module could have avoided a 
series of technical problems (interface problems between instruments and spacecraft) 
and would have constrained mission scope increase. As shown in Diagram I, mission 
scope increase was a major contributor to the problems the project faced during 
implementation and therefore might have been a factor in the loss of the mission. In 
the same way, the change of the procurement approach could have prevented a series 
of problems the mission had to face all the way up to delivery, due to the restrictions 
imposed to mission changes in a fixed-price contract structure.
Overall, it looks as if had the process been more participative and analytical the 
chances of MO to succeed would have been increased.
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Regarding the external context, as it can be observed in Diagrams I and II, 
environmental changes or external factors were very influential on final outcomes. 
Despite that, from the discussions above, it seems that the decision process during 
the formulation phase was still strongly related to the mission final outcomes.
However, given the importance of environmental influences in connection with 
mission outcomes (see antecedents number 1, 3, 7, 8 and 9 in Diagram I and items 
number 5, 6 and 7 in Diagram II), the characteristics of the decision-making process 
can be important, but it is certainly not a sufficient condition for mission success, as 
it was to be expected (in the UARS case, for instance, external factors were directly 
responsible for undermining its policy success).
Taking the example of the UARS case and having a close look at the environmental 
influences in the Mars Observer case, it could be said that the external environment 
has the potential to seriously affect mission outcomes, regardless of the 
characteristics of the decision process in the formulation phase.
It also came out from the analysis that decision process in the formulation phase 
matters but implementation and all the decisions involved in this phase as well as in 
the operations phase are also crucial for mission success.
Concluding Remarks: From the MO case analysis, it looks as if comprehensiveness 
of decision-making process in the formulation phase, in particular participative and 
analytical comprehensiveness, had an important role in connection with final 
outcomes of the mission, even under a highly influential environment.
Mission Scope Increase (Diagrams I I  and IV)
As this was a crucial as well as less simple to explain aspect in connection with Mars 
Observer problems, two separate Diagrams were drawn to show both the antecedents 
which directly resulted in mission scope increase as well as the implications this had 
on the project development. A brief analysis of the Diagrams follows.
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Diagram II: Processes and Decisions Directly Responsible for MO Mission Scope 
Increase
The most significant aspect contributing to increasing mission scope, as well as 
mission costs, was the mission redefinition, which took place between July 1987 and 
August 1988. (Even after mission descope, the increase in mission costs as compared 
to the last previous estimates of March 1987, had a magnitude of around 50%.) The 
mission redefinition process took place entirely during the implementation phase and 
it was a process which was influenced by external forces but mostly was under the 
control of the Project and NASA’s organisation. However, the other two most 
significant aspects contributing to mission scope increase, namely, the selection and 
the confirmation of an oversubscribed payload, took place in the formulation phase. 
Additionally, 4 out of the 7 decisions or processes identified as having directly 
contributed to mission scope increase took place in the formulation phase. Thus, 
looking at both the significance as well as the number of influences, it looks as if 
decisions made during the formulation phase substantially contributed to the final 
increase in mission scope and therefore to the subsequent problems the mission had 
to face as a result of this. All the decisions from the formulation phase directly linked 
with mission scope increase were made internally, either by the Project alone or in 
conjunction with NASA’s organisation, or were kind of imposed by NASA (e.g. 
inclusion of Ka-band beacon experiment). Therefore, they were under the control of 
the organisation and could have been avoided.
Regarding the influence of environment or external factors on the mission scope 
increase, it became apparent only during the implementation phase. In fact, as 
discussed in the subsection on Context Influences (6.2.2.), the inclusion of a French 
Reflectometer seemingly was influenced by an external tendency to support 
international co-operation in space projects. In the same way, the inclusion of the 
Mars Balloon Relay — MBR, a Russian experiment, in the MO mission was 
influenced by this external tendency. However, in this last case, the inclusion of the 
experiment was a direct request from the Russians to NASA, indicating that the 
external influence was stronger, not leaving too much choice to project managers. 
Finally, external factors also seemed to have influenced the decision process on the
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redefinition of Mar Observer. As described before, the most influential external 
aspects were: the increasing political support for Mars exploration, including plans 
for a manned mission to Mars, and again the increasing emphasis on international 
collaboration for the development of complex space missions. The plans for a 
manned mission to Mars did impact MO redefinition, as some precursor tasks to that 
purpose were in fact proposed to be added to MO (see Polk, 1990, p. 59). It looks, 
thus, as if the environment did play an important role in influencing mission scope 
increase in the development& implementation phase and, as such, in worsening 
mission problems.
However, as discussed before, other internal factors also influenced the redefinition 
process. Besides, as it retained the control over the final decisions regarding the 
project, the organisation could have reduced the influence of the environment and 
reacted just partly to them or just to the stronger ones, such as the inclusion of the 
MBR experiment. In summary, though, it can be said that changes in the external 
environment altered mission significance (content) and role and induced mission 
changes when the opportunity for that showed up during the redefinition process that 
followed the launch slip.
Overall, it seems that, even though environmental influences were a factor in mission 
scope increase, the majority of decisions leading up to the mission increase were 
internal decisions, not directly influenced by external factors. Even the ones which 
were influenced by external factors seemingly could have been at least partially 
avoided. So, external influence was significant but manageable.
Diagram IV: Immediate Implications of Mission Scope Increase
Diagram IV shows some of the immediate implications of mission scope increase 
which were not shown in Diagram I for clarity purposes. Additionally it draws 
attention to some associations between items which were not so clear in Diagram I. 
To make it easier to understand the items from Diagram IV which were also present 
in Diagram I will keep the same numbers or letters they displayed in Diagram I.
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As shown in Diagram IV, two direct impacts of mission scope increase were an 
increasing in mission costs and the need for several technical adjustments or changes 
to the mission. However, the mission scope increase became a more serious problem 
in connection with the final loss of Mars Observer when it was associated with other 
aspects of the project implementation.
One of these aspects was the fixed-price contract chosen for the spacecraft 
development. This made it much more difficult and more expensive for the Project to 
make and control the necessary changes. The need for making changes, which 
increased the costs of the mission, aggravated by difficulties as well as higher price 
to pay for the changes put the Project under cost and time pressures. One way the 
Project found to react to the cost pressures was to reduce the JPL staff responsible for 
overseeing the project. This was one contributor factor to the lack of adequate 
surveillance by JPL, as illustrated in Diagram IV.
Following another stream of associations in Diagram IV, it is seen that, due to the 
restrictions imposed by the fixed-price contract and the need for making changes, the 
Project also ended up having relationship problems with the contractor and was kept 
at distance from it. As shown in Diagram IV, this was another factor leading to a lack 
of adequate surveillance by JPL on project development. Considering JPL expertise 
in planetary missions it is possible (as it was in fact suggested by one of the 
interviewees) that some of the problems MO had during its development could have 
been detected and eventually corrected, if JPL had been allowed to exert its usual 
surveillance over the project development & implementation.
The mission scope increase also became a more serious problem due to the choice o f  
a slightly modified version o f Earth-Orbit satellite. This led to too much reliance on 
heritage of hardware, software and procedures which were not adequate for a 
planetary mission. It would probably have been different if the spacecraft had been 
designed to fit the instruments and if the contract did not have a fixed-structure. In 
this case, the technical problems were likely to be much smaller and the most 
significant impacts of mission scope increase were likely to be on mission costs and 
maybe on schedule. Even though by increasing costs and putting pressures on the
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schedule it is possible that the Project would be forced to make some unwise 
decisions which could influence the technical and scientific chances of mission 
success, it is more likely that only the programmematic aspects of mission success 
would be really affected. Overall, it can be said that had a customised spacecraft 
been designed for the mission and had the structure of the contract not been fixed, 
the technical problems the mission had to face would be reduced.
Thus, a crucial “non-decision” here in connection with MO’s problems was the 
maintenance of the fixed-price contract once the potential for mission scope increase 
became apparent. By the time the contract was awarded the project was already 
oversubscribed (evidence was provided before). In much the same way, the choice of 
the spacecraft should have been reviewed, for the same reasons. However, in this 
case, even if they had maintained the same choice of spacecraft they could still have 
tried to avoid too much reliance on its heritage, once they saw that the MO they 
developed was not anymore the MO they had planned. A way of doing that would 
have been to do more tests on parts and subsystems in order to make sure they were 
apt to the job they were expected to do.
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Diagram II : Processes and Decisions Directly Responsible for MO Mission Scope Increase
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Diagram IV : Immediate Implications of Mission Scope Increase
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